Details

in
ALBATROSS
M/B (Owner
?
H.W. Copeland).
THE
20th May
1200
Left
Did not return from Operation Dyanmo.
the
5th
2130
Arrived off Bray bench- Sent boats
inshore to embark troops. Tide low,
and 0 smill but troublesome surf.
Authority - TO.9144
Troops in good spirite though short
of rations.
TO.9436
Landed dry provisions in the skiff.
2330
A bomb dropped about 1 mile to seasord
of the Albery.
29th May
0230
Proceeded to Margate.
1340
Arrived Margate, Disemburked 162
troops.
Sailed for the beaches,
1930
Arrived off Malo. Considerable bombing
in progress.
Proceeded towards 8 grounded and
burning paddle-steamer [the Created
Eagle which was full of troops and
survivore and in a bad way. All
boats and Carley floats were sent away
and many survivors picked up. Bonba
dropped continually around the
Albury and the P/S during this
operation.
Signalled for fighter assistance,
which arrived later in the evening.
57 cot cases were brought off, mostly
suffering from severe burns. The C.O.
and other survivors from the dr.
Gronade were also embarked.
Having embarked all known survivors, the
Albury proceeded to Bray and embarked
troops from several boats. A
Captain Churchill, from the H.O. Staff
came off and said that he had to get
over to England to see his uncle, the
Prime Minister, by 0600.
Proceeded to Margate,
30th May
0550
Arrived Margate. Disembarked AS
and survivors and Captain Churchill,
Bailed to Shoerness for coal and
comunition.
That usy
USDO
Left Sheerness for the beaches.
OTTO
Arrived off Malo benon. Considerable
surf. Embarkation greatly nosleted
by a large power boat.
1230
Bailed for Margate.
1700
Arrived Margate, Disembarked 130 troops
18000s
Sailed from Margate under the orders
of the 8,0,, 5th M.S.F.
2200
The 51h M.S.F. rendezvoused at W buoy.
2345
Anothered off T.S. Funne, Spasmodic
bombardment by shore gune.
2310 riotilla VISA ordered to carry on
ambarkation, using shiph' boats.
AUGUSTER
now en there were practically
construons bombing attreke, mostly
W DAVA nombers.
to the M/D Speedwell
903 aground and towed her off.
18

Details

ALBURY (N.41)
5th M.S.F.
Cdr. C.H.Corbet-Singleton
R.N.
28th May
1200
Left Harwich in company with the 5th
M.S.F.
2130
Arrived off Bray beach. Sent boats
inshore to embark troops. Tide low,
and a small but troublesome surf.
Troops in good spirits though short
of rations.
Landed dry provisions in the skiff.
2330
A bomb dropped about 1 mile to seaward
of the Albury.
29th May
0230
Proceeded to Margate.
1340
Arrived Margate. Disembarked 161
troops.
-
Sailed for the beaches.
1930
Arrived off Malo. Considerable bombing
in progress.
Proceeded towards a grounded and
burning paddle-steamer [the Crested
Eagle] which was full of troops and
survivors and in a bad way. All
boats and Carley floats were sent away
and many survivors picked up. Bombs
dropped continually around the
Albury and the P/S during this
operation.
Signalled for fighter assistance,
which arrived later in the evening.
57 cot cases were brought off, mostly
suffering from severe burns. The C.O.
and other survivors from the dr.
Grenade were also embarked.
Having embarked all known survivors, the
Albury proceeded to Bray and embarked
troops from several boats. A
Captain Churchill, from the H.Q. Staff
came off and said that he had to get
over to England to see his uncle, the
Prime Minister, by 0600.
-0020
Proceeded to Margate.
30th May
0530
Arrived Margate. Disembarked 445 troops
and survivors and Captain Churchill.
Sailed to Sheerness for coal and
ammunition.
31st May
0300
Left Sheerness for the beaches.
0930
Arrived off Malo beach. Considerable
surf. Embarkation greatly assisted
by a large power boat.
1230
Sailed for Margate.
1700
Arrived Margate. Disembarked 130 troops.
1800ca
Sailed from Margate under the orders
of the S.O., 5th M.S.F.
2200
The 5th M.S.F. rendezvoused at W buoy.
2345
Anchored off La Panne. Spasmodic
bombardment by shore guns.
lst June
0230ca
The flotilla was ordered to carry on
embarkation, using ships' boats.
0400ca
From now on there were practically
continuous bombing attacks, mostly
by dive bombers.
0500ca
Passed a wire to the M/S Speedwell
which was aground and towed her off.
19

Details

A.L.C.3
Landing Craft
29th May
1200ca
Off Dunkirk, was hoisted out from the
S.S. Clan Macalister.
-
Ferried troops from Dunkirk beach "until
the vening".
2000ca
No vessels being left in the vicinity,
proceeded with about 20 troops on
board.
Shortly after passing Dunkirk, joined
company with A.L.C.'s 8 and 15.
30th May
0400ca
Arrived Dover. Disembarked 20 troops.
Evening
Left Dover, A.L.C's 8 and 15 in company.
31st May
0400ca
Arrived Dunkirk.
Ferried troops all day and during the
evening.
2230ca
Both engines broke down.
-
Taken in tow by a small merchant vessel.
1st June
0500ca
Arrived Ramsgate in tow.
Engines repaired. Proceeded.
1130
Arrived Dover.
3rd June
1300
Arrived Hayling Island in company with
A.L.C.17.
Total 20
Authority - R.O.III, p.510.

Details

A.L.C.15
Landing Craft
S/Lt. G.B. Eyre,
E.N.V.R.
29th May
0930ca
Off Dunkirk, the second A.L.C. to be
hoisted out of the S.O. Clan Macalis-
ter. Proceeded inshore after some
delay in starting the engines.
Ferried troops, making 15 trips, 1.e.
about 750 troops.
2000ca
Left for Dover with troops on board.
Shortly after passing Dunkirk, met
A.L.C's 3 and 8 and proceeded in
company.
30th May
0400ca
Arrived Dover. Disembarked 25
troops. (1)
Evening
Left Dover, A.L.C's 3 and 8 in company.
31st May
0400ca
Off Dunkirk. Engine trouble, but
A.L.C.15 ferried troops and towed
boats.
-
Damaged propellers on a submerged lorry.
A.L.C.15 out of control, drifted
ashore, beam on.
The crew launched a stranded small
boat and made their way to a drifter.
-
A.L.C.B landed A.L.C. 15's engineer.
He evidently considered it impossible
to salve A.L.C.15, and set her on fire.
When the fire reached the petrol
tanks she blew up.
Total 25. (1)
Authority - R.O.III, p.513.
The
(1) S/Lt. Hardstaff
of on a of the
of his legs
the a 0.8 a
in of B. but they
(1) Estimated.
28

Details

CLAUDE
Water boat
Weater
25th May
yook
no
Left Sheerness, without a crew in
tow of the tug Fairplay I.
[Left of Dayse for Du Was sunk while at Dunkirk.
1040/25). Dunkirk about 0020/25 Bover
and explosives. left Reached Dunkirk the evening
D
191

Details

CLEWBAY
M/V (John Kelly Ltd.)
D.B. Ivor, Master.
Took no part in operation Dynamo.
[Left of explosives. Dover for Dunkirk on 24th May with
and left Reached Dunkirk the a cargo
1040/25]. Dunkirk about 0020/25. Reached same Dover evening
19)

Details

FORTY TWO
M/B (Owner,
N. West)
Lieut. R. Nimmo, R.N.R.
30th May
1400
Left Sheerness with a convoy of nine
craft for Ramsgate. In company the
M/B White Heather also with nine
craft.
1630ca
The White Heather broke down and was
under tow. The Forty Two proceeded
with 18 craft.
2400ca
Arrived off Ramsgate.
31st May
0200
Left Ramsgate escorted by a trawler
towing those craft which were unable
to proceed under their own power.
0400ca
Trawler having trouble with her tow
ropes, and requested the Forty Two to
carry on alone. The Forty Two
proceeded unescorted, in company with
0900ca
14 craft, and arrived off Dunkirk
beach.
Throughout the day, British and French
troops ferried to off-lying ships.
p.m. (late) Engine trouble. Left for Ramsgate.
1st June
a.m.
Ramsgate, where engines repaired.
(early)
(Even-
Sailed for Dunkirk.
ing)
2nd June?
a.m.?
Arrived off Dunkirk. Ferried troops
to ships.
Rudder lost. Transferred troops to a
tug. Rigged a "jury rudder"
(consisting of a ladder, a rail
stauchion and a locker door).
Carried on ferrying troops.
p.m.?
The tug having been filled, proceeded
in tow thereof.
-
When 15 miles off Ramsgate, tow parted.
Completed remainder of voyage under
own power.
3rd June?
(Morn-
Ramsgate, where repairs carried out.
ing)
(Even-
Sailed for Dunkirk, a W.D/M.L. in
ing)
company.
(Evening
Off Dunkirk.
Ferried troops to ships.
late)
4th June?
0200
Proceeded.
Arrived Ramsgate.
-
4th June
2000
Lieut. Nimmo left the ship and
navigated the M/B Mermaiden to
5th June
1700
Weymouth.
Nil
Authority - - R.O.II, pp. 394, 582.
336

Details

Details

GAVA
Fleetwood trawler
Lieut. F.J. Jordan, R.N.R.
Skipper Day, P.N.R.
The Gava was the leader of the six Fleetwood trawlers. Lieut. Jordan
sent in 2 reports as follows:-
Report No.1 to the Captain M/S, Harwich dated 7th June 1940.
Report No.2 to the Port Fishery Captain, Fleetwood, dated 29th October 1940.
This report is accompanied by a copy of the Gava's log for 31st May - 2nd
June, "the principal days of my [Lt. Jordan's operation with the flotilla".
Both these reports refer to the operations of the Fleetwood trawler
flotilla as a unit.
The following account embodies the information contained in both
reports.
Report No.1.
Report No.2.
D
27th May 1830 Left
27th May
Gava left Fleetwood for Dover
Fleetwood.
in command of the trs.
Edwina, Evelyn Rose, Velia,
Jacinta and Dhoon.
28th May 0840 Arrived Portland.
29th May a.m. Flotilla in action against
enemy air attack on troop-
ships. No orders.
30th May
30th May
Flotilla ordered to cover
beaches and tow small craft.
All ships in action against
aircraft attack on trans-
ports.
Arrived Dover
p.m. Gava and Evelyn Rose ordered
in the
into harbour( (1) to assist
evening.
transporting troops to
Channel ports and to Channel
steamers outside the harbour
During these operations the
jetty was shelled, and
several vessels were damaged
and two sunk. (2) These
operations continued through-
out the night.
31st May 0740 Left Dover.
31st May "a.m. Flotilla returning to
0910 Entered
Ramsgate with troops;(3)
Ramsgate
attacked on passage by
harbour.
aircraft; all trawlers in
(1) Presumably Dunkirk harbour.
(2) The only vessel damaged by gunfire on 30th May was the P/V Princess
Maud which was shelled 3 miles west of Gravelines.
No vessel was sunk by gunfire on 30th May. The A.B/V. King Orry
sank outside the harbour on 30th May. as the result of a bomb hit
(3) Although not conclusive evidence, it must that be stated the Fleetwood that there is no
received on 29th May.
indication trawlers disembarked any troops on 30th
in Ramsgate or Dover reports May.
358

Details

2
HARVESTER (continued)
31st May
1530
Sailed from Dunkirk.
(contd.)
2010
Arrived Dover. Disembarked 808 troops.
2315
Sailed for La Panne.
1st June
0218
Ordered to Dunkirk instead of La Panne(1)
0310
Visibility poor; lay to.
0556
Shot down a French army plane piloted
by a German.
0610
Off Dunkirk a Ju.88 dropped 4 bombs
abeam 100 yards near dr. Winchelsea.
Barrage fire burst near. Plane
eventually seen to crash.
0615
Secured alongside seaward side of east
pier and embarked troops.
0618
Fired at bombers.
0620
Received signal "Good work from flank
marking - R.A. Dover".
0715
Sailed from Dunkirk.
0743
Four dive bombers attacked. One salvo
fell near Icarus. One dive bomber
Alla and
hit and crashed in flames.
0748
Sighted a plane being attacked by
the Harriestor
Spitfires. The dr. Codrington
opened fire and then Harvester.
Plane burst into flames and fell into
the sea. Codrington signalled
that the plane had been identified
as a Blenheim.
Lt. Cdr. Thornton observes "it seems
wrong that a bomber should need to
approach destroyers especially after
a dive bombing attack."
[It was later reported that an Army
officer in Codrington had seen the
Swastika marking on the plane as it
sank].
0940
Arrived Dover. Disembarked 576
troops.
Total 3191
Authority - R.O.I. p.44.
C.W. 23187/40.
The following awards were made:
D.S.C.
S/Lieut. E.C. Croswell, R.N.
Mention in Despatches
Lieut. Cdr. M. Thornton, R.N.
Gunner (T), W.G.A. Robinson R.N.
(1) S/Lt. Croswell reports: that on the evening of 31st May,
the Germans, assisted by 2 observation balloons, found
the range of La Panne beach. Lord Gort and his staff
were embarked in a whaler from La Panne and taken to
a patrol vessel [the M/Y Lahloo]: S/Lt. Croswell also
reports that at 0200 1st June, La Panne was abandoned as
a place of embarkation.

Details

I
HOWSON. Captain J.M., R.N. (continued)
30th May
Panne appeared to be invaluable". Captain
(contd.)
Howson returned to Bray from La Panne, and then
went to Dunkirk to meet the S.N.O. [En route,
he noticed the water boat Claude high and dry,
3 miles west of Bray; on his return to Bray
later, he informed the military authorities
of this, because water was then a most urgent
need for the troops.]
S.N.O. Dunkirk told Capt. Howson that about
12/13 thousand had been evacuated from Dunkirk
the previous night. Capt. Howson, for his part,
estimated that about 6/7 thousand had been
embarked from the beaches - and stressed that
ships and boats were urgently wanted, especially
small power boats.
Great numbers of British troops were now at,
and just east of Dunkirk, and many French
troops were at and near Malo.
During this day the R.E's assisted by 1st
Division, constructed a long pier of lorries
and planks off Bray; it was invaluable, later,
for small craft to lie alongside, except in
a lop, when they were liable to hole themselves.
It was, however, insufficiently stable for
larger ships to secure to.
Apart from a skoot or two, no ships had arrived
off the beaches during the forenoon, but some
paddlers and a yacht or two anchored west of
Bray in the afternoon. Later, 2 or 3 destroyers
and sloops passed eastward to La Panne; because
the 1st Division had been waiting in vainfor
ships and boats, Capt. Howson tried to signal
these passing ships to anchor east of the
lorry pier, but the improvised signalling
apparatus was ineffective. [Capt. Howson here
states that he did not learn till some days
later that all ships from Dover had been given
specific instructions as to their destination].
Later in the evening, Capt. Howson passed a
message to R.A. Dover asking for a ship to be
anchored east of the pier. Meanwhile, many of
the lst Division troops had set off for Dunkirk.
Whilst watching the embarkation at Bray, it was
noticed that, time after time, boats which had
taken troops to ships were subsequently cast
adrift without boat keepers. It was therefore
evident that power boats were required to
organise the collection, and towage back to the
beaches, of these drifting craft. Capt.
Howson decided to go to La Panne that night
and obtain R.A. Dover's approval for this to be
done.
During the night it was learnt that the enemy
were closing in and that the final evacuation
would probably take place the following day -
or night at latest.
Capt. Howson left Bray for La Panne at about
2000, and an hour later embarked in R.A.
Dover's "flagship", at that time the dr.
Worcester.
R.A. Dover [who had been visiting Lord Gort
at La Panne] returned to the Worcester at 2200
and approved Capt. Howson's proposal that - in
spite of him being N.O.I.C. beaches - he should
go afloat the next day and direct the small
boat traffic off the beaches.
45

Details

M/B 275
R.N. Air Station,
Ford
C.P.O. Leighton.
A.B. L.F. Strand.
sto. A. Benham.
[The following report 1s by A.B. Strand and
Sto. Benham.
29th May
p.m.
Left Littlehampton and arrived Newhaven
the same evening.
30th May
a.m.
Left Newhaven for Ramagate.
p.m.
Arrived Ramsgate.
31st May
0430
Ordered to sail for Dunkirk.
0730
Developed leak and returned to Ramsgate.
1st June
0430
Sailed for Dunkirk, having embarked 2
volunteer Sub-Lieutenants R.N.V.R.
and an extra able seaman.
-
When near Dunkirk, struck a submerged
object. No damage.
-
Just off shore at Dunkirk, all small
boats suddenly turned about and
left, as if ordered to do so.
Decided to do likewise, and on
turning, saw "two large ships"
packed with troops steaming away from
Dunkirk.
-
Suddenly a crowd of German bombers
came out of the clouds. Direct hits
were made on both the big ships which
sank within about 20 minutes.
[probably the P/V Scotia and the
P.M/S Brighton Queen].
-
All small boats went to the rescue.
M/B 275 picked up 10 survivors. A
destroyer which was being bombed,
kept the raiders off.
-
After about 3/4 hour, sighted 3 trawlers,
two on the starboard hand, one on the
port. [They were the Cape Argona
the Arctic Pioneer and the Sphene
One of them, the Cape Argona made
a signal in morse. A.B. Strand
shouted to C.P.O. Leighton to stop
engines, and he asked for a torch
to signal back with; but either he
"was not heard or was disregarded".
A shot was fired across M/B 275's
bows, but she still steamed fast
towards the trawlers.
1315ca
All three trawlers opened a heavy
fire at about 1,000 yards. A hit
wrecked the wheelhouse.
All hands except the R.N.V.R.
officers and A.B. Strand jumped over
the side. A.B. Strand seized the
wheel, and then waved an ensign;
the trawlers ceased fire.
One of the trawlers [the Cape
Argona] sent a boat to pick up the
in the water, and got the M/B 275
men alongside. Both officers, C.P.O.
wounded; one of the crew of
Leighton and several survivors the were
sunk transport was killed.
261

Details

SCIMITAR (continued)
1300ca
31st (contd.) May
(contd).
Vivacious and Shikari. Intermittent
evening, in company with the drs.
shelling and bombing. Having no
ship's boats, and no other boats
Embarkation appeared difficult on
coming near, unable to embark troops.
1700ca
account of choppy water.
One aircraft shot down - believed by
2030ca
the Scimitar's "A" gun.
The weather improved. Embarked troops,
principallyfrom the sk. Hilda.
2300ca
Sailed knots. with about 500 troops, at 8
-
A slight collision with an unknown
trawler. (1)
1st June
0600ca
Arrived Dover. Disembarked 584
troops. (2)
1000
Sailed for Dunkirk.
-
When near the N. Goodwin L.V., ordered
to return. Having sighted the P/V
Prague in difficulties, went to her
assistance. Went alongside her, and
while under way, took off 500 troops.
Escorted the Prague through the
Downs.
1530
Arrived Dover. Disembarked 376
troops. (2)
2nd June
To dockyard for repairs.
Total 2711
Authority - R.O.I., p.132.
The following awards were made:
D.S.C.
Midshipman M.J. Ball, R.N.R.
D.S.M.
A.B. G. Pasmore.
Sto. F.A. Tyler.
Mention in Despatches.
Lieut. R.D. Franks, O.B.E., R.N.
(1) The two F/B drifters Gervais Rentoul and Eileen Emma
returned to Dover on 1st June damaged and unseaworthy
after being involved in collisions.
(2) D.R.
102

Details

SERIOLA
Portsmouth Yacht Inner Patrol Lieut. D.A. Dawson,
-
29th May
S/Lt. T.E. Godman, R.N.V.R. was
R.N.V.R,
1800
The sailed divisions of the Inner patrol
transferred 2 to the Seriola.
The from Hamble in
2nd Division comprised company. the
Noneta. yeachts Seriola, Eilla II, Ahola 4 and
ep
the [The 1st
5 yachts Ankh
Bounty, Caryanda, Lahloo and Thele]
30th May
0930
2200
The flotilla arrived at Dover.
The flotilla sailed from Dover for Bray.
31st May
0500
The Seriola, leading her division,
arrived off Bray. The yachts then
acted independently.
Seriola ferried troops from the beach
de
1000ca
to off-lying destroyers.
Ordered by a destroyer to proceed to
La Panne and ferry troops from the
beach.
1500
Signalled by the dr. Keith to collect
2 whalers for operations off La
Panne during the evening.
1530
The Noneta having had 1 killed and
another badly wounded, asked for
the services of S/Lt. T.E. Godman.
He was transferred.
1630
Collected 2 whalers and proceeded to
La Panne.
1800
Ordered to close the Bounty which was
flying the flag of Cdre. G.O.
Stephenson. The commodore asked
for a special effort to be made that
night.
Continued ferrying troops from La
Panne™ throughout the night.
1st June
0700
Signalled by a destroyer to collect all
boats in the channel between La Panne
and Dunkirk, tow them to Dunkirk,
and then let them drift ashore.
0830
Embarked several boat loads of troops
and ferried them to a destroyer off
Dunkirk; her Captain asked the
Seriola to tow the Bounty to
Ramsgate as her port engine was
broken down.
0845
Closed the Bounty and embarked her C.O.
[Lt. Lundy] and Cdre. Stephenson.
Took the Bounty in tow and on the
Commodore's orders set course for
Ramsgate; the Lahloo (q.v.) was in
company. Slight damage from
aircraft machine gunning.
1430
Arrived Ramsgate. (1) Cdre. Stephenson
and Lt. Lundy disembarked.
Nil
(1) Ramsgate the "Lalm" [i.e. Lahloo],
"Servion" report [i.e. states Seriola] that and Bounty together disembarked
11 B.E.F. The Lahloo herself states that she disembarked
15.
122

Details

SUNSHINE (R.13)
M/B (A.J.Berrion)
-
30th May
Went over to Dunkirk beaches, where she
was used to assist the Ramsgate
life boat Prudential. She was in
company with 7 other boats, all of
which carried out ferrying duties,
that night.
-
31st May
By this time only the Sunshine and 2
other boats remained to assist the
Prudential, the others having been
damaged or stranded.
-
Sunshine was badly damaged too, and
the 2 other boats were scarcely sea-
worthy.
-
By the evening, while on tow to the
Prudential, the Sunshine broke away
and had to be abahdoned.
Nil
[Report by the Coxewain of Prudential]
Authority - - TO.9144/41.
195

