Naval Staff History No. 41, the official historical study of the evacuation from Dunkirk during Operation Dynamo, 26 May–4 June 1940, dated 1949.
Source: The National Archives, Kew, ADM 234/360. Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.
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CHAPTER x |
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CHAPTER x THE NIGHT OF 1ST - 2ND JUNE AND FROM DAYLIGHT TO DUSK ON 2ND Situation ashore on evening of 1st (Plan 3) During the Ist June heavy enemy attacks developed the of the line, and our forces had to give some THE a a the enemy advance had been checked on a thence due east of the frontier and along the frontier sea. was to withdraw through this line which the French would continue to hold. French troops were holding a line in rear of ours, and the British rearguard Two divisions of French Territorial troops reduced in strength, in addition to part of the British 1st Corps and rearguard of 4,000 men, still remained to be evacuated on the evening of the 1st. The War Office, aware that they were not in a position to judge the local situation, did not set a period to the evacua- tion but ordered Major-General Alexander to hold on as long as possible in order that the maximum number of French and British might be embarked. It left to the General, in close co-operation with Admiral Abrial, to decide was the moment when evacuation must come to an end.¹ Plan for the night 1st-2nd June (See Plan 4) Early in the afternoon of the 1st June the only remaining Route x came under the fire of German guns, and it was judged impossible to carry out any further evacuation by day. There was hope both at Dover and at the War Office that it would be possible to complete the evacuation of the B.E.F. during the dark hours of the night 1st/2nd June, by using both sides of Dunkirk harbour, pier and eastern beach. The War Office asked General Weygand to urge Admiral Abrial to co-operate in completing the evacuation of the French this night. Evacuation was to be confined to the period between 2100 and 0330. It was estimated that British vessels could lift about 17,000 men, probably in the proportion 50 per cent British and 50 per cent French, during these hours, as follows :-(Appendix R8) :-(a) From the beach between Dunkirk and 11 miles to the eastward between 2100/1 and 0300/2, 9,000 men. (b) At the East Pier between 2100/1 and 0330/12, 7,000 men. This time might be extended. (c) On the east side inside the harbour, between 2200/1 and 0300/2, 1,000 men. It was intended to withdraw all naval personnel this night3. All minesweepers, both fleet and paddle, and skoots and all small craft except certain flotillas specially organised, were to lift from the beach stretching eastward 100 1½ miles from Dunkirk, and it was hoped to employ here also about French small beach fishing craft and drifters. Personnel ships up to 7 in 2 I The Report of Captain W. Tennant, S.N.O. Dunkirk, Record Office Case 5458 Vol. 3, p.357. written 0330 or from by hand, and the time has been altered by the exceptionally) either typed from 0300 to read originator's copy of this signal is (rather instead of being was intended 0330 to read 0300, though it is not possible typewriter, to with which figure Admiral to be sent. The time was received at the say certainty at 0330, and Rear S.N.O. Wake-Walker in his Report, M.017978/41 p.32 Admiralty 0330 intended. giving details of the plan until 0430/2. Dunkirk reported, however (Appendix R.24) says that he did was not receive the message 96