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TNA / ADM 234 360

TNA ADM 234 360

TNA ADM 234 360
Collection details

TNA ADM 234 360

Naval Staff History No. 41, the official historical study of the evacuation from Dunkirk during Operation Dynamo, 26 May–4 June 1940, dated 1949.

Holding archive
TNA
Collection reference
ADM 234 360
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Source: The National Archives, Kew, ADM 234/360. Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.

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TUESDAY, 28TH MAY
CHAP. V
In spite, however, of every effort as more and more ships were drawn into
Operation Dynamo", the pressing demand for beaching craft grew, almost hourly, more insistent. A climax was reached on 1st June¹, when, in spite of the number sent over, the inshore flotilla " - crippled by weather, accidents, mechanical breakdowns, exhaustion of crews and enemy action - was still unable to meet requirements, and the minesweeper Gossamer's urgent request for boats received the curt reply It is now impracticable to send more boats.
You must do your utmost with yours². A perusal of the "Dynamo" signals brings sharply to notice the great driving force of the Vice-Admiral, Dover;
the clamorous signals for more boats" were an indication of the great strain to which he was being subjected.
Beach and harbour evacuation compared
There can be little doubt that had not valid reasons prevented more beach ferrying craft from being made available for the first 5 days of the evacuation, a greater number of troops could have been evacuated. The initial problem", says the Vice-Admiral, Dover, "called for a maximum effort over a limited period, regardless of the future, and accordingly all resources in the way of small boats were thrown on the beaches, before adequate provision had been made for their maintenance off the coast in such matters as relief of the personnel and the provision of large beach parties.
" It was only due, to the foresight of the Admiralty in making arrangements for a continued flow in ever increasing numbers of small power boats and beach craft, which became available on the fifth day onwards, that the continued evacuation from the beaches remained a reasonable proposition after the initial crisis had passed.
A perusal of the signals that passed between Dover and the French coast here reveals the many occasions on which the responsible officers stationed on the coast considered so little had been achieved from the beaches that they advocated restriction of evacuation to Dunkirk harbour. Many complaints of no boats', no ships' might lead a detached observer to the conclusion that the great effort that was being made was proving abortive.
" At Dover, where the whole operation could be viewed in truer perspective because the number and origin of the troops being landed in England was always to hand, it was clear that the evacuation from the beaches required by the military situation was, in fact, achieving a considerable success."3
Admiral Ramsay's view is borne out by these recorded figures: Of the 251,000
troops landed in the United Kingdom between May 28th and June 1st inclusive
- the period during which Dunkirk and the beaches eastward were available day and night except for enemy interference - 90,000 were lifted from the beaches, while 55,000 were lifted by personnel ships and hospital carriers, and
106,000 by other vessels, direct from Dunkirk harbour (see Table 2).
Anti-submarine patrols are maintained
While the lifting of troops from Dunkirk and the beaches was progressing with ever-increasing speed, anti-submarine patrols had been maintained from the North Goodwin to Kwint Bank; but on the 28th May all destroyers except
I Appendices H.17 to H.25.
2 Appendix H.22.
3 Letter from V.A. Dover (A.14/0/876/40 of 18/6/40) covering his Report on Operation
" Dynamo". Italics not in original.
33

Raw OCR

Unformatted machine-generated OCR for document page 51.

TUESDAY, 28TH MAY
CHAP. V
In spite, however, of every effort as more and more ships were drawn into
Operation Dynamo", the pressing demand for beaching craft grew, almost
hourly, more insistent. A climax was reached on 1st June¹, when, in spite
of the number sent over, the inshore flotilla " - crippled by weather, accidents,
mechanical breakdowns, exhaustion of crews and enemy action - was still
unable to meet requirements, and the minesweeper Gossamer's urgent request
for boats received the curt reply It is now impracticable to send more boats.
You must do your utmost with yours². A perusal of the "Dynamo" signals
brings sharply to notice the great driving force of the Vice-Admiral, Dover ;
the clamorous signals for more boats" were an indication of the great strain
to which he was being subjected.
Beach and harbour evacuation compared
There can be little doubt that had not valid reasons prevented more beach
ferrying craft from being made available for the first 5 days of the evacuation,
a greater number of troops could have been evacuated. The initial problem",
says the Vice-Admiral, Dover, "called for a maximum effort over a limited
period, regardless of the future, and accordingly all resources in the way of
small boats were thrown on the beaches, before adequate provision had been
made for their maintenance off the coast in such matters as relief of the per-
sonnel and the provision of large beach parties.
" It was only due, to the foresight of the Admiralty in making arrangements
for a continued flow in ever increasing numbers of small power boats and beach
craft, which became available on the fifth day onwards, that the continued
evacuation from the beaches remained a reasonable proposition after the
initial crisis had passed.
A perusal of the signals that passed between Dover and the French coast here
reveals the many occasions on which the responsible officers stationed on the
coast considered so little had been achieved from the beaches that they ad-
vocated restriction of evacuation to Dunkirk harbour. Many complaints of
no boats', no ships' might lead a detached observer to the conclusion
that the great effort that was being made was proving abortive.
" At Dover, where the whole operation could be viewed in truer perspective
because the number and origin of the troops being landed in England was
always to hand, it was clear that the evacuation from the beaches required by
the military situation was, in fact, achieving a considerable success."3
Admiral Ramsay's view is borne out by these recorded figures: Of the 251,000
troops landed in the United Kingdom between May 28th and June 1st inclusive
- the period during which Dunkirk and the beaches eastward were available
day and night except for enemy interference - 90,000 were lifted from the
beaches, while 55,000 were lifted by personnel ships and hospital carriers, and
106,000 by other vessels, direct from Dunkirk harbour (see Table 2).
Anti-submarine patrols are maintained
While the lifting of troops from Dunkirk and the beaches was progressing
with ever-increasing speed, anti-submarine patrols had been maintained from
the North Goodwin to Kwint Bank; but on the 28th May all destroyers except
I Appendices H.17 to H.25.
2 Appendix H.22.
3 Letter from V.A. Dover (A.14/0/876/40 of 18/6/40) covering his Report on Operation
" Dynamo". Italics not in original.
33