Details

TWO RIVERS
M/B (C.C.B. Weymouth)
P/O G.B. Thomas, R.N.R.
Coxswain.
a.m.
30th May
Sailed for Sheerness.
p.m.
Left Sheerness for Dunkirk.
31st May
a.m.
Arrived Dunkirk. Ferried troops to
the dr. Winchelsea all day and until
late evening. (1) The engines had
broken down, but the Two Rivers was
towed to and from the beach by a
motor launch.
2000ca
By this time Two Rivers was leaking and
the engine was still out of action.
The crew of Two Rivers was taken on
board the Winchelsea which proceeded
to Dover.
The Two Rivers was abandoned.
Nil
Authority - TO.9144.
TO.9436.
R.O.II, p.586.
(1) Winchelsea arrived at Bray beach about 1000. She shifted
to Dunkirk at 1830.
250

Details

Details

Details

Details

40
Page
Page
41
5
G.
Page
Ethel Taylor
Page
5
9
Gadfly
22
Guillemot
Page
Doon
3
Ethfra
35
Gael
31
Page
17
Gula
J.
Galvani
15
Kunishi
Doonie Braes
4
Etruscan
14
Gulfoss
Jacketa
23
17
30
11
Kurd
Dorada II
11
Eunice Euclase and Nellie
23
Garola
Gulzar
Jacinta
16
35
11
5
Kuroki
Dorando-Pietri
S
Jack Eve
37
14
Garry
20
Gunner
26
14
Dorienta
37
Europa
5
Gava
Gwenllian
Jade
Dorileen
2
Evadne
Gelert
5
35
32
5
Gwmaho
James Barrie
28
8
4
37
Dorinda
Evelyn Rose
14
Geneva
James Lay
15
Dorothy
15
Evening Primrose
5
General Botha
17
Jano
L.
11
Dorothy Lambert
29
Everton
Genius
36A
Jason
Lacenia
5
31
26
Dragonet
H.
13
Evesham
8
Geordie
15
Jasper
13
Lady Beryl
21
Drangey
35
Exyahne
23
Halcyon
10
Jeanie Deans
19
Lady Blanche
5
Drummer Boy
22
7
E.&T.S.
George and Albert
12
Halcyone
11
Jeannie Howie
Lady Brassey
11
Duchess of Down
12
27
Ex Fortis
George Cousins
Halo
13
27
28
Jeannie Leask
8
Lady Elsa
25
Duchess of Fife
36A
10
Explorer
George Robb
21
Hanyards
3
Jeannie Mackay
Lady Enid
9
22
Duchess of Rothesay
2
Georgette
Harbinger
14
6
Jeannie McIntosh
17
14
Lady Hogarth
Duenna
Gervais Rentoul
Harlech Castle
5
27
Jennet
18
Lady Lilian
31
Dulcibelle
10
16
Gilt Edge
Harmattan
28
Jenny Irvin
Lady Madeline
31
8
16
Dundalk
Girl Christian
Harpada
2
Jessie Tait
Lady Philomena
10
27
27
Dundarg
F.
22
Harrier
10
Jester
Lady Shahrazad
19
Girl Ellen
19
36A
11
23
Harry Melling
Jewel
Lady Shirley
17
Dungeness
Fair Breeze
27
Dunnet
2
7
Fairway
17
Girl Gladys
10
Harvest Gleaner
21
Jocelyn
Laguna Belle
23
22
Dunraven Castle
27
Fair Weather
28
Girl Helen
Lahloo
8
23
Harvest Hope
28
John Alfred
14
Dusky Queen
11
29
Girl Mary
Larch
12A
Fairy Knowe
22
Harvest Reaper
7
John and Norah
15
Falconet
Girl Pamela
Laroc
8
11
10
Hatano
2
John Cattling
11
Lass o'Doune
3
Faraday
17
Girl Pat
12
Haussa
14
John Fitzgerald
37
E.
Laurel
16
Favour
27
Girl Winifred
23
Hav
35
John Stephen
36
Lavatera
27
Eager
29
Fawn
28
Gladys
29
Hawthorn
24
T. Hendry
12
Lavinia L
12
Eaglet II
5
Fazenta
35
Glala
12
Hawthorn Bank
18
Joseph Button
3
Laws
23
Earl Essex
2
Feaco
35A
Gleam On
29
Hazard
29
Jubilee
22
Learig
30
Earl Kitchener
13
Feasible
15
Gleaner
June Rose
31
Hazel
25
23
Leda
10
Easter Rose
27
23
Gleaners
Heather Sprig
27
Juniper
25
Felicity
22
Leeds United
4
Ebor Jewel
17
Fenella
36A
Hebe
29
Justifier
15
Glen Avon
23
Leeward
28
Ebor Wyke
29
Fentonian
12A
Hekla
17
Glen Gower
23
Leicester City
26
Eccleshill
29
Helen
5
Fernmoor
Glen Heather
3
Lephreto
3
29
Ecila
2
Helen West
28
Glen Kidston
Leprechaun
8
Eden
2
Ferry Belle
8
17
Helier II
36B
K.
Le Tiger
25
29
Ferry Prince
8
Glen Strathallan
19
Edith M. Purdy
Fertile Vale
Heliopolis
34
Kalan
19
Letna
8
22
E. D. Walmsley
5
Glen Usk
23
Helvellyn
19
Kathleen
3
Leyland
32
Edwardian
Fervent
11
12A
Glitter II
12
Helvetia
17
Kellet
10
Libra
35
Edwina
Fidget
11
5
Gloamin
7
Hendon
20
Kelpy
12
Libyan
35
Egeria
Fidra
36
22
Gloria
29
Henriette
23
Kelt
32
Lichen
12A
Eileen Emma
10
Filey Bay
16
Glow
22
Hertfordshire
9
Kennet
20
Liddoch
3
Eilla II
8
Fintray
5
Go Ahead
12A
Hickory
24
Kennet (Tender)
12
Liffey
20
Elbury
Fir
24
19
21
Kennymore
7
Lilac
24
16
Goatfell
Hildena
Eldorado
23
Firefly
21
Golden Eagle
12A
Hinba
29
Keverne
12
Lily Oak
28
Elena
35
Fisher Boy
11
Golden Effort
19
Hiniesta
3
Kiddaw
12
Lincoln City
26
Elgin
16
Fisher Lad
28
Golden Emblem
22
Holdfast
11
Kiloran
3
Lincolnshire
19
Elizabeth Angela
11
Fitzroy
16
10
Holly
24
Kindred Star
9
Lizzie Birrel
24
Golden Gift
22
14
Llanthony
S
Elk
2
Flanders
23
Golden Harvest
8
Hollydale
King Emperor
Ellesmere
18
13
King Orry
11
Loch Aline
18
25
Fleming
Golden Lily
27
Hopeful
Elm
28
25
27
8
Kingscourt
16
Loch Alsh
16
Flora
Golden News
Horizon
Elmenzala
5
17
Loch Buie
23
35
Floreat II
22
Golden Sunbeam
10
Hornbeam
Kings Grey
Elna
9
28
Hosanna
11
Floreat III
King Sol
25
Loch Eribol
16
Eloquent
22
Loch Hope
17
Golden Thyme
19
Florence Brierley
37
Golden View
14
Hoverfly
20
Kingston Agate
8
Else Rykens
Huddersfield Town
4
Kingston Alalite
10
Lochinvar
20
28
Flush
Elsie Carn
20
Goodwill
22
30
Kingston Amber
8
Loch Inver
17
35
Elsie and Nellie
Flying Admiral
5
Goodwin
11
Hugh Walpole
Kingston Andalusite
10
Loch Laggan
12
10
12
El Tovar
Flying Breeze
4
Gorse
28
Hussar
Kingston Beryl
30
Loch Leven
16
37
22
Fontenoy
10
S
Loch Long
Embrace
15
Gossamer
Kingston Cairngorm
27
Foray
16
8
Loch Melfort
32
Emilia Primeiro
27
Goth
Force
I.
Kingston Ceylonite
37
14
Gowan
22
Kingston Chrysoberyl
8
Loch Monteith
25
Emilion
16
Forecast
12
Emperor of India
19
Idyll
32
Loch Oskaig
25
10
10
Gowan Craig
S
Kingston Chrysolite
Empress
Forerunner
Ijiun
33
Loch Rannock
5
12A
10
Kingston Coral
Loch Shin
29
9
Gracie Fields
29
Empyrean
Fort Robert
15
Imelda
Kingston Crystal
33
Englishman
8
35
Grampion
25
33
Loch Tulla
28
Fort Ryan
29
Grateful
28
Imperialist
19
36
Kingston Cyanite
Forte
10
Lois
11
Enterprising
Ephretah
Fortitude
2
Gregory
17
Inchgower
20
26
Kingston Galena
30
London Pride
13
25
Indian Star
Epine
28
Fort Rose
19
Greenfly
28
Kingston Jacinth
Loon
29
10
2
Indian Summer
Equerry
29
Forward
35A
Green Howard
27
Kingston Olivine
Lord Ashfield
26
30
Erimo
22
Foss
9
Green Pastures
29
Industry
29
Kingston Onyx
30
Lord Austin
19
3
29
4
Internos
28
Kingston Peridot
Lord Barham
15
Erith
Fox
Greetings
30
Erna
16
Foyle
30
11
Invercairn
Grey Mist
11
Kingston Sapphire
30
Lord Beaconsfield
17
10
Inverforth
37
12
Kingston Topaz
Lord Cavan
11
Eroican
Franc Tireur
20
30
Grimsby Town
Escalonia
35A
Friesland
17
Grosmont Castle
27
Inverugie
15
Kingston Turquoise
3
Lord Collingwood
11
Esmeralda
28
28
Irvana
Freyer
18
Kirkella
35
17
Lord Essenden
19
Grouville
Esperanza
9
Frons Olivae
36A
Guava
5
Isle of May
28
Kopanes
Essex Maid
4
Fumarole
22
Guide On
23
Istria
24
Fyldea
28
Guiding Light
28
11
Guelder Rose
23

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Details

40
Page
Page
Dorothy Lambert
15
Esmeralda
41
25
29
Craig Alvah
Dragonet
Esperanza
26
13
Drangey
Essex Maid
9A
Page
Page
22
14A
Craig-Bo Craig Island
Drummer
Ethel Taylor
Forfeit
Page
26
Golden Lily
26
36
Herdis
Drummer Boy
35
Ethfra
24
Forte
2
17
Golden News
8
Hero
Craigmiller
28
Duchess of Down
7
Ethiopian
Fortitude
36
23
19
Golden Sunbeam
10
Heron
Fort Robert
17
Craig Roy
26
Duchess of Fife
13
Etruria
9A
35
Golden Thyme
28
Hertfordshire
22
Etruscan
29
Fort Rose
9A
Cramond Craik Island
Duchess of Rothesay
15
14B
Golden View
14
Hickory
24
22
2
Duenna
Euclase
7
Fort Ryan
29
Goodwill
22
Hilda Cooper
14
Cranefly
28
25
35
Fortuna
23
Goodwin
17
Dulcibelle
Europa Eunice and Nellie
Hildegarde
36B
Crannock
17
14a
Forward
9A
Gorecht
9
Hildena
21
Dundalk
16
Creagh Mhor
26
14a
Foss
29
Gorse
28
Hinba
Dundarg
27
8
Evadne
14B
Crest
14A
Fox
30
Gossamer
16
Hiniesta
3
Crestflower
Dunedin
14
12A
Eveline
Foyle
20
Goth
Crevice
Dungeness
14B
18
Evelyn Rose
5
16
Holdfast
11
Franc Tireur
36A
14
Gowan
22
Holland
8
Cuirass
28
Dunluce Castle
28
Evening Primrose
Freres Coquelin
35B
Gowan Craig
19
14
Holly
15
Cumulus
12
Dunnet
2
Everton
Friesland
35
14A
G. R. Purdy
24
Hollydale
22
Curlew
15
Dunraven Castle
27
Evesham
Freyer
21
Grampion
15
Hondsrug
9
17
Curtana
5
Dusky Queen
11
Ewald
Friarage
24
Grateful
28
14B
Hopeful
18
Cutty Sark
Exchequer
Frons Olivae
22
Great Admiral
5
Horizon
28
8
6
Cypress
Fumarole
28
Gregory
26
Hornbeam
5
6
Exyáhne
36A
Cysne II
E. & T.S.
Fyldea
10
Greenfly
13
Hortensia
35
E.
14
Green Howard
19
Hosanna
11
Ex Fortis
22
Green Pastures
29
Hoverfly
21
Eager
14A
Explorer
12
G.
Greetings
4
Huddersfield Town
4
D.
Eaglet II
5
21
Gadfly
22
Grey Mist
11
Hugh Walpole
30
Dahinda II
2
Earl Essex
14
Gael
17
Grimsby Town
10
Hurrying Angel
9
13
Daisy Bank
25
Earl Kitchener
14
Galatea
5
Grosmont Castle
27
Hussar
Dale Castle
19
Easter Rose
27
F.
Galvani
14B
Grouville
28
Hval V
35
Dalmatia
8
Ebor Abbey
26
Fairhaven
Garola
35
Guava
5
Damito
9A
Ebor Jewel
17
Fairway
36B
Garry
20
Guide On
14A
Dane
22
Ebor Wyke
29
Fair Weather
14
Gaston Riviere
35B
Guiding Light
28
I.
14
Guelder Rose
23
Idyll
12
Dane Hill
23
Eccleshill
29
28
Gava
Fairy Knowe
Daneman
8,25
Ecila
14A
Gelert
9
Guillemot
31
Ijiun
8
3
Falconet
Daniel Clowden
29
Eden
11
Genberdina Johanna
6
Gula
14B
Imelda
29
2
Fano
12
24
Geneva
17
Gulfoss
15
Imperia
17A
Danube III
Edith M. Purdy
29
Faraday
14B
Genius
15
Gulzar
11
Imperialist
25
Danube IV
12
Edward Walmsley
13
Favour
Inchgower
27
Geordie
23
Gunner
25
2
Danube V
12
Edwardian
12A
Fawn
George and Albert
12
Gustave Dennis
35B
Indian Star
2
D'Arcy Cooper
28
14
Edwina
14
Fazenta
George Bligh
37
Gwenllian
35
Indian Summer
28
Darnaway
35
25
E. & F.
5
Feaco
George Cousins
26
Gwmaho
4
Industry
26
Darnett Ness
8
3
Egeria
17
Fear Not
George D. Irvine
14
Interloper
9A
Darogah
30
Internos
14A
12A
Eileen Duncan
Darthema
35
Feasible
15
George Adgell
11
8
Eileen Emma
10
Fedalmo
George Robb
15
Invercairn
28
Darwin
12
35
Eilla II
9
23
Georgette
3
H.
Invercauld
35
David Ogilvie
23
Felicity
Gervais Rentoul
10
Haarlem
36c
Inverforth
3
Davey
Elbury
16
Fenella
36A
28
Eldorado
Gilder
17A
Halcyon
13
Inverugie
12
Dayspring
25
Fentonian
12A
28
Iona
7
26
Dee
E. Lauland
Gillian
24
Halo
17
Fernmoor
29
20
Gilt Edge
8
Hanyards
3
Irvana
15
Defiance
Electra II
5
Ferry Belle
9
Girard
37
Harbinger
6
Isle of May
18
2
De la Pole
Elena
35
Ferryman
17
Girl Christian
22
Harlech Castle
27
Istria
28
14B
Delphinus
Elgin
Deodar
35
16
Elisabeth Therese
Ferry Prince
9
Girl Ellen
23
Harmattan
28
35B
Fertile Vale
22
Girl Gladys
10
Harrier
13
Deo-Na-Mara
22
Elizabeth Angela
11
11
Girl Helen
23
Harry Melling
23
J.
17
Fervent
Deo Volante
Elizabeth Green
12A
11
Girl Mary
22
Harvest Gleaner
14
Jacketa
11
28
Dervish Derby County
Elk
Fidget
22
Girl Pat
12
Harvest Hope
28
Jacinta
14
4
2
Fidra
Ellesmere
16
Girl Winifred
23
Harvest Reaper
7
Jack Eve
14A
9A
Filey Bay
19
Jacqueline Clasine
36A
Desiree
17
Elm
21
Gladys
29
Hatano
Destinn
35
Elna
25
Fintray
24
Glala
12
Hatuse
35
Jade
32
Devon City
5
Eloquent
9A
Fir
Gleam On
26
Hav
35
James Barrie
37
12A
Devon County
20
19
Firefly
Gleaner
31
Hawthorn
24
James Lay
15
Else Rykens
11
Dewey Rose
12A
Elsie Carn
28
Fisher Boy
28
Gleaners
22
Hawthorn Bank
18
Janetha IV
12
Dhoon
27
35
Fisher Lad
Glen Avon
23
Haybourne Wyke
3
[ano
11
Elsie and Nellie
16
Diana
Glen Gower
23
Hazard
29
[ason
31
14
El Tovar
12
Fitzroy
21
22
Glen Heather
3
Hazel
25
Jasper
13
Dirkje
9
Embrace
Flanders
14
Glen Kidston
17
Heather Belle
30
Jean Edmunds
35
Discovery II
6
Emilion Emerald Wings
27
Flandre
13
Doctor Lee
Glen Strathallan
19
Heather Sprig
27
Jeanie Deans
19
30
8
Fleming
17
Glen Usk
23
Hebe
29
Jeannie Howie
27
Doggers Dolores Bank
29
Empress Emperor of India
11
Flixton
27
Glitter II
12
Hekla
14
Jeannie Leask
8
9
36
Flora
22
Gloamin
7
Helen
5
Jeannie Mackay
22
Donna Doon Nook
12A
En Avant
9A
Floreat II
22
Gloria
29
Helen West
28
Jeannie McIntosh
14A
23
Doonie Braes
Englishman
6
Floreat III
18
35A
Helier II
36c
Jennet
18
Glow
5
Doorie Brae
Enterprising
19
Florence Brferley
4
35A
Heliopolis
18
Jennifer
17
Go Ahead
Dorade II
17
Ephretah
20
Florio
20
19
Helvellyn
19
Jenny Irvine
17
Goatfell
Dorando-Pietri
36A
Epine
28
14A
Golden Eagle
12A
Helvetia
14B
Jenny Irwin
35A
Flush
4
Flying Admiral
19
Hendon
20
Jessie Tait
27
Dorienta
11
Equerry
15
Golden Effort
Dorileen
22
Henriette
23
Jester
19
Erimo
22
Flying Breeze
7
Golden Emblem
8
Golden Gift
Henriette (Fr.)
35B
Jewel
7
Dorinda
Erin
37
3
Flying Wing
15
10
Erith
Golden Harvest
8
Hercules
36A
Jocelyn
21
Dorothy Dorothy (B.D.V.)
36c
27
Fontenoy
H 2
2
Erna
12
16
Foray
12A
28
Eroican
18,37
10
(C38488)
Force
Escalonia
17
Forecast
12A
28
Forerunner

