TNA ADM 199 792

Raw OCR

Unformatted machine-generated OCR for document page 265.

297
This included brought the from General Lees a disparaging which 204
At this no business or justification to Navy. talk Told
he had words "ineptitude of the remark him
were holding time British troops were acting as like that.
of La a line which came down to coast rear guard and
These at midnight on 31st May and fall back on the from
line Panne. Intention was for them to withdraw a little north this
31st
troops (about 5,000) were some of the best, beaches. and Gort
0400
was very anxious they should be got away. 1st SL said
that the Navy would make a supreme effort to get off the
remainder the next day (31st) and the rear guard the
following night: details were being sent over to me by
Bush. Felt daunted at the prospect and the seeming
impossibility of the task. Plan made by Admiralty and
VA, Dover, had every chance of success, but it did not
fall out as planned.
Arranged for Gort to embark from La Panne at 1800 on 31st
and that boats and ships would be there for the purpose:
if that was impossible he would go to Dunkerque. On
returning to WORCESTER informed Stevenson of the arrange-
ments and put him in charge of them: intended to be there
myself also.
(12) 2200 Started back to ship; then getting dark. No boats at the
1035
beach - too precious to be kept hanging about. Tide was
farther out and a number of boats and pontoons were
stranded. Some of the 12th Royal Lancers were trying to
get pontoons afloat, and it was good to see them trying to
help themselves.
With some soldiers got an unused pontoon afloat and 8 men,
Flag-Lt. and myself got in, but soon found that the boat,
which had only 3 inches of freeboard, would inevitably be
swamped before we could get to the ship. Sea was calm,
with a small swell coming in. It was still fairly shallow
so we all jumped out and returned to the beach to empty
the boat of water. Tennant and Lees were still there,
watching our progress, and as we came ashore I remarked
to the latter, "Another example of Naval ineptitude."
Had to reduce crew by 2 and then set off again. Soldiers
2230
(13)
WORCESTER was slowly filling up with troops and I remained
paddled well and we got back on board WORCESTER at 2230.
there till 0100/31: she was then full and I sent her back
Earlier to on 30th I had asked for a ship with 2 lines of W/T
Dover, transferring to EXPRESS.
communication and was told that KEITH would arrive at 2000.
She did not appear and I remained for rest of night in
EXPRESS, which was gradually embarking troops.
There were tens of thousands of men on or near to know the beaches how
Picture as I saw it was as follows:-
and The rear guard were to be withdrawn and night, must
in and around Dunkerque - no one seemed next
many. 24 hours ahead: they were the best troops where
i.e. off. Dunkerque itself was the only place
be got embarkation could take place, and a large and Braye, proportion 10
rapid of the troops were coming down to La Panne
and beaches the only boats available, except ships' for
5 miles away from Dunkerque.
At the and a very few local craft, were crewless boats if
pontoons went away with their ships or were motor boats left.
which cases they had to pull in, as ships' needed.
In many often out of action, and towage was badly
were depended entirely on fair weather - an entirely. onshore
Embarkation of any force would have stopped embarkation shallow
wind stressed the vital necessity for more
draught I had boats and crews, and knew that everything possible
was being the day French destroyers had been coming fired at in from by the
done at home.
During passage and channel and had been at the
Northern They went into Dunkerque and loaded to be
the West shore. Quay: otherwise no French ships seemed there.
Destroyers,