TNA CAB 103 191

6B
116
CAB
103
CLOSED
UNTIL
1981
191

Files containing Matter, Bearing on this Subject.
Subject his sent to. of Namey AIM.5
you hambert w/o
UL.1949
Bug. Ratham
Cabinet Office,
26/7/49
Ncri forkerow
Great George Street,
The Adminalty did not
London, S.W.1.
proced wh me sale edition of
21st July, 1949
Ne bord dealy wh Me Evacuation your Indive which is This upwer to the delay in replying to he Battle Summary on in No! an This file es, as you will realise,
Length and I fear we have -
imprustion I Maw June Rear infair advantage of the before next year.
admal Bellais Beauting here have seen it, and
A.Bauds.
eral official policy is nd publish the Official
Histories. One point
14/2/50
to it might be preferable ipate, this programme by torical studies of urse, find their place
Histories. We do not point, or to press it, suggest that it
---posed to publish we assume that and the Air Ministry, both of whom are concerned, will be given an opportunity of seeing the manuscript.
Several points of detail have been noted here, which seem to call for modification. I give them as examples only. We have not subjected the whole text to a detailed critical scrutiny.
Pages 8 & 9. Is it the right perspective to suggest that the Navy were alone in urging that evacuation should be from a port rather than from the beaches? Would not evacuation from a port be accepted by anyone as the preferable course, if it could be carried out? If the point is that the Navy thought it would be possible to use a port, or ports, and others did not, this
(assuming it is accurate) is not clearly brought out.
Page 26. Does not the statement that the army "with little more than rifles had defeated the German Armour" go a bit too far? (Incidentally, I am told the parallel with Agincourt is open to be criticised on the ground that at Agincourt the victorious troops had the advantage of a new long-range weapon, the long bow).
Page 47. "This was the first time the Germans laid magnetic mines by aircraft during the dark hours". That is, the first time during Operation DYNAMO?
I hope that you will acquit us of any desire, in mentioning these points, to indulge in carping criticism. It is just that we feel that the text should be gone over for a final check-up on details, if it is proposed to proceed to publication.
Yours sincerely,
(SGD.) A. B. ACHESON.
Captain R.G. Onslow, D.S.O.,R.N.,
D.T.S.D. (Naval Staff),
Admiralty, S.W.1.

Capies sent W. no Newsy AIM.5
y hambert w/o days
26JUL.1949
Bug. Ratham
ABINET 68/67 Cabinet Office,
26/7/49
Great George Street,
London, S.W.1.
21st July, 1949
My dear Onslow,
I owe you profound apologies for the delay in replying to your letter of the 14th April about the Battle Summary on
"Evacuation from Dunkirk". It requires, as you will realise, some time to read a document of this length and I fear we have -
at a period of some pressure - taken unfair advantage of the fact that publication was not proposed before next year.
Professor Butler and others interested here have seen it, and this letter represents our joint views.
on the question of principle, general official policy is reflected in the decisions to prepare and publish the Official
Histories and the so-called Preliminary Histories. One point of view which has been expressed is that it might be preferable not to extend, and in some degree anticipate, this programme by the official publication of special historical studies of particular operations, which will, of course, find their place in both the Official and the Preliminary Histories. We do not in the least wish to be dogmatic on this point, or to press it, if the Admiralty feel otherwise. But we suggest that it deserves consideration.
If the Admiralty are disposed to publish we assume that the War Office and the Air Ministry, both of whom are concerned, will be given an opportunity of seeing the manuscript.
Several points of detail have been noted here, which seem to call for modification. I give them as examples only. We have not subjected the whole text to a detailed critical scrutiny.
Pages 8 & 9. Is it the right perspective to suggest that the Navy were alone in urging that evacuation should be from a port rather than from the beaches? Would not evacuation from a port be accepted by anyone as the preferable course, if it could be carried out? If the point is that the Navy thought it would be possible to use a port, or ports, and others did not, this
(assuming it is accurate) is not clearly brought out.
Page 26. Does not the statement that the army "with little more than rifles had defeated the German Armour" go a bit too far? (Incidentally, I am told the parallel with Agincourt is open to be criticised on the ground that at Agincourt the victorious troops had the advantage of a new long-range weapon, the long bow).
Page 47. "This was the first time the Germans laid magnetic mines by aircraft during the dark hours". That is, the first time during Operation DYNAMO?
I hope that you will acquit us of any desire, in mentioning these points, to indulge in carping criticism. It is just that we feel that the text should be gone over for a final check-up on details, if it is proposed to proceed to publication.
Yours sincerely,
(SGD.) A. B. ACHESON.
Captain R.G. Onslow, D.S.O.,R.N.,
D.T.S.D. (Naval Staff),
Admiralty, S.W.1.

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Tactical and Staff Duties Division,
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CABINET 68/67
26JUL1949 REGISTRY
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Dear Acheson
Onslow wrote to you on 14th account April of last concerning Captain "Dynamo". a proposal Could to publish you please an let Professor me know
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CABINET OFFICE
No.: Whitehall 5422
HISTORICAL SECTION
26JUL1949
8, BARTON STREET
S.W.I
CABINET 68/67 REGISTRY REGISTRATION
A.B. Acheson, Esq.
I have the following remarks to make on the publication of the enclosed work "The evacuation from Dunkirk".
(a)
In General such a book might have been fairly issued It as a pamphlet in my opinion, a pity to publish it now for
I think through the M.O.I. during the War.
would I think be, the public would expect a more objective study.
contains many mis-statements and inaccuracies should be in regard It to the operations on land which corrected.
written as a "Boost" for the Navy. the It other may
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with Issuess L- the L. h batendy lenting hi Say, arthe introduction res members below Examper) that. from Danlish who then to while il up in a whole book: to Claim that the whole Susan was Sulerely The
15 the Daoy; h fur no credit- hR Eurn to mention, in the mlroduction- the lonk ofthe am fore; & sag that is was they have alone who gor. the hoops mhi the boats; non and
Simh Claim that all the credit g the work one by Something like boo naval
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Ihe any forgut. Lu the last mindi. Cased in i. him 6- imply, that hm drad while the Havy n the great. lower shalled the army become Losh also was only p 7.
The description you Campayn m 10.7. sereach me almose whosly insecurate
What er lypease frfuling relreal"? The whole syshe B.E.F frighting m the Sealence" Small delaging achous by non then p8.
Irp per. Coruler allack wattroy head 'ay' fikes means the 20% it. is malcurati.
It on then payer that. operation Iynamo was non, afterall, planned whithy by the apprare Many as Clament in the for her the Was april shipping are membined.
the last has " suu describing the 20d (whech is the "herel. day" to the first Conferum on of Evastuation) K was nor them Chas that Calais was finally Cul. of the ganerori
Brulogue was m Evactuated Tell may 24th. also / true. of d. can h law twice.
as accurately that Osocrozer blrw up the boal. of Boulogue", than oral as any -
th is nn true 6- Support That this army woshers Edacualion from the breaker toach in p.g.
The navy was light m wroking L- use a post. The parlicular manungler for aug same man prefers a pare first " availables.
"on may 20. the Garing trops 4 BEF Rachew Dunder is meaninglen and the the of par is wholly curtre. The treyrain quoters warsene the by ardress in the 27th May Rd Sml. adam was no apposued to oyann afrime of the permiter we Mayab.
The france par is only half true. Evacualion Standard before Agnams about. -
the German were were aware gir. By the them
30000 has already are Evacuated. (Sa also by 26.)
and do on. an the bornad healong to h for too Carelently in
Wheten, implied special than undames wh lead is me full all than saw Drun open " guaram. m 10.26. for all is wheneom (r que nutrus) 6. Say that have hate here than Tyles they has Mr. German armoun." made mm wrater by new comparing long it with. defrated ag in Court when the victorm Urops has the advantage go Paugh wrapon m the dong how.
See
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I am surprised that the Admiralty should be willing to sponsor a book written as this is, but that is their affair. I don't think it will hurt anyone but themselves. But it seems to me to be patently untrue to say, as the introduction does, (to mention but one example) that the evacuation from Dunkirk was "unspectacular"
and then to write it up in a whole book: to claim that the whole success was entirely due to the Navy; to give no credit - not even to mention, in the introduction - the work of the Air Force; to say that it was the Navy alone who got the troops into the boats,*
and even to claim thatall the credit of the work by something like
600 non naval craft belongs to the Navy.
P.
4
The first para on page 4 is a queer description of an
"unspectacular" operation!
p.
4
Lord Gort had warned the Cabinet that evacuation from Dunkirk might be moved on May 19 and the Admiralty began considering it that day. Operation Dynamo began on May 26. Is this so "audden"
for the Navy?
p. 5
2nd para. The Army didn't all "wait on the beaches" while the minute. And is it true to imply that while the Navy had the gallant navy did all the work. The Army fought till the last great losses stated the Army personnel lost at sea was only
"hundreds".
p.7
The description of the Campaign on p.7 seems to me almost wholly inaccurate. What is a "typical fighting retreat"? The whole of the B.E.F. fighting is discussed in the sentence "small delaying actions by non combatants".
Counter attack "next day" if this means the 20th it p. 8
Top is inaccurate. para. It appears on this page that operation in Dynamo the was not, introduction, for here the War Office and Ministry of Shipping after all, planned wholly by the Navy as claimed
If to the first conference on evacuation) it was not then are the last para is still describing the 20th (which is the mentioned.
"next day" that Calais was finally cut off and the garrison can at be Boulogne said clear evacuated till May 24th. Also I doubt if it then was accurately not that Destroyers "blew up the port of Boulogne" or at any time.
p. 9
It is - "the Navy was right" in wishing to use a port. a This not true to suggest that the Army wished evacuation from the particular beaches boast is meaningless for any sane man prefers port if it is available. 20th the leading troops of the B.E.F. reached untrue. Dunkirk" The is meangingless quoted was sent by Mr Eden on the 27th May. Gen till Adam was
"on May and the end of this para is wholly not telegram approached to organise the defence of the perimeter
May 26th.
The final and para the Germans were well aware of it. By the also page Dynamo is only half true. Evacuation started before time
Dynamo started about 30,000 had already been evacuated (see 26).
And carelessly so written and full all of implied I have had or explicit seems open mis-statements. to question.
on. All the potted history seems to me to be far too on I have p.36 not for read instance it all it but than is ridiculous rifles they (and had quite defeated untrue) it the with German to say
Armour". Agincourt that "with This when little is the more made victorious more ridiculous bow. troops had by the comparing advantage of a new long range weapon in the long
* See for instance the photo opposite p.70.