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Details

39
Page
Page
Page
40
Bervie Braes
2
Caleta
12
Coila
19
Dane Hill
Page
32
Caliban
12
Coldsnap
28
Daneman
23
Beryl
Eden
Page
30
Calliope
23
Colette
12
Beryl II
Daniel Clowden
8,25
Page
4
Calverton
16
Collena
37
29
27
Calvinia
12
Edward. Palmsley
2
Fawn
Beth
Collingwood
Danube III
29
12
Fazenta
28
21
Betsy Slater
Danube IV
13
Feaco
35
2
Cambridgeshire
3
Colne
20
Bilsdean
Danube V
12
10
Compina
Comely Bank
Edwina
12A
35A
4
12
Fear Not
Birch
Comet
D'Arcy Cooper
12
E. & F.
14
Feasible
30
Bishopsgate
20
Cape Argona
16
2
Cape Baracouta
Comitatus
Darnaway
14
Egeria
5
15
Fedalmo
Black Arrow
2
27
21
Commander Holbrook
Darnett Ness
26
11
Eileen Duncan
17
12
Felicity
Cape Comorin
25
Darogah
3
35
23
Blackfly
16
Fenella
Blackthorn
22
Cape Finisterre
14
Commander Horton
Eileen Emma
4
Darthema
12A
Eilla II
10
36A
Fentonian
20
4
Commiles
12A
Blackwater
Cape Mariato
3
Darwin
8
Elbury
9
Fernmoor
15
15
Commander Evans
29
Cape Melville
14B
David Ogilvie
35
Eldorado
16
Blighty
Ferry Belle
9
18
Cape Nyemetski
29
Commander Nasmith
Bluebell
11
Davey
23
E. Lauland
23
Ferryman
17
8
Commodator
28
17
Bluebird
20
Cape Palliser
21
Dayspring
Electra II
Ferry Prince
9
29
Cape Portland
25
Boom Carriers
Computator
9A
Dee
27
Elena
5
Fertile Vale
22
B. 0. Davies
Cape Spartel
8
Concertator
20
Elgin
35
24
8
Defiance
Fervent
11
Cape Trafalgar
19
Concordia
29
2
Borde
De la Pole
Elizabeth Angela
16
9
Fidget
11
9A
Cape Warwick
25
Conidaw
14B
Boscawen
Elizabeth Green
11
Fidra
10
Delphinus
22
12A
35
Conqueror
35
Filey Bay
Botanic
10
Capricornus
9A
Deo-Na-Mara
Elk
16
Bountiful
29
4
17
2
Capstone
Conquistador
Ellesmere
Fintray
21
12A
Deo Volante
9
Carbineer II
Consbro
28
9A
7
37
Elm
Fir
24
Bounty
Derby County
Consolation
4
25
Elna
Firefly
12A
Bouvet I
35
Cardiff Castle
15
8
Dervish
17
9A
Cardy
9A
Constant Friend
Eloquent
Fisher Boy
11
Bouvet II
35
12
Desiree
19
35
Fisher Lad
Bouvet III
35
Carency
5
12
Else Rykens
28
Constant Hope
Destinn
28
5
Consul
Elsie Carn
Fitzroy
16
Bouvet IV
35
Caribia
9
9A
Devon City
35
Flanders
20
21
29
Contender
Elsie and Nellie
Carina
19
15
Devon County
12
Flandre
12A
14
Bownet
El Tovar
Boy Alex
15
Controller
22
24
Carisbrook
14B
Dewey Rose
Fleming
13
27
Embrace
27
Flixton
17
Boy Allen
12A
Caroline
7
Convallaria
27
Dhoon
14
Emerald Wings
8
Flora
27
Boy Andrew
21
Caroline Moller
14
Conway Castle
29
Diana
9
Emilion
11
Floreat II
22
Boy John
26
Caryanda
9
Copious
28
Discovery II
30
Emperor of India
5610
Floreat III
22
Boyne
20
Carraig
18
Coral
32
Doctor Lee
29
Empress
9A
Florence Brierley
18
Boy Pat
13
Carry On
12
Coral Bank
18
Doggers Bank
9
Endeavour
17
Florio
4
Boy Philip
15
Castle Bay
35A
Corbrae
12A
Dolores
12A
Englishman
19
Flush
20
Boy Scout
12
Caswell
14A
Corcyra
5
Donna Nook
23
Enterprising
20
Flying Admiral
14A
Boyne Water
2
Caterina
12
Cordela
14
Doon
5
Epine
15
Flying Breeze
4
Boy's Own
17
Catherine
23
Cordelia II
18
Doonie Braes
17
Equerry
22
Flying Wing
7
Doorie Brae
36A
Erimo
3
Fontenoy
15
Brabant
21
Caulonia
3
Corena
13
Bracendale
26
Cayrian
35
Corfield
Dorade II
4
Erin
36c
Foray
27
12A
Bracon Heath
12A
Cayton Wyke
10
Cornelian
5
Dorando-Pietri
11
Erith
16
Force
12A
15
12
Dorienta
8
Erna
18,37
Forecast
10
Bracon Moor
Cecil Margetts
Cornelis
36A
Coronatia
12
Dorileen
37
Eroican
17
Forerunner
12A
Braemar
28
Cedar
8
28
Forfeit
27
Dorinda
2
Escalonia
Bramble
29
Cedric
36B
Coronet
9A
12
Esmeralda
9A
Forte
2
Branch
28
Ceresio
26
Cortina
35
Dorothy (B.D.V.)
28
Esperanza
4
Fortitude
19
Brecon Castle
2
Cervantes
12A
Coruscation
21
Dorothy
20
Ceto
2
Cotsmuir
Dorothy Lambert
15
Essex Maid
24
Fort Robert
35
Breda
15
Dragonet
29
Ethel Taylor
23
Fort Rose
14B
Brenda
Ceylonite
9
9A
Fort Ryan
29
21
36
Count
Drangey
13
Ethfra
Brigand
Chalcedony
18
Drummer
Ethiopian
29
Fortuna
23
29
22
Countess Betty
14A
7
Forward
9A
Brimness
21
Charde
8
Courtier
3
Drummer Boy
35
Etruria
35
Foss
29
Brine
29
Charles Doran
15
Coventry City
25
7
Etruscan
Duchess of Down
14A
Fox
30
Brinmaric
9A
Cherwell
8
Craig
22
13
Euclase
Duchess of Fife
14A
Foyle
20
British
16
Chestnut
10
Craig Alvah
26
10
Eunice and Nellie
Duchess of Rothesay
14A
Franc Tireur
14
British Guiana
7
Chico
11
Craig-Bo
26
2
Europa
Duenna
5
Friesland
35
British Honduras
7
Chiltern
2
22
21
Evadne
Craig Island
Dulcibelle
14
Freyer
21
Britomart
29
Chimaera
Craigmiller
36
16
Evelyn Rose
3
Dundalk
Broadland
28
27
Evening Primrose
14A
Friarage
24
23
Chorley
Frons Olivae
22
37
Craig Roy
17
Brock
Dundarg
10
Christine
36A
Craik
27
14
Everton
14B
Fumarole
28
Dunedin
Brontes
28
Christiana T. Purdy
29
Cramond Island
22
14B
Evesham
36A
Fyldea
10
B.T.B.
Dungeness
35A
28
Ewald
Chrysea
36B
22
36A
Cranefly
Dunluce Castle
Buckingham
2
Exchequer
12
Chrystobel II
28
14
12
Crannock
Dunnet
Bunting
Citron
17
27
Exyáhne
22
14
12
Dunraven Castle
E.&T.S.
G.
Burke
Creagh Mhor
10
City of Rochester
8
11
12
12A
Crestflower
Dusky Queen
Ex Fortis
22
21
Gadfly
Burlington
29
Clan McKay
37
17
21
Cuirass
Explorer
Gael
Burnbanks
Clarinet
12
5
12A
37
Curlew
Galatea
Burnhaven
14B
18
Claverhouse
21
Curtana
15
Galvani
Bush
35
5
Clavis
23
Cutty Sark
5
E.
14A
Garola
F.
20
Bushwood
3
Clevella
16
Cypress
8
Eager
5
36B
Garry
14
Buttermere
25
Clifton
Buzzard
23
6
Eaglet II
14
Fairhaven
14
Gava
Cysne II
9
12
Clio
Earl Essex
14
Fairway
28
Gelert
6
17
Bystander
11
Clorinde
Earl Kitchener
27
Fair Weather
14A
Geneva
12
15
Clotilde
D.
Easter Rose
Fairy Knowe
11
Genius
15
27
23
C.
Cloud
2
Ebor Abbey
17
Falconet
24
Geordie
12
Cachelot
28
Dahinda II
George and Albert
12
Cacorina
Cloughton Wyke
2
Daisy Bank
26
Ebor Jewel
29
Fano
14B
37
5
Cloverdale
14A
Dale Castle
19
29
Faraday
27
George Bligh
Cadella
Ebor Wyke
17A
Clythness
11
Dalmatia
Eccleshill
2
Favour
H
8
Cadorna
35
Cobbers
14A
Damito
9A
Caldy
Ecila
35
Cochrane II
20
Dane
22
(C38488)

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Page 6.
OPERATION "DYNAMO" - RECOMMENDATIONS OF PERSONNEL.
H.M.S. "PANGBOURNE" - Acting Commander Francis Douglas-Watson, R.N.
The ship left Harwich, and arrived at Dunkirk on the
evening of 28th May; she returned t 0 Margate and disembarked
400 troops. On her second trip to Dunkirk she rescued the
crew of the "CLAN MACALISTER". She was subjected to air
attacks from 1645 to 1715 and from 1000 to 1900 (29th May);
the latter was particularly severe and caused some 24
casualties, including Belgian soldiers. On her way back
she towed the badly damaged "GRACIE FIELDS", rescuing the
latter's crew when she sank.
After undergoing temporary repairs to D.G. wiring and
for splinter damage, "PANGBOURNE" completed one more round
trip to Dunkirk and also brought in a number of soldiers
transferred to her by 8. trawler.
In all she completed 3 round trips, bringing back 920
men.
RECOMMENDATIONS.
OFFICERS:
Acting Commander Francis Douglas-Watson. R.N.
Commander Douglas-Watson displayed courage, resource
and professional skill of a high order in dangerous and most
DSO
difficult conditions. The steadiness of the ship's company
in the face of severe air attack and casualties was an
eloquent tribute to his leadership and example.
Recommended for Decoration.
RATINGS:
Leading Stoker Ronald Kenneth Robb, O.N. D/KX18359.
C.G.M
Remained on the forecastle during the first bombing
attack in charge of the capstan. When this was put out of
DSM
action and he was badly wounded in both arms, he stood by
in an exposed position ready to slip the cable. Afterwards
he continued to assist the repair parties although one arm
was out of action.
Recommended for Decoration.
Leading Seaman Alfred Reid, O.N. D/J13129.
As coxswain of the motor boat, Reid was of great
assistance to the officer in charge of the boats on the beach.
He carried out all orders in prompt and seamanlike manner
as well as acting on his own initiative when towing the
various boat loads back to the ship.
Recommended for Mention.

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Page 70
Operation "DYNAMO" - Recommendations of Personnel.
H.M.S. BIDEFORD - Lieutenant Commander John Hugh Lewes, R.N.
being bombed and machine-gunned on the way across. While May,
This vessel proceeded to Bray beach on the 29th
bombing attack took place. The ship was struck on the
off the beach embarking troops in the evening, the third
blown away, No.2 gun put out of action and the 0.5 machir
quarter deck, about 40 feet of stern being completely
gun platforms wrecked, in addition to much other damage.
In spite of the damage done, of the fact that the ship
was grounded aft and of the casualties suffered (3 office
and 13 men killed, 1 officer and 18 men wounded), BIDEFOR
continued to embark troops during the night, and when
eventually towed off and home, carried 400 troops to
England on the 31st May.
Recommendations.
OFFICERS,
Lieutenant Commander John Hugh Lewes, R.N.
In spite of the severe damage to his ship by
bombs and the fact that his ship was aground, he
continued to rescue troops from Bray beach, and
eventually carried 400 to England.
Recommended for mention.
Surgeon Lieutenant John Jordan. M.B.. B.Ch., R.N.
Displayed zeal and unswerving devotion to duty
throughout the period 29th-31st May, when he was an
outstanding example to all. His sick berth
attendant seriously wounded, he dealt with some 50
casualties, many horribly mutilated or dangerously
wounded, and performed several major operations,
having organised his limited resources to their
utmost. Throughout the period tended his patients
continuously and at all times displayed great
ability, patience and understanding. No effort was
too much for him - no call was left unanswered.
He was completely selfless and upheld the traditions
of the Royal Navy and of his profession in a most
worthy manner.
Recommended for decoration.
RATINGS.
Private George William Crowther, 6th Field Ambulance
B. Company, No. 7354480.
This man had been embarked from Bray beach. After
the ship was struck by bombs he immediately volunteer
to assist the Surgeon. An hour later, when the troop
board had been transferred to another ship,
Crowther on said he would remain in BIDEFORD and continu was
his work there, knowing full well that BIDEFORD time
very it was considered highly improbable that the to
severely damaged and aground; and at that ship
would reach England, but he gave up his chance
Carried get away out his voluntary duties for all but 48 hours
in order to tend his wounded comrades.
continuously in a most efficient manner.

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Page 74
Operation "DYNAMO" - Recommendations of Personnel.
H.M.S. LOCUST - Lieutenant Ackroyd Norman Palliser Costobadie R.N.
not evacuating troops but in bombarding
This only ship played a prominent part in Operation DYNAMO,
batteries, hour and in taking BIDEFORD in tow to Dover, shore
MOSQUITO to ensure the destruction of all secret wreck books
ship. carried out demolition work in the saving of
passage, Also and is probably responsible for a that 30
had already taken the correct steps to safeguard secret
and other gear, it not then being known that MOSQUITO
matter. The ship had only been in commission for a
fortnight prior to joining this operation.
Recommendations.
OFFICERS.
Lieutenant Ackroyd Norman Palliser Costobadie, R.N.
Displayed good judgment and initiative throughout
the operation, frequently under fire from shore
artillery and under air bombardment, particularly
when he found himself the Senior Officer afloat off
La Panne beach on the evening of the 29th, and his
personal efforts in organising the various inshore
boats and the troops ashore resulted in more than
1,000 troops being lifted from the beach to his ship
and other offshore craft, there being no Army
officers present in charge of these troops.
Recommended for decoration.
Lieutenant Arundell Holdsworth, R.N.
Did excellent work on board and on shore, where
on the last night of beach evacuation he hunted up
several small parties of troops hidden amongst the
sand dunes, thereby ensuring their safety, He also
took charge of the successful demolition work in
MOSQUITO, a job of great difficulty owing to the
movement of the wreck in the swell. At all times
he displayed exceptional initiative.
Recommended for mention.
RATINGS.
Signalman E. E. Roden, C/D.360.
Signalman H. O. Carter, C/SSX.17317.
Accompanied the officers when they landed. Behaved
with great courage and resource and were personally
instrumental in organising the soldiers and handling
the boats, and in detailing the military for embark-
ation. Their initiative and bearing set a fine example
to the soldiers, who certainly would have failed to
launch the boats without their leadership.
Recommended for mention.

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Operation "DYNAMO" - Recommendations of Personnel.
Page 101.
RATING:
Engineer C. Coggins.
yacht being running fouled the whole time, in spite of motor
This civilian kept the engines of this
required. frequently and the continuous propeller
boats to He also put the engines of several running other
assisted rights when they broke down. He
the Skipper throughout the operations. ably
Recommended for mention.
30 ft. Motor Yacht MAID ERRANT. - Able Seaman S. Palmer, D/JX.
148052.
Recommendations.
Able Seaman S. Palmer. 148052.
Sailed from Sheerness on Friday, 31st May, in
convoy for Dunkirk. En route rescued survivors
of a French destroyer, then prodeeded to the beaches.
There he was swamped by French soldiers swarming
over his boat, which drifted ashore. Later the
boat refloated and he took one V.C.O. and 8 British
soldiers; he had no crew except one Stoker, who had
great difficulty with the engine. Off Dunkirk, on
the way home, the engine broke down, so he broke up
the yacht's wood fittings and made the 8 soldiers
paddle the boat. Later, the engine restarted after
on 18 hour voyage. Next day, without orders, he
sailed with a crew of one other Able Seaman, but was
turned back as his craft was too slow to take part
in the night evacuation ordered for that evening.
Able Seaman Palmer states that he passed for
Leading Seaman in May, 1927. He states he
possesses the L. S. & G. C. Medal.
Recommended for immediate advancement.
Drifter OCEAN BREEZE, War Department Launch HAIG and Skoot
PASCHOLL.
(Lieutenant Victor Alexander Christian Henry George de Mauny,
R.N.Retired.
Recommendations,
Lieutenant Victor Alexander C.H.G. de Mauny. R.N.
Between noon on the 30th May and 0815 4th June
was continuously engaged under way on evacuation
duties without any intermission. Commanded in
succession OCEAN BREEZE, HAIG and then as Navigator
of a group of skoots in PASCHOLL. Brought back more
than 300 troops from Dunkirk beach in surf
conditions on two separate occasions. Was notably

Details

REPORT OF OPERATIONS.
Trawler II "GAVA", Flag
No. Fleetwood also Fishing Ship, Section,
"EDWINA", "VELIA", "EVELYN ROSE", "DHOON", "JACINTA".
day, 27th May, 1940.
30 p.m.
Left Fleetwood.
iday, 31st May.
Having a.m. received arrived at Dover the previous evening, at 7.40
orders to proceed to Ramsgate.
Lge
.10 a.m.
Entered Ramsgate Harbour and embarked stores for troop
but
3.30 p.m.
Left Harbour and anchored off Harbour.
Saturday, 1st June, 1940.
at
,
7.25. a.m.
Ordered to proceed to Dunkirk and pick up and transpor
ly. army troops that were contacted. Proceeded immediate
ores
ish
9.00 a.m.
is;
Received signal from Naval launch - "Am broken down".
Took same alongside, "GAVA's" engineer effecting
in
repairs.
come
antil
9.30 a.m.
Dropped launch astern in tow.
9.41 a.m.
Ten Heinkels opened attack on vessel. Bren gun,
We
rifles and 12 pdr. in action. Two bombs dropped
thre
25 yards ahead, and one bomb fell close on starboard
en
,
quarter. Two 'planes' engines set on fire, one
falling in sea. Trawler machine gunned.
9.58. a.m.
Order cease fire.
11.00 a.m.
Attack by two 'planes, one bomb dropped. Vessel in
en
action.
11.08 a.m.
re
Cease fire ordered.
orty
11.25 a.m.
111
Moored alongside Train Ferry Lock, Dunkirk, and
commenced embarking French Tank Corps Troops.
11.40 a.m.
Swarms planes attacked harbour, especially
directed transport "LADY diving over transport, machine Two
of enemy OF MAN" alongside Mole.> 12 pdr.
and on planes and rifles defending trawler. trawler
direct hits made planes on falling over Mole, trawler. plane
Bren gun planes diving past another on
coming "LADY OF down MAN", out of control close to
11.49 a.m.
4
11.57 a.n.
Order cease fire.
raid, five planes concentrating action. their
on
Another attack on air "GAVA", all guns in
21.01 p.m.
direct Heinkel two 500 hit lb. shot with bombs down 12 dropping when pdr. power after close diving fourth to stern. on shot trawler, (H.E.) by

Details

landed them Lovely at Painsgate on Mai 31ˢᵗ imme-
smight I took another 100 English Loldiers on board, I
diately If Lailed back to Dunkenque and managed
to take another 110 English foldiers on board which
I lauded Lovely eat Romsgate on June 14.
the evening. In spite of the fierce bardments which
On your 2nd y returned back to Dinkergue during
we had to fustain during the whole night, y was
able to take once more 98 bughish Loldiers mboard
and handed them at Paintgate.
On June 3rd If returned once again to Dunkerque
but owing to the remorklett and heavy to bombardments take
which we experienced I was only able a
10 furthermore English Loldiers on board, which bere
lavely landud cat Ranulgate
On June 4th I was ordered not to sail back to Tukergue
the harbour was object to intende bombardments the
by the "luftroaffe" and the every leas near
point of taking fottetion of Dunkerque on
this fort I was ordered by the Freuch Seine to
On June 6th y failed to be House, authorities arriving at to
ferry troops and refugeed across the river Service till
Cronoille. of have done this forrying June 10ᵗʰ
During aireal the bombard following ment night eec which we fultained my thip received a heavy
or direct hit and was Lunk with the loss of all
my On June property I was fortunate to get the on Bhaunel board
another ship which took me across to
further theated as a Beligian refuges. in
England. On your 13th I handed at Phoreham and was
Later on I joined my father London who

Details

North Finchley, 7.7.41
The Admiralty,
Whitehall, S.W.1.
y I, Georges Ragaert, kindly drawn your attention to the following matters.
earned recently that the men who took part in the evacuation of the B.E.F.
erque last have been rewarded by the Admiralty. I am a Belgian
of Zeebruge, year and deemed it my duty to make it known to you that I also took
1 these operations of which feats no acknowledge was received.
I have these facts to my own Government on two occasions without the
test results, reported and are inclined to doubt wether this report ever reached you.
il
fore Dear Sir, allow me to make the following statement.
On Mai 18th Zeebruge in command of the fishing motorboat at 2.50
ppe d and ZUZANNA, with France several as days. On Mai 29th I received orders arriving the
LYDIE 1940, I left destination. I arrived the next day by
10
ere I was ordered Authorities by the to English Authorities to proceed to Dunkerque
noh Naval stayed there for proceed with my vessel to Ramsgate On and to
sist in the evacuation.
p.
li
with 100 English Soldiers on night board, I soon took
th
nother fter On landing Mai 30th these arrived men I at sailed Ramsgate back to I Dunkerque landed them and savely during at the Ramsgate another 110 on Mai
ii
Soldiers on board, Dunkerque and managed to take 1st.
c
sailed back which to I landed savely at Ramsgate on In June spite of
a
2nd I returned on board, back to Dunkerque during during the the evening. whole night, Ramsgate. I was able the
fierce to take bombardments once more 98 which English we had Soldiers to sustain on board but and landed owing to them the at remorseless and
On June 3rd I returned once again to Dunkerque only able to take a 10 furthermore
16
which board, we landed at Ramsgate.
On June 4th on I was ordered by not the to "luftwaffe" sail back to and Dunkerque the enemy the was harbour near the was
point object of to taking intense possession bombardments of Dunkerque.
I
was
ordered
by the On June 6th I sailed to to ferry Le Havre, troops service on and arriving refugees till June at across this in 10th. which port the During my river ship Seine the received to
Brouville. following French night I Authorities done this ferrying heavy the loss aireal of all bombardment my property. ship which took me
hit 12th I was England. fortunate to get on board another threated as & Belgian
across On the Channel to
refugee. On June Later 13th on his I I landed joined poor savings at my Shoreham father he had in and London to was fit in further who me this out was struggle with staying a new forfreedom, there suit as of a clothes. I
refugee. Out 1940, Royal anxious Navy, Sheldon. and to do are my proud share to be serving at the present and time
in H.M.S.
as
taking the father's adress: Jules Ragaert, 42 Woodside Park Road,
a 1 truet Dear Sirion you the will Services give these rendered, matters I will your expect kind attention, a favorable reply
which Finchley you N.12.
I am, Sir,
Y
Your obedient Servant,
(Sgd.) Ragaert Georges

Details

Details

Dynams
Dipramo 323.
329
302
Kingmead,
Riding Mill,
Northumberland.
Friday 7th June, 1940.
Sir,
g
I have the honour to submit the following account of my
movements from Tuesday 28th May until Wednesday 5th June.
On my arrival at Sheerness I found a convoy of sixteen
motor boats being prepared to assist in the evacuation of Flanders.
I took charge of a small boat "LIEBESTRAUM" and we
proceeded for Dover towing whalers, at about 1730 on Tuesday.
285
About six miles outside Sheerness we broke down and were picked
up by the Trawler "ASAMA" who towed us to Deal and then back to
Ramsgate where we arrived on Wednesday morning.
23/5
At Ramsgate I reported on the state of my boat and was
appointed to the Dutch eel boat "JOHANNA" which had a diesel engine
and was capable of about 6 knots. The crew consisted of a Leading
Hand and four ratings and three Dutchmen, who owned the boat and
could not speak English. We set out in convoy that night with a
Motor boat under the Command of a Lieutenant Commander and other
eel boat commanded by Sub-Lieutenant T.K. Edge-Partington R.N.
Finding the second eel boat only capable of 4 knots the motor boat
left her behind and soon after left me. I had no charts so after
casting around for a bit I secured alongside a ship, the name of
which I did not find out, near the North Goodwin and stayed there
for the night. Sub. Lt. Edge-Partington in the 'Chanticler' with great
determination took his boat across, navigating by an extremely
faulty compass and managed to bring troops back to Dover.
The next morning, Thursday, I returned to Ramsgate and 30/5
succeeded in joining up with the Dutch Schoot "Jutland" who towed
me that evening. We had an uneventful crossing and
anchored across about two miles east of Dunkirk at 2330. The Cutter and
Whaler went ashore. The Whaler returned to report that the cutter
I volunteered to the Captain of the Schoot to go
was and see aground. what I could do but before we had got back the Petty Officer
had succeeded in floating the boat.
this time the beach was swarming wi th shore French because soldiers of
I could not get of the water. I summoned heros" my and "Courage mes French
By my boats within 100 yards of the limited store of
the shallowness and with cries of "En Avant mes water. My efforts were
enfants" I I had to go and fetch them for miles and I leap
to my aid tried to tempt them into the myself. My first
unavailing and took so me into the only deep of patch the hole I waded
into the water neck. Struggling out in rush and ashore. I
went in up to my to my waist the French came it threateningly. on a This was
Seeing me only up revolver and brandish get to the boats only
compelled them to draw down my a bit but when crew they and I had to lift them a on few
were quietened strong enough to trips get and in so brought my off about 200 in all, each time
board. I had to go We did into six the water time and to get go. them. I only At had 0230 ten the Frenchmen Captain on of the
Schoot reckoned it was it was a bit choppy and all had to go below.
They board all the suffered "JOHANNA" from as sea sickness I on the sent way back. back
boat on the our "LIEBESTRAUM" return Sheerness to Ramsgate and in I arrived the was Motor at boat 2230 "THARKS" to on Friday. Sheerness in On in 31/5
my old 1500 I left boats all of which reached
charge Saturday of at a convoy of 12 motor Ramsgate.
1/6

Details

Controller
434 461
Small Vessels Pool.
8th June 1940.
Dunkirk, work of the I desire In following connection to bring the your with recent notice operations the excellent at
capacity in S.V.P. this emergency. found itself forced to act in an operational
Hutchins, case was one particular officer taking boats over,
outstanding their services to fill the emergency of and civilians who offered an
1. Among the many officers
allowed to Department, and asked had a
from a certain M.C., Grenadier Guards. This officer Lieut.Col.R.L. day off
Ramsgate, where he was given charge of a motor boat. Wharton, On the way
proceed with my Deputy, Captain my permission E.F. to be to
useless. Continuing under one engine, on arrival off Dunkirk
over the boat hit submerged wreckage which rendered one engine
he found a steamer ashore with her boats at the davits. He
went to a destroyer, asked for the loan of four hands, and with
these men he lowered the boats, which he used to evacuate
soldiers from the beach to the destroyer. I understand some
700 men were thus evacuated. He returned to London in time
to go on duty the following morning.
2. Captain E.F. Wharton, R.N. This officer under
Ner
S.N.O., Ramsgate acted as Pier Master for four days at Ramsgate.
Upon him the detailed organisation of "ferrying" with the
smaller boats from Ramsgate devolved. Captain Phillimore,
S.N.O., Ramsgate made a special report by telephone on the very
valuable services rendered by this officer, and has been asked
to report it officially in due course.
3. Paymaster Lieutenant Commander H. Garrett, R.N.V.R.
my Secretary. He showed immense capacity for tireless work,
and was practically on the telephone for hours, using his own
initiative throughout three nights consecutively. He was
responsible for obtaining yachtsmen from the clubs in the late
evening, putting them in Admiralty cars and sending them down to
Ramsgate and Sheerness; arranging special forms, which he
signed himself, for petrol from garages to bring down over 100
boats from the Upper Thames - again on his own initiative. In
various other ways he displayed a grasp of the urgency of the
situation, which is deserving of much praise. His readiness
to accept responsibility was most praiseworthy. He has of also
been some 2,500 offers of motor boats received in
responsible for the large additional organisation here
collecting with Statute No. 718 of May 10th 1940. His methodical of
accordance of these boats by areas allowed the great majority. in service
those indexing boats requisitioned by S.V.P. officers being
within a few hours.
Lionel Preston
Admiral.
Director Small Vessels Pool.

