Naval Staff History No. 41, the official historical study of the evacuation from Dunkirk during Operation Dynamo, 26 May–4 June 1940, dated 1949.
Source: The National Archives, Kew, ADM 234/360. Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.
1 matching pages. OCR may contain transcription errors.
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THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK |
Unformatted machine-generated OCR for document page 30.
THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK CHAP. II Defences of Dunkirk It was would be Dunkirk¹. Its local were under the only port du now obvious that if the B.E.F. defences was to be evacuated the available Nord, Admiral Abrial, whose command included the Boulogne, Calais and Dun- in these areas to General Fagalde. kirk, but on this day (24th May) he delegated command of military forces and comprised an inner and an outer sector; inner on The French defences of Dunkirk extended only the as far as the Belgian frontier, Mardyck Canal to Spyker, thence to Bergues to the frontier and so to the the outer on the line of the river Aa to St. Omer, thence by Cassel and Steen- sea voorde to the frontier.¹ the inundations which formed part of the defence scheme of Dunkirk.² The French now took over the British posts on the Aa and began to operate Belgian line penetrated In the late evening the enemy attacked the Belgian line on the Lys, pene- trating to a depth of 1] miles on a 13 mile front3 and endangering the security of the British left flank. It had become a matter of vital importance to keep open the B.E.F.'s line of communication to the coast through a corridor of withdrawal which was hourly narrowing. The penetration of the Belgian line made it certain that before long the whole area east of the Yser canal would be in the hands of the enemy, with the serious risk of the Belgian right becoming separated from the British left at Menin, and of the Belgian Army being forced to fall back in a northerly, rather than a westerly direction.³ 25TH MAY Enemy pincer attack On the 25th May enemy activity intensified. He was across the canal at St. Venant, and was developing the bridgeheads between that place and Aire and also at St. Omer, while further north the situation on the river Aa remained obscure. During the day the Belgians continued to withdraw in a north-westerly direction under enemy pressure. General Sir John Dill, who had now succeeded General Sir Edmund Ironside as C.I.G.S., visited Lord Gort in the morning. He then informed the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for War that there could be no disguising the seriousness of the situation.3 By 1800, says Lord Gort, "I was convinced that the steps I had taken to secure the north. my left flank would prove insufficient to meet the growing danger in held; ment the the south-west on Dunkirk had already and being The from pattern of the enemy pincer attack was becoming clearer. One move- between counterpart was now developing on the developed, front. was The gap the British left and the Belgian right which Belgian had been threatening D.R. 3 Lord Lord Gort's Second Despatch, 41. Gort's Second Despatch, para. para. 42. 12