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TNA / CAB 103 191

TNA CAB 103 191

TNA CAB 103 191
Collection details

TNA CAB 103 191

Cabinet Office papers concerning the proposed publication of a book about Operation Dynamo and the 1940 evacuation from Dunkirk, dating from April 1949 to February 1950.

Holding archive
TNA
Collection reference
CAB 103 191
View the archive catalogue entry ↗

Source: The National Archives, Kew, CAB 103/191. Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.

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27A
SECRET
NOTES ON DYNAMO PLAN
1. The attached table shows the numbers brought off from
France by the Navy and landed in the U.K. under the
Dynamo Plan.
2. On Thursday, 23rd May, there was a meeting at Dover between
Vice-Admiral, Dover, A.C.I.G.S. (A), General Loyd and Lt.-Col.
Napier in which the outline plan prepared by Q(M)2 was discussed. It was based on the bonts CALAIS and, DUNKIRK and OSTEND
being available.
3. On 26 May Captain Macarthy went to DUNKIRK with Captain
Tennant R.N. who took with him 11 Officers and 150 Ratings.
This party arrived at DUNKIRK at 1700 hours. Captain
Tennant and Captain Macarthy saw Q.M.G. B.E.F. and Captain
Macarthy handed the latter a letter from D.Q.M.G. (A). They there discussed the plan. Col. Warner also accompanied these parties with orders to see the Q.M.G. to get his plan and also the C.in C. He did not however see the latter.
Navy
Q(M)2 had already taken up some 20 more personnel ships and had offered more small craft to the Admiralty than they appeared to require.
4. Captain Macarthy returned early on 28 May and reported to
V.A. Dover. He had also impressed on Captain Tennant the vital importance of keeping liaison with Col. Hewar (Q.M. G.H.Q.)
and he again urged the importance of this on V.A. Dover.
In fact this liaison did not function for about 48 hours.
5. It was about 27 May that the Navy really got busy taking up small craft. Progressively since that day they have scoured the country to obtain what they required.
6. The complaints from the B.E.F. as regards the numbers of small craft and the lack of a proper Naval beach organisation have at once been passed over to Gen. Loyd or to the
Admiralty.
7. In considering the steps taken it should be realised that the original problem was to take men off through the available ports, which might well have included Ostend and Calais as well as Dunkirk, and also that it was at first thought that all that could be done was one rush for the first 48 hours That The evacuation would over several days primarily from beaches was not realised until about
28 May. also Shich 5 as until did not hear of HE my
8. The figures in the attached table show how the numbers evacuated have progressively increased.
9. Beyond the provision of Marines, who may have been available;
or Naval personnel, who probably were not; available it is difficult to see what more the Navy could have done to assist the evacuation. The fact that liaison has not worked very well between the S.N.O. and G.H.Q. appears mainly to be due to the Naval Officers concerned and not to the organisation created.

Raw OCR

Unformatted machine-generated OCR for document page 15.

27A
SECRET
NOTES ON DYNAMO PLAN
1. The attached table shows the numbers brought off from
France by the Navy and landed in the U.K. under the
Dynamo Plan.
2. On Thursday, 23rd May, there was a meeting at Dover between
Vice-Admiral, Dover, A.C.I.G.S. (A), General Loyd and Lt.-Col.
Napier in which the outline plan prepared by Q(M)2 was
discussed. It was based on the bonts CALAIS and, DUNKIRK and OSTEND
being available.
3. On 26 May Captain Macarthy went to DUNKIRK with Captain
Tennant R.N. who took with him 11 Officers and 150 Ratings.
This party arrived at DUNKIRK at 1700 hours. Captain
Tennant and Captain Macarthy saw Q.M.G. B.E.F. and Captain
Macarthy handed the latter a letter from D.Q.M.G. (A). They
there discussed the plan. Col. Warner also accompanied
these parties with orders to see the Q.M.G. to get his
plan and also the C.in C. He did not however see the latter.
Navy
Q(M)2 had already taken up some 20 more personnel
ships and had offered more small craft to the Admiralty
than they appeared to require.
4. Captain Macarthy returned early on 28 May and reported to
V.A. Dover. He had also impressed on Captain Tennant the
vital importance of keeping liaison with Col. Hewar (Q.M. G.H.Q.)
and he again urged the importance of this on V.A. Dover.
In fact this liaison did not function for about 48 hours.
5. It was about 27 May that the Navy really got busy taking up
small craft. Progressively since that day they have scoured
the country to obtain what they required.
6. The complaints from the B.E.F. as regards the numbers of
small craft and the lack of a proper Naval beach organisation
have at once been passed over to Gen. Loyd or to the
Admiralty.
7. In considering the steps taken it should be realised that
the original problem was to take men off through the
available ports, which might well have included Ostend
and Calais as well as Dunkirk, and also that it was at first
thought that all that could be done was one rush for the
first 48 hours That The evacuation would over several
days primarily from beaches was not realised until about
28 May. also Shich 5 as until did not hear of HE my
8. The figures in the attached table show how the numbers
evacuated have progressively increased.
9. Beyond the provision of Marines, who may have been available;
or Naval personnel, who probably were not; available it is
difficult to see what more the Navy could have done to assist
the evacuation. The fact that liaison has not worked very
well between the S.N.O. and G.H.Q. appears mainly to be due
to the Naval Officers concerned and not to the organisation
created.