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Director of Tactical and Staff Duties Division,
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Honght answer if was mmB a rom maltur pain tn wuman about the land
Whitehall,
S.W.1.
26JUL
1949
S.W
68/67
14th April, 1949.
NET
REGISTRY
21/4/49
My dear Acheson,
Some time ago the Admiralty Historical Section under Rear
Admiral Bellairs produced a Battle Summary on the Evacuation from
Dunkirk. Captain Dick, my predecessor thought that it was an outstanding work and proposed that in due course the Admiralty should publish a sale edition of the book. The then Assistant Chief of Naval
Staff thought well of the idea and directed that the subject was to be raised later.
The Historical Section has now produced a version suitable for publication through the Stationery Office. The Central Office of Information have seen the attached draft and say that they are willing to consider publishing the book, or rather booklet, in a cheap form similar to wartime productions such as "East of Malta, West of Suez" etc.
They propose that 1950, the tenth anniversary of Dunkirk would be a fitting moment for publication.
This proposal has not yet been submitted to The Board for their approval and before doing so I am anxious to clear it with
Professor Butler, and if necessary with the Cabinet Advisory Panel.
I have already made sure that Mr. Arthur Bryant has no objection to the proposal.
I understand that you will be seeing Professor Butler in a few days time so perhaps you will be good enough to obtain his ruling on the matter.
Your Suicerely,
Richard Onelow
A.B. Acheson, Esq., C.M.G.,
Room 65,
Cabinet Offices,
Great George Street,
London, S.W.1.

K
D.5.
EVACUATION OF B.E.F. FRANCE FF/97
WO 106/1618
MOI
PLAN "DYNAMO" " Box0054 11
SECRET
to the envelope so as $0.35
nel) and post marks.
MAY1940 - MAY1941
VICE
7,000M. 6/40 51-7063
S.
MO.I. Peopalches
Box 0054
ID
CHERAL M.O.4. STAFF W.O.
MAR 1941
*
*
D, M. O.
1694. Wt.80052/4466. 1000. 9/39. Wy.L.P. Gp. 656.

Register No.
DYNAMO.
Minute Sheet No.
1.
Dynamo Movement Instruction No.1. dated 24.5.40.
ENCL.1.A.
2.
"
11
11
No.2.
11
27.5.40.
Encl.2.A.
3.
Copy of Cipher from Gen. Lloyd to D.M.O. & P.
Situation Report 1720/27.
Encl.3.A.
4.
Instructions concerning the accommodation and disposal of personnel evacuated from the B.E.F. Dated 28.5.40.
Encl.4.A.
5.
Progress Report Midnight 19/20 May to Midnight 26/27 May. Encl.5.A.
6.
11
11
11
26/27
11
to
11
27/28. 11
Encl.6.A.
7.
11
11
"
27/28
11
"
11
28/29
11
Encl.7.A.
8
11
11
11
28/29
"
11
11
29/30. "
Encl.8.A.
9.
11
11
1/
29/30
11
" Midday
30th
"
Encl.9.A.
10.
"
11
Midday
30th
"
"
Midnight
30/31
11
Encl.10.A.
11.
Instructions as at Enc. 4.A.
Encl.11.A.
12.
Copy of Telephone conversation with C. in C.
Encl.12.A.
13
Progress Report Midnight 30/31 to Midday 31 May.
Encl.13.A.
14.
11
11
Midday
31
to Midnight 31/1st June.
Encl.14.A.
15.
11
"
Midnight 30/31 to 31st May.
Encl.15.A.
16.
11
11
31/1st June to 1.6.40.
Encl.16.A.
17.
If
"
Midnight 31/1 June Midday 1.6.40.
Encl.17.A.
18.
11
"
Midday 1.6.40. to Midnight 132 June.
Encl.18.A.
19.
11
"
Midnight 132 to Midday 2.6.40.
Encl.19.A.
"
"
20.
Midday 2.6.40. to Midnight 2/3.
Encl.20.A.
"
11
21.
24. Hours ending Midnight 2/3.6.40.
Encl.21.A.
"
"
22.
Midnight 2/3.6.40. to Midday 3.6.40.
Encl.22.A.
"
"
23.
Midday 3.6.40. to Midnight 3/4.6.40.
Encl.23.A.
"
11
24.
Midday 4.6.40. to Midnight 4/5.6.40.
Encl.24.A.
25.
Admiralty Cypher dated 4.6.40. ( cmored)
Encl.25.A.
26. Progress Report Midnight 3/4 June to midday 4/6/40.
Encl.26A.
27. Notes on Dynamo Plan. d. 1/6/40.
Encl.27A.
28. Copy of minute re Evacuation of Allies from North Area.
d. 2/6/40.
Encl.28A.
(6441) Wt. 27714/4338. 300M. 9/39. P.I. 51-4832.
[P.T. Over