Details

444
succession of British shipping as motley in its larger form as
were the motor-boats themselves. Tramps, cargo ships, barges,
drifters, tugs, Dutch schoots, British warships, even river
ferry-boats such as carry one's car across the Thames at
Woolwich and elsewhere.
Of individual acts only a few can be given; every crew,
every man almost, experienced some incident or another. some
adventure that could fill a whole small volume on its own. And
yet what can a writer do when such men report such events in the
tersest of language such as "heavily shelled whilst at work"?
A few reminiscenses may be given here in the hope that
some idea of the work may be gathered by anyone who cares to
piece them together. Here are some extracts from a letter
written by Sub. Lt. W.R. Williams, R.N. which serve to illustrate
that merry sangfroid which has been referred to earlier:-
"So I proceeded by compass (error 20°) to the Calais -
Gravelines sands and anchored a few hundred yards out.
I was pulled ashore in the boat, which waited for me
while I walked inland in search of Allied soldiers.
After about a quarter of a mile I saw two men silhouetted
against the glow of a distant blaze. I approached to
within a few yards and hailed them.
I heard one of them say "Lieber Gott!" and they turned
around and commenced to shoot at me. By this time I had
come to the conclusion that I was in enemy territory, so
I hid behind a dune and shot back.
Fortunately it was a very dark night and the Germans
could not see me properly, while I could see their out-
lines quite well. I shot the one on the right twice
and he fell without a sound. The other one screamed
when I fired two bullets at him, and he dropped whatever
he was carrying and then fell and lay still. By this
time I heard nearby shouts so, deeming discretion to be
the better part of valour, I ran at top speed back to
the boat and my ship was under way at her full six knots
within less than five minutes."
-
"I proceeded back to Dunkirk as soon as I had landed
the soldiers at Ramsgate and arrived just in time to
catch the dusk bombing and shelling. There was a lot
of shrapnel falling on the beach and I was greatly
impressed by the Tommies and Poilus who waded out into
the sea and helped the sailors with the boats. Nowhere
did Isee any signs of cracking morale or anything but
cheerfulness.
-
"I went back for the last time the same evening. Dunkirk
was by now a flamir DIGHT unsulba in the "Swallow"
and proceeded todna S kct with a
slower motor-bernoon INEM untern to manionother War
Department I -Denimm wartlerc vao imar reemonant nortly after-
wards sunbSe=b6sih beat 6/PLB oDoor some of the

Details

2nd June 1940
To V.a. Dovel
From S.I.O. Folkestone
Sailing orders even given by
me on the evening of 1st June to the Maati
some delay had arisen and he informed
of malines /o leave here for at 18. me 30.
he could not have steam before 20" 00,
in the meantime Ben my Charee came alongiade
and was visited by Master of Malines, I
presume they had same conversation about
conditions at Durkque. about 20 00 I
called on master Ben my Charl and asked
definite "no and the Masti Malines
if he world sail, he gave me a
agreed Later I sent orders is 'Lywoold'
to sail which he accepted but did not
obey, In clone comespendence Thone had
today which will perhaps give an idea
of what caused at 10 10 this liday refusal the Maline
sailed without order, and to me her
destination is unknown
Chea E Stocks
Lient RaR.
VIOE DOVO 2- JUN ADMIR 1940

Details

10 ⁵
&
9
Signal 0840 to V.A. Dover :-
"Evacuation practicable. Vessels urgently
required.
In the meantime some destroyers and small craft,
including some Dutch Skoots, had arrived off Bray beaches,
and I sent an N. M.T.B. down there to supervise the embarkation
arrangements. I ordered the Dutch Skoots to enchor as
close to the shore as possible and the destroyers to send
all their boats to ferry the troops between the shore and
the Skoots. AS soon as the skoots were full they went
alongside the destroyers to discharge their troops and then
returned to their position near the beach. In this way
we were able to get some 4000 men away during the afternoon
and evening. This operation was continued through the
night and it was estimated that a further 3000 men were
embarked. On her return the N.T.B. was sent home as she
was running short of fuel.
miles AS 1420 heavy bombing on Bray took place and I ordered
more troops to march to Dunkirk, During daylight hours
probably 18000 troops were embarked from the Santern Hole.
At 1725 the following signal was made to Admiralty :-
"Suggest magnatic mineaweeping of channel being
used from Dunkirk is advisable and preferably at
night."
1835 signal made :-
Signal
sent Pressing for all possible shipping who tever their
"breed" be sent for troops during dark hours."
Night
of
88th
May.
Evaquation from the Eastern Arm proceeded steadily,
embarkation being at average rate of 2000 an hour. Enemy

Details

11
Embarkation proceeded at rate of 3 to 4,000 an hour.
Troops were now consisting mainly of the Fighting Corps,
all the non-combatant troops in the area having been
evacuated. The display of this Corps Troops was
noticeably superior - - previous detachments had reached the
embarkation point in a straggling manner with scarcely
any semblance of order. The Corps Troops marched in
formation along the beaches, quickly scattering during
an air raid, and reforming and continuing afterwards.
It was this order which enabled such a high rate of
embarkation to be maintained.
At 1800 I proceeded with Brigadier Perminter by
Motor Boat to La Panne to G.H.Q. to report on the difficult
situation vis-a-vis the French over the evacuation. When
on board EXPRESS I made a signal to the Admiralty and to
V.A. Dover giving an appreciation of the situation as
follows :-
"Bombing of beaches and Dunkirk pier hasnow commenced
without opposition from fighters. If they hit
Dunkirk pier embarkation will become very jammed.
Beach at La Panne covered with troops congregating
in large numbers. Very slow embarkation taking place
from Restern Beach.
The French Staff at Dunkirk feel strongly that they
are defending Dunkirk for us to evacuate, which is
largely true. To continue evacuation my appreciation
is as follows -
The perimeter must be strongly held, food and stores
immediately provided, and bombing of Dunkirk pier
must be prevented.
There is no other Alternative evacuation to take off
mone than a tithe of men now on beach before they
are bombed continuously."
In Dunkirk itself we were left in comparative peace
by enemy aircraft until the evening. V.A. Dover's 1906/29
received, reading :-
"Evacuation of British troops to continue at
maximum speed during the night. If adequate
supply or personnel vessels cannot be maintained

Details

12
to Dunkirk East Pier destroyers will be
sent there as well. All other craft
except Hospital Carriers to embark from
beach which is extended from one mile East
of Dunkirk to one mile East of La Panne.
Part 2 follows."
Part 2 received as follows :-
Whole length is divided into 3 equal ports
referred to as La Panne, Bray, Malo, from
East to West with a mile gap between each
port. La Panne and Bray have troop
concentration points each end and in middle;
Malo at each end. These points should be
tended by inshore craft.
Pass this message by V/S to ships not equipped
U/I, as opportunity offers. Destroyer at
Dunkirk pass to S.N.O. Dunkirk."
This was exactly what was required.
In the evening a series of fierce air attacks
were made on the Seatern Arm. These resulted in H.N.S. GREMADE
being bombed while embarking troops. It looked for the
moment as though she might sink and block the entrance to the
harbour but a trawler and drifter were sent to assist her
and managed to guide her into 8 pocket to the Westward of
the main channel. She burned fiercely for some hours and
eventually blew up with a loud explosion.
A trawler was also bombed and sank in the channel
in
about 50 yards from the East Pier about two cables/from the
Rastern Lighthouse.
The transport FENELLA was sunk while loading at
the outside extremity of the Kastern Arm. She was practically
fully loaded but the troops were transferred to another ship
with very little loss
A troop transport CRESTED KAGLE was bombed and
rendered unusable. She drifted down towards Bray where she
ran aground. A "J" Class destroyer was bombed off the
beaches but was taken in tow by another destroyer.

Details

12
16
30 - 31 may.
As ships had now arrived in good mumbers it was
necessary that the rate of embarkation mut in some way be
speeded up. The troops coming down the Pier were, therefore,
urged to quicken their pace and eventually the thousands of
troops, tired and without food and water for days, broke
into the double and kept it up the whole length of the
Eastern are for more than two hours. During that period
it is entimated that more than 15,000 troops were embarked.
Night 30th 31st Have Shelling was heavy during the
afternoon and night and operations were greatly hampered.
However, ships arrived in some misbers and with the cessation
in the shelling between 3 and 4 a.m. about ten thousand
troops were enbarked. This relieved the congestion on the
beaches which had been very great in the evening. In the
early morning the beaches were very nearly clear of troops.
I remined at G.H.C. for the night and telephoned
the noval situation to the Admirality. I was present with
the C.in C. at several meetings, my main object being to
explain to the Military that if the evacuation of the B.E.F.
was to be largely accomplished, it could only be done by
means of Dunkirk. Even given good weather embarkation from
the beaches must be very slow. A destroyer going full out
with her boats to the beaches could only embark 600 men in
12 hours, whereas this could be done in 20 minutes at the
Pier.
Some of the O.H.Q. staff expressed disappointment
that more could not be done to push on with the embarkation
off the boaches in a surf. I was satisfied that when the
weather permitted everything possible was being done by the
officers I had placed there, but I continually stressed that
troops should be moved to Dunkirk and maximum mumbers should
also be available to asbark there.
Political
*******

Details

14
i
18
Friday 31st May. The following signals were mades-
0320. "Request more shipsto load Dunkirk."
0445. "Every available ship will be required at Dunkirk
during the next two hours to evacuate rest of
army.
0605. "Imbarkation proceeding satisfactorily in spite
of bonbardment. I would again stress the need
for more ships and constant fighter protection
0638. "Am now receiving a number of Frenchmen. I have
raised no objection to their embarking in British
ships and an allowing then to do 80.
0940. "Request you will inform me whether troops are
now being ordered to earch to Dunkirk from the
beaches.
0945. "Sun is now coming through and I have a big
target of ships in harbour. Request special air
protection for next two hours.
0957. "Lord Gort has agreed that 5,000 Frehe troops
should be embarked here this evening after dark
in British vessels. Request necessary ships may
be sent to arrive at dusk.
1044. "We have been continually heavily bonbarded and
they are gradually finding the range of our loading
berth. I would rather only enter ships as
necessary for the flow of troops.
Continuous and heavy shelling all the morning, but the
evacuation proceeded fairly speedily. At last ships were
arriving in large numbers and strong a 2. protection kept
bomeing attack away. The only thing necessary was tostop the
shelling. At 1200 B signal was received from the Air Linison
Officer at Dover asking for position of energy battery. This
was not known with any certainty as the battery was probably
mobile, but it was in the district of Loon Plage Brouge Kerk
Soch. A reply was made to this effect. The bombardment,
novertheless, become more intense and a great deal more accurate.
Very heavy attacks were delivered during the evening but were
concentrated chiefly upon derelict ships in the roads. Dive
bombing attacks were carried out on the ships loading but without
success. The embarkation proceeded smoothly.

Details

36
40
there
Signal 0840 to V.A. Dover :-
"Evacuation practicable. Vessels urgently
required.
In the meantime some destroyers and small craft,
including some Dutch Skoots, had arrived off Bray beaches,
and I sent an H. N.T.B. down there to supervise the embarkation
arrangements. I ordered the Dutch Skoots to snchor as
close to the shore as possible and the destroyers to send
all their boats to ferry the troops between the shore and
the Skoots. As soon as the skoots were full they went
alongside the destroyers to discharge their troops and then
returned to their position near the beach. In this way
we were able to get some 4000 men away during the afternoon
and evening. This operation was continued through the
night and it was estimated that a further 3000 men were
embarked. On her return the M.T.B. was sent home as she
was running short of fuel.
At 1420 heavy bombing on Bray took place and I ordered
more troops to march to Bunkirk. During daylight hours
probably 12000 troops were embarked from the Eastern Mole.
At 1725 the following signal was made to Admiralty :-
to
Suggest magnetic mineaveeping of channel being
used from Dunkirk is advisable and preferable at
night.
1835 signal made :-
qual dent Pressing for possible shipping whatever their
"breed" be sent for troops during dark hours.
10
I
have
sent
Captain
by
N.T.B.
Night of 88th May.
food in
Evaquation from the Eastern Arm proceeded steadily,
embarkation force being at average rate of 2000 an hour. Enemy
Cannot
Officer with staff
Army unable to provide."

Details

4238
43
Embarkation proceeded at rate of 3 to 4,000 an hour.
Troops were now consisting mainly of the Fighting Corps,
all the non-combatant troops in the area having been
svacuated. The display of this Corps Troops was
noticeably superior - previous detachments had reached the
in
embarkation point in a straggling manner with scarcely
any semblance of order. The Corps Troops marched in
formation along the beaches, quickly scattering during
an air raid, and reforming and continuing afterwards,
It was this order which snabled such 8 high rate of
embarkation to be maintained.
At 1200 I proceeded with Brigadier Parminter by
Motor Boat to La Panne to G.H.Q. to report on the difficult
situation vis-a-vis the French over the evacuation. When
on board EXPRESS I made a signal to the Admiralty and to
V.A. Dover giving an appreciation of the situation as
follows :-
the
"Bombing of beaches and Dunkirk pier hasnow commenced
the without opposition from fighters. If they hit
Dunkirk pier embarkation will become very jammed.
Beach at La Panne covered with troops congregating
in large numbers. Very slow embarkation taking place
from
Restern
Beach.
The French Staff at Dunkirk feel strongly that they
are defending Dunkirk for us to evacuate, which is
largely true. To continue evacuation my appreciation
is as follows -
The perimeter must be strongly held, food and stores
immediately provided, and bombing of Dunkirk pier
must be prevented.
the
There is no other alternative evacuation to take off
mone than a tithe of men now on beach before they
are bombed continuously."
very
loss
In Dunkirk itself we were left in comparative peace
by enemy aircraft until the evening. V.A. Dover's 1906/29
received, reading these bombed the
Evacuation of British troops to continue at
maximum speed during the night. If adequate
supply of personnel vessels cannot be maintained

Details

39
43
to Dunkirk East Pier destroyers will be
sent there as well. All other craft
EAT
except Hospital Carriers to embark from
beach which is extended from one mile East
Inemyor Dunkirk to one mile Rest of La Panne.
Part 8 follows."
Scobing
being
It
intended
Part 8 received as follows -
"Whole length is divided into 3 equal ports
referred to as La Panne, Bray, Malo, from
daly East to West with a mile gap between each
port. La Panne and Bray have troop
concentration points each end and in middle;
Malo at each end. These points should be
tended by inshore craft.
Pass this nessage by V/S to ships not equipped
I/C, as opportunity offers. or Destroyer at
Dunkirk pass to S.N.O. Dunkirk."
referred so the by a dive-bomber
This was exactly what was required.
In the evening a series of fierce air attacks
ere made on the Enstern Arm. These resulted in H.R.S. GRENADE
eing bombed while embarking troops. at It looked for the
oment as though she night sink and block the entrance to the
If
arbour but 8 trawler and drifter were sent to assist her
nd managed to guide her into a pocket to the Westward of
information as to the blooking
he main channel. She burned fiercely for some hours and
by Commader
If
ventually blew up with a loud explosion.
1a reduced the
A travler was also bombed and sank in the channel
the simimum. in
bout 50 yards from the East Pier about two cables/from the
astern Lighthouse.
The transport FENELLA was aunk while loading at
he outside extremity of the Reatern Arm. She was practically
ully loaded but the troops were transferred to another ship
1th very little loss
A troop transport CRESTED EAGLE was bombed and
endered unusable. She drifted down towards Bray where she
an aground. A "J" Class destroyer was bombed off the
eaches but was taken in tow by another destroyer.

Details

4743
30 31 may
AB ships had now arrived in good numbers it was
necessary that the rate of embarkation must in some way be
speeded up. The troops coming down the Pier were, therefore,
urged to quicken their pace and eventually the thousands of
troops, tired and without food and water for days, broke
into the double and kept it up the whole length of the
Eastern STE for more than two hours. During that period
it is estimated that more than 15,000 troops were embarked.
Night 30th - 31st May. Shelling was heavy during the
"ternoon and night and operations were greatly hampered.
However, ships arrived in some numbers and with the cessation
in the shelling between 3 and 4 a.m. about ten thousand
troops were embarked. This relieved the congestion on the
beaches which had been very great in the evening. In the
early morning the beaches were very nearly clear of troops.
I remained at G.H.Q. for the night and telephoned
the naval situation to the Admiralty. I was present with
the C.in C. at several meetings, my main object being to
explain to the Military that if the evacuation of the B.B.F.
was to be largely accomplished, it could only be done by
means of Dunkirk. Even given good weather embarkation from
the beaches must be very slow. A destroyer going full out
with her boats to the beaches could only embark 600 men in
12 hours, whereas this could be done in 20 minutes at the
Pier.
Some of the G.H.Q. staff expressed disappointment
that more could not be done to push on with the embarkation
off the beaches in a surf. I WELD satisfied that when the
weather permitted everything possible was being done by the
officers I had placed there, but I continually stressed the
troops should be moved to Dunkirk and maximum numbers shou'
also be available to embark there.
Political

Details

45
49
Friday 31st May. The following signals were made:-
0320. "Request more shipsto load Dunkirk."
0445. "Every available ship will be required at Dunkirk
during the next two hours to evacuate rest of
army.
0605. "Embarkation proceeding satisfactorily in spite
of bombardment. 1 would again stress the need
for more ships and constant fighter protection
0638. "Am now receiving a number of Frenchmen. I have
raised no objection to their embarking in British
ships and am allowing them to do so.
0940. "Request you will inform me whether troops are
now being ordered to march to Dunkirk from the
beaches.
0945. "Sun is now coming through and I have a big
target of ships in harbour. Request special air
protection for next two hours.
0957. "Lord Gort has agreed that 5,000 Freinh troops
should be ambarked here this evening after dark
in British vessels. Request necessary ships may
be sent to arrive at dusk.
1044. We have been continually heavily bombarded and
they are gradually finding the range of our loading
berth. I would rather only enter ships as
necessary for the flow of troops.
Continuous and heavy shelling all the morning, but the
evacuation proceeded fairly speedily. At last ships were
arriving in large numbers and strong a r protection kept
bomging attack away. The only thing necessary was tostop the
shelling. At 1200 a signal was received from the Air Liaison
Officer at Dover asking for position of enemy battery. This
was not known with any certainty as the battery was probably
mobile, but it was in the district of Loon Plage Brouge Kerk
Soch. A reply was made to this effect. The bombardment,
nevertheless, become more intense and a great deal more accurate.
Very heavy attacks were delivered during the evening but were
concentrated chiefly upon derelict ships in the roads. Dive
bombing attacks were carried out on the ships loading but without
success. The embarkation proceeded smoothly.

