TNA ADM 199 792

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CONFIDENTIAL.
122
Page 3,
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
27/5
Monday, 27th May (continuod).
2 Military Officers from G.H.Q., which suggested that the
situation of the B.E.F. was procarious and it was possible that
the enomy might succeed in cutting off this force from Dunkirk.
This report appeared to confirm the results of air rcconnaiss-
ance, which indicated that German armoured units wore operating
to the south of Dunkirk. Sinco it appeared that ovacuation
might well be strictly limited, both in regard to numbers and
time available for the operation, it was a cided to concentrate
every effort in sending 'ovcr as many craft as possible to the
beaches without delay. Had the situation appeared to be less
critical, an organised flow of large and small craft working in
reliefs would have been arranged.
9.
On receipt of these signals from S.N.O., Dunkirk, all
available forces were diverted to the beaches, the Personnel
Ships to the beach, code letters A.B.C. and D., the destroyers
on patrol being diverted to La Panne. Destroyers that were
working off Dunkirk were ordered to divert the Personnel Ships
going into Dunkirk to lay off the beaches and the smaller craft
such as drifters and motor boats were ordered to be used for
ferrying troops from the beach to the larger ships. Two
27MAY
important strings of boats being towed by a tug were lost in
the night through the tows being run down and cut in half, the
boats being scattered.
10.
As a result of the above action there were assembling
off the beaches 2 transports, 9 destroyers, 4 minesweepers,
CALCUTTA, 17 drifters and a few skoots, and all the ships were
ordered to use their own boats for ferrying as none of the
inshore flotilla had arrived. From signals received it
appeared that the situation was desperate, that little could be
lifted direct from the Port of Dunkirk, and that the maximum
effort must be made from the beaches. Commander-in-Chief, Nore,
at this stage provided additional reinforcements of minesweepers
and paddlers. During the night, Vice Admiral, Dover, was
informed of continuous bombing and machine gunning of troops in
the beach areas, and directed Senior Officers present on the
beach to use their discretion in ordering withdrawal of the
Naval forces, observing that a strong fighter protection should
be expected after dawn; this having been arranged after a
special visit by the Liaison Officer to Hawkinge to procure the
maximum effort.
11. Limiting factors were thought most likely to be
restrictions due to enemy action at Dunkirk and on the beaches,
and the difficulties of concentrating the ships and troops at
a common point or points. The general evacuation plan had been
conveyed to the G.O.C. by the S.N.O. on his way to Dunkirk, and
the Vice Admiral, Dover, hoped to receive in return some out-
line of the Military's operational plan upon which the rate of
evacuation in the various areas under the scheme must depend.
Subject to the development of beach evacuation and the
continuation of fine weather, it appeared to the Vice Admiral
that adequate shipping for his plans was either in, or on, its
way to the Dover area, except for a chronic shortage of beach-
ing boats.
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Tuesday, 28th May
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