SECRET
WAR OFFICE NOTE ON DUNKIRK EVACUATION
a
29-F
Up to 30th May, 1940, the arrangement was that British troops were to be taken off in British ships and French troops in
French ships. Notwithstanding this arrangement up to noon 31st
May 14,811 French troops in addition to 149,642 British had arrived in this country in British ships. The number taken off in French ships is not known but the Admiralty had the impression that the
VEIDA LOLID
French Navy made very little effort and that no en rective steps had been taken to collect French coastal shipping.
girls
On the night 30/31 May Lord Gort received orders that equal numbers of French and British troops were to be taken off in
British ships. It was decided that the final night of evacuation was to be 1/2 June. Evacuation by daylight was no longer possible as the only channel was covered by enemy guns and his air action was incessant. On the morning 1st June alone we lost six ships by enemy bombing.
.on (tood?
Notwithstanding the former decision the evacuation was continued up to and including the night 3/4 June.
Major General
Alexander and the last of the British troops left Dunkirk in the amp COULOR
early morning of 3rd June. This withdrawal was made in full agreement with Admiral Abrial who said he had sufficient French troops to hold the perimeter and asked only for British naval and air assistance during night 3/4 June. At considerable risk to - our shipping taking part this assistance was given.
During the period after the decision to take off equal numbers of French and British troops the numbers brought off in
British ships were
ОИ
British
74,943
French
97,735.
The total numbers including wounded during the whole period of evacuation were
British
224,585
French
112,546.
The two main reasons for the disparity in total numbers are
(a) Failure of French Navy to make an effort to assist in evacuation.
bolf of
(b) Failure of French High Command to issue any orders as to evacuation.
(c) French Commanders insistence that his troops were too tired to continue withdrawal to the coast, had resulted in their failure to reach гньыие VDAICE ФЕГІЛЕКА
Dunkirk while evacuation was still possible.
The War Office.
3rd May, 1941.
noti шолетов!
Constanor of
TO clobori

Desputehed consignee.
(FL)
No. of Packages,
Landed.
(13)
B.M43 - Evacuation of allies from harth 28A area
Shut
Out.
(12)
C.I.G.S.
Shipped.
(11)
1. At 1(A) is a copy of the telegram received from No.1
Mission at 2130 hours last night. Copies of the War
Where stowed.
Office messages referred to in that telegram are at
1(B) to 1(E).
(01)
Not unnaturally there is some difference in emphasis between these War Office messages according to the person to whom they were addressed and to the changing situation.
Weight.
Cwt.
(9)
2. Since the probable hour of receipt of 1(D) by No.1
Mission the following two messages have been sent:-
(A) From War Office to Madelon. 1845 hours, 1 June.
Tons.
(No.72794 Cipher)
(S)
Following from P.M. to Gen. Spears for Gen. Weygand.
Crisis in evacuation now reached. Five Fighter
Shipping Tons.
Ft.
(2)
squadrons acting almost continuously is most we can do, but six ships, several filled with troops, sunk by bombing this morning. Artillery fire
Tons.
(6)
menacing only practicable channel. Enemy closing in on reduced bridgehead. By trying to hold on until
No. of
Packtomorrow we may lose all. By going tonight much ages.
(5)
may certainly be saved though much will be lost.
Situation cannot be fully judged only by Admiral
Abrial in the fortress, nor by you, nor by us here.
We have therefore ordered General Alexander,
Marks.
Commanding British Sector on bridgehead, to judge in
($)
consultation with Admiral Abrial whether to try to stay over tomorrow or not. Trust you will agree.
(B) From C.I.G.S. 1940 hours, 1 June to S.N.O. Dunkirk.
Following for General Alexander.
contents.
We do not order any fixed moment for evacuation.
You are to hold on as long as possible in order that
DUE
the maximum number of French and British may be evacuated. Impossible from here to judge local situation. In close co-operation with Admiral Abrial
(3)
you must act in this matter on your own judgment.
3. The present situation is obscure but Brig. Morgan thinks that the reduced perimeter 1s now being held by the remaining elements of 12,23 and 68 French Divs. with an unknown number of disorganised troops further in rear. No more than 500 probably remain in command General Alexander and these are probably holding the short line immediately covering the quay at Dunkirk from the East.
No.
Brig. Leese states that in his opinion the difficulty
(2)
has been to get the French to evacuate. They appear to have some idea that the perimeter can be held for a considerable period during which some at least of the troops of the French First Army who refuse to withdraw from the
Lille area might manage to make their way back to Dunkirk.
Only during the last two days have they made any real attempt to get away.
As you know evacuation by day is now impossible and has become increasingly difficult by night. The opinion of the Military Commander, who is in touch with situation on the front, 1.0. General Alexander, was that evacuation should have been completed on night 1-2 June and certain]
must be completed on night 2-5 June. Admiral Abrial, however, takes a different view, but as he sits in the

E
bastion one need not attach much weight to his opinion.
The French were given certain berths in Dunkirk and a complete beach but their lack of control has greatly increased the difficulties of evacuation.
France In my opinion evacuation must be completed tonight.
It is not fair to expect the Navy to go on with this business just because the French cannot, or will not, organise a complete evacuation.
4. I suggest that a letter should be sent to General Weygand by you and to M. Reynaud by the Prime Minister. General
Howard-Vyse is sending a letter which will arrive by air this afternoon making some suggestions for your letter.
On 26 May Captain Eacarthy went to DUNKIRK with Captain
Tunnant R.N. witho took with him 11 Officers and 150 Ratings.
This party arrived at PANKIRK at 1700 hours. Captain and Captain Macarthy saw Q.M.G. B.E.F. and Captain
Macarthy handed the latter R letter from D.Q.M.G.(A). They discussed the plan. Col. Warner also
2/6/40. 1es with orders to see the A.C.I.G.S.(A)
and also the 0.1n C. He did not however see the latter.
Q(M)2 New already taken up some 20 MOTO personnel ships and had offered more small craft to the Admiralty than they appeared to require.
4.
Captain Macarthy returned early on 28 May and reported to
V.A. Dover. He had also impressed on Caphain Tennant the vital importance of Edeping liaison with Col. Hewar (Q.K. 0.9.211
and he again urged the importance of this on V.A. Dover.
In fact this linison did not function for about 48 hours.
5. It WBB about 27 May that the NATY really got busy taking up small craft. Progressively since that day they have adoured the country to obtain what they required.
6. The complaints from the B.E.F. as regards the numbers of email craft and the lack of SS proper Navel beach organisation have at once been passed over to Gon. Loyd or to the
Admiralty.
7. In considering the steps taken it should be realised that the original problem WILB to take men off through the evailable ports, which might well have included Ostand and Calais as well as Dunkirk, and also that 10 was at first thought that all that could be done was one rush for the first 40 hours 1 The evacuation Textending over several days primarily from beaches was not realisga and about
28 HERE shich hastend that of
8. The figures 1.21 the attached table show how the numbers evacuated have prograssively increased.
9. Beyond the provision of Marines who may have been availabie;
or Naval personnel, who probably were 16 is difficult to 800 what more the Savy have done to assist the evacuation. The cast that Lisison has not worked very woll between the 8.5.0. and appears mainly to be due to the Naval Officers not to the organisation created.

27A
SECRET
NOTES ON DYNAMO PLAN
1. The attached table shows the numbers brought off from
France by the Navy and landed in the U.K. under the
Dynamo Plan.
2. On Thursday, 23rd May, there was a meeting at Dover between
Vice-Admiral, Dover, A.C.I.G.S. (A), General Loyd and Lt.-Col.
Napier in which the outline plan prepared by Q(M)2 was discussed. It was based on the bonts CALAIS and, DUNKIRK and OSTEND
being available.
3. On 26 May Captain Macarthy went to DUNKIRK with Captain
Tennant R.N. who took with him 11 Officers and 150 Ratings.
This party arrived at DUNKIRK at 1700 hours. Captain
Tennant and Captain Macarthy saw Q.M.G. B.E.F. and Captain
Macarthy handed the latter a letter from D.Q.M.G. (A). They there discussed the plan. Col. Warner also accompanied these parties with orders to see the Q.M.G. to get his plan and also the C.in C. He did not however see the latter.
Navy
Q(M)2 had already taken up some 20 more personnel ships and had offered more small craft to the Admiralty than they appeared to require.
4. Captain Macarthy returned early on 28 May and reported to
V.A. Dover. He had also impressed on Captain Tennant the vital importance of keeping liaison with Col. Hewar (Q.M. G.H.Q.)
and he again urged the importance of this on V.A. Dover.
In fact this liaison did not function for about 48 hours.
5. It was about 27 May that the Navy really got busy taking up small craft. Progressively since that day they have scoured the country to obtain what they required.
6. The complaints from the B.E.F. as regards the numbers of small craft and the lack of a proper Naval beach organisation have at once been passed over to Gen. Loyd or to the
Admiralty.
7. In considering the steps taken it should be realised that the original problem was to take men off through the available ports, which might well have included Ostend and Calais as well as Dunkirk, and also that it was at first thought that all that could be done was one rush for the first 48 hours That The evacuation would over several days primarily from beaches was not realised until about
28 May. also Shich 5 as until did not hear of HE my
8. The figures in the attached table show how the numbers evacuated have progressively increased.
9. Beyond the provision of Marines, who may have been available;
or Naval personnel, who probably were not; available it is difficult to see what more the Navy could have done to assist the evacuation. The fact that liaison has not worked very well between the S.N.O. and G.H.Q. appears mainly to be due to the Naval Officers concerned and not to the organisation created.

