TNA ADM 199 792

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CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 7.
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events,
Wednesday, 29th May (continued)
well as from Dunkirk harbour, both from the aspect of the
military situation and from the fact that Dunkirk was limited
by a bottle-neck, formed by the narrow gangway along the East
Pier to the points of embarkation. Furthermore, there was
every prospect of the weather improving and the surf reducing
as the tide rose. Nevertheless, an increased number of
H.M. ships was ordered to Dunkirk to augment the personnel
vessels, though it was feared that an accumulation of ships
alongside the East Pier at Dunkirk by day might well invite
intensive air attack,
Subsequently, this fear was fully to be justified.
25. Meantime, considerable anxiety was felt as to the
fate of the personnel vessels which had been despatched in a
steady stream to Dunkirk commencing the previous evening. The
first of these was due back at Dover about 0300, but by 0900
nothing had been sighted or reported. But at 0700, S.N.O.,
Dunkirk, had reported that the embarkation there was going on
at the rate of 2000 an hour, so it was presumed that the
transports had failed to enter the harbour during darkness,
had waited outside, and had commenced to enter in succession
at dawn. The necessity for continuous fighter protection in
view of the exposure of these unarmed ships while at Dunkirk
and during the daylight passage through coastal waters, was
obvious. Constant touch was maintained with R.A.F. Commands
to obtain continuous fighter protection during the hours when
the Vice Admiral, Dover, estimated the largest concentration
of vessels would be present, it being realised that the R.A.F.
resources were not sufficient to provide continuous air cover,
and to dispense with full cover at less important periods.
26.
At 0930 the belated return of the personnel vessels
from Dunkirk commenced, and proceeded steadily through the
day. In addition to the personnel vessels using Dunkirk the
Admiralty were informed of the necessity for X-lighters and
other self-propelled lighters to increase the facilities for
beach evacuation. A Medical Party was shipped in VERITY for
use on the beaches, and a Naval Medical Party was sent to
Dunkirk.
27. The considerable alarm as to the immediate safety
of the B.E.F. felt during the evening and early night of the
28th, which caused all available resources to be immediately
concentrated on the French Coast, eased during the 29th. But
emergency measures taken late on the 28th had an adverse
effect on the orderly organisation for evacuation so necessary
if effective measures were to be devised and put in force.
28. Meantime, in the early hours of' the 29th, an un-
fortunate disaster occurred involving the loss of H.M.
destroyers WAKEFUL and GRAFTON, and the danlayer COMFORT.
WAKEFUL, after embarking troops at Bray, sailed for Dover at
2300/28 by the Zuydecoote Pass and North Channel. Approaching
the Kwinte Whistle Buoy the speed of the ships was 20 knots,
and a zigzag of 40 deg es every 4 minutes was started. At
0045 two torpedo tracks were observed, one torpedo missed, the
other hit ship amidships. WAKEFUL broke in half and the two
portions sank in 15 seconds, each remaining standing with the
midship/