TNA ADM 199 792

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were An impracticable not feature of this plan was that craft
inshore asking too much to think that when our crying need It was for
to be used except for the rear guard. small
boats, any such could be held idle while was
men were on beaches with ships waiting to take them so many off.
Actual development of this plan was very different.
(19)
HEBE sent up to La Panne, to be there at 1800 to receive
Gort whom Stevenson was to bring off.
Beaches shelled during the day, but in most cases shells
landed on dunes which had a fairly steep scarp and protect-
ed the beach. Shelling was principally to westward of
Braye; at one time a French battery 2 or 3 miles out of
Dunkerque on top of dunes, but close to sea, received a
lot of attention.
1330
As I was returning to eastward HEBE signalled she had been
shelled off La Panne at 1200 and had had to move westward
a couple of miles.
1430
Went up in KEITH off La Panne to see if battery could be
shelled, but had to withdraw - not essential to be so far
to the eastward and battery was not visible. Its fore
was directed by an observation balloon over Nieuport;
aircraft came out to shoot it down, but without result;
it was re-hoisted as soon as they left. Shell bursts
appeared to be 6 or 8-inch, in salvoes of four.
(17)
Owing to the shelling of anchorage at La Panne urged Gort
to embark as soon as possible, but he would not leave
before the time arranged.
Soon after, I moved down to Dunkerque so as to be on spot
when boats arrived. En route a terrific air battle over-
head - 3 Spitfires shot down, 2 in the sea; onepilot
killed, the other not found.
While waiting off Dunkerque signal from VA, Dover, to say
Army wanted to start embarkation at 2000 instead of 0100.
Replied: Boats had not arrived and sloops would not be
there then, but would do my best. (This had an unfortu-
nate effect: as sloops could not be there in time I had
to keep destroyers, etc., off the beaches which would
otherwise have been sent to Dunkerque during the night.
Result = though many were embarked from beaches, very few
ships went into Dunkerque where men were waiting, and full
use of it was not made.)
Always impossible for me to do more than deal with the
situation of the moment. Did not know what ships were
coming or when - except for the pre-arranged plan of the
sloops; nor could Dover give me much information.
The stream of ships was constant, but irregular; not pos-
sible to see any way ahead. My policy was to keep only
enough ships off the beaches and send all others into
Dunkerque, but situation changed continually. I wanted
(18)
to be in several places at once.
The first of the boat tows did not arrive until 1700 - a
tug with what looked like 6 dinghies in tow: she was
Could not wait off Dunkerque as I wanted to get up to La
preceded by some motor yachts which came in company.
Panne for Gort, so left Wynne-Edwards in a motor yacht to
direct the tows as they arrived, and to order a large
number of hoppers and other craft that were lying off the
westwen beaches to beach themselves on the rising tide so
that men could embark.
Gort's embarkation produced some odd incidents.
Dover had sent over 4 MTBs and MA/SBs to get him: the
reached me. During the afternoon 2 MTBs came to me and
signal informing me of this, like many others, never
said they were to embark a party from a point 2 miles west
of La Panne. Could not understand this; thought they
must have been sent to fetch off some of Naval landing the H.
party, but realise now the party concerned was
Staff. While approaching La Panne, shortly before 1800, HEBE
1800
signalled to me "General on beach abreast you, and saw a
group at water's edge with 2 cars and some KEITH'S gnalmen.