OF
A
was sound
BONSTY ent
10. "I am convinced, in Dover any case, with that V.A. the Dover, decision, General together,Ito Loyd
Omenya run Q
27th and and THE and the Naval
STUDT
88th по
20th to authorities be fixed up on the spot - working in conjunction 48,000 with
30th
V.A. Dover was sound. 12,200
59,000
Slot
47,000
Sated теплет as
.8
вллет eidT
ISOBY
Tent adds the
Sdy eo iv
100%
M.O.4
1/6/40

150
the
Movement Control,
War Office.
SECRET
Personnel returned from B.E.F. (Dynamo Plan).
FINAL PROGRESS REPORT, MIDDAY 4 JUNE to MIDNIGHT 4/5 JUNE 1940.
British
Allies
Trains
Remarks
Fit
Casualties
Fit
Casualties
Harwich
Sheerness
1
470
Margate
1
538
Ramsgate
4
5
1516
Dover
10
5654
Folkestone
3
1333
Hastings
Eastbourne
Newhaven
Brighton
=
Southampton
Clacton
27
Total
19
5
9538
9,543
Total to date
572
211,265
13,053
110,877
1,230
336,425
Q(M) 2a.
5/6/40.
SEARAIL.
NOTE: The evacuated totals from to date includo Fit 21,410, Casualties 4,992, Allies 1534
midnight 19th/20th May to midnight 26/27th May.
The finures are based on check into trains and may not be accurate.
Distribution:
P.S. to P.M.
P.S. to S. of S.
D.G.
C.I.G.S.
D.H.D. & A.A.
A.G.
D.G.A.M.S.
Q.M.G.
D.S.T.
P.U.S.
D.O.S.
D.M.O. D.S.D. & P. (2 copies)
D.P.R.
S.D. 1.
D.R.O.
A.K. 1.
D.Q.M.G. (A)
M.O. 4.
D.G.M.G. (B)
Mob. 1.
D. Nov.
Admiralty (Capt. Joffroy) (4 copies)

This should have cone
Hynamofil Kepthy
14
MOUG. who SECRET 416
26A
Personnel returned from B.E.F. (Dynamo Plan).
PROGRESS REPORT, midnight 3/4 June to midday 4 June, 1940.
British
Allies
Trains
Remarks
Fit
Casualties
Fit
Casualties
Harwich
Sheerness
Margate
4
2135
Ramsgate
4
2184
Dover
17
2
9518
Folkestone
6
2827
Hastings
Eastbourne
Newhaven
Brighton
Southampton
=
Total today
31
2
16664
16666
Total to date
553
211260
13053
101339
1230
326882
Q(M)2.a.
SEARAIL.
4/6/40
NOTE: The totals to date include Fit 21,410, Casualties 4,992, Allies 1,534
evacuated from midnight 19th/20th May to midnight 26th/27th May.
The figures are based on check into trains and may not be accurate,
Distribution: P.S. to P.M.
D.Q.
P.S. to S. of S.
D.H.D. & A.A.
C.I.G.S.
D.G.A.M.S.
A.G.
D.S.T.
Q.M.G.
D.O.S.
P.U.S.
D.P.R.
D.M.O. & P. (2 copies)
S.D.1.
D.S.D.
A.G.1.
D.R.O.
M.O.4.
D.Q.M.G. (A).
Mob.1.
D.Q.M.G.(B).
D. Mov,
Admiralty (Capt. Jeffrey) (4 copies)

Dynamo. File R/666
SECRET
Personnel returned from B.E.F. (Dynamo Plan).
PROGRESS REPORT, midday 3rd June to midnight 3rd/4th June.
British
Allies
Trains
Remarks
Fit
Casualties
Fit
Casualties
Harwich
Sheerness
2
15
960
Margate
Ramsgate
4
1691
Dover
5
106
49
2619
101
Folkestone
Hastings
Eastbourne
Newhaven
Brighton
Southampton
Total today
11
121
49
5270
101
5541
Total to date
522
211,258
13,053
84,675
1,230
310,216.
Q(M)2.a.
SEARAIL.
4/6/40.
Note: The totals to date include Fit 21,410, Casualties 4,992, Allies 1,53
evacuated from midnight 19th/20th May to midnight 26th/27th May.
The figures are based on check into trains and may not be accurate.
Distribution: P.S. to P.M.
D.Q.
P.S. to S. of S.
D.H.D. & A.A.
C.I.G.S.
D.G.A.M.S.
A.G.
D.S.T.
Q.M.G.
D.O.S.
P.U.S.
D.P.R.
D.M.O. & P (2 copies)
S.D.1.
D.S.D.
A.G.1.
D.R.O.
M.O.4.
D.Q.M.G. (A).
Mob.1.
D.Q.M.G. (B).
D. Mov.
Admiralty (Capt. Jeffrey) (4 copies).

R. 65b
251/8
SECRET
MOVEMENT CONTROL,
WAR FFICE.
Personnel returned from B.E.F. (Dynamo Plan).
PROGRESS REPORT, Midnight 2nd/3rd June to midday 3rd June.
British
Allies
Trains
Remarks
Fit
Casualties
Fit
Casualties arwich
Sheerness
1
403
Margate
6
3166
334
Ramsgate
4
1992
Dover
20
4388
240
7092
Folkestone
10
2046
2578
Hastings
Eastbourne
Newhaven
Brighton
Southampton
Total today
41
6434
240
15231
334
22,239
TOTAL TODATE
512
211,137
13,004
79,808
1,129
305,078
Q(M) 2a.
SEARAIL.
3/6/40.
NOTE: The totals to date include Fit 21,410, Casualties 4,992, Allies 1,534
evacuated from midnight 19th/20th May to midnight 26th/27th May.
The figures are based on check into trains and may not be accurate.
Distribution: P.S. to P.M.
D.Q.
P.S. to S. of S.
D.H.D. & A.A.
C.I.G.S.
D.G.A.M.S.
A.G.
D.S.T.
Q.M.G.
D.O.S.
P.U.S.
D.P.R.
D.M.O. & P (2 copies)
S.D. 1.
D.S.D.
A.G. 1.
D.R.O.
M.O. 4.
D.Q.M.G. (A).
Mob. 1.
D.Q.M.G. (B).
Admiralty (Capt.Jeffrey) (4 copies)
D. Mov.

