← Document collections
TNA / ADM 234 360

TNA ADM 234 360

TNA ADM 234 360
Collection details

TNA ADM 234 360

Naval Staff History No. 41, the official historical study of the evacuation from Dunkirk during Operation Dynamo, 26 May–4 June 1940, dated 1949.

Holding archive
TNA
Collection reference
ADM 234 360
View the archive catalogue entry ↗

Source: The National Archives, Kew, ADM 234/360. Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.

Showing only pages tagged with the vessel name Amiens. Tags are exact matches from this collection’s OCR tag index. Clear vessel filter ×
Showing only document page 22. Show all matching pages ×

1 matching pages. OCR may contain transcription errors.

List page 1 of 1 Showing document pages 22–22 of this collection
Page ImageOCR textOCR tags
22 Page 22 Log in to enlarge

CHAPTER II
THE WEEK BEFORE OPERATION "DYNAMO,"
19TH - 25TH MAY, 1940
19TH MAY
Compulsory withdrawal of B.E.F. foreseen
Gort was forced to the conclusion Continent possibility of a compulsory with-
A crisis was now approaching. After that considering the various alternatives, Lord
General Staff, Lieut-General H. the R. War Pownall, telephoned to the Director drawal of the B.E.F. from the must be faced, and so his Chief of the
Military Operations and Plans at Office and discussed this possibility. of at Abbeville were still holding, but there was little doubt that enemy armoured
On this 19th day of May communications by road and rail over the Somme forces in that area would shortly break through to the coast. The force could then no longer be supplied through in the ports south of the Somme, and the great be available for maintaining replacements.¹
bulk of the reserves, which were the rearward areas, would shortly cease to
R.A.F. Component begins return to England
The growing failure of communications had now made it impracticable for the British air organisation to function, and by the evening orders had to be given for a large proportion of the R.A.F. Component of the B.E.F. (Air Vice-
Marshal C.H.B. Blount) to return to England.
Equally serious was the fact that, by the evening, German troops had arrived in Amiens. The picture was no longer that of a line bent or temporarily broken, but of a besieged fortress.²
Vice-Admiral, Dover, represented at War Office conference
Meanwhile, in London, following the receipt of General H. R. Pownall's message, a meeting had been held at the War Office at which Vice-Admiral
B. H. Ramsay (Vice-Admiral, Dover), was represented.
This meeting discussed the temporary maintenance of the B.E.F.-and the evacuation other of its personnel through Dunkirk, Calais and Boulogne. Among questions considered was the possiblity of "the hazardous evacuation of known very large forces." So little, apparently, was the true military situation then seven of days later it developed into Operation "Dynamo". "The main decision in London that this problem was regarded as "unlikely," though only delegated disposal." to the Vice-Admiral Dover, and available shipping placed at his this meeting," says Vice-Admiral Ramsay, "was that the control must be
Channel ports the German objective enemy down the armoured forces appeared to be directed deepened
On the 20th May the breach south of Arras and widened; the the Channel valley ports. of the Somme on Abbeville, the on other two main doubtless objectives - making one for
2 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 30.
2 I Lord Lord Gort's Second Despatch,
Gort's Second Despatch, para. para, 31. 32.
4

Raw OCR

Unformatted machine-generated OCR for document page 22.

CHAPTER II
THE WEEK BEFORE OPERATION "DYNAMO,"
19TH - 25TH MAY, 1940
19TH MAY
Compulsory withdrawal of B.E.F. foreseen
Gort was forced to the conclusion Continent possibility of a compulsory with-
A crisis was now approaching. After that considering the various alternatives, Lord
General Staff, Lieut-General H. the R. War Pownall, telephoned to the Director
drawal of the B.E.F. from the must be faced, and so his Chief of the
Military Operations and Plans at Office and discussed this possibility. of
at Abbeville were still holding, but there was little doubt that enemy armoured
On this 19th day of May communications by road and rail over the Somme
forces in that area would shortly break through to the coast. The force could
then no longer be supplied through in the ports south of the Somme, and the great
be available for maintaining replacements.¹
bulk of the reserves, which were the rearward areas, would shortly cease to
R.A.F. Component begins return to England
The growing failure of communications had now made it impracticable for
the British air organisation to function, and by the evening orders had to be
given for a large proportion of the R.A.F. Component of the B.E.F. (Air Vice-
Marshal C.H.B. Blount) to return to England.
Equally serious was the fact that, by the evening, German troops had arrived
in Amiens. The picture was no longer that of a line bent or temporarily
broken, but of a besieged fortress.²
Vice-Admiral, Dover, represented at War Office conference
Meanwhile, in London, following the receipt of General H. R. Pownall's
message, a meeting had been held at the War Office at which Vice-Admiral
B. H. Ramsay (Vice-Admiral, Dover), was represented.
This meeting discussed the temporary maintenance of the B.E.F.-and the
evacuation other of its personnel through Dunkirk, Calais and Boulogne. Among
questions considered was the possiblity of "the hazardous evacuation of
known very large forces." So little, apparently, was the true military situation then
seven of days later it developed into Operation "Dynamo". "The main decision
in London that this problem was regarded as "unlikely," though only
delegated disposal." to the Vice-Admiral Dover, and available shipping placed at his
this meeting," says Vice-Admiral Ramsay, "was that the control must be
Channel ports the German objective
enemy down the armoured forces appeared to be directed deepened
On the 20th May the breach south of Arras and widened; the
the Channel valley ports. of the Somme on Abbeville, the on other two main doubtless objectives - making one for
2 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 30.
2 I Lord Lord Gort's Second Despatch,
Gort's Second Despatch, para. para, 31. 32.
4