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TNA / CAB 103 191

TNA CAB 103 191

TNA CAB 103 191
Collection details

TNA CAB 103 191

Cabinet Office papers concerning the proposed publication of a book about Operation Dynamo and the 1940 evacuation from Dunkirk, dating from April 1949 to February 1950.

Holding archive
TNA
Collection reference
CAB 103 191
View the archive catalogue entry ↗

Source: The National Archives, Kew, CAB 103/191. Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.

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E
bastion one need not attach much weight to his opinion.
The French were given certain berths in Dunkirk and a complete beach but their lack of control has greatly increased the difficulties of evacuation.
France In my opinion evacuation must be completed tonight.
It is not fair to expect the Navy to go on with this business just because the French cannot, or will not, organise a complete evacuation.
4. I suggest that a letter should be sent to General Weygand by you and to M. Reynaud by the Prime Minister. General
Howard-Vyse is sending a letter which will arrive by air this afternoon making some suggestions for your letter.
On 26 May Captain Eacarthy went to DUNKIRK with Captain
Tunnant R.N. witho took with him 11 Officers and 150 Ratings.
This party arrived at PANKIRK at 1700 hours. Captain and Captain Macarthy saw Q.M.G. B.E.F. and Captain
Macarthy handed the latter R letter from D.Q.M.G.(A). They discussed the plan. Col. Warner also
2/6/40. 1es with orders to see the A.C.I.G.S.(A)
and also the 0.1n C. He did not however see the latter.
Q(M)2 New already taken up some 20 MOTO personnel ships and had offered more small craft to the Admiralty than they appeared to require.
4.
Captain Macarthy returned early on 28 May and reported to
V.A. Dover. He had also impressed on Caphain Tennant the vital importance of Edeping liaison with Col. Hewar (Q.K. 0.9.211
and he again urged the importance of this on V.A. Dover.
In fact this linison did not function for about 48 hours.
5. It WBB about 27 May that the NATY really got busy taking up small craft. Progressively since that day they have adoured the country to obtain what they required.
6. The complaints from the B.E.F. as regards the numbers of email craft and the lack of SS proper Navel beach organisation have at once been passed over to Gon. Loyd or to the
Admiralty.
7. In considering the steps taken it should be realised that the original problem WILB to take men off through the evailable ports, which might well have included Ostand and Calais as well as Dunkirk, and also that 10 was at first thought that all that could be done was one rush for the first 40 hours 1 The evacuation Textending over several days primarily from beaches was not realisga and about
28 HERE shich hastend that of
8. The figures 1.21 the attached table show how the numbers evacuated have prograssively increased.
9. Beyond the provision of Marines who may have been availabie;
or Naval personnel, who probably were 16 is difficult to 800 what more the Savy have done to assist the evacuation. The cast that Lisison has not worked very woll between the 8.5.0. and appears mainly to be due to the Naval Officers not to the organisation created.

Raw OCR

Unformatted machine-generated OCR for document page 14.

E
bastion one need not attach much weight to his opinion.
The French were given certain berths in Dunkirk
and a complete beach but their lack of control has
greatly increased the difficulties of evacuation.
France In my opinion evacuation must be completed tonight.
It is not fair to expect the Navy to go on with this
business just because the French cannot, or will not,
organise a complete evacuation.
4. I suggest that a letter should be sent to General Weygand
by you and to M. Reynaud by the Prime Minister. General
Howard-Vyse is sending a letter which will arrive by
air this afternoon making some suggestions for your
letter.
On 26 May Captain Eacarthy went to DUNKIRK with Captain
Tunnant R.N. witho took with him 11 Officers and 150 Ratings.
This party arrived at PANKIRK at 1700 hours. Captain
and Captain Macarthy saw Q.M.G. B.E.F. and Captain
Macarthy handed the latter R letter from D.Q.M.G.(A). They
discussed the plan. Col. Warner also
2/6/40. 1es with orders to see the A.C.I.G.S.(A)
and also the 0.1n C. He did not however see the latter.
Q(M)2 New already taken up some 20 MOTO personnel
ships and had offered more small craft to the Admiralty
than they appeared to require.
4.
Captain Macarthy returned early on 28 May and reported to
V.A. Dover. He had also impressed on Caphain Tennant the
vital importance of Edeping liaison with Col. Hewar (Q.K. 0.9.211
and he again urged the importance of this on V.A. Dover.
In fact this linison did not function for about 48 hours.
5. It WBB about 27 May that the NATY really got busy taking up
small craft. Progressively since that day they have adoured
the country to obtain what they required.
6. The complaints from the B.E.F. as regards the numbers of
email craft and the lack of SS proper Navel beach organisation
have at once been passed over to Gon. Loyd or to the
Admiralty.
7. In considering the steps taken it should be realised that
the original problem WILB to take men off through the
evailable ports, which might well have included Ostand
and Calais as well as Dunkirk, and also that 10 was at first
thought that all that could be done was one rush for the
first 40 hours 1 The evacuation Textending over several
days primarily from beaches was not realisga and about
28 HERE shich hastend that of
8. The figures 1.21 the attached table show how the numbers
evacuated have prograssively increased.
9. Beyond the provision of Marines who may have been availabie;
or Naval personnel, who probably were 16 is
difficult to 800 what more the Savy have done to assist
the evacuation. The cast that Lisison has not worked very
woll between the 8.5.0. and appears mainly to be due
to the Naval Officers not to the organisation
created.