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TNA / ADM 234 360

TNA ADM 234 360

TNA ADM 234 360
Collection details

TNA ADM 234 360

Naval Staff History No. 41, the official historical study of the evacuation from Dunkirk during Operation Dynamo, 26 May–4 June 1940, dated 1949.

Holding archive
TNA
Collection reference
ADM 234 360
View the archive catalogue entry ↗

Source: The National Archives, Kew, ADM 234/360. Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.

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CHAP. VIII
THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
that could be found, the intention at Panne 1600-being boats the past 24 hours². Parties were organised the time-about collect all the oars and for wood R.N.¹ and the 12th Lancers to marshalling the beaches
Work was commenced on a second who lorry had pier been at La Panne by Lieut. Greatthe embarkation of troops from La would at 2030 be with two ships, to recommence hoped the fire of the Nieuport battery less effective3.
westward of La Panne, which considered would be out
Dover for the embarkation of Lt. Cdr. McClelland at about 1800 from a point 2 miles V.A.
At about 1630, arrangements Lord were Gort made from La Panne direct with range of the Nieuport battery. In the event, however, Lord Gort embarked of in the Hebe's whaler nearer to La Panne.
were already filled put off. No additional boats arrived, however, and the
At 2030 two ships arrived off La Panne⁴, and the beaching craft there which rate fell to about 150 an hour. With about 7,000 men awaiting embarkation of embarkation was no more than 300 an hour; indeed, as darkness set in, rate the before 0400 the next morning (when the beach would be exposed to gunfire, and might even be in the hands of the enemy) a rate of at least 1,000 an hour was the necessary. for Urgent representations were made to V.A., Dover, and to ships however, in response to this signal that at 2223 the Keith asked V.A., Dover, to to urgently and that they lacked ships and boats⁵. It was probably, informed clear Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker that La Panne had reported 6,000 troops in vicinity more boats, but none came, although at 2130 V.A., Dover, tell S.N.O., Dunkirk, that troops must be moved down to Bray, as tows of boats got Panne. intercepted at Bray in the dark, with a resulting shortage of boats at La
During darkness hostile low-flying aircraft were patrolling continually overhead and bombing promptly all lights shown, which no doubt explains why lights. Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker in the Keith did not see the pre-arranged shore
By 2200 the situation at La Panne had become serious; only about 600
troops had been embarked and the few boats available, which had to be handled and pulled in the darkness by troops inexperienced in this work, had dwindled to three. At this time, as the telephone to Dover was still working, Lt. Cdr.
McClelland destroyed the W/T set.
At about 2300 the situation was becoming critical, as troops for whom there were no boats were piling up on the beach, and the military withdrawal which would full leave La Panne in no-man's-land by 0400 the following morning was in on the crowded beach, causing casualties with almost every shell.
swing. To make matters worse the Nieuport battery opened a slow fire
D.G. Johnson, V.C., D.S.O., M.C., Commanding the 4th Division, who in turn
Lt. Cdr. McClelland discussed the situation with the G.O.C., Major-General conferred the with the Duty Captain at Dover, and it was finally decided to march being reached after Lt. Cdr. McClelland had made reconnaissance
6,000 men remaining at La Panne to Dunkirk, via Bray-Dunes, the decision right had along the beaches, without finding any more ships a personal or boats, and after he not arrives. informed the G.O.C. in reply to a direct question that he thought they would
List. I Lt. Cdr. McClelland's report. The name Greatwood is not in the May 1940 Navy
2 3 S/Lt. E. C. Croswell R.N. (C.W.23187/40).
Appendix Q.16.
4 Probably the Worcester and Hebe.
5 Appendix H.16.
76

Raw OCR

Unformatted machine-generated OCR for document page 100.

CHAP. VIII
THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
that could be found, the intention at Panne 1600-being boats
the past 24 hours². Parties were organised the time-about collect all the oars and for
wood R.N.¹ and the 12th Lancers to marshalling the beaches
Work was commenced on a second who lorry had pier been at La Panne by Lieut. Great-
the embarkation of troops from La would at 2030 be with two ships, to recommence
hoped the fire of the Nieuport battery less effective3.
westward of La Panne, which considered would be out
Dover for the embarkation of Lt. Cdr. McClelland at about 1800 from a point 2 miles V.A.
At about 1630, arrangements Lord were Gort made from La Panne direct with
range of the Nieuport battery. In the event, however, Lord Gort embarked of
in the Hebe's whaler nearer to La Panne.
were already filled put off. No additional boats arrived, however, and the
At 2030 two ships arrived off La Panne⁴, and the beaching craft there which
rate fell to about 150 an hour. With about 7,000 men awaiting embarkation
of embarkation was no more than 300 an hour ; indeed, as darkness set in, rate the
before 0400 the next morning (when the beach would be exposed to gunfire,
and might even be in the hands of the enemy) a rate of at least 1,000 an hour
was the necessary. for Urgent representations were made to V.A., Dover, and to ships
however, in response to this signal that at 2223 the Keith asked V.A., Dover, to
to urgently and that they lacked ships and boats⁵. It was probably,
informed clear Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker that La Panne had reported 6,000 troops
in vicinity more boats, but none came, although at 2130 V.A., Dover,
tell S.N.O., Dunkirk, that troops must be moved down to Bray, as tows of boats
got Panne. intercepted at Bray in the dark, with a resulting shortage of boats at La
During darkness hostile low-flying aircraft were patrolling continually over-
head and bombing promptly all lights shown, which no doubt explains why
lights. Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker in the Keith did not see the pre-arranged shore
By 2200 the situation at La Panne had become serious; only about 600
troops had been embarked and the few boats available, which had to be handled
and pulled in the darkness by troops inexperienced in this work, had dwindled
to three. At this time, as the telephone to Dover was still working, Lt. Cdr.
McClelland destroyed the W/T set.
At about 2300 the situation was becoming critical, as troops for whom there
were no boats were piling up on the beach, and the military withdrawal which
would full leave La Panne in no-man's-land by 0400 the following morning was in
on the crowded beach, causing casualties with almost every shell.
swing. To make matters worse the Nieuport battery opened a slow fire
D.G. Johnson, V.C., D.S.O., M.C., Commanding the 4th Division, who in turn
Lt. Cdr. McClelland discussed the situation with the G.O.C., Major-General
conferred the with the Duty Captain at Dover, and it was finally decided to march
being reached after Lt. Cdr. McClelland had made reconnaissance
6,000 men remaining at La Panne to Dunkirk, via Bray-Dunes, the decision
right had along the beaches, without finding any more ships a personal or boats, and after he
not arrives. informed the G.O.C. in reply to a direct question that he thought they would
List. I Lt. Cdr. McClelland's report. The name Greatwood is not in the May 1940 Navy
2 3 S/Lt. E. C. Croswell R.N. (C.W.23187/40).
Appendix Q.16.
4 Probably the Worcester and Hebe.
5 Appendix H.16.
76