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TNA / ADM 199 792

TNA ADM 199 792

TNA ADM 199 792
Collection details

TNA ADM 199 792

Admiralty records concerning Operation Dynamo and the evacuation of troops from Dunkirk, covering 1940–1941.

Holding archive
TNA
Collection reference
ADM 199 792
View the archive catalogue entry ↗

Source: The National Archives, Kew, ADM 199/792. Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.

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List page 1 of 1 Showing document pages 525–525 of this collection
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CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 13.
Operation "DYNAMO"
Narrative of Events.
Thursday, 30th May.
40. As an example of the difficulty of any one man appreciating the situation at Dunkirk and the beaches during the night, at 0030/30 the S.N.O. on the French Coast reported that he had no destroyers. In fact, at that time, all available destroyers, namely 10, in the Dover Command, were either on, or on passage to or from, the coast, and the remaining 5 were at Dover discharging troops, embarking ammunitition, fuelling, etc. and were to sail within the next
+ hours.
Simultaneously the V.C.I.G.S. reported that the beaches were well organised, the troops in good heart, and there had been no bombing since dark, but that there was still a great shortage of small craft - urgently required. This last fact was well known to the Vice Admiral, Dover.
41. Commander-in-Chief, Nore, was requested to send as nuch grass hawser as possible to Ramsgate, as quickly as ossible, for supplying the skoots, to haul boats off the beaches, thus speeding up the boat work to compensate for the hortage of boats, which would continue for at least another
14 hours.
42. At 0500 the 7 modern destroyers remaining with Vice dmiral, Dover - ICARUS, IMPULSIVE, INTREPID, IVANHOE, HAR-
ESTER, HAVANT and JAVELIN - sailed to Sheerness in accordance ith Admiralty instructions. The MONTROSE and MACKAY sailed
'or repairs.
43. Meantime the Vice Admiral, Dover, had been much xercised regarding the possibility of the continued use of unkirk harbour for personnel vessels and was anxiously waiting the report from VANQUISHER, who had been sent to nvestigate the reported obstruction. VANQUISHER'S report as received at 0610 stating entrance was practicable but that bstruction exists towards outer inside end of the EASTERN ARM.
ending amplifying reports, the sailing of personnel vessels o Dunkirk was resumed, although at this time there were still personnel vessels presumed to be in the vicinity of Dunkirk arbour, whose movements and whereabouts throughout the night till remained obscure.
The Vice Admiral asked R.A. Dover, who was in HEBE, hether personnel ships could, in fact, still use Dunkirk. In he meantime a series of signals from Rear Admiral Dover, and estroyers off the coast, were received, stating that the eaches were filling up rapidly and more ships and boats were rgently required there. Although it was known that the estroyers could use Dunkirk, it appeared at this time that the est division of transport was to send the great majority of estroyers to the beaches, where urgent demands could not be gnored, and the personnel vessels to Dunkirk Harbour, only an ccasional destroyer being sent to Dunkirk from the reduced umber now available for the operation.
44/

Raw OCR

Unformatted machine-generated OCR for document page 525.

CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 13.
Operation "DYNAMO"
Narrative of Events.
Thursday, 30th May.
40. As an example of the difficulty of any one man
appreciating the situation at Dunkirk and the beaches during
the night, at 0030/30 the S.N.O. on the French Coast reported
that he had no destroyers. In fact, at that time, all
available destroyers, namely 10, in the Dover Command, were
either on, or on passage to or from, the coast, and the
remaining 5 were at Dover discharging troops, embarking
ammunitition, fuelling, etc. and were to sail within the next
+ hours.
Simultaneously the V.C.I.G.S. reported that the
beaches were well organised, the troops in good heart, and
there had been no bombing since dark, but that there was still
a great shortage of small craft - urgently required. This
last fact was well known to the Vice Admiral, Dover.
41. Commander-in-Chief, Nore, was requested to send as
nuch grass hawser as possible to Ramsgate, as quickly as
ossible, for supplying the skoots, to haul boats off the
beaches, thus speeding up the boat work to compensate for the
hortage of boats, which would continue for at least another
14 hours.
42. At 0500 the 7 modern destroyers remaining with Vice
dmiral, Dover - ICARUS, IMPULSIVE, INTREPID, IVANHOE, HAR-
ESTER, HAVANT and JAVELIN - sailed to Sheerness in accordance
ith Admiralty instructions. The MONTROSE and MACKAY sailed
'or repairs.
43. Meantime the Vice Admiral, Dover, had been much
xercised regarding the possibility of the continued use of
unkirk harbour for personnel vessels and was anxiously
waiting the report from VANQUISHER, who had been sent to
nvestigate the reported obstruction. VANQUISHER'S report
as received at 0610 stating entrance was practicable but that
bstruction exists towards outer inside end of the EASTERN ARM.
ending amplifying reports, the sailing of personnel vessels
o Dunkirk was resumed, although at this time there were still
personnel vessels presumed to be in the vicinity of Dunkirk
arbour, whose movements and whereabouts throughout the night
till remained obscure.
The Vice Admiral asked R.A. Dover, who was in HEBE,
hether personnel ships could, in fact, still use Dunkirk. In
he meantime a series of signals from Rear Admiral Dover, and
estroyers off the coast, were received, stating that the
eaches were filling up rapidly and more ships and boats were
rgently required there. Although it was known that the
estroyers could use Dunkirk, it appeared at this time that the
est division of transport was to send the great majority of
estroyers to the beaches, where urgent demands could not be
gnored, and the personnel vessels to Dunkirk Harbour, only an
ccasional destroyer being sent to Dunkirk from the reduced
umber now available for the operation.
44/