TNA / CAB 103 191

TNA CAB 103 191

Collection details

TNA CAB 103 191

Cabinet Office papers concerning the proposed publication of a book about Operation Dynamo and the 1940 evacuation from Dunkirk, dating from April 1949 to February 1950.

Holding archive: TNA
Collection reference: CAB 103 191

View the archive catalogue entry ↗

Source: The National Archives, Kew, CAB 103/191. Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.

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Page	Image	OCR text	OCR tags
2	Log in to enlarge	Files containing Matter, Bearing on this Subject. Subject his sent to. of Namey AIM.5 you hambert w/o UL.1949 Bug. Ratham Cabinet Office, 26/7/49 Ncri forkerow Great George Street, The Adminalty did not London, S.W.1. proced wh me sale edition of 21st July, 1949 Ne bord dealy wh Me Evacuation your Indive which is This upwer to the delay in replying to he Battle Summary on in No! an This file es, as you will realise, Length and I fear we have - imprustion I Maw June Rear infair advantage of the before next year. admal Bellais Beauting here have seen it, and A.Bauds. eral official policy is nd publish the Official Histories. One point 14/2/50 to it might be preferable ipate, this programme by torical studies of urse, find their place Histories. We do not point, or to press it, suggest that it ---posed to publish we assume that and the Air Ministry, both of whom are concerned, will be given an opportunity of seeing the manuscript. Several points of detail have been noted here, which seem to call for modification. I give them as examples only. We have not subjected the whole text to a detailed critical scrutiny. Pages 8 & 9. Is it the right perspective to suggest that the Navy were alone in urging that evacuation should be from a port rather than from the beaches? Would not evacuation from a port be accepted by anyone as the preferable course, if it could be carried out? If the point is that the Navy thought it would be possible to use a port, or ports, and others did not, this (assuming it is accurate) is not clearly brought out. Page 26. Does not the statement that the army "with little more than rifles had defeated the German Armour" go a bit too far? (Incidentally, I am told the parallel with Agincourt is open to be criticised on the ground that at Agincourt the victorious troops had the advantage of a new long-range weapon, the long bow). Page 47. "This was the first time the Germans laid magnetic mines by aircraft during the dark hours". That is, the first time during Operation DYNAMO? I hope that you will acquit us of any desire, in mentioning these points, to indulge in carping criticism. It is just that we feel that the text should be gone over for a final check-up on details, if it is proposed to proceed to publication. Yours sincerely, (SGD.) A. B. ACHESON. Captain R.G. Onslow, D.S.O.,R.N., D.T.S.D. (Naval Staff), Admiralty, S.W.1.	London George Little Long Page right

Raw OCR

Unformatted machine-generated OCR for document page 2.

Files containing Matter, Bearing on this Subject.
Subject
his sent to. of Namey AIM.5
you hambert w/o
UL.1949
Bug. Ratham
Cabinet Office,
26/7/49
Ncri forkerow
Great George Street,
The Adminalty did not
London, S.W.1.
proced wh me sale edition of
21st July, 1949
Ne bord dealy wh Me Evacuation
your Indive which is This upwer to
the delay in replying to
he Battle Summary on
in No! an This file
es, as you will realise,
Length and I fear we have -
imprustion I Maw June Rear
infair advantage of the
before next year.
admal Bellais Beauting
here have seen it, and
A.Bauds.
eral official policy is
nd publish the Official
Histories. One point
14/2/50
to it might be preferable
ipate, this programme by
torical studies of
urse, find their place
Histories. We do not
point, or to press it,
suggest that it
---posed to publish we assume that
and the Air Ministry, both of whom are concerned,
will be given an opportunity of seeing the manuscript.
Several points of detail have been noted here, which seem
to call for modification. I give them as examples only. We
have not subjected the whole text to a detailed critical scrutiny.
Pages 8 & 9. Is it the right perspective to suggest that
the Navy were alone in urging that evacuation should be from a
port rather than from the beaches? Would not evacuation from a
port be accepted by anyone as the preferable course, if it could
be carried out? If the point is that the Navy thought it would
be possible to use a port, or ports, and others did not, this
(assuming it is accurate) is not clearly brought out.
Page 26. Does not the statement that the army "with little
more than rifles had defeated the German Armour" go a bit too
far? (Incidentally, I am told the parallel with Agincourt is
open to be criticised on the ground that at Agincourt the
victorious troops had the advantage of a new long-range weapon,
the long bow).
Page 47. "This was the first time the Germans laid magnetic
mines by aircraft during the dark hours". That is, the first
time during Operation DYNAMO?
I hope that you will acquit us of any desire, in mentioning
these points, to indulge in carping criticism. It is just that
we feel that the text should be gone over for a final check-up
on details, if it is proposed to proceed to publication.
Yours sincerely,
(SGD.) A. B. ACHESON.
Captain R.G. Onslow, D.S.O.,R.N.,
D.T.S.D. (Naval Staff),
Admiralty, S.W.1.