30.
19
SECRET.
Personnel returned from B.E.F. (Dynamo Plan).
PROGRESS REPORT, midnight 1/2 June to midday 2 June, 1940.
British
Allies
Trains
Remarks
Fit
Casualties
Fit
Casualties
Harwich
Sheerness
Margate
6
1288
1535
Ramsgate
8
2154
1983
Dover
21
8698
122
4212
Folkestone
Hastings
Eastbourne
Newhaven
Brighton
Southampton
Total today
35
12140
122
7730
-
19992
Total to date
459
202605
12764
59866
795
276030
21410
4992
27936
181195
7.772
Note. The totals to date include - Fit 21,410, Casualties 4992,
245099
Allics 1534 evacuated from midnight 19/20 to midnight 26/27 May.
The figuros are based on check into trains and may not be accurate.
27,936
Q(M)2.a.
2/6/40
SEARAIL.
Di
Distribution:- P.S. to S. of S.
D.Q.
C.I.G.S.
D.H.D. & A.A.
A.G.
D.G.A.M.S.
Q.M.G.
D.S.T.
P.U.S.
D.O.S.
D.M.O. & P. 2 copies
D.P.R.
D.S.D.
S.D.1.
D.R.O.
A.G.1.
D.Q.M.G. (A)
M.O.4.
D.Q.M.G. (B)
Mob.1.
D.Mov.
Admiralty (Capt.Jeffrey) 4 copies

15%
Passed to CIOS
7155
SECRET.
with morning 18 Telepams
Personnel returned from B.E.F. (Dynamo Plan).
PROGRESS REPORT, MIDDAY 1 JUNE to MIDNIGHT 1/2 JUNE 1940
British
Allios.
Trains
Ramarks,
Fit
Casualties
Fit.
Casualties,
Harwich
Sheerness
5
1694
594
Margate
9
2761
2052
.
Ramsgate
10
1061
4112
Dover
26
9513
609
6236
256
Folkestone
14
1748
4711
Hastings
Eastbourne
Newhaven
Brighton
Southampton
Total today
64
16,777
609
17,705
256
35,347
Total to date
424
190,465
12,642
52,136
795
256,038
197,876
12,850
55,179
795
06002
Amendments
Report for period midnight 19/20 to 26/27 May, on 24. May Dover
266700
S
for 1284 read 29 and reduce total of fit by 1255 to read 21,410.
Totals have been corrected in this report.
S
Note.
The totals to date include - Fit 21,410, Casualties 4992,
Allies 1534 evacuated from midnight 19/20 to midnight 26/27 May.
The figures are based on check into trains and may not be accurate.
Q(M)2(a)
2/6/40.
"SEARAIL"
Note:- Figures are based on check into trains and may not be accurate.
Distribution:-
P.S. to S. of S.
D.Q.
C.I.G.S.
D.H.D. & A.A.
A.G.
D.G.A.M.S.
Q.M.G.
D.S.T.
P.U.S.
D.O.S.
D.M.O. &P. 2 copies
D.P.R.
D.S.D.
S.D.1.
D.R.O.
A.G.1.
D.Q.M.G. (A)
M.O.4,
D.Q.M.G. (B)
Mob.1.
D.Mov.
Admiralty (Capt.Jeffrey) 4 copies

14 R/64
R/64b, mr
14
SECRET.
Personnel returned from B E.F. (Dynamo Plan).
PROGRESS REPORT, Midday 31 May to Midnight 31 May/1 June.
Trains
Fit
Casualties
Allies
Remarks
Harwich
4
1896
23
6
Sheerness
2
831
82
Margate
10
3931
603
Ramsgate
4
2436
13
Dover
28
9776
592
5759
Folkestone
8
2224
1384
Hastings
Eastbourne
Newhaven
597
Brighton
Southampton
Total today
56
21094
1212
7847
30,153.
Total to date 312
160963
10620
22658
194,241.
The totals to date include Fit 22625 Casualties 4992 Allies 1534.
Evacuated from m.n.19/20 May to m.n.26/27 May already published.
Amendments.
In last report - Margate - for 7 trains read 6 and for 2559 Fit read 2194.
Totals have been corrected in this report.
Q(H)2(a)
"SEARAIL"
1/6/40.
Note:- Figures are based on check into trains and may not be quite accurate.
Distribution:-
P.S. to S. of S.
D.Q.
C.I.G.S.
D.H.D.&A.A.
A.G.
D.G.A.M.S.
Q.M.G.
D.S.T.
P.U.S.
D.O.S.
D.M.O.& P.
D.P.R.
D.S.D.
S.D.1.
D.R.O.
A.G.1.
D.Q.M.G. (A)
M.O.4.
D.Q.M.G. (B).
M.I.L.
D. Mov.

R/64 6.
SECRET.
Personnel roturned from B.E.F. (Dynamo Plan).
PROGRESS REPORT, MIDNIGHT 30/31i to MIDDAY 31 MAY 1940
Trains
Fit
Casualties
Allies
Remarks
Harwich
Sheerness
2
990
2194
Margate
7
2559
529
Ramsgate
5
2694
Dover
37
18203
2334
Folkestone
4
618
1539
Hastings
Eastbourne
Newhaven
1
178
Brighton
Southamphon
5/6
24694
Total today
55
25064
178
4402
Total to date.
257
140234
9408
14811
These figures include Fit 22625 Casualties 4992 Allios 1534
evacuated from midnight 19/20 May to midnight 26/27 May already publishod
(M)2(a)
31/5/40.
SEARAIL.
Note:- Figures are based on check into trains and may not be accurate.
Distribution:- P.S. to S. of S.
D.Q.
C.I.G.S.
D.H.D.& A.A.
A.G.
D.G.A.M.S.
Q.M.G.
D.S.T.
P.U.S.
D.O.S.
D.M.O. &P. 2 copies
D.P.R.
D.S.D.
S.D.1.
D.R.O.
A.G.1.
D.Q.M.G, (A)
M.O.4.
D.Q.M.G. (B)
Mob.1.
D.Mov.
Admiralty (Capt,Jeffroy) 4 copies

Need amended Copy.
till. 2.1./5539 with A150 HOST STORET.
30/5/40
THE WAR OFFICE,
WHITEHALL, S.W.1.
28 May, 1940.
INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING THE ACCO, ODATION AND DISPOSAL
OF PERSONNEL EVACUATED FROM THE B.E.F.
1.
The Plan: falls into three Phases:-
Phase (1) The receeption of personnel according to
"Dynamo" lan and their indiscriminate allocation to
Reception Areas already specified, namely:-
Aldershot Command
30,000
Southern Command
150,000
Western Command
80,000
Northern Command
40,000
Phase (2) The re-distribution of:-
(a) Divisional Troops to selected new Divisional
Areas,
(b) Corps and G.H.Q. Troops by arms to various
"Re-organisation Centres".
Phase (3) The final re-distribution of Corps and G.H.Q.
Troops from "Re-organisation Centres" to new Corps Areas.
2.
PHASE (1) has already been implemented and is proceeding according to "Dynamo" Hovement Instructions Q(LI) 2.a/43 Nos. 1 & 2, of 25/4/40 and 27/5/40 respectively.
3.
PHASE (2) (i) G.H.Q. personnel to re-assemble in LONDON AREA.
(ii) Divisional Troops will be sent from their Reception
Areas to their Divisional Areas, which are allocated by Commands as follows:-
NORTHERN COMMAND.
1 Division
Yorkshire Administrative
Area LEEDS and SHIFFIELD.
2 Division
Yorkshire Administrative
Area BRADFORD, HALIFAX,
HUDDERSFIELD.
12 Division
...
NORTHUHBRIAN AREA.
42 Division
I Corps
North Midland Area,
NOTTINGHAN, LEICESTER, DERBY.
SCOTTISH COMMAND.
5 Division
(including 25 Inf. Bgde) 9th Divl. Area - ELGIN -
ABERDEEN.
SOUTHERN dol HAND/..

