TNA ADM 199 792

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CONFIDENTIAL
Report on Operation "DYNAMO".
Page 4.
(a) Shore Artillery. At the commencement of the operation,
the southern Route Z was found to be under gunfire
from batteries near Calais, and consequently could
only be used by night. The northern Route Y was usable
only by night when later the batteries near Nieuport
brought fire to bear on the Zuydecoote Pass, which was
too narrow to permit a reasonable chance of ships
running the gauntlet of fire. By this time, however,
Route X was available, and was free of gunfire until
German batteries near Gravelines brought its exit into
the Dunkirk Roads under gunfire. This occurred in
the afternoon on Saturday, 1st June, and in conjunction
with the result of enemy air attack, led to the
suspension of daylight traffic altogether.
(e) Submarines. U-boats do not appear to have caused any
casualties. It is unlikely that the one thought to
be present penetrated further than the northern Route Y.
It may well be that this U-boat laid moored mines, which
are thought to have caused the loss of two A/S trawlers.
8.
AIR CO-OPERATION.
The system of co-operation between the Naval and
R.A.F. Commands does not permit of direct contact with the
R.A.F. operational units allocated for duty with the Naval
Command. For this reason much time appears to be lost
and the needs of the ever-changing situation may not be
provided for. Delays and lag occur, resulting often in
the R.A.F. effort being brought to bear either in the
wrong place or at the wrong time, or with inadequate force
to meet the current situation. The requirement is for
the Naval Commander in charge of an operation to be able to
convey his requirements direct to the R.A.F. Commander of
the R.A.F. Operational Units, and for this latter officer
to communicate direct to the Naval Commander the steps that
he is taking to meet the stated requirement.
It is unnecessary to stress the vital necessity
for effective air co-operation in an operation of this
nature. Not only did unopposed German air effort interrupt
and reduce seaborne traffic, but it also prevented
embarkation by suspending troop movement. To both Naval
and Military observers on the coast, the situation at times
was extremely disheartening. Rightly or wrongly, full air
protection was expected, but instead, for hours on end the
ships offshore were subjected to a murderous hail of bombs
and machine gun bullets.
Required by their duty to remain offshore waiting
for the troops, who themselves were unable to move down to
the water for the same reason, it required the greatest
determination and sense of duty, amounting in fact to
heroism, on the part of the ships' and boats' crews, to
enable them to complete their mission.
In their reports, the Commanding Officers of many
ships, while giving credit to the R.A.F. personnel for
gallantry in such combats as were observed from the ships,
at the same time express their sense of disappointment and
surprise at the seemingly puny efforts made to provide air
protection during the height of this operation.
In this connection, as one Commanding Officer
remarks, the formations of our own fighters when operating
over the area were so outnumbered by enemy aircraft that it
was no surprise to the observer to note that more British
machines were shot down than were enemy, and feelings of
disgust were engendered on listening in to the B.B.C. of/ report