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TNA / ADM 199 792

TNA ADM 199 792

TNA ADM 199 792
Collection details

TNA ADM 199 792

Admiralty records concerning Operation Dynamo and the evacuation of troops from Dunkirk, covering 1940–1941.

Holding archive
TNA
Collection reference
ADM 199 792
View the archive catalogue entry ↗

Source: The National Archives, Kew, ADM 199/792. Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.

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1 matching pages. OCR may contain transcription errors.

List page 1 of 1 Showing document pages 294–294 of this collection
Page ImageOCR textOCR tags
294 Page 294 Log in to enlarge

325
322
- 17 -
31/5
Owing to the shelling of the anchorage at La Panno and the difficulty it might cause later in the day I urged Lord Cort to ombark as soon SD
(ca)
possible, but he would not leave before the time that he had arranged.
1330
Soon after, I moved down to Dunkirk so as to be on the spot when the boats arrived. On the way a terrific air battle took place overhead and 1415-30
1t seemed to go against us. I saw three Spitfires shot down, one went inland over the dunes, still under control, one came down towards the sea at a fairly gentle angle and when only one hundred feot or so up the pilot seemed to be pulled out by his parachute and came down in the sea with his parachute open - the plane went on for quite a way and than flow into the water. The third pilot baled out a good way up and came down a couple of miles away.
An M.T.B. and a. motor boat in sight went off to try and pick them up and the
Captain of the M.T.B. told me later that the pilot they got to W&S shot to pieces and they salved his parachute for identification purposes. I am afraid the other was not found.
I waited anxiously off Dunkirk for the arrival of the boat town and 31/5
while I waited, came a signal from V.A. Dover to say that the Army wanted to start embarkation at 2000 instead of 0100. I replied saying that the boats had not arrived and the sloops would not be there then but that I
would do my best. To anticipate - this had an unfortunate effect, because, as the sloops intended for the beaches could not be there in time I had to keep destroyers, minesweepors and other craft off the beaches which would otherwise have been sent in to Dunkirk during the night. As a result though many were embarked from the beaches very fow ships worrt into Dunkirk where men were already waiting and full use of it was not made.
It was always impossible for me to do more than doal with the situation of the moment. I did not know what ships were coming 02' whon - execut for the pre-arranged plan of the sloops. Nor was 1t possible for Dover to give me much information. Ships got back there, unloaded, and were OST again, the stream W&B constant but irregular and it was not possible to see any way shead. My policy was always to keep only sufficient ships off the beaches and send all the others into Dunkirk, but the situation changed continually. When I was off La Panne I could not watch the other and of the

Raw OCR

Unformatted machine-generated OCR for document page 294.

325
322
- 17 -
31/5
Owing to the shelling of the anchorage at La Panno and the difficulty
it might cause later in the day I urged Lord Cort to ombark as soon SD
(ca)
possible, but he would not leave before the time that he had arranged.
1330
Soon after, I moved down to Dunkirk so as to be on the spot when the
boats arrived. On the way a terrific air battle took place overhead and 1415-30
1t seemed to go against us. I saw three Spitfires shot down, one went inland
over the dunes, still under control, one came down towards the sea at a fairly
gentle angle and when only one hundred feot or so up the pilot seemed to be
pulled out by his parachute and came down in the sea with his parachute
open - the plane went on for quite a way and than flow into the water. The
third pilot baled out a good way up and came down a couple of miles away.
An M.T.B. and a. motor boat in sight went off to try and pick them up and the
Captain of the M.T.B. told me later that the pilot they got to W&S shot to
pieces and they salved his parachute for identification purposes. I am
afraid the other was not found.
I waited anxiously off Dunkirk for the arrival of the boat town and 31/5
while I waited, came a signal from V.A. Dover to say that the Army wanted
to start embarkation at 2000 instead of 0100. I replied saying that the
boats had not arrived and the sloops would not be there then but that I
would do my best. To anticipate - this had an unfortunate effect, because,
as the sloops intended for the beaches could not be there in time I had to
keep destroyers, minesweepors and other craft off the beaches which would
otherwise have been sent in to Dunkirk during the night. As a result though
many were embarked from the beaches very fow ships worrt into Dunkirk where
men were already waiting and full use of it was not made.
It was always impossible for me to do more than doal with the situation
of the moment. I did not know what ships were coming 02' whon - execut for
the pre-arranged plan of the sloops. Nor was 1t possible for Dover to give
me much information. Ships got back there, unloaded, and were OST again,
the stream W&B constant but irregular and it was not possible to see any
way shead. My policy was always to keep only sufficient ships off the
beaches and send all the others into Dunkirk, but the situation changed
continually. When I was off La Panne I could not watch the other and of the