TNA ADM 234 360

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DUSK TO DUSK, 1ST-2ND JUNE
CHAP. X
very clear and the Rear-Admiral decided to get the ships away at 0300
now of 0330 as originally planned. The Admiralty orders that evacuation
Dunkirk Pier was to continue until 0700 did not
apparently Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker not receive the orders which went
by Dunkirk (Appendix did R.20, 23) ; and it is to be pre-
out from the Admiralty at 0115/2, that destroyers were to continue the evacua-
tion until 0700 (Appendix R.21). Although men were still coming down the
the Rear-Admiral was unwilling to run the risk of having ships sunk
alongside pier, and blocking the pier and harbour. Accordingly he told the ships
to leave and himself followed out of harbour the last of them, apparently the
destroyers Winchelsea and Whitshed about 0300.
British rearguard held up
Meanwhile, a most disquieting message had been received at Dover. At
0040 on the 2nd the Lydd, while embarking troops off Malo beach, was requested
by the Brigadier of the brigade then embarking to transmit to Rear-Admiral
Wake-Walker a message from Major General Alexander reporting that on
account of French congestion on the mole at Dunkirk a considerable number
of British troops were held up and further arrivals were still expected. It was
essential that the rearguard of the B.E.F. should embark from the beaches east
of the mole, where they were expected to arrive by 0230.
What had happened was, that French troops had cut into the flow of British
making their way along the road to the East Pier, by a converging route; and both
British and French troops were now being embarked at the pier.
Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker apparently never received the message and
knew nothing of the state of affairs at the East Pier until he arrived there at
0200.
Vice-Admiral Dover, who received the message at 02001, at once sent orders
to all destroyers of Force K still on the coast, the minesweepers, and the gun-
boat Locust which was off Bray supporting the evacuation by covering fire, to
endeavour to embark the British rearguard from the beach, remaining after 0300
if necessary. The coding and transmission of the message took some time,
and the orders apparently went out too late; all ships had sailed, and the rear-
guard could not get away that night. Only the personnel vessel Portsdown
was left on the coast. This was an undegaussed ship manned by a naval crew,
which had anchored off Malo at 2205/1. After running to death her own two
dinghies ferrying troops she got hold of a large motor boat, and she sailed
about 0400. On the way home the ship collected further troops from a French
vessel aground off Dunkirk, and from two further vessels encountered, and she
eventually disembarked at Dover 168 British and 450 French.
Bombing of the hospital ships Worthing and Paris. (App. S)
There was a large number of wounded in Dunkirk because no hospital ships
had sailed for 24 hours, orders having been given to evacuate fit men in prefer-
ence, since, other considerations apart, embarking wounded would have taken
up too much valuable time. The cessation of daylight sailings rendered it
possible for hospital ships to occupy berths alongside, without detriment to
the operation, and jt was decided to get some of the wounded away in daytime
in hospital ships, in the hope that the Germans would respect them.
In order to afford the enemy no excuse to attack a warning signal was sent
0120. I Dover Report, p.27. The time of receipt on the flimsy of the decypher appears to be
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