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TNA / ADM 199 792

TNA ADM 199 792

TNA ADM 199 792
Collection details

TNA ADM 199 792

Admiralty records concerning Operation Dynamo and the evacuation of troops from Dunkirk, covering 1940–1941.

Holding archive
TNA
Collection reference
ADM 199 792
View the archive catalogue entry ↗

Source: The National Archives, Kew, ADM 199/792. Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.

Showing only pages tagged with the vessel name Hebe. Tags are exact matches from this collection’s OCR tag index. Clear vessel filter ×
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1 matching pages. OCR may contain transcription errors.

List page 1 of 1 Showing document pages 298–298 of this collection
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298 Page 298 Log in to enlarge

329
325
- 21 -
31/5
thousands of men were waiting but no boats, messages from ships that thoir beats found no one on the beach. The truth of 1t was, I think, that the
Germans had the range of the lorry breakwator and the beaches nost 1t and they shelled them heavily. Boats went in there and found no one on the troops had moved further west clear of the shell firo. I do not know to this day what really took place there. Off shore one felt helpless, the ships and the boats were there and the troops ashoro and one could do no more.
Aircraft passed close overhead flying down the anchorages and fairway, and "MALCOLM" off Braye reported that a number of parachuto mines had been dropped to westward of there and suggested that ships ought to loavo by the uidcoote
Zudcote
Ruy pass in the morning, as the pasuage to the West WEB no heavily mined.
The noise of M.T.B. engines could often be hobrd to deaward and castward and added to my anxiety, though I thought they might possibly be our own patrol. About 2300 I received an urgent signal from Admiralty asking where
Lord Gort was and why I had detailed the M.T.B.'s sent for him to other work.
As the M.A.S.B. had just returned with Wynne-Edwards, I sent it off at once to "HEBE" to collect Lord Gort. To my horror it came back almost at otice to say that Lord Gort had just left "HEBE" in a motor launch. It was very dork and "НЫВЕ" could not; be seen though we knew where she was and I wellted anxiously for the boat to arrive. Presently out of the dark a boat appeared and como alongside, still not the right one and I had a bad moment thinking of the possibilities of the boat getting lost. However, to my relief, after what appeared about half an hour, the right boat, in charge OF Stevenson once moro, found US at last. Apologizing to Lord Gort for keoping him walting 30 long,
I transferred him to the M.A.S.B. and sent him off to Dovor with Ceneral Iecs.
My experience of the bombing the day before led 100 to request fighter
June, protection at dawn though I had no doubt that this was alroady hoing arrenged.
At 0215 I heard that troops were moving Westward and case to the conclusion that embarkation at La Panne was no longer possible. "MARCOLN" and "HARVISING"
which were off Lo Panne were ordered into Dunkirk in consoquence.
I also made D. signal telling ships to keep close to the buoyo as I hoped that they would thus avoid any minos which had boon Groy od in the channel. At 0235 I made the following signal to V.A. Dover and

Raw OCR

Unformatted machine-generated OCR for document page 298.

329
325
- 21 -
31/5
thousands of men were waiting but no boats, messages from ships that thoir
beats found no one on the beach. The truth of 1t was, I think, that the
Germans had the range of the lorry breakwator and the beaches nost 1t and
they shelled them heavily. Boats went in there and found no one on the
troops had moved further west clear of the shell firo. I do not know to
this day what really took place there. Off shore one felt helpless, the
ships and the boats were there and the troops ashoro and one could do no more.
Aircraft passed close overhead flying down the anchorages and fairway,
and "MALCOLM" off Braye reported that a number of parachuto mines had been
dropped to westward of there and suggested that ships ought to loavo by the
uidcoote
Zudcote
Ruy pass in the morning, as the pasuage to the West WEB no heavily mined.
The noise of M.T.B. engines could often be hobrd to deaward and castward
and added to my anxiety, though I thought they might possibly be our own
patrol. About 2300 I received an urgent signal from Admiralty asking where
Lord Gort was and why I had detailed the M.T.B.'s sent for him to other work.
As the M.A.S.B. had just returned with Wynne-Edwards, I sent it off at once
to "HEBE" to collect Lord Gort. To my horror it came back almost at otice to
say that Lord Gort had just left "HEBE" in a motor launch. It was very dork
and "НЫВЕ" could not; be seen though we knew where she was and I wellted anxiously
for the boat to arrive. Presently out of the dark a boat appeared and como
alongside, still not the right one and I had a bad moment thinking of the
possibilities of the boat getting lost. However, to my relief, after what
appeared about half an hour, the right boat, in charge OF Stevenson once moro,
found US at last. Apologizing to Lord Gort for keoping him walting 30 long,
I transferred him to the M.A.S.B. and sent him off to Dovor with Ceneral Iecs.
My experience of the bombing the day before led 100 to request fighter
June,
protection at dawn though I had no doubt that this was alroady hoing arrenged.
At 0215 I heard that troops were moving Westward and case to the conclusion
that embarkation at La Panne was no longer possible. "MARCOLN" and "HARVISING"
which were off Lo Panne were ordered into Dunkirk in consoquence.
I also made D. signal telling ships to keep close to the buoyo
as I hoped that they would thus avoid any minos which had boon Groy od in the
channel. At 0235 I made the following signal to V.A. Dover and