Details

163
SCIMITAR REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS
168
PAGE 2
*
The reasons for this collision and as report on the damage
sustained have been more fully reported to Capatin (D) 16.
8. I arrived at Dunkirk at about 1300/31 and was
ordered to go to Bray beaches. I spent this afternoon and evening
in company with "Vivacious" and "Shikari" off Bray under inter-
mittent bombardment and bombing during which no damage was
sustained. During one bombing attack at sbout 1700(?) an aircraft
was shot down; it is thought that this was from "Scimitar's" A
gun. I myself was watching A gun bursts, which appeared close to
the target and at the moment the aircraft caught fire a burst
from A gun appeared nearly in line. The aircraft fell in the sea
and was obviously a total loss. During this period no troops
were embarked as I had no boats and no other boats come near.
There seemed to be trouble in embarking due to choppy water.
9. At nightfall/31 the weather improved and troops
were very quickly embarked, principally from the "skoot" "Hilda"
which was doing excellent work. I sailed at about 2300 with
500 troops, proceeding at 8 knots. During the passage numerous
aircraft were heard but no attacks were made. A slight collision
occurred with an unknown trawler, in which my port propellor
guard was damaged. I arrived at Dover at about 0600/1 and after
disembarking troops proceeded to oil. A further examination of
the damage was made.
100 At 1000/1 I was ready and was orderedato proceer
to Dunkirk again, but when near the North Goodwin L.V. I was
ordered to return. At this time I had just sighted Prague in
difficulties 80 I went to his assistance. Re asked me to take
some of his troops 80 I went alongside while under way and
embarked 500. I then stood by while he proceede through the Downs
and at about 1530/1 I arrived at Dover and disembarked troops
subsequently proceeding to a buoy.
11. At 0600/2 I proceeded to Sheerneas to
disembark ammunition, thence to London for repairs by Messrs
Harland and Wolff. Repairs are expected to take 14 days.
12. "Soimitar" being short handed compared to other
destroyers, all ratings had to work very hard and it was noteworthy
that Engine room ratings not only steamed the ship with full
also assisted on deak in embarkation etc. Nearly all seamen took
efficiency and took their place at ammunition supply parties, but
part as boat's crews at one time or another, using skill and
determintion inxtrying conditions. The following are considered
Midshipman M.J.BALL R.N.R.,.for taking adminate charge with of the boats
particularly worthy of mention or award.
in bombing etc. for & day ship
absent.
A.B.
P/J
96339.
for taking charge of his gun's crew
G.PASMORE
well, and skill in shooting down an enemy
P/K 61614 aircraft For long and untiring it work as driver
Stoker in TYLER the motor and keeping running nearly
continuously for 3 days.
I have the honour to be
Sir
The Vice Admiral
your obedient servent
DOVER
Two copies to
Strants
The Captain (D)
16th D.F.
Lieutenant in Command
ADMIRAL
9-JUN 1940
DOVER

Details

208
223
On return X channel was taken at dead low water and owing
to rounding No.5 Buoy Dunkirk roads too close, grounded
on a shoal 337° 2.5 cables from that buoy. Then the
ship was refloated it was discovered that 18 - 20 knots
was the maximum safe speed.
Occasional firing was carried out on enemy
aircraft in the vicinity during the evening of the
30th May.
Journey 5. As soon as ship had refuelled and
had the propellers examined by divers a passage was made
at 18 knots to the beaches which were reached at dusk on
the 31st May.
East pier was full at this time and it was
evident that difficulty was being experienced in getting
men to the minesweepers already at the beaches. I visited
all the beaches in turn finally anchoring at LAPANNE.
The minesweepers further inshore were getting small loads
but none came the greater distance to WORCESTER. At
dawn WORCESTER came under shell fire from shore batteries
and I decided to slip the cable and proceed to East pier
where a full load of troops was embarked.
Journey 6. June 1st. On approaching X xhannel
about 1500 in the vicinity of No.5 buoy, two recent wrecks
of transports were sighted; small craft and destroyers
were picking up survivors. A few survivors were picked up.
At this time a signal was received from V.A.Dover to
return to harbour forthwith. It seemed however not worth
while to return so close from Dunkirk and so I continued
my course through the roads where some French soldiers
were picked up from an open boat and the crew of a small
service motor launch which had broken down.
- 2 -

Details

- 232
Page 3.
aday (continued)
congestion in the harbour
2331
Just cleared Harbour entrance when Kingfisher was
rammed by French Trawler 'Edmond Rene', and her Port
Bow, 20 feet from the stem opened up to the water-line
"M" and"F" Degaussing circuits were cut. The two ships
swung alongside one another after the collision and
troops transhipped to the trawler who was undamaged
tesday 4th June.
0005
Received orders to return to Margate.
Kingfisher was making a little water in the Asdic
Compartment.
0010
Proceeded. Speed 7 Knots.
Ordered to proceed to Sheerness.
0505
In company with H.M. S.Lida who had been in collision
and requested Kingfisher to stand Dy.
0540
Sighted French Destroyer with damaged bows,at anchor
near N. Goodwin Lt. Vessel, who had been in collision
0545
French Destroyer got under way and proceeded to the
South.
0615
Observed heavy explosion in position 51° 23' II,
1° 31' E., and unknown ship sink. Several of H.M. Ships
including H.M.S. Aulbury and H.M.S. Kellet near the pos-
ition picked up survivors.
0714
H.M.S. Lida and Kingfisher arrived off Margate.
Decided to anchor attempt repairs to D.G. Circuits
before proceeding,
0745
Thick FOE. Requisioned steamer King GeorgeV, hit
Kingfisher on the Starboard Bow when entering
Margate Road but caused practically no damage
1200
D.G. Circuits temporarily repaired. Received orders
to proceed to Lowestoft at daylight on Wednesday.
During the evening M.A.S.B. No.1. came alongside
and reported one engine out of action and requested
a tow up the swept channel to abreast Harwich.
lednesday 5th June.
0400
North Knock Deep Buoy. Slipped M.A.S.B. No.1. who
Proceeded with M.A.S.B. No.1. in tow.
0926
Berthed in Lowestoft Harbour.
proceeded to Harwich.
1620

Details

SECRET
243
. 258
manocuvring and one rating near the wall fairly heavy shelling use in
outside the harbour W88 slightly wounded by a splinter. On progress
hemp wreck air the bearing - 30 88 soon 00 I 769 just clear or
round I found the Dort peddle and mony fathoms arriving of
hands the entrance to the Dorto I stopped and got B musber the of
cleared on with knives to clear ito The bearin- ma
the and 2 was able to proceed though Ny half practically In
increasing light the ship WOB shelled from - a speedo
coant I picked m a Service notor Jounch une also lifebox : and
to the west of Dunkirko but was 20% hito Soon after gun 1e position ving the
towad them back to the Worth Copúvino.
the Commanding Officer of Hollod, "Crested Engle" but from the
NAOLE" I have not yet doen the report from
evidence of a survivor it appears that, after I had ordered her
to Dunkirk on May 29th, the proceeded alongaido the sestem side
of the East Mole at Dunkisk and embarited troups and consulties
including many from II 3.3. "Grafton" and a transport which
had both been sunk alongside by boabs. Heavy boaling and shell
fire WUB experienced but "frested Regle" this unhit with the
evening when she had just left the Vole to proceed have with her
for 1 or troops and casualties and TROB his by a boob in the engl 0
TO no A fire was started and It appeared that 18 the engines were
et: 11 working slowly the Companiting Officer decided to beich the
shin. Before or after he ⑈ benched 11 is believed she was hit
again by two borbs. It is thought that only a mail proportion of
the hip's company were committies but that may 02 the streeth "
cases who were accomptated 1nth mardroom and after the
ship were loot in the fire.
H.H.B. "OOLDEN OLN". I would like to & 'il the following return
HOWEIST and Lucas. Although technically Lic to Ludas 10 second in
in Tespect or th report of proceedings formided by Reutenants
First Mentenant and there in no doubt that the initiative and
R.NoV.No Officer), Lieut. Neumen has curried our the Jusice of
commend of the ship (se on R.N.R. Officer #: Lieud being an
by the ship d 128 the absence of have Commiting
2 elmost entirely to Membership Research the took
Belf the commend and we toyally supported by the two
C. vewn. 1 1a 34 years of age and quite inexperienced an Naval
once Lieutenant Nowman had decided white una to be concol Meuts Jo
Officers Lieutenants Lucan and/Denting who did excellent work
matters - but I consider that the part he played in these operations
have Paken any sotive part in the
not been for his highest Seadership and Littletive 001000 agle would not
is We they of the commentation and I on convinced Shirt had is
Lucan 340 & who handles the ship with great abill, and OR the
1 - V 11km S180 to mention the gooder york by Licut.
consider that which the ship that she 803 out enfetly JOB in a great
OCCBR on VOB in Dunidak Surbour it nights I
messure as due to the his fact personal efforts on the DD well
his handling of the ship.
J, Shirley, Ust of men Telegraphist RaNaVaR whose
To the recomended I VOL the to add Fredito
BORION and excreme officer of the flotilla and elso that
efficiency Actin Leading devotion to duty has been 05 the statest
rely Kion Searen Scott 8.2. with any degree of competency €
02 At moo DU no BB Senior 10/31406, who USD the only man I duri could
given , O.P.O. Sereen to and Uttam STATE RNR
the night visit tc take the Lunicipio wheel 1 thoroughts shill insteme the

Details

(5)
- 334
On the return voyage, after passing Nieuport Bank
Buoy, we saw two ships ahead of us bombed, one with 8 bombs,
the other with sixteen bombs.
but as we drew nearer it could be seen that one was in
There was no indication that either had been hit,
difficulties, and in reply to & signal we went alongside.
This ship was the GRACIE FIELDS, and while she continued to
steam round in a circle, we took off troops, & number
seriously wounded.
After about 45 minutes when this was almost
completed ( another dynamo ship was taking off troops on her
starboard side ) a destroyer indicated that she wanted to come
alongside and at 2130 we proceeded, passing through the Downs
harbour. in an early morning fog, up the Ramsgate Channel and into
As soon as the troops were disembarked, precaration
was made for the next trip. Army provisions were put aboard
and two Lewis guns mounted.
For the next trip, officers and nen 1 not engine
room men who could work in three watches ) were relieved to
get some sleep.
I understand that on that trip of the 30th/31st,
JUTLAND brought off troops from the beaches to the East of
Dunkirk Pier.
On her return it was reported that she required
fuel and that fact and the state of the tide kept her in
harbour that day.
With the original crew. I took over again from the
understand the ship's speed was not considered suitable
Ramsgate Road, standing by for further orders; but I
relief crew, and on the 1st June was at anchor in the
for taking that in the final operations. and after standing to
by for further part period. JUTLAND was ordered to return
London a after reporting to F. 0. 1. C., I handed Dock. over
the ship where. to the Chief Dock Master, Surrey Commercial
obtaining a detailed receipt.
floats were sent any and many survivors were picked
up. Bombs were being dropped continually around the
ship and the Paddl e-steamer during this operation, and
two Machino-gun attacks were carried out, I have
nothing but the utmost praise for all concerned, the
never been in action before. Continual Anti-aircraft
majority of whom are very young and had certainly
signal for Fighter assistance, which arrived later in
fire vis kent up by the Twelve Pounder. I sent a
the evening.

Details

Dynam 200.
336
37
From
The Commanding Officer, H.M.S. "GOSSAMER".
Date
7th June 1940.
No. Bo/F
To
Flag Officer Commanding Dover.
Submitted.
Reference your 314/0/1101/40 of 4/6/40 the following
are the particulars required :-
Lieutenant Peter Forster Menisty - for cool and accurate
observation of enemy aircraft during dive-bombing attacks.
Sub-Lieutenant Michael Phinos - for constantly returning to
the beaches to organise the embarkation of the troops.
Petty Officer Edward William Highs, C/JX.138416 - for his service
at the 0.5" machine-gun during dive-bombing attacks, and his
courage and activity throughout the operation, including several
rescues from the sea.
Yeoran Simala John Yours, C/JX.131436 - for cool and accurate
observation of enemy aircraft during dive-bombing attacks.
Petty Officer Steward Arthur Hockney, C/L.14824 - for his coolnes
and resource in calming the French troops between decks during di
bombing attacks by singing to them.
Assistant Cook (0) Thomas Henry Ward, C/UX.59379 - for constant
activity and gallantry including five reseuse of exhausted men
from the see.
VIOE ADMIRAD
(sd.) R. C. V. Ross
*
DOVER
COMPANDER IN COMMAND.
bad grounded be in 3 bad my. All boats picked
6. I made and,beirs being full of troops and and Carley
towards 3 burning Paddl e-stemmer, survivors, which
up. ship appeared floats were to were sent being any dropped and sazy carried continually survivors this out. operation, around were I have the the and
two the for all had certainly
THE concerned,
majority nothing but of in about notion are before. very young Continual and Anti-aircraft I sent a
signal fire MS for kent Fighter up assistance, which later in
never been by the Twelve Pounder. arrived
the evening.

Details

Dynams 202.
BIGLO
- 337
H.M.S. Albury. H.M.S.
9th June 1940.
Sir,
I have the honour to formed the account of
proceedings of His Majesty's Ship Albury during the
days May 28 th to June 6th 1940.
25
I left Harwich at noon on lay 38th in company
with the Fifth Minesweeping Flotilla, arrived off
Zudecotte Beach at 3130 and, anchoring as close as
possible, sent Doats inshore to embark troops. The
rate of embarkation was then slow as the tide vis low
and a small surf was troublesome 00 the beach. The
troops were in good spirits though short of rations;
I landed a quantity of dry provisions in the skiff.
mile 3. to seamed of the ship, but no interference was
About 2330 a bomb was seen to drop about one
caused to the work in hand.
4. ceeded without incident to Margate, where the troops
At 0830 on May 20th I got under my and pro-
were disembarked.
5. at 1930 on May 29th; a considerable amount of bombing
I then returned to Zudecotte, arriving there
was in progress. On arrival the roads were fairly
empty, as we had passed,on the my,a number of loaded
ships returning.
had 6. grounded and,beirg being full of troops and survivors,
I made towards a burning Paddl -stommer, which
appeared to be in 8 bad my. All boats and Carley
up. Bombs were being dropped continually around the
floats were sent any and many survivors were picked
two Machino-gun attacks were carried out. I have
ship and the Paddle-steamor during this operation, and
but the utmost praise for all concerned, the
majority nothing of whom are very young and had certainly
never fire was kent as by the Twelve Pounder. I sent
been in action before. Continual Anti-aircraft a
signal for Fighter assistance, which arrived later in
the evening.

Details

332
338
7.
mostly suffering from severe burns; the Commanding
Fifty seven cot-cases alone were brought off,
Officer and other survivors from His Majesty's Dest-
cleared the steamer out as far as was known, I pro-
royer Grenade were amongst those embarked, After having
ceeded down the coast towards Bray, and picked up troops
from several boats, which they had found on the beach. A
Captain Churchill, from the Headquarters Staff, off
and told me that he had to get over to England to see
his uncle, the Prime Minister,by 0600.
8.
I proceeded to Margate, arriving at 0550 on May
30th, disembarked troops,survivors and Cartain Churchill,
then sailed for Sheerness for coal and Ammunition.
9.
I left Sheerness at 0300 on the 31st and arr-
ived without incident off the beach just to the Bast of
Dunkirk, at 0930. The rate of embarkation was slow ording
to considerable surf on the beach, but valuable assist-
ance was given by a large power boat, It was necessary
for me to leave at 1230 in order to unload and be at By
render-vous by 8300 on May 31st for the evening oper-
ations.
10.
I sailed from liargate to comply with previous
instructions and proceeded, under the orders of the
Senior Officer 11 the Fifth Minesweeping Flotila, to By
appointed station off the beach; navigation at this
period was difficult,a the absence of wind allowed the
smoke from Dunkirk to settle over the channel, that
visibility The poor. On enchoriz at 2345 a shell from 8
shore battery landed about a cable to securd; this ma
repeated spasmodically. Reports were then received of
magnetic nines being dropped in the channel.
on 11, embarkation, using ships' boats, Short y after a
About 0832 the Flotil a ms ordered to carry
bombing attack took place,and from then on these
attacks were practically continuous. Several Heinkel III
type aircraft were observed, but the majority of the
attackers were identified as Junkers 87 Dive-bombers.
Embarkation was carried out, though the rate ha slow,
this operation the ship case under machine-gun fire
aground; 12. a vire was passed and I towed her off. During
His Majesty's Ship Speedwell ma seal to be
tenant for the speed and coolness with which be carried
from the air, end great credit is due to ay First Lieu-
out the ution.
afloat 15. to proceed alongaide in Dunkirk harbour, and to
I then received orders from the 7108 Officer
comp. ete with troops there. As troops vere being and a
machine-gun embarked, attack me delivered, but no casualties were
bombs were dropped in the harbour
incurred.
14. board, His Majesty's Dostroyer Ivanhoe to was her hit
Just before I al ipped, with a full load of
by troops a bomb on outside the herbour. Two ships went
assistance, 80 I proceeded at full speed,

Details

From
Lieut: WykehamH Martin.
Dynam.
223.
Alulol
1352
1st Ideut: of "Alice', D.B.2.
15
Date 7th June 1940.
TO V.A. Dover.
Report on Dynamo Operation.
15
Alice left Southampton at 2030/26/5/40
and at Dover was directed to beach herself at
La Panne, to fac litate unloading of cargo of
250 tons of provisions.
This operation was carried out at
0800/28 by Alice and Kaap Falga, the former
having rescued Pilot Sergeant T.BOYD 516716
of 213 Fighter Squadron, who had descended
by parachute.
Two hours later he was transfered
to Able Tasman, also beached at La Panne as
it was thought that she would be the first
to return, Alice and Kaap Falga having received
orders to refloat as soon as possible and beach
themselves again after dark at Bray Beaches,
there to land some provisions and evacuate soldiers
before daylight.
Lieut: Slater (C.O. Alice ) and Lieut
Beale (C.O. Kaap Falga) landed to make definità
arrangements with G.H.Q. for the evening's
operation.
Whilst they were ashore four bomb
and Machine gun attacks were carried out against the
three ships beached and the Military ashore
About 1400/29 ,Major P.De Havilland, of
at
unea
G.H.Q. four soldiers, himself being wounded, with instructions
(D.A.Q.M.G.) arrived on board Alice with
29
for me to try and get in touch with a destroyer cut
immediately, and he wished to report to the War Office
as his communications had been the
28
seriousness of the situation.
stated that Germans would be occuppying evening
Dunkirk and He advancing along the coast that
due to the capitulation of Belgian Troops for
told him of the intentions he had the
evening evacuation Bray Beaches, where the provisions were
I and he told me that troops
falling just come back from on La Panne, and that
were no longer required mentioned there. that the beach Channel. at Bray
was under He also was the Zudycote he said
fire ,as
Two naval leg. and one
had taken been to hit one the
Military From his description Slater I (Alice)
conclusion that it was Lieut: Beale (Kaap Falga)
who who I spoke was was KIlled wounded. to Lieut and Slater Lieut: was I was also over wrong; unharmed. the phone, since on and June6th he assured
me but that due Lieut Efforts Beale were made bullets the to
aircraft of the engine, up.

Details

I arrived at Dover at 16.00 and disembarked the prisoners alongside
Adminalty Pier
23
After obtaining fuel I remained at Dover until ordered
prt
H.H.S.Kaap Falga to Poole, leaving Doms at 09.20 on Tuesday 4th. June 1940
23
"RUJA"
B
H.M.S. RUJA sailed for Dunkirk from Dover and on first attempt broke down in the
Downs. The ship was towel back to Dover and repaired by Sandhurst and then I reported
to N.O.I.C. Ramsgate and sailed for Dunkirk and remained there for 24 hours in order
to collect about 300 soldiers off the Beach East of Dunkirk and later on in the
evening off the barracades east of La. Panne. On the way back to Poole the ship
broke down again and was successfully towed by H.H.S. Pascholl.
Signed H.R.Webber (Lieut R.N.)
"FRISO"
A
This vessel under the command of Licut. G.O. Symonds R.N. and subsequently under
Sun. Lieut. R.N.V.R. made two successful trips to Dunkirk beach and was able
to evacuate 1008 officers and men. Although under continual fire from shore
batteries and dive bombers the operation was carried out without mishap to vessel
or
crew.
Signed. G.V.Ward (Sub. Lieut. R.N.V.R.)
"DESPATCH II"
B.
May 29th & 30th.
To West of La Pain. Arrived La Pain 20.00 29th. and embarked 267 French with
ships boats only until 04.00
At 04.00/30 discovered 2 ft of water in E.R. no air bottles and belt to air
compressor broken. Managed to get under way 10.00/30th and returned to Ransgate
19.00 30th.
May 31st. June 1st.
Arrived Dunkirk 18.00/51 Air compressor not working and insufficient air in bottles
to restart motors if they stopped. Embarked 160 mostly Middlesex Regiment with
ships boats only until midnight.
Ships company were then exhausted with boat work and all Middlesex Regiment embarked
ship sailed for Ramsgate arriving 07.30/1.
Ships Company acted very well. Besides my Lst. Lieut. Lt. Miller I wish to mention
L.S. A.J.M. Upton P/SSX 13505
A.B. W.H. Dibben P/JX 148504
A.B. H.B.Ketchley PJ109346
O.S. S.A.Greenwood P/JX 130093
Signed J.E. Whitwell, Lt. Comdr.
"PASCHOLL"
B.
This ship was only taken over by me on Sunday June 2nd., the previous Captain
having returned to his proper duties at Ramagate. I proceeded to Ramagate
arriving there 23.00 Instructions received ashore at 23.30 were to remain at anchor
until further orders. At 15.00 Monday 3rd. June we sailed with Commander Hammond flying
his flag in the ship in Command of 5 skoots. We arrived Dunkirk Harbour Jetty at
23.00 and embarked ap roximately 300 troops and after some delay left at 00.30 Tuesday
June 4th, arriving Ramsgate approximately 08:30 On instructions sailed at 05.30
Wednesday 5th. June for Poole. arrived Newhaven at 21.00 having taken
H.M.S.Ruja in tow at approximately 10.00 Sailed from Newhaven at 18.00 Thursday
6th. June Ruja still in tow arriving Studland Bay approximately 21.00.7th. June
entered Poole Harbour.
Signed Wise Lieut. R.N.V.R.
"ZEUS"
I have the honour ? to Report the following of my vessels activity in operation
I
Dynamo in diary form.
25th. May Joined at Poole. P.M. Vessel wiped 5.0 p.m. approx cast off and
proceeded to anchor off Portsmouth. 9.0 p.m. ordered to anchor off Yarmouth.
26th, May. 5.10 a.m. ordered to remain at anchor until further orders. Hands cleaning ship
3.0 p.m. Ordered to proceed Portsmouth.
6.0 p.m. Arrived Portsmo th. Recive fuel water and stores and ordered to broken proceed
Spithead to swing for deviation. Discharged Dutch engineer. Note compass
and steering compass damaged. Results of swinging give very unreliable deviation card
10.30 Proceed in company for Newhaven.
27th. May Dawn arrived off Newhaven and anchoved. Note. Ship very and short overhauling of dec. gear stores
rope etc. Hands employed rope etc. Hands employed cleaning ship
9.0 approx. Proceeded in company for Dover.
28th. p.m. Dawn arrived off Dover 9.30 approx berthed alongside "Ruja" at West bad Quay,
Enemy render independance p.m. of navigation impossible we follow rest ahead. gunfire
May air raid 1.0 approx. Proceed in company for Dunking. Compass Considerable so as to
etc. all night.