-2-
SOUTHERN COLLAND.
3 Division
4 Division
25 Division
WARMINSTER
44 Division
II Corps
-3-
French Troops
....
Area) Area)
WESTERN COMMAND,
Area) Command.
R.A.I.C.
46 Division
To LEEDS.
48 Division
MANCHESTER
50 Division
R.A.O.C.
III Corps
HEREFORD
To CHILWELL.
(iii) Reception tion Corps and G.H.Q. and Areas G.H.Q. Troops and Troops. It is that Command. -> Co
R.A.P.C.
R.A.C. Centres" in a
To LONDON AREA.
A.M.P.S.
and R.B
48, 49, 59, 62, 68, 102, 121, 122 and 123 Coys., to No.2 Training Centre CAISTE R, Northern Command.
Depot
VINCHESTER
Divisional Tank Bns, be Part sent are now there
40, 61, 78, 79, 81 and 500 Coys., to No.4 Training
Centre, CLACTON, Eastern Command.
LONDON
ReAs Horse Cavalry & Yeomanry. - BOVINGTON SOVINGTON Commani
44 and 45 Coys. to No.6 Training Centre, SKEGNESS.
Div
70 and 75 Coys., to UPPER NORWOOD Reception Depot.
conterbury
Remainder to No.1 Training Centre, WESTCLIFFE, Eastern Cmd.
Remainder A.A. Medium and and & S.L. Heave to Field TRANSFYDDYD. - Light SoL's. to Heavy Artillery LARKHILL, A.A. A.A. to to to Southern OKEHALPTON, Command. Southern Command, Command, Command
C.H. P.
to mytcheet.
P. O. W. Camps.
to HYTCHETT.
R.E.
(a)
Printing & Stationery.
(b)
Army
&
to LONDON ARE A.
(t) (g) (e) (a) (c) Miscellaneous Tunnelling Field Railway Fd. Survey to to THE Fd. to Command. Area,
Reception Camps.
THE
to LONDON AREA.
Graves and Enquiries.
to LONDON AREA.
Mobile Bath Units.
Corps G.H.Q. Signals Signals to to No.2 No.1 Signal Signal Training Training Centre, Centre, Tavistock CATTERICK. (N.C.) Command. Western Cd to LONDON AREA.
Field Service Police.
to LIYTCHETT.
NON-DIVISIONAL Pioneer, INFANTRY.
PRESTATYN,
Salvage Corps.
(W.C.)
Overseas to ALDERSHOT.
R.A.S.C. All Garrison & M/G. WESTERN
GENERAL.
Where there is a doubt as to the proper destination of personnel, they should be sent to, or retained by R.A.S.C., Southern of to Nos. Centres, Command.PAIGNTON.
AREA, Southern SOUTH
at, ALDERSHOT, and enquiries made of the War Office
(A.G.1. Branch).
Air
PHASE (3) Corps and G.H.Q. Troops after re-organisation in the various
Centres (PHASE II) will be despatched to the Corps Areas.
5./..

I SOUTH E Io is be for H, Pana notified
-3-
ASI FL < 144
/
R.A.I.C.
WIMB
To LEEDS.
ins: ti in + 20084 that STUB for III Company Personal to It I Be To E/D
(4
R.A.O.C.
To CHILWELL.
R.A.P.C.
CONWAY
To LONDON AREA.
senisa
A.M.P.S.
cherie 04 Motal
48, 49, 59, 62, 68, 102, 121, 122 and 123 Coys., to No.2 Training Centre CAISTE R, Northern Command.
x0 and I < any STOP on
40, 61, 78, 79, 81 and 500 Coys., to No.4 Training
Centre, CLACTON, Eastern Command.
Compania,
44 and 45 Coys. to No.6 Training Centre, SKEGNESS.
70 and 75 Coys., to UPPER NORWOOD Reception Depot.
Remainder to No.1 Training Centre, WESTCLIFFE, Eastern Cmd.
SOUL Signature
C.M. P.
to lytcheet.
P.O. W. Camps.
to HYTCHETT.
Printing & Stationery.
exp. heart UTH
to LONDON ARE A.
Reception Camps.
Tes KOTTA Ca to LONDON AREA.
Graves and Enquiries.
To is to LONDON AREA.
TON.
Mobile Bath Units.
to LONDON AREA.
Field Service Police.
to MYTCHETT.
Salvage Corps.
to ALDERSHOT.
GENERAL.
Where there is a doubt as to the proper destination of personnel, they should be sent to, or retained at, ALDERSHOT, and enquiries made of the War Office
(A.G.1. Branch)
A.
PHASE
(3) Corps and G.H.Q. Troops after re-organisation in the various
Centres (PHASE II) will be despatched to the Corps Areas.
5./..

onward Command are as in which for
-5-
(11)) para.3(iii) Divisis
Separate instructions as to their duties and the documents they are to take are being sent separately to all addresses of this instruction and O.C. in charge of Records.
with officers clerical available
Post. Field Service postcards are being despatched to Command person
Headquarters to arrive on the afternoon of the 29th May, 1940, by to to SOUTHERN ALDERSHOT COLLIAND.
passenger train. They will be collected as early as possible and distributed to Reception Areas. One card per man is allowed. When completed cards will be collected and handed in bulk to the nearest G.P.O. No
Composition the orders of of COLIHAND. the G.O.C. concerned franking or stamping is necessary.
If further postcards are required the Indent should be forwarded to the Army Forms Depot, to whom surplus cards should be returned.
visional, be Divisional Ps sent Battleand being despatched by ctc., will in from the Reception G.H.Q.
ponsible tted the Staffs Areas to
Major-Generals i/c Administration
ALDERSHOT, EASTERN, NORTHERN, SCOTTISH, SOUTHERN and WESTERN COMMANDS.
A.Q.I.G., LONDON Area.
take and administerthmer ther ther the first for
G.H.Q., HOME FORCES.
H.A./C.I.G.S.
antival anged blanket Reception that Areas blanket per man
Q.II.G.
D.Q.M.G(A)
D.S.D.
he
D.H.T.
blanket Corps "Re-organisation to issued on on arrival which loan,
D.H.I.
D.M.O. & P.
D.H.D. & A.A.
laced in PHASE
Centres",
D.R.O.
D.Hob.
for representatives (2) of the R.A.P.C.
D.Mov.
D.S.T.
D.O.S.
F.9.
G.H.V., 2nd Echelon.
am or 1'Sub-Units with cash and
Ranks whose Units payment. 02" Officers rders 20,000 to daily be issued at each of the by the
Chief without War Office,
Pay
Books ormations dation in accommodated London and Detention in for the dispatch para.3(1) above.
of representatives above. Echelon for to the

ble
-5-
FOR PRS
and
Separate instructions as to their duties and the documents they
(TH)
are to take are being sent separately to all addresses of this instruction and O.C. in charge of Records.
Lable
Post. Field Service postcards are being despatched to Command
Headquarters to arrive on the afternoon of the 29th May, 1940, by passenger train. They will be collected as early as possible and distributed to Reception Areas. One card per man is allowed. When completed cards will be collected and handed in bulk to the nearest G.P.O. No franking or stamping is necessary.
If further postcards are required the Indent should be forwarded to the Army Forms Depot, to whom surplus cards should be returned.
Major-Generals i/c Administration
ALDERSHOT, EASTERN, NORTHERN, SCOTTISH, SOUTHERN and WESTERN COMMANDS.
A.Q.II.G., LONDON Area.
G.H.Q., HOME FORCES.
H.A./C.I.G.S.
Q.II.G.
D.Q.M.G(A)
D.S.D.
D.H.T.
D.H.I.
D.li.o. & P.
D.H.D. & A.A.
D.R.O.
D.Hob.
D.Mov.
D.S.T.
D.O.S.
F.9.
G.H.V., 2nd Echelen.

R/636
SECRET.
Personnel returned from B.E.F. (Dynamo Plan)
PROGRESS REPORT, MIDDAY 30 MAY to MIDNIGHT 30/31 MAY.
Trains fit
Casualties
All.es
Remarks.
Harwich
Sheerness
Margate
9
4442
Ramsgate
9
2533
2048
Dover
32
14938
269
2780
Folkestone
6
667
1130
Hastings
Eastbourive
Newhaven
49
449
Brighton
Southampton
Total
56
22,629
718
5,958
Total to date 202
115,170
9,230
10,409
Amendments.
In last report - Harwichfor 650 read 549 fit and 4 Allies. In previous report
- Ramsgate for 5 read 6 trains.
Totals have been corrected in this report.
Q(M)2 A.
3135/40.
SEARAIL
Note:- Figures are based on check into trains and may not be accurate,
Distribution:- P.S. to S of S.
D. Q.
C. I. G. S.
D. H. D. & A. A.
A. G.
D. D. A. M. S.
Q. M. G.
D. S. T.
P. U. S.
D. O. S.
D. M. O. & P.
D. P. R.
D. S. D.
S. D. 1.
D. R. O.
A. G. 1.
D. Q. M. G. (A)
M. O. 4.
D. Q. M. G. (B)
Mob 1.
D. Mov.
Admiralty (Captain Jeffrey) 4 copies

