TNA ADM 199 792

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CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 10.
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
Wednesday, 29th May (continued).
harbour. She was immediately subjected to heavy bombing
attacks, having previously had her steering gear put out of
action by a dive bombing attack when about - mile outside of
the entrance. She remained in sole occupation of the harbour
until shortly after midnight 29th/30th, when her Captain
rightly decided to take the ship out of harbour before she
also was sunk, thus freeing the berth and safeguarding the
channel from being blocked.
Little information of these disasters filtered through to
Dover, except that it was known that Dunkirk was under heavy
air bombardment, and that the destroyers there were being hit
soon after 1600.
32. At 1906 the Vice Admiral promulgated the plan for the
night by signal as follows: "Evacuation of British troops to
continue at maximum speed during the night. If adequate
supply of personnel vessels cannot be maintained to Dunkirk
East Pier, destroyers will be sent there as well. All other
craft except hospital carriers to embark from beach which is
extended from one mile East of Dunkirk to one mile East of
La Panne. Whole length is divided into three equal parts
referred to as LA PANNE, BRAY, MALO, from East to West with a
mile gap between each part. LA PANNE and BRAY have troop
concentration points each end and in Middle, MALO at each end.
These points should be tended by inshore craft. Pass the
message by V/S to ships not equipped W/T as opportunity offers".
33. About 1900 a telephone message was received from
La Panne Military Headquarters through the War Office and the
Admiralty to the effect that Dunkirk harbour was blocked
by damaged ships, and that all evacuation must therefore be
effected from the beaches.
About the same time a corrupt message from S.N.O., Dunkirk,
was received stating continuous bombing, one destroyer sinking,
one transport with troops on board damaged and impossible at
present to embark more troops, though pier undamaged.
34. In this confused situation the Vice Admiral, Dover,
at 2128, ordered all ships approaching Dunkirk not to close the
harbour, but instead to remain off the Eastern beach to collect
troops from the shore, and the drifters and minesweepers which
were about to be despatched to Dunkirk harbour were also
diverted to the beaches.
It appeared, therefore, at this time that the use of
Dunkirk harbour would be denied to us except possibly to the
small ships.
Signals addressed to S.N.O., Dunkirk, HEBE, VERITY, who
were known to be in the vicinity of Dunkirk, were sent require-
ing information as to the accessibility of the Eastern pier for
personnel vessels. Admiral Nord was also informed that Dover
was out of touch with Captain Tennant, and asked whether it was
still possible for transports to enter harbour and berth alongside.
No reply to these enquiries could be expected until after midnight.
35.
In the event only 4 trawlers and a yacht entered
Dunkirk during the hours of darkness, and as enemy activity was
much reduced only two bombing attacks being made, it subsequently
transpired that a good opportunity had been missed. It is
probable that ships to lift some 8000 to 10, 000 troops could
have been made available for Dunkirk during the night at little
loss to embarkation from the beaches.
36/