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TNA / CAB 103 191

TNA CAB 103 191

TNA CAB 103 191
Collection details

TNA CAB 103 191

Cabinet Office papers concerning the proposed publication of a book about Operation Dynamo and the 1940 evacuation from Dunkirk, dating from April 1949 to February 1950.

Holding archive
TNA
Collection reference
CAB 103 191
View the archive catalogue entry ↗

Source: The National Archives, Kew, CAB 103/191. Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.

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Capies sent W. no Newsy AIM.5
y hambert w/o days
26JUL.1949
Bug. Ratham
ABINET 68/67 Cabinet Office,
26/7/49
Great George Street,
London, S.W.1.
21st July, 1949
My dear Onslow,
I owe you profound apologies for the delay in replying to your letter of the 14th April about the Battle Summary on
"Evacuation from Dunkirk". It requires, as you will realise, some time to read a document of this length and I fear we have -
at a period of some pressure - taken unfair advantage of the fact that publication was not proposed before next year.
Professor Butler and others interested here have seen it, and this letter represents our joint views.
on the question of principle, general official policy is reflected in the decisions to prepare and publish the Official
Histories and the so-called Preliminary Histories. One point of view which has been expressed is that it might be preferable not to extend, and in some degree anticipate, this programme by the official publication of special historical studies of particular operations, which will, of course, find their place in both the Official and the Preliminary Histories. We do not in the least wish to be dogmatic on this point, or to press it, if the Admiralty feel otherwise. But we suggest that it deserves consideration.
If the Admiralty are disposed to publish we assume that the War Office and the Air Ministry, both of whom are concerned, will be given an opportunity of seeing the manuscript.
Several points of detail have been noted here, which seem to call for modification. I give them as examples only. We have not subjected the whole text to a detailed critical scrutiny.
Pages 8 & 9. Is it the right perspective to suggest that the Navy were alone in urging that evacuation should be from a port rather than from the beaches? Would not evacuation from a port be accepted by anyone as the preferable course, if it could be carried out? If the point is that the Navy thought it would be possible to use a port, or ports, and others did not, this
(assuming it is accurate) is not clearly brought out.
Page 26. Does not the statement that the army "with little more than rifles had defeated the German Armour" go a bit too far? (Incidentally, I am told the parallel with Agincourt is open to be criticised on the ground that at Agincourt the victorious troops had the advantage of a new long-range weapon, the long bow).
Page 47. "This was the first time the Germans laid magnetic mines by aircraft during the dark hours". That is, the first time during Operation DYNAMO?
I hope that you will acquit us of any desire, in mentioning these points, to indulge in carping criticism. It is just that we feel that the text should be gone over for a final check-up on details, if it is proposed to proceed to publication.
Yours sincerely,
(SGD.) A. B. ACHESON.
Captain R.G. Onslow, D.S.O.,R.N.,
D.T.S.D. (Naval Staff),
Admiralty, S.W.1.

Raw OCR

Unformatted machine-generated OCR for document page 3.

Capies sent W. no Newsy AIM.5
y hambert w/o
days
26JUL.1949
Bug. Ratham
ABINET 68/67 Cabinet Office,
26/7/49
Great George Street,
London, S.W.1.
21st July, 1949
My dear Onslow,
I owe you profound apologies for the delay in replying to
your letter of the 14th April about the Battle Summary on
"Evacuation from Dunkirk". It requires, as you will realise,
some time to read a document of this length and I fear we have -
at a period of some pressure - taken unfair advantage of the
fact that publication was not proposed before next year.
Professor Butler and others interested here have seen it, and
this letter represents our joint views.
on the question of principle, general official policy is
reflected in the decisions to prepare and publish the Official
Histories and the so-called Preliminary Histories. One point
of view which has been expressed is that it might be preferable
not to extend, and in some degree anticipate, this programme by
the official publication of special historical studies of
particular operations, which will, of course, find their place
in both the Official and the Preliminary Histories. We do not
in the least wish to be dogmatic on this point, or to press it,
if the Admiralty feel otherwise. But we suggest that it
deserves consideration.
If the Admiralty are disposed to publish we assume that
the War Office and the Air Ministry, both of whom are concerned,
will be given an opportunity of seeing the manuscript.
Several points of detail have been noted here, which seem
to call for modification. I give them as examples only. We
have not subjected the whole text to a detailed critical scrutiny.
Pages 8 & 9. Is it the right perspective to suggest that
the Navy were alone in urging that evacuation should be from a
port rather than from the beaches? Would not evacuation from a
port be accepted by anyone as the preferable course, if it could
be carried out? If the point is that the Navy thought it would
be possible to use a port, or ports, and others did not, this
(assuming it is accurate) is not clearly brought out.
Page 26. Does not the statement that the army "with little
more than rifles had defeated the German Armour" go a bit too
far? (Incidentally, I am told the parallel with Agincourt is
open to be criticised on the ground that at Agincourt the
victorious troops had the advantage of a new long-range weapon,
the long bow).
Page 47. "This was the first time the Germans laid magnetic
mines by aircraft during the dark hours". That is, the first
time during Operation DYNAMO?
I hope that you will acquit us of any desire, in mentioning
these points, to indulge in carping criticism. It is just that
we feel that the text should be gone over for a final check-up
on details, if it is proposed to proceed to publication.
Yours sincerely,
(SGD.) A. B. ACHESON.
Captain R.G. Onslow, D.S.O.,R.N.,
D.T.S.D. (Naval Staff),
Admiralty, S.W.1.