8/150
9
and
SECRET.
Personnel returned from B.E.F. (Dynamo Plan).
PROGRESS REPORT, midnight 29/30 May tomidday 30. May, 1940.
Trains
Fit
Casualties
Allies
Remarks
Harwich
1
650-549 650-
4
Sheerness
Margate
3
1343
Ramsgate
7
2745
560
Dover
21
9920
258
1539
Folkestone
Hastings
Eastbourne
Newhaven
Brighton
Southampton
Total today
32
14658
258
2099
14557
2103
Total to date
145
92642
8512
4447
Q(M)2.a.
30/5/40
SEARAIL.
Note:- Figures are based on check into trains and may not be accurate.
Distribution:- P.S. to S. of S.
D.Q.
C.I.G.S.
D.H.D. & A.A.
A.G.
D.G.A.M.S.
Q.M.G.
D.S.T.
P.U.S.
D.O.S.
D.M.O. &P.
D.P.R.
D.S.D.
S.D.1.
D.R.O.
A.G.1.
D.Q.M.G. (A)
M.O.4.
D.Q.M.G. (B)
D.Mov.
Admiralty (Capt.Jeffrey) 4 copies

SECRET.
8
Personnel returned from B.E.F. (Dynamo Plan).
Progress Report, Midnight 28/29 to Midnight 29/30
Trains
Fit
Casualties
Allies
Remarks
Harwich
Sheerness
2
903
Margate
12
6429
Ramsgate
5
2508
5
Dover
44
21897
791
748
Folkestone
10
5393
Hastings
Eastbourne
Newhaven
1
326
716
#
:
Brighton
Southampton
Total today
74
37456
1507
753
Total to date
113
77984
8254
2348
Q(M)2.a.
SEARAIL.
30/5/40
Note:- Figures are based on check into trains and may not be accurate.
Distribution: - P.S. to S. of S.
D.R.O.
C.I.G.S.
D.G.A.M.S.
D.Q.M.G. (A)
A.G.
D.S.T.
D.Q.M.G. (B)
Q.M.G.
D.O.S.
D.Mov.
P.U.S.
D.P.R.
Admiralty (Capt.Jeffroy).4 copies
D.M.O. &P.
S.D.1.
D.Q.
D.S.D.
A.G.1.
D.H.D.&A.A.
M.O.4.

7
SECRET.
Personnel returned from B.E.F. (Dynamo Plan).
PROGRESS REPORT, midnight 27/28 to midnight 28/29 May,1940.
Trains
Fit
Casualties
Allies
Remarks
Harwich
-
Sheerness
2
581
Margate
1
280
Ramsgate
2
827
Dover
26
12360
505
57
Folkestone
1
493
Hastings
Eastbourne
Newhaven
-
Brighton
-
Southampton
=
=
Total today
32
14441
505
57
Total to date
39
40528
6747
1595
Q(M)2.a.
29/5/40
SEARAIL.
Note:- Figures are based on check into trains and may not be accurate.
Distribution:- P.S. to S. of S.
D.Q.
C.I.G.S.
D.H.D. & A.A.
A.G.
D.G.A.M.S.
Q.M.G.
D.S.T.
P.U.S.
D.O.S.
D.M.O. &P.
D.P.R.
D.S.D.
S.D.1.
D.R.O.
A.G.1.
D.Q.M.G. (A)
M.O.4.
D.Q.M.G. (B)
D.Mov.
Admiralty (Capt.Jeffrey) 4 copies

6
SECRET
Personnel returned from B.E.F. (Dynomo Plan)
PROGRESS REPORT, midnight 26/27 to midnight 27/28 May, 1940.
Personnel
Fit
Trains
Casualties
Allies
Remarks
Harwich
Sheerness
Margate
Ramsgate
Dover
7
3324
300
4
Folkestone
Hastings
Eastbourne
Newhaven
950
Brighton
Southampton
ID
Total today
7
3324
1250
4
Total to date
25,987
6242
1538
Q(M)2.a.
SEARAIL.
28/5/40
Note:- Figures are based on check into trains and may not be accurate.
Distribution
P.S. to S. of S.
D.Q.
C.I.G.S.
D.H.D. & A.A.
A.G.
D.G.A.M.S.
Q.M.G.
D.S.T.
P.U.S.
D.O.S.
D.M.O. & P.
D.P.R.
D.S.D.
S.D.1.
D.R.O.
A.G.1.
D.Q.M.G.(A).
M.O.4.
D.Q.M.G.(B).
D. Mov.
Admiralty (Captain Jeffrey) 4 copies.

8/150
4
Q.2./5539
THE WAR OFFICE,
TNO
WHITEHALL, S.W.1.
LIOST SECRET.
28 May, 1940.
INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING THE ACCO ODATION AND DISPOSAL
OF PERSONNEL EVACUATED FROM THE B.E.F.
1.
The Plan falls into three Phases:-
Phase (1) The receeption of personnel according to
"Dynamo" 'lan and their indiscriminate allocation to
Reception Areas already specified, namely:-
Aldershot Command
30,000
Southern Command
150,000
Western Command
80,000
Northern Command
40,000
Phase (2) The re-distribution of:-
(a) Divisional Troops to selected new Divisional
Areas.
(b) Corps and G.H.Q. Troops by arms to various
"Re-organisation Centres":
Phase (3) The final re-distribution of Corps and G.H.Q.
Troops from "Re-organisation Centres" to new Corps Areas.
2. PHASE (1) has already been implemented and is proceeding according to "Dynamo" Hovement Instructions Q(Ii)2.a/43 Nos. 1 & 2, of 25/4/40 and 27/5/40 respectively.
RD
3. PHASE (2) (i) G.H.Q. personnel to re-assemble in LONDON AREA.
(ii) Divisional Troops will be sent from their Reception
Areas to their Divisional Areas, which are allocated by Commands as follows:-
NORTHERN COMMAND.
1 Division
Yorkshire Administrative
Area LEEDS and SHEFFIELD.
2 Division
Yorkshire Administrative
Area BRADFORD, HALIFAX,
HUDDERSFIELD.
12 Division m
NORTHUHBRIAN AREA.
42 Division
I Corps
North Midland Area,
NOTTINGHAM, LEICESTER, DERBY.
SCOTTISH COLLMAND.
5 Division
(including 25 Inf. Bgde) 9th Divl. Area - ELGIN -
ABERDEEN.
SOUTHERN CONNAND/..

4 Division
Division
44 Division
23 Division concerned
VARTINSTER
II Corps
French Troops
WESTERN GOMMAND,
THE
THE
-3-
48 Division
46 Division
R.A.I.C.
III Corps
50 Division
To LEEDS.
Corps
R.A.O.C.
R.A.C. C. Centres in and G.Hcke Troops and the Troops. shall assembled following be It is distributed that Command,
To CHILWELL.
R.A.P.C.
locations:-
To LONDON AREA.
A.M.P.S.
visional K.R.R.AND should be Part sent are to now there and
48, 49, 59, 62, 68, 102, 121, 122 and 123 Coys., to No.2 Training Centre CAISTE R, Northern Command.
Medium Horse and Field To. Artillery to - to Borineton
Q.V.R.
40, 61, 78, 79, 81 and 500 Coys., to No.4 Training
Centre, CLACTON, Eastern Command.
44 and 45 Coys. to No.6 Training Centre, SKEGNESS.
Heave to to
70 and 75 Coys., to UPPER NORWOOD Reception Depot.
and
S.L.
LARKHILL,
-
Southern
Southern
Remainder to No.1 Training Centre, WESTCLIFFE, Eastern Cmd.
emainder to stransfyddyd. S.L's. Light Heavy AcAs bade to to Command. Western Command,
C.lf. P.
to liytcheet.
P. O. W. Camps.
RD
&
Rd.
to HYTCHETT.
Tway Surger to Fd. to to ITEMARK,
Printing & Stationery.
to LONDOR ARE A.
Reception Camps.
to LONDON AREA.
Northern PLYNOUTH, CHESTER, Company PORTSICOUTH Command. Cd
Graves and Enquiries.
to LONDON AREA.
Signals NAL Signals to to No.2. No.1 Signal Signal Training Training Centre, CATTERICK.
Mobile Bath Units.
to LONDON AREA.
INTANTRY:
Centre,
(N.C.)
Field Service Police.
Overseas
PRESTATYN, to MYTCHETT.
to
PAINTON PAIGNTON WESTERN
(W.C.)
Salvage Corps.
to ALDERSHOT.
GENERAL.
Where there is a doubt as to the proper destination in Command, 2 Hobilisation 2 BURFORD Areas, astrol Centres, Command.
of personnel, they should be sent to, or retained at, ALDERSHOT, and enquiries made of the War Office,
(A.G.1. Branch).
allocated
4.
PHASE (3) Corps and G.H.Q. Troops after re-organisation in the various
Centres (PHASE II) will be despatched to the Corps Areas.
5%/..

