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TNA / ADM 199 792

TNA ADM 199 792

TNA ADM 199 792
Collection details

TNA ADM 199 792

Admiralty records concerning Operation Dynamo and the evacuation of troops from Dunkirk, covering 1940–1941.

Holding archive
TNA
Collection reference
ADM 199 792
View the archive catalogue entry ↗

Source: The National Archives, Kew, ADM 199/792. Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.

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CONFIDENTIAL
Report on OPeration "DERTAMO".
Page 5.
of the same evening, which recounted the opposite story. The more so as the gallantry of our outnumbered airmen was so obvious at the time, and was the admiration of all.
9.
No. 11 Group Fighter Patrols Dunkirk area history.
Total flying
Enemy aircraft
Enemy aircraft
Date. Patrols.
hours daily.
destroyed.
driven down.
26/5
22
480
30
20
27/5
23
536
48
32
28/5
11
576
20
6
29/5
9
674
78
8
30/5
9
704
:
--
31/5
8
490
36
4
1/6
8
558
69
I
2/6
4
231
16
6
3/6
4
339
I
I
4/6
3
234
--
-
Total flying hours 4,822
Notes: (1) It will be observed that the number of patrols decreased from 27th May onwards, whilst there was an increase in the daily flying hours. This is due to the fact that the fighters were employed in increasingly bigger patrols as the enemy air opposition increased.
(2) Operation Dynamo suffered most from enemy air effort on 29/5 and on 1/6, after which latter date the combination of enemy air attack and shore artillery fire led to the suspension of the operation by day.
10.
The position of enemy batteries had been located by air reconnaissance by nightfall on 31st May, and additional batteries in the Gravelines area on the 1st June.
Air bombardment of these batteries during the 1st and 2nd
June undoubtedly reduced their fire during dusk and dawn on each of the nights 2/6 - 3/6 and 3/6 - 4/6, when seaborne traffic was passing within range of the enemy batteries commanding the south end of X Route, the Dunkirk Roads, and
Dunkirk Harbour. This was a valuable contribution by the
R.A.F. to the successful outcome of the operation. A
similar beneficial result was obtained by the bombing of the batteries which had Dunkirk Pier and roadstead under fire.
11.
CONTROL OF ALLIED TROOPS.
In the earlier stages the large number of British troops located in the dunes off the beach were of rear formations with few officers. Command of these mixed units was noticeable by its absence, aggravated, no doubt, by the fact that Army Officers' uniform is indistinguishable from that of other ranks. When Naval Officers appeared in their unmistakable uniform, order in most cases was quickly restored, the troops responding to commands in a disciplined manner.
In the absence of any Army embarkation staff or organisation a strong Naval party. was required to form up and embark the troops. Later, no difficulty was experienced when troops of fighting/

Raw OCR

Unformatted machine-generated OCR for document page 506.

CONFIDENTIAL
Report on OPeration "DERTAMO".
Page 5.
of the same evening, which recounted the opposite story. The
more so as the gallantry of our outnumbered airmen was so
obvious at the time, and was the admiration of all.
9.
No. 11 Group Fighter Patrols Dunkirk area history.
Total flying
Enemy aircraft
Enemy aircraft
Date. Patrols.
hours daily.
destroyed.
driven down.
26/5
22
480
30
20
27/5
23
536
48
32
28/5
11
576
20
6
29/5
9
674
78
8
30/5
9
704
:
--
31/5
8
490
36
4
1/6
8
558
69
I
2/6
4
231
16
6
3/6
4
339
I
I
4/6
3
234
--
-
Total flying hours 4,822
Notes: (1) It will be observed that the number of patrols
decreased from 27th May onwards, whilst there was
an increase in the daily flying hours. This is
due to the fact that the fighters were employed in
increasingly bigger patrols as the enemy air
opposition increased.
(2) Operation Dynamo suffered most from enemy air
effort on 29/5 and on 1/6, after which latter date
the combination of enemy air attack and shore
artillery fire led to the suspension of the
operation by day.
10.
The position of enemy batteries had been located
by air reconnaissance by nightfall on 31st May, and
additional batteries in the Gravelines area on the 1st June.
Air bombardment of these batteries during the 1st and 2nd
June undoubtedly reduced their fire during dusk and dawn
on each of the nights 2/6 - 3/6 and 3/6 - 4/6, when seaborne
traffic was passing within range of the enemy batteries
commanding the south end of X Route, the Dunkirk Roads, and
Dunkirk Harbour. This was a valuable contribution by the
R.A.F. to the successful outcome of the operation. A
similar beneficial result was obtained by the bombing of the
batteries which had Dunkirk Pier and roadstead under fire.
11.
CONTROL OF ALLIED TROOPS.
In the earlier stages the large number of British
troops located in the dunes off the beach were of rear
formations with few officers. Command of these mixed units
was noticeable by its absence, aggravated, no doubt, by the
fact that Army Officers' uniform is indistinguishable from
that of other ranks. When Naval Officers appeared in their
unmistakable uniform, order in most cases was quickly restored,
the troops responding to commands in a disciplined manner.
In the absence of any Army embarkation staff or organisation
a strong Naval party. was required to form up and embark the
troops. Later, no difficulty was experienced when troops of
fighting/