Details

I arrived at Dover at 16.00 and disembarked the prisoners alongside
Adminalty Pier
23
After obtaining fuel I remained at Dover until ordered
escort
H.M.S.Kaap Falga to Poole, leaving Downs at 09.20 on Tuesday 4th. June 1940
23
"RUJA"
B
H.M.S. RUJA sailed for Dunkirl from Dover and on first attempt broke down in the
Downs. The ship was towel back to Dover and repaired by Sandhurst and then I reported
to N.O.I.C. Ramsgate and for Dunkirk and remained there for 24 hours in order
to collect about 300 soldiers off the Beach East of Dunkirk and later on in the
evening off the barracades east of La. Panne. On the way back to Poole the ship
broke down again and was successfully towed by H.M.S. Pascholl.
Signed Webber (Lieut R.N.)
"FRISO"
A
This vessel under the command of Licut. G.O. Symonds R.N. and subsequently under
Sun. Lieut. Ward R.N.V.R. made two Although successful under trips continual to Dunkirk fire beach from and shore was able
batteries to evacuate and 1008 dive bombers the operation was carried out without mishap to vessel
officers
and
men.
or crew.
Signed. G.V.Ward (Sub. Licut. R.N.V.R.)
"DESPATCH II"
May 29th & 30th.
To West of La Pain. Arrived La Pain 20.00 29th. and embarked 267 French with
At 04.00/30 discovered 2 ft or water in E.R. no air bottles and belt to air
ships boats only until 04.00
compressor broken. Managed to get under way 10.00/30th and returned to Ramsgate
19.00 30th.
May 31st. June 1st.
Arrived Dunkirk 18.00/51 Air compressor not working and insufficient air in bottles with
to restart motors if they stopped. Embarked 160 mostly Middlesex Regiment
Ships company were then exhausted with boat work and all Middlesex Regiment embarked
ships boats only until midnight.
sailed for Ramsgate arriving 07.30/1.
Ships ship Company acted very well. Besides my Lst. Lieut. Lt. Miller I wish to mention
L.S. A.J.M. Upton SSX 13505
A.B. W. H. Dibben P/JX 148504
A.B. .B.Ketchley PJ109346
O.S. S.A.Greenwood P/JX 130093
Signed J.E. Whitwell, Lt. Comdr.
This "PASCHOLL" ship was only B. taken over by me on Sunday June 2nd., the previous Captain
having there 23.00 Instructions received ashore at 23.30 were to remain at anchor
returned to his proper duties at Ramsgate. I proceeded to Ramsgate
arriving until further orders. At 15.00 Monday 3rd. June we sailed with Commander Hammond at flying
his in the ship in Command of 5 skoots. We arrived Dunkirk Harbour Jetty
flag and embarked approximately 300 troops and after some delay left at 00.30 05.30 Tuesday
June 23.00 4th, arriving Ramsgate approximately 08:30 On instructions taken sailed at
Wednesday 5th. June for Poole. arrived Newhaven at 21.00 having
H.M.S.Ruja in tow at approximately 10.00 Sailed from Newhaven at 18.00 Thursday June
6th. June Ruja still in tow arriving Studland Bay approximately 21.00.7th.
entered Poole Harbour.
Signed J.N.Wise Lieut. R.N.V.R.
"ZEUS" I have the honour to Report the following of my vessels activity in operation
Dynamo 25th. in diary Joined form. at Poole. P.M. Vessel wiped 5.0 Dalla approx cast Yarmouth. off and
26th. proceeded May. to 5.10 anchor a.m. off ordered Portsmouth. to remain at anchor until further orders. Hands cleaning ship
May 9.0 p.m. ordered to anchor off
3.0 p.m. Ordered Portsmo to proceed th. Portsmouth. Recived fuel water and stores and ordered to proceed broken
6.0 p.m. Arrived deviation. Discharged Dutoh engineer. Note compass deviation
Spithead and steering to swing compass for damaged. Results of swinging give very unreliable card
10.30 Proceed Dawn in arrived company off for Newhaven Newhaven. and anchored. Note. Ship very and short overhauling of dec gear stores
27th. rope etc. May Hands employed rope etc. Hands employed cleaning ship
9.0 28th. p.m. May approx. Dawn arrived Proceeded off Dover in company 9.30 approx for Dover. berthed for alongside "Ruja" Compass at so West bad Quay. as to
Enemy render air independance raid 1.0 p.m. of navigation approx. Proceed impossible in company 49 rest shead. Considerable fofolComt gunfire
etc. all night.
so
folonsidat
ores
ost to
el gunfire
Duto.

Details

1
48
47
In the afternoon of the 3rd June orders were received to
be prepared to proceed to Dunkirk but these were later
cancelled.
In the evening of the 4th June orders were received to
proceed to Tilbury. At Tilbury on the 5th June orders were
given to destore at Royal Victoria Yard, Deptford, and to
proceed to Surrey Commercial Docks. The dock was entered
at 1530 and the ship handed over to the Port of London
Authorities.
I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
Donald H.,Sift.
Lieutenant. R.N.
VICE AUMIRAL TRAL
11 JUN 1940
*
*
DOVER ER E
for

Details

289.
-
83
NARRATIVE OF DUTCH BOAT "JAVA"
26th May - 4th June, 1940.
0645, 27th May, the crew of D.B.22 under the command of
Lieut-Commander Drake, BUE left Chatham Barracks and travelled via
Portsmouth to Southampton, joining "Java" that evening. The
vessel was then under repair, with orders on completion to load
ammunition in the River.
On the afternoon of 29th May those orders were cancelled
and we were instructed to fuel and proceed light to Dover.
Accordingly about 1700 with Main and Auxilliary machinery
persuaded to function by Diesel experts from the shore "Java" left
ible.
SECRET
,914/0
irted. Our final air
??
22/1148
left with the handicap of
IS the belt driving our
ally our Auxilliary
LIEUT.F.T.RENNY.R.N.R. - REPORT
83
Lght and air with the
ON OPERATIONS OFF FRENCH COAST.
er our E.R.A. collapsed
(Letter dated June, 1940.)
as already out of action
è morning of 31st May
By this time our
II.
in
No:477.cc/40.
egards the other and
FLAG OFFICER COMMANDING, DOVER.
it was pointed out that
Lete and we were under
h starting on them.
-Commander Drake was
Forwarded.
=
proceed to Dunkirk to
2. The full names of the
945, steaming 10 knots
Officer and rating concerned are:-
working. My confidence
as being too slack it
Lieut. Frederick Thomas
ack of air and consequent
Renny, R.N.R.
ahead or astern, might
Petty Officer James Potts,
, 16 miles off Dunkirk,
D/J.92816.
, shedding bolts from
eventually held in place
5 knots making an 0200
at to put about, but a
Engine cooling, some
rpoceeded another 5 miles
The Nore.
ADMIRAL
ngine failed and it was
9th June, 1940.
hat it could be kept
ogress unwise I cruised
VICE ADMIRAL
then made the best of my
2nd June. Here repairs
11 JUN 1940
y,4th June I was towed
lowing day by "Bornrif"
*
to Surrey Commercial Docks
DOVER
ΓyHaTo
Davie
It. P.N.V.R.
14 Ju.
DOVER

Details

289.
-
83
NARRATIVE OF DUTCH BOAT "JAVA"
26th May - 4th June, 1940.
0645, 27th May, the crew of D.B.22 under the command of
Lieut-Commander Drake, RND left Chatham Barracks and travelled via
Portsmouth to Southampton, joining "Java" that evening. The
vessel was then under repair, with orders on completion to load
ammunition in the River.
On the afternoon of 29th May those orders were cancelled
and we were instructed to fuel and proceed light to Dover.
Accordingly about 1700 with Main and Auxilliary machinery
persuaded to function by Diesel experts from the shore "Java" left
dock and proceeded down the Solent to Hamble.
At 0400 on 30th May our troubles started. Our final air
pressure started the Main Engine and we left with the handicap of
being able neither to stop or go astern as the belt driving our
Auxilliarys parted immediately. Eventually our Auxilliary
Diesel was started and ran all day for light and air with the
result that shortly before arrival at Dover our E.R.A. collapsed
owing to fumes. As our Windlass gear was already out of action
the ship was allowed alongside and on the morning of 31st May
"Sandhurst" was notified of our defects. By this time our
Auxilliary engine also had ceased running.
The Main belt was renewed, but as regards the other and
major defects, notably our Ballast Pump, it was pointed out that
as they would take several hours to complete and we were under
1 hours' notice for sea, it was not worth starting on them.
On Saturday morning, 1st June Lieut-Commander Drake was
taken ill and detained sick in "Sandhurst".
I received orders that afternoon to proceed to Dunkirk to
arrive at 0200 on 2nd June and left at 1945, steaming 10 knots
with neither Auxilliary nor Anchor gear working. My confidence
in our new belt was apparently misplaced as being too slack it
failed to drive the Compressor. This lack of air and consequent
inability, if stopped, to restart, either ahead or astern, might
have led to complications if, at midnight, 16 miles off Dunkirk,
No.3 Cylinder had not commenced to seize, shedding bolts from
the Crankcase which my Engineroom staff eventually held in place
with wedges. But our speed was down to 5 knots making an 0200
arrival impossible and I had no choice but to put about, but a
for
minuteslater however presumably with the Engine cooling, some
higher revolutions were obtained, and I rmoceeded another 5 miles
towards the shore. Again however the Engine failed and it was
only at slow speed and with great care that it could be kept
moving at all. Considering further progress unwise I cruised
in the neighbourhood until daylight and then made the best of my
way home, berthing in Dover about 1015, 2nd June. Here repairs
were considered impossible and on Tuesday, 4th June I was towed
by "Gorecht" to Sheerness and on the following day by "Bornrif"
to Tilbury, thence the following morning to Surrey Commercial Docks
ADNIRAL
Raviei
DOVER 14JUN 1940
ft. R.N.V.R.
R

Details

Dyrams 314
Blale
m. Lieut.Commdr.K.M.Drake,R.N.R., c/o W.Simons & Co., Renfrew.
1325
e. 13th.June 1940
-
85
Vice Admiral, Dover. copy to 0.in O., Nore.
mitted in accordance with Nore General Order 448/40 relative to
ration "Dynamo".
On the morning of 27th.May I proceeded from Chatham to Portsmouth
:h draft, to take over Dutch ship "TINY". On arrival at Portsmouth I
3 informed that "TINY" had already been taken over by the C.O. and ships
mpany of "JAVA" which had broken down and was then undergoing repair,
1 I was instructed to proceed to Southampton and take command of the
tter ship;this I accordingly did on the evening of the same day.
Repair work proceeded as arranged in accordance with F.O.1/c.
uthampton's instructions and main engine trials were held during the
renoon of 29th. May; these appeared to be satisfactory.
ring the afternoon of the same day I received instructions to proceed
Dover at the earliest possible moment, the urgency of these instructions
king it impossible to carry out the full tests of auxiliary machinery
originally planned with a further 24 hours at my disposal.
I left Inner Dock, Southampton at approx.1840/29th.and,after
justment of compasses and fuelling at Hamble Jetty, finally sailed for
ver at 0400/30th. arriving off that port at 1730 on the same day.
On passage the following defects had appeared:-
Driving belt from main engines to auxiliary machinery broken.
Auxiliary diesel refused to start.
Leaks from air bottles had resulted in starting air supply being
reduced to only sufficient air for one certain restart.
Mooring and windlass diesel refused to statt.
Ballast pump out of order.
On arrival off Dover a report was made through the Examination
essel to the effect that engineroom repairs were required and I was later
nstructed to berth alongside in Submarine Basin. This was done at
approx. 2230/30th.
Repair work was started the following day but at 2000 was stopped
is all ships were at immediate notice and remaining repairs would require
at least 24 hours. At that time the only repairs which had been completed
were the renewal of the driving belt and the restarting of the auxiliary
Omant

Details

127
-2-
This method was found successful and two trips were
carried out in same manner. For the third endeavour,
"VANQUISHER" and"FITZROY" having left for England, and no other
larger craft being in the vicinity, my intentions were to
close again, fill to capacity and proceed towards La Panne, to
transfer troops if requested, or return to England.
It is regretted that this effort failed in that
"SURSUM"CORDA" was beached too securely and no efforts ot my part
were successful in re-floating.
Thiswwas due to an error in judgement on my part in
allowing too many men on board at the time and my incorrect
appreciation of the time of the tide turning, no tide tables being
carried.
H.M.S. "HEBE" came to my assistance, but unfortunately
though a tow was passed, her lack of power and manoeuvreability
were strong handicaps, and she herself grounded two cables to
Eastward.
At 0800/30 it was realised there was no chance of the
ship moving until the following High Water.
During the period of waiting until High Water that
evening, I assisted where possible on the Beach in the vicinity
of the Ship, and during periods where there were no small craft
operating, took aboard soldiers for shelter and distributed
what food remained aboard "SURSUM-CORDA".
All members of my crew worked magnificently under
somewhat strained conditions, and with no consideration for
themselves.
Further endeavours to re-float were made between 1800
and 2030 using kedge anchor with soldiers onboard assisting.
At 1840 a shell from an enemy shore battery burst & few yards ahead
of the ship and four soldiers were hit by splinters. I ordered
these and one officer hit whilst on the beach to be placed below
and with the assistance of a stretcher bearer my First
Lieutenant, Lieutenant Brooks rendered first aid and made them as
comfortable as conditions allowed.
I then cleared the ship of soldiers and continued my
efforts to re-float, but with no success, delay being caused by
an influx of soldiers somewhat naturally seeking shelter after
the shell fire, whom L'ordered to stand by to board "HEBE" who
I could see appeared to shew hopeful signs of clearing the
beach. The majority of them carried out these orders and
"HEBE" was re-floated at approximately 1945. On receiving
report of my engines being temporarily out of action and on
point of "seizing-up") decided further efforts were fruitless,
and retaining only wounded and completely exhausted men onboard
for shelter, until small craft or ambulances could be commandeered
to take them off, decided to land and assist on beach where
possible.
(continued
ty
d,
that
too
Cing.

Details

129
-4-
Having reported to H.M.S. "LYNX" was ordered to
remain ready at short notice, but received no further
instructions until the evening of Sunday June 2nd, when
under the orders of Captain G. Fraser returned in the tug
Sun X' to assist disembarking French troops. I was discharged
to Admiralty P.M. Tuesday, 4th June.
A verbal report was given to H.M.S. "LYNX" of proceedings
during the operations "Dynamo" and delay in forwarding this
report is regretted but had no immediate access to P.G.O's.
I have the honour,
to be
Sir
Your obedient Servant,
LIEUTENANT, R.N.,
Vice Admiral Dover.
VICE ADMIRAL
25 JUN 1940
A

Details

t.of Officers and "Christobel other ranks brought from Dunkirk by H.M.Y.
II" June 1st 1940.
180
Varney. R.A.S.C.
3449762.
I
1/5 " Battallion 11 Lancs Fus.
-
3450550.
168
"
"
If
airhurst
3451380.
If
If
"
"
"
Walkden. Fus.
3445062.
"
If
If
If
If
6018271.
Taylor. Green. Fus.
2nd Essex regiment.
3450323. 1st 5th. Lancashire Fus.
kelly. Fus.
3446761.
1st 5th.
If
If
3449109.
"
G. Butler Fus.
If
If
If
B.Mc. Ewan.
7339992.
R.A.S.C.
CPL. N.H. Colson.
T92456.
T58067.
2nd If Corps Amm Park. R.A.S.C.
CPL E. Betts.
"
"
"
If
Dawson. Fus.
3449949.
1st 5th. Battallion Lancs Fus.
3445064.
If
"
Singleton Fus.
If
If
If
If
L. J.R. Crompton.
3448391.
"
If
If
If
If
If
Evans Fus.
3450278.
If
If
II
If
If
"
3446130.
"
If
If
France. Fus.
"
If
11
Chadwick. Fus.
3449797.
"
If
If
"
"
11
3445292.
"
S. Mc Carthy.
11
"
If
11
"
3444120.
If
If
If
II
If
Renshaw.
If
Q.M.S. John Armstrong.
3449829.
"
If
If
If
"
If
ohn Oddie. Fus.
3449958.
If
If
If
If
11
If
.Q.M.S. George Blagg.
4073997.
If
=
II
If
"
If
S.M. John Henry Brown.
1714972.
2nd Corps Amm Park. R.A.S.C.
harles Belshaw. Pte.
807755.
5th Bii Northants Regt.
ack Trailing. Pte.
6141581.
1st 6th Btn East Surrey Regt.
amuel Penman. Fus.
3452270.
1st 5th Btn Lancs Fusiliers.
rederick Charles Clarke.
34471191.
"
"
If
"
II
11
ames Henry Herbert Wood.
3448936.
If
"
"
If
If
If
C.A. Warren.
6018483.
2nd Essex Regt.
3. Fielding. Fus.
3448122.
1st 5th Regt Lancs Fus.
7. Sherrington. Fus.
3450197.
"
"
If
If
"
Dunn.
3452185.
- **** 1000 range. a pay. AND HAVE - now 04 was 0
Hurricanes have in sight and we saw no more of the Messerschmits
after that.
Another day we were bombed by a large formation of
Heinkels flying miles up. At least I think it was our little
ship they were after, unless it was one on the horison, in
which case they missed by miles.
During the course of these operations we took off
from the beaches upwards of 400 French soldiers. To our bitter
disappointment we could find no British, others were luckier.
He also mislaid out ship for a few hours - she was on tow -
having one propeller completely tied up with bits of line and
the other engine knooking hard. The tow rope broke and we
could not find her though we cast about for a time. However
5'
back at Sheerness yesterday evening having called from Ramsgate
she turned up again next day - faithful thing. We arrived
at 1200. An eventful trip. We borught back 2 "prises" - a nice
18ft

Details

Dynamo 185.
182
MOTOR YACHT "MARSAYRO"
170
6th.June 1960
B14/0/1513
II.
Leading Seaman BROWN.
No.R.E.2/014.
Vice Admiral,
Dover.
(Copy to Commander-in-Chief,
that I took over dommand
The Nore.)
esday 29th.May 1940.
rt I tried to sort things
on, regarding any particular
Forwarded.
stremely hasty. I therefore
nga will suffice.
2.
Reports and recommendations
Friday 31st.May 1940 at
concerning the above named vessels
with X217 and 2 other
were forwarded by my Nos. M.I. 1/14/015
utenant POOL,R.N. We
and R.E. 2/014. of 8th and 9th
out 3 p.m. we came in sight
June, 1940.
moke and explosions as far
later we contacted the
3.
Of the vessels mentioned in the French soldiers from the
above reports only the "Royal Eagle", to the beach; it was
"Golden Eagle" and "Crested Eagle"
heen and capsized at once.
are specifically named in Appendix 1, it himself from being more
thdrew my ship to review
4.
In addition to the vessels
", stuff that looked like
named in Minute 1 above, the Yachts
iD devil as I know that
"Christobel II" "Caleta", "Glala"
our propellers in the way
"Amulree" and the tug "St Clears"
happen as soon as I had
were mentioned in my reports, and
each we managed to pick
are presumed to be included in the
captured and used a little
note to Appendix 1.
troops appeared to be a
>-loads for some 5 hours,
Jaba" and so on. On this
ADMIRAL
am Queen" (about 2000 tons
" she had put her nose.
30th JULINE, 1940
*
;ines of "Marsayru" and
1940.
COMMODORE-IN-CHARGE,
ghout this day and the
SHEERNESS.
all a complete jumble in
stant fire of various kinds,
affird
the ship was not hit by
most
lune I think - we were
UMum
-done, nearest ship being
Marmay) by 4 brave Messershimi to who dived and
m. compair bell hadwith much vigour but exceedingly poor aim
tant fire 7 we messenour. We had a Bren and 2 rifles but did
the ship . are bus German pilots seemed disinolined to come
lune I thinwaleand 4 net and I had given orders to hold our fire
ar, nearechya pity.. A pity. After half an hour of this 3
rebbmit to worght and sight and we saw no more of the Messerschmits
and exceeding 2 rire bombed day we were bombed by a large formation of
d disinclleast I class up. At least I think it was our little
arders wer was one as. unless it was one on the horison, in
After half anre French soldienw . course of these operations we took off
iven calf an a these opeedirapd by miles.
we saw no more be British, others ads of 400 French soldiers. To our bitter
few hours - she and find no British, others ware luckier.
were bombed by aly a tied up with hingly for a few hours - she was on tow
At least I thinked. The sow rope rifompletely tied up with bits of line and
a it was one we cast about for a noling hard. The sow rope broke and we
iles. 80 of them tay evening having eaflecut day - faithruk thing. No arrived
day - faithruk thing. Hugh we cast about for a time. However
400 1 about
We borught back 2 preday evening having called from Ramagate
- faithruk
tip. We borught back 2 "prises" - a nice
evening h.s.
We borught

Details

Dynamo 18.5
182
MOTOR YACHT "MARSAYRU"
170
6th.June 1960
SKIPPER. G.D.OLIVIER.
SIGINEER
C.COGGINS.
CREW
Messrs.FORBES, HUMPHRIES and Leading Seaman BROWN.
I have the honour to report that I took over dommand
of the Motor Yacht "Marsayru" on Wednesday 29th.May 1940.
Before commencing this report I tried to sort things
out a bit but find that my recollection, regarding any particular
date on which incidents occurred, is extremely hazy. I therefore
hope that a general report on our doings will suffice.
We sailed from Sheerness on Friday 31st.May 1940 at
4 A.M., bound for Dunkirk, in company with X217 and 2 other
drifters under the comand of .Lieutenant POOL,R.N. We
steamed at 5 knots approximately. About 3 p.m. we came in sight
of the coast, a long line of fires, smoke and explosions as far
as the eye could see. About one hour later we contacted the
Naval forces engaged in evacuating the French soldiers from the
beaches. I had a whaler and sent it to the beach; it was
immediately stormed by about 50 Frenchmen and capsised at once.
My rating, Brown, had a job to prevent himself from being more
or less forcibly drowned. I then withdrew my ship to review
the position. Warps were everywhere, stuff that looked like
42", also smaller ropes which were the devil as I knew that
sooner or later we were bound to get our propellers in the way
of one of them. However this did not happen as soon as I had
feared. In our retreat p from the beach we managed to pick
up a very nice naval cutter which we captured and used a little
futther down channel where the French troops appeared to be a
little calmer. life took off many boat-loads for some 5 hours,
loading X217, S.S. "Foam Queen", S.S. "Jaba" and so on. On this
first day we also managed to pull "Foam Queen" (about 2000 tons
I should say) off the mud, into which she had put her nose.
I thought this spoke well for the engines of "Marsayru" and
Mr. Coggins who attended them. Throughout this day and the
days and nights that followed (it's all a complete jumble in
my mind) we were of course under constant fire of various kinds,
but I have the honour to report that the ship was not hit by
anything. On one day - Sunday 2nd.June I think - we were
singled out for attention (we were alone, nearest ship being
about 2½ miles away) by 4 brave Messershimits who dived and
machine-gunned us with much vigour but exceedingly poor aim
for about half an hour. We had a Bren and 2 rifles but did
not use them as the German pilots seemed disinolined to come
nearer than 2000 feet and I had given orders to hold our fire
Hurricanes have in sight and we saw no more of the Messerschmits
to 1000 feet range. A pity. After half an hour of this 3
after that.
Another day we were bombed by a large formation of
Heinkels flying miles up. At least I think it was our little in
ship they were after, unless it was one on the horison,
which case they missed by miles.
the course of these operations we took off
from the beaches During upwards of 400 French soldiers. To our luckier. bitter
disappointment we could find no British, others were tow -
He also mislaid out ship for a few hours - she was on
having propeller completely tied up with bits broke of and line we and
could not find engine her though we cast about for a time. arrived However
the other one knocking hard. The tow rope
back turned Sheerness up yesterday evening having called from Ramsgate - nice
she again next day - faithful thing. we
at 1200. at An eventful trip. We borught back 2 "prises" a
18ft

