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TNA / ADM 199 792

TNA ADM 199 792

TNA ADM 199 792
Collection details

TNA ADM 199 792

Admiralty records concerning Operation Dynamo and the evacuation of troops from Dunkirk, covering 1940–1941.

Holding archive
TNA
Collection reference
ADM 199 792
View the archive catalogue entry ↗

Source: The National Archives, Kew, ADM 199/792. Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.

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1 matching pages. OCR may contain transcription errors.

List page 1 of 1 Showing document pages 75–75 of this collection
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136
25
CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 15.
134
Operation "DYNAMO"
-
Narrative of Events.
30/5
Thursday, 30th May (continued).
48.
Arrangements for the final evacuation of the Rearguard of the B.E.F.
During the forenoon representatives of the
Commander-in-Chief of the B.E.F. and staff attended a conference with the Vice Admiral.
The Military officers explained the Commander-in-
Chief's plan and gave daylight on Saturday, 1st June, as the latest reasonable date up to which the B.E.F. might be expected to hold the castern porimeter, the size of the corrosponding force being about 4,000.
By that date and time the Vice Admiral knew that he should be in possession of ocean-going tugs, ships' lifeboats and ships' power lifeboats which he could specially reserve for the climax of this critical operation. Accordingly, agreement was reached on the following:-
(a) That evacuation should proceed with the utmost vigour to ensure that by 0130 on 1st June the
British Forces ashore should have been reduced to the rear guard of 4,000.
(b) That special boats and tugs. should be accumulated and held aside to ensure them being available in the early hours of 1st June.
(c) That the plan should provide for lifting the rear guard of 4,000, plus R.N. beach parties, in one or more flights between 0130 and 0300 on the 1st June.
(d) Final decision based on the progress of the evacuation of the main body to be made by the
Vice Admiral at 1400 on Friday, 31st May, as to the possibility of adhering to the plan.
Other technical details were settled at the meeting and the
Military staff were given the assurance that the ever increasing rate of lifting showed every promise of enabling an affirmative decision to be given at the critical hour of
1400/31st May. After the conference the Military officers communicated the plan both to the War Office and the
Commander-in-Chief ashore.
49. Remarks.
The organisation of traffic to and from the beaches was recovering from the setback it had recei ved when all resources had to be thrown upon the beaches and Dunkirk
Harbour when the outflanking and forcing back of the B.E.F.
was thought to be imminent consequent upon the surrender of the Belgian forces. Furthermore, a number of organised, and freelance groups of small power boats, were commencing to arrive off the coast, who, by seizing the abandoned and drifting pulling boats, were able to do much to increase the rate of lifting from the beaches.
50/

Raw OCR

Unformatted machine-generated OCR for document page 75.

136
25
CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 15.
134
Operation "DYNAMO"
-
Narrative of Events.
30/5
Thursday, 30th May (continued).
48.
Arrangements for the final evacuation of
the Rearguard of the B.E.F.
During the forenoon representatives of the
Commander-in-Chief of the B.E.F. and staff attended a
conference with the Vice Admiral.
The Military officers explained the Commander-in-
Chief's plan and gave daylight on Saturday, 1st June, as the
latest reasonable date up to which the B.E.F. might be
expected to hold the castern porimeter, the size of the corros-
ponding force being about 4,000.
By that date and time the Vice Admiral knew that he
should be in possession of ocean-going tugs, ships' lifeboats
and ships' power lifeboats which he could specially reserve
for the climax of this critical operation. Accordingly, agree-
ment was reached on the following:-
(a) That evacuation should proceed with the utmost
vigour to ensure that by 0130 on 1st June the
British Forces ashore should have been reduced
to the rear guard of 4,000.
(b) That special boats and tugs. should be accumulated
and held aside to ensure them being available
in the early hours of 1st June.
(c) That the plan should provide for lifting the rear
guard of 4,000, plus R.N. beach parties, in one or
more flights between 0130 and 0300 on the 1st June.
(d) Final decision based on the progress of the
evacuation of the main body to be made by the
Vice Admiral at 1400 on Friday, 31st May, as to
the possibility of adhering to the plan.
Other technical details were settled at the meeting and the
Military staff were given the assurance that the ever
increasing rate of lifting showed every promise of enabling
an affirmative decision to be given at the critical hour of
1400/31st May. After the conference the Military officers
communicated the plan both to the War Office and the
Commander-in-Chief ashore.
49. Remarks.
The organisation of traffic to and from the beaches
was recovering from the setback it had recei ved when all
resources had to be thrown upon the beaches and Dunkirk
Harbour when the outflanking and forcing back of the B.E.F.
was thought to be imminent consequent upon the surrender of
the Belgian forces. Furthermore, a number of organised, and
freelance groups of small power boats, were commencing to
arrive off the coast, who, by seizing the abandoned and
drifting pulling boats, were able to do much to increase the
rate of lifting from the beaches.
50/