TNA ADM 234 360

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THE WEEK BEFORE OPERATION "DYNAMO"
CHAP. II
On the following day (24th May), however, the Prime Minister again con-
ferred with M. Reynaud and General Weygand in Paris ; an extract is quoted
below from the telegraphic report of this conference which Lord Gort received
from the Secretary of State for War :
"Both are convinced that Weygand's plan is still capable of execution and only in
its execution has [?lies] hope. of restoring the situation. Weygand reports French
VII Army is advancing successfully and has captured Péronne, Albert, and
Amiens It is essential that you should make every endeavour to co-operate in
this plan. Should however, situation on your communications make this at any
time impossible you should inform us so that we can inform French and make
Naval and Air arrangements to assist you should you have to withdraw on the
north coast"¹.
Lord Gort says that he fully appreciated the importance of attacking
early, before the enemy could bring up his infantry in strength, but facts had
to be faced "!. These were some of the facts :-
(a) General Weygand's report of the recapture of Péronne, Albert and
Amiens was, says Lord Gort, 'inaccurate None of these three
towns on the line of the Somme had been recaptured.
(b) Two British divisions were still closely engaged with the enemy, and
three others were awaiting relief by the French and Belgians, and
would not become available for a further 48 hours.¹
(c) Only about 300 rounds per gun were immediately available to the
B.E.F., and with communications cut the prospect of further supply
was remote.¹
(d) Serious losses in Allied tanks had already been suffered and could
not be replaced.¹
(e) The Belgian cavalry was unlikely to be able to engage, at short notice,
in a battle 40 miles away, and on French soil.¹
Nevertheless, after consultation with General Blanchard, Lord Gort agreed
that in order to implement their share of the Weygand plan they should attack
southwards with 2 British divisions, one French division and a French Cavalry
Corps. The attack however, could not take place till the 26th May at the
earliest, owing to the reliefs in progress and the need to assemble the 2 British
divisions which were still closely engaged with the enemy.¹ Furthermore,
Lord Gort emphasised, both to the Secretary of State and to General Blanchard,
that the principal effort must come from the south, and that the operation of
the northern forces could be nothing more than a sortie.
It will be seen therefore that the British and the French Governments were
both urging a counter offensive on a large scale, barely 48 hours before the
Dunkirk evacuation became a desperately urgent necessity.
24TH MAY
The Allied position on the canal line was considerably strengthened during
the 24th May. On this day also Lord Gort prepared for the proposed counter-
attack southwards on the 26th May, with the ultimate objective Plouvain -
Marquion - Cambrai. In effect, this attack was never carried out.
Fighting troops hold on at Calais
In the meantime the evacuation of Boulogne was completed. At Calais
evacuation was limited to non-fighting personnel. The fighting troops held
on, and a supply ship [the Benlawers]² with stores and transport unloaded for
them at Calais.
1 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 38.
2 T.M. 6213/40.
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