Details

Dyrams 61.
DOVER.
à
179
5
4th June, 1940
TO: COMMANDING OFFICER,
H.M.S."LYNX".
189
.
-2-
177
lighter to see if I could help them and found a young Tommy
(K. Alfred) in the water vigorously assisting the others to get
aboard.
Just as I arrived he said he was exhausted and so
we got him on to the lighter and I went overboard to take his
place.
We continued to get men on to my boat until no more
were coming down the beach.
During this operation three bombs
fell quite close to the lighter but no one was hurt. I took
this boat load of about thirty five out to the hopper.
I spent some time during the afternoon trying to
pull other motor boats which had gone ashore without dropping an
anchor off the beach which was a lee shore. I also towed
various whalers and ships boats out to the transports.
Towards evening the big ships started sending their
own boats ashore on long lines and as this occurred about every
50 yds the manoeuvring of motor boats became difficult. I was
hailed by a tug which had a supply lighter in tow outside the line
of big ships.
Saying that he could come no nearer the beach
he asked me to take this lighter as close in as I could. The
lighter was almost unmanageable.
While towing it the water
circulation of one engine gave out but I had to continue using
the engine which got very overheated until I could safely drop
the lighter after taking it through the line of big ships
to the shore.
This caused the engine to seise up. Shortly
afterwards the other engine began to give trouble and could only
be used at slow speeds.
I later discovered that this was due
to a choked jet in the carburettor. Just as dark came I passed
a rope to a drifter and asked permission to hang on until morning
when I could see to try to repair my engines. This drifter had
not got its complement of men on board and during the night he
moved about slowly from one spot to another trying to get a load.
During this period a bomb fell very close to us. The fourth
time he moved he headed to a point south of the harbour and then
very slowly made his way down channel.
About a mile from the harbour I realised he was
heading for home and being then too far from the seat of operations
Ramsgate. and being practically engineless I let him tow me right back to
We entered the harbour at noon (Saturday).
I reported for duty again at 0800 on Sunday morning
and though I was given command of another boat and got her all
ready I was not again ordered to sea.
I brought both my boats back to H.M.S. Wildfire on
Thursday p.m. the 6th June.
yours obediently
Ian F. Smith
SubL RNVR

Details

ENCLOSURE I. TO FORD'S NO. 541 of 17th. JUNE, 1940.
198
REPORT BY STOKER A. BENHAM, STOKER OF
MOTOR BOAT, NO.275
P.M. 29th.
Left Littlehampton and arrived Newhaven same evening,
had a spot of bother before we were allowed to enter
harbour and stay the night.
A.M. 30th.
Left Newhaven for Ramsgate arriving P.M. same day.
Port Stern Gland was leaking badly had to be repacked on
arrival, Refuelled and ready to sail.
A.M. 31st.
Was ordered to leave Ramsgate independently for Dunkirk.
C.P.O. Leighton, Cox., A.B. Strand and Stoker Benham,
crew. Left harbour and picked up convoy already leaving
for Dunkirk. After about 2/2 to 3 hours out we had
trouble again with Port Stern Gland and returned to
harbour and repacked and tightened up both Stern Glands.
A.M. lst.
Was called again about 4.30 and ordered to sail and
proceed to Dunkirk. Two Sub-Lientenants R.H.V.R.
volunteered to come with us as their boat was unfit for
the trip, and an extra Able Seaman came aboard with them
for the trip. On the way to Dunkirk was kept busy,
Able Seaman Strand watching for aircraft and myself
tending engines, had no more trouble with Stern Glands,
There was quite a considerable amount of aircraft about
and our destroyers were continually repelling their
attacks. Struck something below water starboard side
which made the boat jump but no damage seemed to be done
as the engine was running smoothly and we were not making
water, so we carried oh. On sighting Dunkirk we saw
two large ships loaded with soldiers steamin down the
coast and all small craft following, so we decided to
follow as there was nothing we could do there. After
about 10 minutes steaming we saw a crowd of German
áircraft in the air flying at a great height. About
six detached themselves, and dived down at the two
big ships. They did not release their bombs until they
were almost on the ships, registered hits which sunk
both ships quite close to each other. We were
travelling at full speed and picked up 10 of the
survivors which made the boat full. As the bombers
were still very active in the vicinity, we decided it
was best to leave with all possible speed for home.
After about half to three-quarters of an hour we were
mistaken for German Torpedo Boat by our own trawlers,
who opened fire on us at close range. I saw C.P.O.
Leighton leave the boat after a shell had wrecked the
wheel house and Able Seaman Strand dashed forward to grab
the wheel, I got on to the side and saw one of the
trawlers bearing down on us as though it was going to
ram us, she was just about a boat's length away when I
jumped into the water, for it seemed impossible that she
would miss us. But Strand must have swung boat around
enough to clear. I was picked up by one of the boats
after swimming around for a while. I dont know how long.
I did not see any one else of the boat's crew until we
arrived at Margate, when Able Seaman Strand came aboard
the trawler I was on and spoke to me about the affair.
The only....

Details

Page 3.
267
256
day (continued)
congestion in the harbour
2331
Just cleared Harbour entrance when Kingfisher
Bow, 20 feet from the stem opened up to the Port
rammed by French Trawler 'Edmond Rene', and her was
"M" and"F" Degaussing circuits were cut. The water-line two ships
swung alongside one another after the collision and
troops transhipped to the trawler who was undamaged
esday 4th June.
0005
Received orders to return to Margate.
Kingfisher Compartment. was making a little water in the Asdic
0010
Proceeded. Speed 7 Knots.
Ordered to proceed to Sheerness.
0505
In company with H.M.S.Lida who had been in collision
and requested Kingfisher to stand by.
0540
Sighted French Destroyer with damaged bows at anchor
near N. Goodwin Lt. Vessel, who had been in collision
0545
French Destroyer got under way and proceeded to the
South.
0615
Observed heavy explosion in position 51° 23' N,
1° 31' E., and unknown ship sink. Several of H.M.Ships
including H.M.S. Aulbury and H.M.S. Kellet near the pos-
ition picked up survivors.
0714
H.M.S. Lida and Kingfisher arrived off Margate.
Decided to anchor attempt repairs to D.G. Circuits
before proceeding
0745
Thick Fog. Requistoned steamer King GeorgeV, hit
Kingfisher on the Starboard Bow when entering
Margate Road but caused practically no damage
1200
D.G. Circuits temporarily repaired. Received orders
to proceed to Lowestoft at daylight on Wednesday.
During the evening M.A.S.B. No.1. came alongside
and reported one engine out of action and requested
a tow up the swept channel to abreast Harwich.
lednesday 5th June.
0400
Proceeded with M.A.S.B. No.1. in tow.
0926
North Knock Deep Buoy. Slipped M.A.S.B. No.1. who
proceeded to Harwich.
1620
Berthed in Lowestoft Harbour.

Details

264
276
have off a the few boats. At this time I got a signal
I at this part of doing the essential work and that there were
I was beaches were to proceed to Dunkirk but that as
many men and coast to be evacuated I decided to
ignore the signal, proceed with the evacuation. There were at
and/cross arrived. The embarkation arrangements were
first no other channel transports boa on the beach but later a paddle minesweeper
most inadequate the other only about 3 power boats of doubtful efficiency were
present and boats consisted of a few service boats mercantile
between the loto It was only due to the magnificent work of the
boats and Royal Engineers Ferry Boats do with very few seamen ratings
Army units at this part of the beach who were admirably led by their
Officers. that embarkation was able to proceed at any sort of
speed, although the work of the naval officers 10 were present in
few power boats available was beyond praise. These appeared to be
no centralised control either of boats or beach. During the
afternoon and evening there was a certain amount of enemy air
activity but enemy planes always moved away when A/A fire was brought
to bear on them, and there were frequent visitations by British
Fighters which appeared to have an excellent deterrant effect. No
bombs were dropped in my vicinity.
At about 2000 a short but heavy artillery fire was brought to
bear on the part of the beach near to Dunkirk and many men started
to swim out to the ships or come out in very inadequate boats.
I weighed anchor in the "Royal Eagle" - as the tide was approaching
high tide and proceeded as close in shore as possible to pick up these
men. At about 2200 when no further men were coming to the ship
and "Royal Eagle" was packed to nearly full capacity - 1.e. every
covered in part of ship full and men also on the upper deck forward
and aft, I decided to weigh and proceed to Sheerness rather than
Margate on account of the ships requirements in oil and water which
at Margate would have taken too long to complete. I consider now
that on this day I committed a serious error of judgement as in
view of the poor embarkation facilities I should have ordered "Royal
Eagle" to ground herself in shore at low water and fill up my boats
running between the ship and shore on a line and then have floated
off and proceeded as the tide rose, or alternatively I might have
grounded /Royal Eagle" to form a pier to facilitate embarkation
by other ships when they arrived. I consider now on looking back
that the provision of some sort of pier should have been a matter
of primary importance.
In view of the shelling of the beaches from the Westward I
decided to proceed back by route "y" particularly as this was the
only route known by experience. Shortly after leaving a report was
received of M.T.B.'s off Bray but I then considered that it was too
late to turn back. After passing Middelkerke Buoy the ship was
attacked by an aircraft firing machine gun but I gave orders that
no firing was to take place so that thereshould be less chance of
giving away 10 ships position to M.T.B. The ship was not hito
During the night I passed three small dark vessels which I believed
were French Torpedo Boats. I did not challenge but kept guns trained
on them. About 0230 on 31st May there were signs of firing about
10 miles astern and about five minutes later a tremendous column of
flame rose from the water. I consider now that I was to blame in
using route "Y" and that I unduly hazarded the ship by so doing.
On arrival at Sheerness at 0600 I found that in response to my
request possible arrangement had been made for the reception the
of the every and the cleaningofuelling and provisioning of
hours ships working under conditions of high tension and
ship. The troops company had had practically no sleep for about 48
been discomfort was very much appreciated. I cannot speak
extreme and had been and the fact that such excellent arrangements had
ships highly company. of the On both nights the whole of the ships accomodation
too made by Shearness spirit and sense of duty shown by the officers and

Details

SECRET
mánoeuvring one rating near was the slightly wall fairly heavy shelling was in progress58 k.
284
and the harbour wounded by a splinter.
hemp at the entrance soon as I was just clear
outside round the bearing I found - so as the port paddle had many On fathoms arriving of
wreck with knives to the port, I stopped and got of the of
hands on and I was able to clear it. The bearing was a number
cleared light to proceed though only at half practically speed. In
the increasing of the ship was shelled from a gun position
coast I picked up a Service motor launch and also a lifeboat and
to the west Dunkirk, but was not hit. Soon after leaving the
towed them back to the North Goodwin.
H.M.S. "CRESTED EAGLE"
I have not yet seen the report from
the Commanding Officer of H.M.S. "Crested Eagle" but from the
evidence of a survivor it appears that, after I had ordered her
to Dunkirk on May 29th, she proceeded alongside the eastern side
of the East Mole at Dunkirk and embarked troops and casualties
including many from H.M.S. "Grafton" and a transport which
had both been sunk alongside by bombs. Heavy bombing and shell
fire was experienced but "Crested Eagle" was unhit until the
evening when she had just left the Mole to proceed home with her
load of troops and casualties and was hit by a bomb in the engine
room. A fire was started and it appeared that as the engines were
still working slowly the Commanding Officer decided to beach the
ship. Before or after she was beached it is believed she was hit
again by two bombs. It is thought that only a small proportion of
the ship's company were casualties but that many of the stretcher
cases who were accommodated in the wardroom and after part of the
ship were lost in the fire.
H.M.S. "GOLDEN" EAGLE". I would like to add the following remarks
in respect of th report of proceedings forwarded by Lieutenants
Newman and Lucas. Although technically Lieut. Lucas is second in
command of the ship (as an R.N.R. Officer - Lieut Newman being an
R.N.V.R. Officer), Lieut. Newman has carried out the duties of
First Lieutenant and there is no doubt that the initiative and
good work done by the ship during the absence of her Commanding
Officer was due almost entirely to Lieutenant Newman who took
upon himself the command and was loyally supported by the two
R.N.R. Officers-Lieutenants Lucas and Dent, who did excellent work
once Lieutenant Newman had decided what was to be done. Lieut. J.
C. Newman is 54 years of age and quite inexperienced in Naval
matters - but I consider that the part he played in these operations
is worthy of the highest commendation and I am convinced that had it
not been for his leadership and initiative "Golden Eagle" would not
have taken any active part in the proceedings.
I would like also to mention the goods work done by Lieut.
Lucas R.N.R. who handled the ship with great skill, and on the
occasion on which the ship was in Dunkirk harbour at night. I
consider that the fact that she got out safetly was in a great
measure due to his personal efforts on the springs, etc, as well
as his handling of the ship.
To the list of men recommended I would like to add Fredk.
J. Shirley, Acting Leading Telegraphist R.N.V.R. C/WRX84, whose
efficiency and extreme devotion to duty has been of the utmost
assistance to me as Senior Officer of the flotilla and also that
rely upon to take with degree of competency during
of Able Seaman Scott S.T. TD/X1406, who was the only man I could
the night visit to the Dunkirk. wheel I thoroughly any endorse the recommendations
given to C.P.O. Seaman and Utton, Seaman R.N.R.

Details

REPORT OF 'BOUNTY' (Contd).
of I should Petty Officer like to draw T.Jones special throughout attention operations. to the magnificent work 295
2
The Potter-Irwin following officers, Sub.Lieuts. Godman
and ships accompanied and me and reported to Ramsgate,
Our names were accordingly entered on the Volunteer's List.
volunteering services on the following day if required.
June 2. Having reported to Ramsgate, we were informed
course of day, found M.T.B.101. lying idle and requested use
that only fast and shallow draft vessels were required. During
of same, but were informed that the vessel was R.A.F. property
and we were unable to obtain permission to use her.
Received instructions to stand by and later to return
to own Base.
Throughout twenty seven hours spent at Dunkirk and
adjacent beaches, were under continuous bombardment from the
air and shelling from the land.
308
REPORT OF INNER PATROL YACHT "SERIOLA"
COmmanding Officer, Lieut. D.A.Dawson, R.N.V.R.
- 287
29. 1800. Left Hamble in formation for Dover, my division
consisting of "SERIOLA", "EILA II", "AHOLA" & "NONETA".
30. 0930. Arrived Dover, and seet into submarine basin, S.O.I.P
and myself went to report to S.N.O. Dover and received
final orders for our departure.
2200. Left Dover.
31 0500. Arrived off Bray, leading my division, when we received
signal to commence embarking troops from beach to
destroyers lying farther out. This lasted until about 1000,
when I received a signal from a destroyer to proceed to
La Panne and carry on with the same routine there.
1200. Suggestion made to run a grass rope from "SERIOLA" to
the shore, which would enable the troops to pull themselves
out by the aid of this warp in boats etc. Sub.Lt.Godman,
r.n.v.r left "SERIOLA" in a whaler with a Lt., R.N.V.R. off
H.M.S. "Hebe2 to operate the shore end. Unfortunately, a
lorry was driven into the sea and turned over, fouling the
line, so this idea had to be abandoned. With great difficulty
we were able to get Sub. Lt. Godman aboard again as the whaler
which took him off, left the shore without him, with a full
load of troops. A severe bombardment was going on at the
time and, consequently, most small craft had withdrawn to
seawards but in spite of a big sea running at the time, we
managed to lower our dinghy and got him aboard in an
exhausted condition. We then prodeeded to continue disembarking
1500. troops. Received signals from H.M.S.Keith to go and collect
two whalers and crews foroperations off La Panne during the
1530. evening. Received signal from C.O. "NONETA" to say that she had
a dead man on board and her P.O. badly wounded. Closed her
and the C.O. suggested that he should take Sub.Lt. Godman to
with him. This I agreed to and advised him to return
Ramsgate "NONETA" was holed above the water line.
1630. Collected as the two whalers and crews and set off for La
Panne. the whalers and their respective crews.
1800. Received Beached signal from "BOUNTY" which was flying the
The of Commodore me and my crew that the hours 2100 on the that
flag Stephenson WMMXXXXX ordering us to close.
day Commodore to the told following morning were to be considered to get as
many Hour" and possible. We then returned to night. La
"Zero 0400 eh hoped we would do our utmost Panne and
continued men off transporting as troops throughout the
(Continued).

Details

345
be 322
June 2nd. In Ramsgate Harbour doing temporary repairs to
boilor of "Kindred Star".
shaken up and galley stove destroyed.
"Thrifty" reported to be leaking badly, engines
June 3rd. Orders were received from N.O.I.C. Ramsgate to
return to Portland in company as soon as the
tide permitted. Owing to the repairs not being
completed until late, we were not in time for
that evening's tide.
The Chief Engineer of "Thrifty" got intoxicated
and struck the Skipper of the "Kindred Star" and
also his own Skipper. He was placed under arrest
by orders of the N.O.I.C. and handed over to the
Ramsgate Police.
June
4th.
Left Ramsgate 0925.
June 5th. Arrived Portland 1100.
June 12th 1940
Lieutenant. R.N.V.R.
ded hereto

Details

36,
PRINCIPAL SEA TRANSPORT OFFICE
FRENCH PORTS,
2
MINISTRY OF SHIPPING,
338
ROOM 8009
BERKELEY SQUARE HOUSE,
FP/YX/4.
SHEERNESS
BERKELEY SQUARE,
LONDON. W.1.
20th June, 1940.
The Director of Sea Transport.
Sir,
I have the honour to bring to your notice Lieutenant
C.V. Brammell R.N.R. of H.M.S. "GULZAR".
2. On the evening of. 26/27th May, 1940, I was informed by
Vice Admiral, Dover, that H.M.S. "GULZAR" was placed at my
disposal to go to Calais to take water and stretchers, and to
bring back wounded.
3. Lieutenant Brammell brought his ship into Calais, it
being a very dark night, turned round, and secured with slip
lines alongside the steps of the Gare Maritime. All this was
done without noise, which enabled the officers landing to get
ashore unnoticed. On entering the channel, the complete absence
of any firing raised suspicions that the enemy might already have
taken the town, suspicions which were confirmed when the landing
party got ashore and had to return hurriedly to the yacht.
4. Lieutenant Brammell slipped his lines very quickly and
got away just in time, as a heavy fire from rifles and machine
guns was opened on the yacht from the neighbourhood of the
steps as she proceeded down the entrance.
5. It was due to the quiet discipline in his ship that the
landing party got ashore unnoticed, and due to his seamanship
and smartness that we got quickly away; any delay might have
entailed severe casualties.
/6.

Details

Dynamo 143
372
H.M.D. "RENASCENT"
-
349
6th June, 1940.
Sirs,
I have the honour to put before you a report of our
action in getting troops off in the Evacuation of Dunkirk.
We sailed on orders on Thursday evening May 30th at
8.45 p.m. and proceeded to Ramsgate. Arrived at Ramsgate in
the early morning 5.0 a.m. and received orders to go to Dunkirk
and take off soldiers.
We arrived at Dunkirk and hailed a destroyer, asking
him where they were getting the troops from. He asked us what
and T replied about 11 feet. He then told
348
2.
About 1,000 men stood to attention 4 deep about
half way along the pier, the General and his staff
about 30 feet away and after having faced the troops;
whose faces were indescernable in the dawn light, the
flames behind them showing up their steel helmets,
the Officers clicked their heels, saluted and then
turned about and came down to the boat with me and
we left at 0320.
"Go stranger, tell the Spartans that here
we lie, having been obedient to their
commands!".
Commander, R.N.

Details

Dynams 143
372
*
H.M.D. "RENASCENT"
349
6th June, 1940.
Sirs,
I have the honour to put before you a report of our
action in getting troops off in the Evacuation of Dunkirk.
We sailed on orders on Thursday evening May 30th at
8.45 p.m. and proceeded to Remsgate. Arrived at Ramsgate in
the early morning 5.0 a.m. and received orders to go to Dunkirk
and take off soldiers.
We arrived at Dunkirk and hailed a destroyer, asking
him where they were getting the troops from. He asked us what
water we were drawing and I replied about 11 feet. He then told
us to proceed 8 miles to the Eastward and get troops off the beach.
We proceeded on our way and as soon as we got there, hailed
some small boats and told them to bring us some men.
raid.
Dynamo 143.
bombs
348A 'S from
to the
From:
Captain M/S, Sheerness.
roraft
During all
Date:
6th June, 1940.
Eagle
To:
Commodore in Charge, Sheerness.
When we
to smother
did. We
so I ran
he boat
In forwarding the attached, I have
hen we
$ at
nothing but praise for the Skipper and Crew of
"Renascent". Theis officer carried out his very
coming
in
unusual duties in a prompt and seamanlike and
them
courageous manner.
hing to
He had no Unit Officer on board to assist
ring a
and the
him.
1 Della and
The
hanging
put the
PBHartford CAPTAIN M/S
a 51t to
kirk harbour
SHEERNESS.
UNMODORE-IN-CHARGE
would
day June
ashore
-7 JUN 1940
return
*
CHEERNESS

Details

Dyuams 143
372
H.M.D. "RENASCENT"
6th June, 1940.
349
Sirs,
action in getting troops off in the Evacuation of Dunkirk.
I have the honour to put before you a report of our
We sailed on orders on Thursday evening May 30th at
8.45 p.m. and proceeded to Ramsgate. Arrived at Ramsgate in
the early morning 5.0 a.m. and received orders to go to Dunkirk
and take off soldiers.
We arrived at Dunkirk and hailed a destroyer, asking
him where they were getting the troops from. He asked us what
water we were drawing and I replied about 11 feet. He then told
us to proceed 8 miles to the Eastward and get troops off the beach.
We proceeded on our way and as soon as we got there, hailed
some small boats and told them to bring us some men.
We were waiting for them when we had an air raid.
There were about 80 planes over and they were dropping bombs
for about three quarters of an hour. We then had orders from
a destroyer to go back to the Westward. We then went to the
Westward as ordered, with wave after wave of enemy aircraft
continually coming over and trying to get some of us. During all
this they started shelling from ashore.
While on our way back, we were hailed by an Eagle
paddle steamer and told to put our troops on board him. When we
did that, we were told to take the Commodore from him to another
paddle boat - about a mile back to the East - which we did. We
then came to the West again and it was a rising tide, so I ran
my ship up on the beach and started to get troops in the boat
by any means I could. We had one hundred and eighty when we
were floating again, so I came away with them - leaving at
approximately 8. 30.
We were subjected to one more air raid while coming
out. It lasted for about twenty minutes. We arrived in
Ramsgate 8 A.M. Saturday 1st June with first load, put them
ashore and laid off at anchor.
Set sail for Dunkirk 5.40 Saturday p.m. Nothing to
report until we got into Dunkirk Roads. We were following a
large steam yacht when there was a terrible explosion and the
yacht disappeared - he had been mined. The time Was 11 Della and
I ordered full speed and the boat's crew to stand by. The
visibility was very poor and the smoke from ashore was hanging
on the water, but we got as near as we could.
I could hear men shouting in the water, 30 70 put the
boat away and picked up four survivors. I waited for a bit to
see if we could get any more of them, but we could not.
I then proceeded on my way and went into Dunkirk would harbour
where took on board eighty British. The French men
not we I started back for Ramsgate at 2 a.m. them Sunday ashore June
2nd. come, arrived so in Ramsgate about 7 a.m. I put to return
and went We off and laid at anchor until we had orders
back to Sheerness.
I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your obedient servant,
(Signed) R.E. HANNAPORD
Skipper R.N.R.

