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TNA / ADM 199 792

TNA ADM 199 792

TNA ADM 199 792
Collection details

TNA ADM 199 792

Admiralty records concerning Operation Dynamo and the evacuation of troops from Dunkirk, covering 1940–1941.

Holding archive
TNA
Collection reference
ADM 199 792
View the archive catalogue entry ↗

Source: The National Archives, Kew, ADM 199/792. Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.

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CONFIDENTIAL.
Page i.
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
INTRODUCTION.
As far as the Dover Command is concerned, the genesis of this operation took place at a War Office Meeting on Sunday, the 19th May, 1940, at which the Vice Admiral, Dover, was represented. This Meeting discussed (1) Temporary maintenance of the B.E.F. through Dunkirk, Calais and Boulogne, and (2)
Evacuation of personnel through Dunkirk, Calais and Boulogne.
Under this last item was included, amongst other items, the problem of "the hazardous evacuation of very large Forces."
This was considered "to be unlikely". (This problem ultimately became that of Operation Dynamo).
The main decision of this Meeting was that the control must be delegated to the Vice Admiral, Dover, and available shipping placed at his disposal.
Further Meetings were held at Dover on the 20th May, and at the War Office on the 21st May, to consider the "emergency evacuation across the Channel of very large Forces." These
Meetings determined the number of personnel vessels and small craft available, and confirmed that the control of all sea movements rested with the Vice Admiral, Dover, a liaison officer from the War Office Movement Control and from the
Ministry of Shipping being attached to the Vice Admiral.
The need for air protection of sailings, including the period of embarkation and disembarkation was recognised, and was to be arranged by the Vice Admiral, Dover, direct with the
Fighter Command.
The reception arrangements at the points of disembarkation were provided for. At the Dover Meeting it was pointed out that in the event of evacuation it would be necessary to make provision for lifting troops from beaches, and that owing to the very gradual shoaling of the beaches it would be necessary to have a large number of small boats to carry troops from the beaches to the off-shore ships. Further, it was thought extremely doubtful if the whole of the troops to be evacuated could be lifted from the beaches, and that, if at all possible, the ports must be used as well.
Subsequent to the Dover Meeting of the 20th May, continual telephone conversations took place between Dover, the
Admiralty, Ministry of Shipping and the Commander-in-Chief,
Nore, as to the provision of small craft for the final evacuation, and the provision of Naval personnel for manning the small boats required for ferrying, and skoots and other small vessels taken up for transport purposes.
A Meeting was held at the Admiralty on Sunday, the 26th
May, to consider the same subject and to examine the number of craft available. The notes of this Meeting were subsequently supplied to the Vice Admiral, Dover, who was not represented at/

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Unformatted machine-generated OCR for document page 510.

CONFIDENTIAL.
Page i.
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
INTRODUCTION.
As far as the Dover Command is concerned, the genesis of
this operation took place at a War Office Meeting on Sunday,
the 19th May, 1940, at which the Vice Admiral, Dover, was
represented. This Meeting discussed (1) Temporary maintenance
of the B.E.F. through Dunkirk, Calais and Boulogne, and (2)
Evacuation of personnel through Dunkirk, Calais and Boulogne.
Under this last item was included, amongst other items, the
problem of "the hazardous evacuation of very large Forces."
This was considered "to be unlikely". (This problem
ultimately became that of Operation Dynamo).
The main decision of this Meeting was that the control
must be delegated to the Vice Admiral, Dover, and available
shipping placed at his disposal.
Further Meetings were held at Dover on the 20th May, and
at the War Office on the 21st May, to consider the "emergency
evacuation across the Channel of very large Forces." These
Meetings determined the number of personnel vessels and small
craft available, and confirmed that the control of all sea
movements rested with the Vice Admiral, Dover, a liaison
officer from the War Office Movement Control and from the
Ministry of Shipping being attached to the Vice Admiral.
The need for air protection of sailings, including the
period of embarkation and disembarkation was recognised, and
was to be arranged by the Vice Admiral, Dover, direct with the
Fighter Command.
The reception arrangements at the points of disembarkation
were provided for. At the Dover Meeting it was pointed out
that in the event of evacuation it would be necessary to make
provision for lifting troops from beaches, and that owing to
the very gradual shoaling of the beaches it would be necessary
to have a large number of small boats to carry troops from the
beaches to the off-shore ships. Further, it was thought
extremely doubtful if the whole of the troops to be evacuated
could be lifted from the beaches, and that, if at all possible,
the ports must be used as well.
Subsequent to the Dover Meeting of the 20th May,
continual telephone conversations took place between Dover, the
Admiralty, Ministry of Shipping and the Commander-in-Chief,
Nore, as to the provision of small craft for the final evac-
uation, and the provision of Naval personnel for manning the
small boats required for ferrying, and skoots and other small
vessels taken up for transport purposes.
A Meeting was held at the Admiralty on Sunday, the 26th
May, to consider the same subject and to examine the number of
craft available. The notes of this Meeting were subsequently
supplied to the Vice Admiral, Dover, who was not represented
at/