Naval Staff History No. 41, the official historical study of the evacuation from Dunkirk during Operation Dynamo, 26 May–4 June 1940, dated 1949.
Source: The National Archives, Kew, ADM 234/360. Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.
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APPENDIX U |
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APPENDIX U THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK Times of arrival of ships in each group to be staggered. boat. Red Very's light stops entry. Green Very's light allows entry. Ships to berth at inner end of eastern arm as directed by traffic control motor 1548/2 7. S.N.O. DUNKIRK to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER (R) Admiralty B.E.F. evacuated. Returning now. 2330/2 APPENDIX U SIGNALS RE EVACUATION ON 3rd JUNE Monday, 3rd June 1. AIR MINISTRY to FIGHTER COMMAND, COASTAL COMMAND, BACK VIOLET, V.A. Dover (R) Admiralty, War Office X.334 3/6. This signals confirms arrangements made by telephone for providing fighter protection for Dunkirk and shipping in evacuation over the period 1930 hours 3rd June to 0800 hours 4th June. Coastal Command to provide protection for shipping between Dover and Dunkirk during period 1930 hours till dark. Fighter Command to maintain continuous patrol-strength one Blenheim fighter-over Dunkirk area during hours of darkness. Fighter protection to be provided over Dunkirk area and shipping in the channel from 0430 hours to 0800 hours 4th June, protection to be provided by Fighter Command followed by Coastal Command; times to be concerted with C-in-C. concerned by Back Violet. 1850/3 APPENDIX V SIGNAL RE THE DECISION TO TERMINATE THE EVACUATION AFTER THE NIGHT OF 3rd-4th JUNE Monday, 3rd June 1. VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER to ADMIRALTY (R) C.-in-C. Nore After nine days of operations of a nature unprecedented in naval warfare, which followed on two weeks of intense strain, commanding officers, officers and ships companies are at the end of their tether. I therefore view a continuance of the demands made by evacuation with the ut- most concern as likely to strain to breaking pcint the endurance of officers and men. this state of affairs in the ships under my command, and I consider it would be I should fail in my duty did I not represent to Their Lordships the existence of unfortunate, after the magnificent manner in which officers and of the sur- viving that ships have faced heavy loss and responded to every call made men upon them, human endurance. they should be subjected to a test which I feel may be beyond the limit of and the strongest possible manner that fresh forces should be used for these operations, If therefore evacuation has to be continued after tonight I would emphasise in any consequent delay in their execution should be accepted. 1344/3 188