← Document collections
TNA / ADM 199 792

TNA ADM 199 792

TNA ADM 199 792
Collection details

TNA ADM 199 792

Admiralty records concerning Operation Dynamo and the evacuation of troops from Dunkirk, covering 1940–1941.

Holding archive
TNA
Collection reference
ADM 199 792
View the archive catalogue entry ↗

Source: The National Archives, Kew, ADM 199/792. Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.

Showing only document page 94. Show all matching pages ×

1 matching pages. OCR may contain transcription errors.

List page 1 of 1 Showing document pages 94–94 of this collection
Page ImageOCR textOCR tags
94 Page 94 Log in to enlarge

153
CONFIDENTIAL,
Page 34.
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
155
Inshore Flotillas and Naval Shore Parties (continued).
boats which never left the estuary and only one of their crews had been further afield than Ramsgate before. In spite of this fact perfect formation was maintained throughout the day and night under the control of a Sub-Lieutenant, R.N.V.R.
in command of the Unit and all orders were carried out with great diligence even under actual shell fire and aircraft attack.
103. The difficulties of passage from the United
Kingdom to the Flanders coast were great. With compasses of doubtful accuracy and no navigational instruments other than a lead pencil, once a boat lost contact with a main convoy the chances of making a correct landfall in the strong currents of the straits were slight. Many of the small craft had not even a compass, yet all who left the Flanders coast in safety managed to reach the English coast to refuel and the majority set off again to repeat the adventure.
Cases occurred, however, of boats attempting to enter Calais instead of Dunkirk, where they received a rousing reception from the Boche, and yet another case where the landfall was made between Gravelines and Calais and the Sub-Lieutenant in command landed, finding it necessary to shoot 2 German soldiers before leaving for his proper destination of Dunkirk.
Open boats of all kinds, from the naval cutters and whalers to seaside dinghies, were towed over from
England by the motor boats themselves or in special tows by tugs. Some of these pulling boats were manned by odd naval ratings as boat keepers, and others by soldiers off the beach.
One of the principal difficulties was to avoid fouling the motor boats' screws with painters and lines attached to all these pulling boats. Carley floats and infl: 1 motor inner tubes also played their part in carrying men from the beach to the motor boats.
104, Having reached the coast the business of ferrying from the water line to the offshore craft was by no means easy. Apart from the surf, which was usually experienced for some hours every day, derelict lorries, which had been abandoned below the high tide mark, proved a serious danger to boats. Another source of much trouble close inshore was the large amount of floating grass rope which various craft had used and lost in their rescue work, and numerous articles of military equipment such as great coass jettisoned during the evacuation. A great number of small power boats were put temporarily out of action by such ropes and garments fouling the screws, usually resulting in broaching to and being swamped while they were thus unmanageable.
The number of' soldiers taken off the beaches by motor boats cannot be estimated, One 35 ft. motor launch, however, ferried off 600 men to transports and carried 420
direct to England.
105. Of the pulling boats used, the main difficulty was insufficient provision made for Naval boat keepers to take charge of the outgoing boats and bring them back to the disembarkation points. As a result, the soldiers detailed to act as boat keepers for an outward trip, failed to return the boat on the inward trip and it was necessary for the
Naval boat keepers to swim or to wade out to the drifting boats/

Raw OCR

Unformatted machine-generated OCR for document page 94.

153
CONFIDENTIAL,
Page 34.
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
155
Inshore Flotillas and Naval Shore Parties (continued).
boats which never left the estuary and only one of their
crews had been further afield than Ramsgate before. In spite
of this fact perfect formation was maintained throughout the
day and night under the control of a Sub-Lieutenant, R.N.V.R.
in command of the Unit and all orders were carried out with
great diligence even under actual shell fire and aircraft
attack.
103. The difficulties of passage from the United
Kingdom to the Flanders coast were great. With compasses
of doubtful accuracy and no navigational instruments other
than a lead pencil, once a boat lost contact with a main
convoy the chances of making a correct landfall in the strong
currents of the straits were slight. Many of the small
craft had not even a compass, yet all who left the Flanders
coast in safety managed to reach the English coast to refuel
and the majority set off again to repeat the adventure.
Cases occurred, however, of boats attempting to enter Calais
instead of Dunkirk, where they received a rousing reception
from the Boche, and yet another case where the landfall was
made between Gravelines and Calais and the Sub-Lieutenant in
command landed, finding it necessary to shoot 2 German
soldiers before leaving for his proper destination of Dunkirk.
Open boats of all kinds, from the naval cutters
and whalers to seaside dinghies, were towed over from
England by the motor boats themselves or in special tows by
tugs. Some of these pulling boats were manned by odd naval
ratings as boat keepers, and others by soldiers off the beach.
One of the principal difficulties was to avoid fouling the
motor boats' screws with painters and lines attached to all
these pulling boats. Carley floats and infl: 1 motor inner
tubes also played their part in carrying men from the beach
to the motor boats.
104, Having reached the coast the business of ferrying
from the water line to the offshore craft was by no means
easy. Apart from the surf, which was usually experienced
for some hours every day, derelict lorries, which had been
abandoned below the high tide mark, proved a serious danger
to boats. Another source of much trouble close inshore was
the large amount of floating grass rope which various craft
had used and lost in their rescue work, and numerous articles
of military equipment such as great coass jettisoned during
the evacuation. A great number of small power boats were
put temporarily out of action by such ropes and garments
fouling the screws, usually resulting in broaching to and
being swamped while they were thus unmanageable.
The number of' soldiers taken off the beaches by
motor boats cannot be estimated, One 35 ft. motor launch,
however, ferried off 600 men to transports and carried 420
direct to England.
105. Of the pulling boats used, the main difficulty
was insufficient provision made for Naval boat keepers to
take charge of the outgoing boats and bring them back to the
disembarkation points. As a result, the soldiers detailed
to act as boat keepers for an outward trip, failed to return
the boat on the inward trip and it was necessary for the
Naval boat keepers to swim or to wade out to the drifting
boats/