ea)
ea)
-3-
and
R.A.I.C.
To LEEDS.
STER
R.A.O.C.
To CHILWELL.
R.A.P.C.
To LONDON AREA.
A.M.P.S.
48, 49, 59, 62, 68, 102, 121, 122 and 123 Coys., to No.2 Training Centre CAISTE R, Northern Command.
40, 61, 78, 79, 81 and 500 Coys., to No.4 Training
Centre, CLACTON, Eastern Command.
44 and 45 Coys. to No.6 Training Centre, SKEGNESS.
70 and 75 Coys., to UPPER NORWOOD Reception Depot.
BURY.
Remainder to No.1 Training Centre, WESTCLIFFE, Eastern Cmd.
C.li. P.
to lytcheet.
P. O. W. Camps.
RD
to HYTCHETT.
Printing & Stationery.
to LONDOR ARE A.
Reception Camps.
to LONDON AREA.
Graves and Enquiries.
to LONDON AREA.
Mobile Bath Units.
to LONDON AREA.
Field Service Police.
to MYTCHETT.
Salvage Corps.
to ALDERSHOT.
GENERAL.
Where there is a doubt as to the proper destination of personnel, they should be sent to, or retained at, ALDERSHOT, and enquiries made of the War Office,
(A.G.1. Branch).
4.
PHASE (3) Corps and G.H.Q. Troops after re-organisation in the various
Centres (PHASE II) will be despatched to the Corps Areas.
5%/..

ADMINISTRATION=
the
Staffs above. the initial To assist case to Areas (see para.1.) Areas. Command and as personnel (ii)), in which
-5-
Separate instructions as to their duties and the documents they are to take are being sent separately to all addresses of this instruction and 0.0. in charge of Records.
as from follows:- G.H.Q. 'A' 4 3 Commands' Officers are being to shown officers clerical in available personnel
Post. Field Service postcards are being despatched to Command
Headquarters to arrive on the afternoon of the 29th Hay, 1940, by passenger train. They will be collected as early as possible and distributed to Reception Areas. One card per man is allowed. When completed
These
Officers Officers will to report report to to SOUTHERN ALDERSHOT COLLIAND.
cards will be collected and handed in bulk to the nearest G.P.O. No franking or stamping is necessary.
Beef., To facilitate shown work in of theirisional, to under Battlemposition the orders being of of COLIHAND. the G.O.C. concerned, in
If further postcards are required the Indent should be forwarded to the Army Forms Depot, to whom surplus cards should be returned.
locations given the the despatched by ctc.,
Major-Generals i/c Administration
Areas Reception the Staffs Areas G.H.Q. to
ALDERSHOT, EASTERN, NORTHERN, SCOTTISH, SOUTHERN and WESTERN CORBIANDS:
A.Q.M.G., LONDON Area.
G.H.Q., HOLE FORCES.
H.A./C.I.G.S.
Blankets. THE will PHASE THE been that the in the which per for he man
Q.II.G.
D.Q.M.G(A)
D.S.D.
D.H.T.
D.H.I.
D.li.o. & P.
Clothing & To be Corps to on on arrival loan,
D.H.D. & A.A.
D.R.O.
to attend Pay. Arrangements replaced "Re-organisation
D.Hob.
D.Mov.
D.S.T.
(a) Officers acquittance Reception charge being Areas made in order for representatives in PHASE (2) of the Centres". R.A.P.C.
D.O.S.
F.9.
G.H.V., 2nd Echelon.
(b) are To pay not individual present. rolls Other to of make Units am 02° Sub-Units payment. with cash and the staffs to to Ranks 20,000 whose Units 02" Officers
Detention their II, also to identity. be Other made the orders to daily be issued without at each by War the of Office, the Chief
Pay
Books
Unit Documentations D.A.G. authorised, of in
He they will belong in also arrange in accommodated London and Detention ich Unit and Do Corps who an not given own in para.3(111) despatch personnel of above. arrange at 2nd for Echelon-to the for the

-5-
egs is Their FOR onel slizz) and are to take are being sent separately to all addresses of this instruction
Separate instructions as to their duties and the documents they and 0.01 in charge of Records.
Post. Field Service postcards are being despatched to Command
Headquarters to arrive on the afternoon of the 29th Hay, 1940, by passenger train. They will be collected as early as possible and distributed to Reception Areas. One card per man is allowed. When completed cards will be collected and handed in bulk to the nearest G.P.O. No franking or stamping is necessary.
If further postcards are required the Indent should be forwarded to the Army Forms Depot, to whom surplus cards should be returned.
erned.
in
111
Major-Generals i/c Administration
ALDERSHOT, EASTERN, NORTHERN, SCOTTISH, SOUTHERN and WESTERN CORRIANDS:
A.Q.II.G., LONDON Area.
G.H.Q., HOME FORCES.
H.A./C.I.G.S.
Q.II.G.
D.Q.M.G(A)
D.S.D.
D.H.T.
D.H.I.
D.li.O. & P.
RD
D.H.D. & A.A.
D.R.O.
D.Hob.
D.Mov.
D.S.T.
D.O.S.
F.9.
G.H.V., 2nd Echelen.

74
(COPY)
SECRET IMPORTANT
MO 4(h)
PASS TO WAR OFFICE
ADDRESSED WAR OFFICE
FROM DOVER
GENERAL LLOYD TO DIRECTOR OF MILITARY OPERATIONS
SITUATION REPORT
MAY FIVE PERSONNEL AND TWO SMALL NEWHAVEN. SHIPS
1. HAVE ALL SINCE PERSONNEL DISEMBARKED 2230 SHIPS ROUTE 26th 7,300 AT AT AT PRESENT PRESENT DOVER USING UNPRACTICABLE AND 915 DOVER. WOUNDED USED IN AT DAYLIGHT BUT CHANGE OWING
2. TO HAS LONGER HEAVY SOUTHERN INVOLVED OWING GUNFIRE, OF DELAY SHIPPING TO ADDITIONAL NORTHERN IN CAPACITY. SAILINGS ROUTE MILEAGE TEMPORARILY. NOW LIMITING BUT BEING NAVY IN 458, FACTORS DO TURN NOT BEACHES ANTICIPATE MORE ROUND LIKELY IS AND OVER NOW
SHORTAGE TO DIFFICULTIES BE RESTRICTIONS OF OFFICERS CONCENTRATING DUE TO PROCEED ENEMY TROOPS. 458 ACTION MIDDAY MODFICATION PER DESTROYER B BRASSARD WITH
3. PROPOSED WE OF HOPE SCHEME PARTY TO SHIPPING OF MUST HEAR IS NOW DEPEND. SOON PLAN ON ITS OUTLINE FOR WAY. ADEQUATE ACCEPTANCE OF OPERATIONAL SHIPPING YESTERDAY OR FOR PLAN ARE PLANS UPON WORKING PROPOSED WHICH RA
V 4. A DOVER STAFF ARRANGEMENTS MADE BY YOU
SATISFACTORILY.
Providerly our 1720/27 stand ab 12 boure
La at Komelington,
+++EMO+++
Dovor in then 60 Dover
Greet with
RD
TOR
18.59*+Da++VA++
Dovor;
and
Rodhill
Reception Areas
Distribution:
4.
The following needs will be used C.I.G.S.
British troops
D.M.I.S.
Q.M.S M.O.4 (5 copies).
Aldershot
30,000
Southern Command
Alderabot
Tldworth
Doschestor
75,000
Blendford
84118bury
Oxford
Turban M.O.4.
15,000
I
24