TNA CAB 103 191

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Unformatted machine-generated OCR for document page 13.

Desputehed
consignee.
(FL)
No. of Packages,
Landed.
(13)
B.M43 - Evacuation of allies from harth 28A area
Shut
Out.
(12)
C.I.G.S.
Shipped.
(11)
1. At 1(A) is a copy of the telegram received from No.1
Mission at 2130 hours last night. Copies of the War
Where stowed.
Office messages referred to in that telegram are at
1(B) to 1(E).
(01)
Not unnaturally there is some difference in emphasis
between these War Office messages according to the
person to whom they were addressed and to the changing
situation.
Weight.
Cwt.
(9)
2. Since the probable hour of receipt of 1(D) by No.1
Mission the following two messages have been sent:-
(A) From War Office to Madelon. 1845 hours, 1 June.
Tons.
(No.72794 Cipher)
(S)
Following from P.M. to Gen. Spears for Gen. Weygand.
Crisis in evacuation now reached. Five Fighter
Shipping Tons.
Ft.
(2)
squadrons acting almost continuously is most we
can do, but six ships, several filled with troops,
sunk by bombing this morning. Artillery fire
Tons.
(6)
menacing only practicable channel. Enemy closing in
on reduced bridgehead. By trying to hold on until
No. of
Pack-
tomorrow we may lose all. By going tonight much
ages.
(5)
may certainly be saved though much will be lost.
Situation cannot be fully judged only by Admiral
Abrial in the fortress, nor by you, nor by us here.
We have therefore ordered General Alexander,
Marks.
Commanding British Sector on bridgehead, to judge in
($)
consultation with Admiral Abrial whether to try to
stay over tomorrow or not. Trust you will agree.
(B) From C.I.G.S. 1940 hours, 1 June to S.N.O. Dunkirk.
Following for General Alexander.
contents.
We do not order any fixed moment for evacuation.
You are to hold on as long as possible in order that
DUE
the maximum number of French and British may be
evacuated. Impossible from here to judge local
situation. In close co-operation with Admiral Abrial
(3)
you must act in this matter on your own judgment.
3. The present situation is obscure but Brig. Morgan thinks
that the reduced perimeter 1s now being held by the
remaining elements of 12,23 and 68 French Divs. with an
unknown number of disorganised troops further in rear. No
more than 500 probably remain in command General Alexander
and these are probably holding the short line immediately
covering the quay at Dunkirk from the East.
No.
Brig. Leese states that in his opinion the difficulty
(2)
has been to get the French to evacuate. They appear to
have some idea that the perimeter can be held for a
considerable period during which some at least of the troops
of the French First Army who refuse to withdraw from the
Lille area might manage to make their way back to Dunkirk.
Only during the last two days have they made any real
attempt to get away.
As you know evacuation by day is now impossible and
has become increasingly difficult by night. The opinion
of the Military Commander, who is in touch with situation
on the front, 1.0. General Alexander, was that evacuation
should have been completed on night 1-2 June and certain]
must be completed on night 2-5 June. Admiral Abrial,
however, takes a different view, but as he sits in the