Details

SECRET
- 3 -
1
Binlo/2 408
and get 21. around provisions. At 1130/3 the wheelhouse. June, The opportunity 1940, Dure we were was ordered taken to alongside fit sandbags to water 38671
only of motor and 22 remain boats Commander were alongside motor secured Le for Measurer astern. about came an At hour onboard to 1700 either the four tugs at side tugs 1600 large of weighed and draft high four water. and we large on could top
broceeded. Two British boats were slipped at 1830 and came on under
evening. At position two German floating mines were sighted.
their own power. "W" fighter patrols were observed during the
They were destroyed by minesweepers.
boat (Santday)
parted, as its engines were broken down. It was, unfortunately, a
23. At 2130 one motor was abandoned after the tow ropes had 3/6
boat only three days old.
24 By 2330 we were approaching the breakwater when a small
boat filled with French soldiers hailed us. These soldiers were
embarked. They told us that the Germans were in the town, but that
the French held the coast for about one and a half miles to the westward
of the breakwater. The tug was stopped to the eastward of the
breakwater and we remained in this position until 0200/4 June, 1940,
when we went inside the harbour to try and pick up more soldiers from
the pier. H.M.S. Malcolm hailed and asked us to hold her stem up
to the jetty. This we did. Between 0200 and 0230 there was
periodic shelling outside the breakwater.
25. At 0230 the tugs had, been ordered to leave and we proceeded
with our one remaining motor steaming under its own power. One
aircraft was engaged with Lewis guns at 0310, it did not retaliate.
The motor boat was taken in tow about half an hour later. The tug
was anchored in Ramsgate at 0730 after an extraordinarily peaceful
passage home.
26. Lieutenant Fletcher and myself together with nine naval
ratings left the tug A.M. on 5th June, 1940. Lewis guns and two
Able Seamen were left onboard until the tug arrived back at Gravesend.
27. Both the naval ratings, the civilian tug's crew, and the
volunteers behaved splendidly.
I have the honour to be,
Commanding Officer,
Sir,
H.M.S.Pelican.
Your obedient Servant,
JEL hartin
LIEUTENANT, R.N.
II.
No. 195D.
VICE ADMIRAL
JUN 1940
VICE ABMIRAL,
*
DOVER
(Copy to :- Commander-in-Chief, The Nore).
no
Submitted in accordance with Nore General Order 448/40.
LIEUTENANT Jenhnaitin FOR
PELICAN.,
COMMANDER (on leavel
1940.

Details

NAVAL
21 JUNISTANT
PRINCIPAL SEA TRANSPORT OFFICE, .
7-
FRENCH PORTS,
MINISTRY OF SHIPPING,
ROOM 8009
*
BERKELEY SQUARE HOUSE,
7
FP/YX/4.
of
BERKELEY SQUARE,
LONDON. W.1.
20th June, 1940.
The Director of Sea Transport.
Sir,
C.V. Brammell, R.N.R. of H.M.S. "GULZAR".
I have the honour to bring to your notice Lieutenant
2. On the evening of 26/27th May, 1940, I was informed by
Vice Admiral, Dover, that H.M.S. "GULZAR" was placed at my
disposal to go to Calais to take water and stretchers, and to
bring back wounded.
3. Lieutenant Brammell brought his ship into Calais, it
being a very dark night, turned round, and secured with slip
lines alongside the steps of the Gare Maritime. All this was
done without noise, which enabled the officers landing to get
ashore unnoticed. On entering the channel, the complete absence
of any firing raised suspicions that the enemy might already have
taken the town, suspicions which were confirmed when the landing
party got ashore and had to return hurriedly to the yacht.
4. Lieutenant Brammell slipped his lines very quickly and
got away just in time, as a heavy fire from rifles and machine
guns was opened on the yacht from the neighbourhood of the
steps as she proceeded down the entrance.
5. It was due to the quiet discipline in his ship that the
landing party got ashore unnoticed, and due to his seamanship
and smartness that we got quickly away; any delay might have
entailed severe casualties.
/6.
be were dropped, but they were
Commanding Officer,
HMS. Gulzar,
"Canterbury," "Calvi", "Polly
e men received shrapnel wounds
% W.P. Oi,
the raiders were driven off.
London
think one by "Jaguar". "Jaguar"
hips attended to their wounded.
18 "Canterbury" and got the
from "Grenade" for the more

Details

YES
M.T.B. to be well which clear said before all craft dawn, were being ordered
so we had to turn to back.
without help. transports might not a were ben able the to m
to the Dunkirk harbour The because and next the wrecks day, Monday, and I was ordered to
hours borrowed was from Navigation only a about wooden on ship, the way and across consequently was not usasy becaus
On 200 yards, while a local squall 1
to getting stand in by. and arrival I out requested of at harbour Dunkirk quickly I duly under reported. their own The tran
permission to enter power
was the the on Tuesday refused operation morning, as was it might ending the 4th have and June, was impeded then to Captain the ordered transports. Wharton back harbour to Ramsg I to th I
same evening I was ordered to report back to H.M.S. and "KI Co
(sd) T Lamine
Proby. Temp. Sub. Lieut,

Details

REPORT
539
522
ON THE OPPERATIONS OF THE MOTOR LAUNCHES "YSER" AND
"MALBOROUGH DURING THE EVAQUATION OF THE BRITISH &
509
7
FRENCH FORCES.
Yug Vincia
The Hopper no.95, which I had been ordered to take
h
round to Ramsgate, anchored early last Wednesday evening,
and Commander Duffet gave me the Belgian ferry boat "Yser".
We started in 8 convoy of eighteen other small
motor craft at about 0100 on Thursday. Shortly after daylight
512
the escorting drifter had to turn back with two of the small
512
boats, and with our much greater speed we soon left the
remainder of the launches well astern.
VI940
Owing to the fact that the "Yser" was not fitted
with a compass we deviated from our course, making a landfall
8 few miles to the westward of the town. We arrived off the
beaches at about 0900, and ran aground in our attempts to
approach close enough to the sands for the men to wade out to
us. There was no anchor in the boat, but we salvaged two of
the plowshare type from other abandoned boats, and laid them
out at low tide in order to kedge her off.
During the afternoon and dog-watches we were able to
be of some use by acting as a liason link between the boats
and the officers of the embarking troops. The Frenchmen were
very reluctant to wade in deeper than their waists, and
Petty Officer Clarke (Chatham Division) spent approximately
five hours, with water up to his neck, helping the soldiers
ief
into the small boats.
agret
I should like to take this oppotunity to recommend
Petty Officer Clarke for his cheerfulness, vigour, and valuable
advice offered on this occasion and later in the WD boat
"Malborough". I understand that Captain Lord Louis Mount-
batten mentioned Petty Officer Clarke in his despatches
following the torpedoing and bombing of HMS "Kelly".
Our efforts to refloat the "yser" were without
success, and having waited for high tide we took passage home
G. Gabbett- Mulhallen.
Sub.Lieutenant Royal Navy.
The Captain's Secretary.
H.M.S. FERVENT.
RAMSGATE.

Details

Statement from S.J. Vincea: (Re, Dankish
522
C.B.O.
Sir,
6x Imday the 31" M May. are the J.Juy Vincia
left Ramagah in taw of three skelfs for Durkish at
2.45pm.
at 4pm see were off the Sandetha Bany, ohen
548
eport by Lieut. V.A. de Mauny, R.N. (contd)
-
518
1500
From 1500 onwards we were subject to almost
continuous attack by enemy aircraft and had the
satisfaction of seeing 7 bombers brought down by
destroyers' and shore batteries' anti-sireraft
fire. Two enemy pilots escaped by parachute.
Majority of troops embarked at this point were
French.
1700
On hearing that there were a number of British
troops on the beach near La Panne proceeded
there with Sub. Lt. Cornish and his motor boat
and succeeded in embarking a number of British.
Total number embarked was not recorded by ne
but was approximately 150 altogether.
2030
Having valuable cargo aboard and observing that
there were a number of schoots and other craft
who, owing to the absence of small power driven
craft, were unable to get any troops. I decided
to return to Base with my load and turned over
my whaler to Sub. Lt. Cornish and asked him to
report to the Schoot "Atlantic", the Commanding
Officer of which told me that he had been there
all day without being able to get a single man
on board for reasons explained above.
Proceeded by route X in company with other drifters,
troop ships, tugs, etc. and were attacked by
enemy aircraft until past No 6 W Buoy, when they
were driven off by anti-aircraft fire from
British destroyers.
1st June.
1430
Arrived N. Goodwin L/V and anchored owing to
insufficient water in Ramagate.
1600
Weighed and proceeded in to Ramagate and discharged
That troops. evening was ordered to return to Dunkirk in
"Ocean Breeze" but order was cancelled as we
could not reach destination by 2130.
2nd June.
Ordered to proceed in Power Boat "Haig" with Lt. in
McMullan R.N.R. and Sub. Lt. Hollingshead
company with Marlborough, Kestrel and Swallow. Cmdr.
2100
Proceeded with Marlborough in company with with one
Troop R.N. in command of "Haig" and
lifeboat in tow.
3rd June.
0030
Approached Dunkirk; obliged to out lifeboat adrift
she became full of water and was hampering bollard.
Entered Dunkirk Harbour and proceeded alongside
speed as of "Haig" and damaging towing

Details

558
4
528
for order.
On 28/5/40 at 1735 whilstlying
at anchor off Deal fier order
were received to proceed to Dunkit
in order to evacuate troops. at
this time, owing to information
received the previous evening from
an armed merchant cruiser (see my
report on varyage ho 1) we thought that
Dunkirk was in the hands of the
every Ten minutes later we have
up ancher and proceeded to Dunkink
followed by some half dozen other
small motor vessels! We proceeded
via broys u "V" and W and
arrived off Dunkisk at about 2300
-and observed the town was in flames.
Downs to Dunkisk with 5 other
I did all the Piloting from
(ht- line close astern, including "Patria"
schoolo following in single
Cundr Pisani R.N.) the "Lwenti"
and the Rian w l waited
near the entrance, about 1/4 mile
3ra Juny.
tow. harbour. Ordered
staff and French but troops. Furthest end now
inner could find none; loaded of with harbour snggion
in German hands.
Returned Ramsgate.
Completed 5 journeys in all.

Details

PLAGE OFFICER IN CHARGE
17JUN1940
*
HARWIOH
H.M.S. "Vatchful"
547
Great Termouth.
8th June, 1940.
Sir,
I have the honour to submit the report of proceedings of the
"M" Drifters attached to Tarmouth Base (H.M.S. "Watchful") whilst
employed on Operation "Dynamo",
30.5.40. 2345. Flotilla sailed Tarmouth for Ramagate,
Good
46
567
From:- Sub. Lt. W.R. Williams, R.N.
Mm
537
Date:- 5th June, 1940.
To:-
Naval Officer in Charge, Ramagate.
30th May. Arrived Ramsgate from Portsmouth with lighter. X.209
Ordered to sands between Gravelines and Calais.
Compass error 20°. Fixed green Bight buoy
appeared to be missing.
Anchored off sands; landed in boat and searched
inland. Encountered enemy, engaged two and believe
I shot both; returned to my ship.
31st May. Followed tug to East beach at dawn. Took aboard
500 men from my boats. One boat destroyed by
bomb, two struck submerged lorries.
Left for Ramagate.
1715
Landed soldiers at Ramagate and returned Dunicipe.
led
2150
Arrived Dunkirk at dusk, heavy bombing and shelling.
Soldiers very steady and cheerful.
1st June. Landed soldiers at Ramagate at noon. Ship had been
n
in collision off Dunkirk; left her in Ramagate
us
inner harbour. Took command of a tug whose
Master refused to go to Dunkirk again and left
of
for Dunkirk. Arrived evening: very few soldiers
on beaches. Went alongside small pier at back or
harbour. Went ashore to look for troops; found
no English so loaded up with French.
2nd
June.
Arrived Ramsgate 0730. Obtained Captain Duka's
Mann,
permission to arm and command Power Boat "Swallow". xi
Arrived Dunkirk in "Swallow" at dusk. Entered
inner harbour; took off 15 men and towed & full
cutter in addition.
3rd
June.
Arrived Ramsgate in morning with loaded cutter in
tow. Left for Dunkink in afternoon; entered
inner harbour. Ordered to embark some French
staff but could find none; loaded with English
and French troops. Purthest end of harbour now
in German hands.
Returned Ramsgate.
Completed 5 journeys in all.

Details

582
552
Report of Operation "DYNAMO" from 30th lay to 5th Tune 1940.
Subject :
Dynama 374 581
it
EVACUATION OF B.E.F. - NARRATIVE OF EVENTS.
551
From
THE COMMANDING WEYMOUTH. OFFICER, CONTRABAND CONTROL BASE, ser
Date
17th June, 1940.
No. 40/23.
a
To
THE FLAG OFFICER-IN-CHARGE, PORTLAND.
poss
G
following reports in connection with the evacuation of
With reference to your No.2912 of 6th instant, the
troops from Dunkirk are submitted :-
Temp. Lieutenant R.Nimmo, R.N.R.
Petty officer F.J.Norton, Pensioner.
Petty officer G. Senior, Pensioner.
pes.
Petty officer G.B. Thomas, R.N.R.
$
Leading Stoker W.A.S.Horne, R.F.R.
2. - Other officers who took part in Operation
Dynamo, have been reappointed and instructed to hand in
reports to their Commanding Officers.
CER-IN-CHARGE 310 4
may
JUN 1940
ed
2
*
CAPTAIN.
RTLAND
/II.
early
on the 1st June and the engine was overhauled that day and made 115
Ior rurther service. ne left again for Dunkirk in the early evening
and on arrival OIT Dunkirk troops were again ferried for some time.
unfortunately in manoeuvering close to the anor the crait either stuck
a submerged object or grounded and in the subsequent movements of
engines and nelm the rudder W.S.S. lost. 1 eventually managed to retch
up alongside of tus, transferred the troops 1 had on Doard and unen
proceeded to 118 a jury rudder; consisting or at ladder Asshed so &
rail stantion art and with & locker door lashed at une oottom; the
flag start acting 8.8 a tiller. This proved rairly effective and as
earried on Terrying troops until the tue nad surficient and 40 left
in tow or the EUG. when about 15 miles off Hamagate the GOW rope parted
and we completed this latter part of the voyage under our own power

Details

582
552
Report of Operation "DYNAMO" from 30th May to 5th Tune 1940.
30.5.1940. 2pm. Left Sheerness in charge of Motor Boat "Forty TWO"
and a convoy of nine craft bound for Ramsgate for orders. After about
2* nours steaming the leader of the second convoy, Lt.ges] on Dogra
"white Heather" requested me to take charge or nis convoy or nine
craft as White Heather" had broken down and was under GOW. Thereafter
proceeded with the full convoy of 18 craft and arrived OIL Hamsgate
about midnight. Proceeded ashore for orders and received same, which
were to carry on as soon as possible to Dunkirk beaches for the purpose
of ferrying troops to the larger ships at anohor. At Itam on the 51st
May left Ramsgate escorted by H.M. Trawler towing those craft wnion
were unable to proceed under their own power. After about 2 nours
steaming the trawler requested me to carry on with the convoy as the
craft ne nad in tow were causing him some trouble with their tow ropes.
I earried on with 14 crait and arrived or the Dunkirk beach as about
9am. Throughout the day British and French troops were ferried to
the various large vessels at anchor. Sometime during the night the
engines on "Forty Two" were giving trouble and as 1 had the opportunity
of a tow back to Ramsgate where 1 might expect repairs to be executed
and as few ships seemed to be left in our immediate vicinty for the
transferrence or troops 1 decided to return. Arrived off namagate early
on the 1st June and the engine Was overhauled that day and made 115
IOr further service. ne left again for Dunkirk in the early evening
and on arrival orr Dunkirk troops were again Ferried for some time.
unfortunately in manoeuvering close to the anor the craft either stuck
a submerged object or grounded and in the subsequent movements 01
engines and nelm the rudder was lost. 1 eventually managed to reach
up alongside a tug, transferred the troops 1 had on DOBIQ and onen
proceeded to 115 a jury rudder; consisting or at ladder issued to &
rail stantion art and with at locker door lashed at une oottom; the
flag stari acting 8.8 a tiller. This proved rairly effective and we
carried on ferrying troops until the tug nad surficient and we left
in tow or the tug. when about 15 miles off kamagate the GOW rope parted
and we completed this latter part or the voyage under our own power

Details

582
552
Report of Operation "DYNAMO" from 30th May to 5th June 1940.
30.5.1940. 2pm. Left Sheerness in charge of Motor Hoat "Forty Two"
and a convoy of nine craft bound for Ramsgate for orders. After about
2* nours steaming the leader of the second convoy, Lt.3eal on Dogra
"white Heather" requested me to take charge or nis convoy or nine
craft as White Heather" had broken down and was under GOW. Thereafter
proceeded with the full convoy of 18 craft and arrived OIL Mamagate
about midnight. Proceeded ashore for orders and received same, which
were to carry on as soon as possible to Dunkirk beaches for the purpose
of ferrying troops to the larger ships at anchor. At 2am on the jlst
May left Ramsgate escorted by H.M.Trawler towing those craft wnion
were unable to proceed under their own power. After about 2 nours
steaming the trawler requested me to carry on with the convoy as the
E.
craft ne nau in tow were causing him some trouble with their tow ropes.
I carried on with 14 crait and arrived or the Dunkirk beach at about
9am. Throughout the day British and French troops were ferrisa to
the various large vessels at anchor. Sometime during the night the
engines on "Forty Two" were giving trouble and as 1 nad the opportunity
of a tow back to Ramsgate where 1 might expect repairs 60 De executed
and as few ships seemed to be left in our immediate vicinty for the
transferrence or troops I decided to return. Arrived off Ramagate early
on the 1st June and the engine was overhauled that day and made 115
IOr further service. ne left again for Dunktrk in the early evening
and on arrival off Dunkirk troops were again ferried for some time.
unfortunately in manoeuvering close to the anor the crait either stuck
a submerged object or grounded and in the subsequent movements 01
engines and nelm the rudder was lost. 1 eventually managed to reach
up alongside at tug, transferred the troops 1 had on Doard and onen
proceeded to 118 a jury rudder; consisting or a ladder Aasned to &
rail stantion art and with of locker door lashed at une Dottom; the
flag start acting as a tiller. This proved rairly effective and we
carried on ferrying troops until the tug had sufficient and 40 left
in tow or the tug. when about 15 miles off Ramagate the GOW rope parted
and we completed this latter part or the voyage under our own power

Details

er
contd.
and steering and was with tola jury the rmudder. craft would Berthed in Ramsgate naroo
morning that with be repaired ,8,8 soon
I again left in the evening a War Dept Motor Boat arri
Dunkirk late evening and troops were again transfe
the larger ships. When this operation was completed at sb
2am a return was made to Ramsgate. On Tuesday the 4th Jun
ordered to return to sheerness, out a few minutes before
the Petty Officer on the Mermaiden" advised me he was nel
having an officer to navigate the vessel back to weymout
myseli to Commander ----- R.N. for this Job and was told
we left at 8pm that night and arrived and pertned at wey
the next day wednesday 5th June 1940.
Lee

Details

or
83
contd.
morning and steering and was with tola jury the rmudder. craft would Berthed in Ramsgate hardour
left that evening with be repaired 8.B soon as
I Dunkirk again late in the evening and a War Dept Motor Boat arrivi
When this troops were again transfer
the larger ships. operation was completed at sho
2am a return was made to Ramsgate. On Tuesday the 4th June
ordered to return to Sheerness, out a few minutes before 0
the Petty Officer on the" Mermaiden" advised me he was neld
having an officer to navigate the vessel back to weymouth,
myself to Commander ----- R.N. for this Job and was told 1
we left at 8pm that night and arrived and berthed at weym
the next day wednesday 5th June 1940.
LeaR

Details

or
contd.
and steering and was with told jury the rmudder. craft Berthed in Ramsgate har
morning left that would be repaired .8.8 8001
I again evening with a War Dept Motor Boat ar
Dunkirk late in the when evening and troops were again trans
the larger ships. this operation was completed at
2am 8. return was made to Ramsgate. On Tuesday the 4th J
ordered to return to Sheerness, out a few minutes befor
the Petty Officer on the Mermaiden" advised me he was n
having an officer to navigate the vessel back to weymou
myseli to Commander ----- R.N. for this Job and was tol
we left at 8pm that night and arrived and perthed at we
the next day wednesday 5th June 1940.
Lic

Details

$ 16
5
contd.
morning and steering and was with tola jury the rmudder. craft would Berthed in Ramsgate
I again left that evening with be repaired 8.8 harbour soon
Dunkirk late in the evening a War Dept Motor Boat 3.8 %
the larger ships. When and troops were again transferre arrivina
2am 8. return was made this operation was completed at
ordered to to Ramsgate. On Tuesday the 4th June shortly
the return to Sheerness, out a few minutes before
Petty Officer on the" 'Mermaiden" advised me he was held due
having an officer to navigate the vessel back to weymouth. up
myself to Commander ----- R.N. for this Job and was told to
we left at 8pm that night and arrived and berthed at weymouth
the next day wednesday 5th June 1940.
LuR.

Details

W.A.S. HORNE LDG. Si
R.F.R. B.1672
M.L. MERMAIDE
JUNE 13th 1940.
c/o HOTER E.)
WEYNOU
DUTY PERFORMED By M.L. "MERMAIDEN" Doks
AT EVACUATION OF DUNKIRK.
Lept Heyminth of 6.30P.M.St procession to .) we
& / & Maid RNR
555
am
Wed 29/5/40, went to Sharmes, There 30/5/40, of was put
kswain of a small open moha boat named Two Revers:
ith Ldg Sho Williams of Devenport RNB. Christian name 998 to
as
to (Christian name & off be not known) and molored
known) to drive the molor, and Sea horris RNRof Lowshoff
Lobs % Dunkish to help evacuate she Goldiers from the
ch, arriving at Dunkish early hows of Frid morning
beach East of Dunkirk piers a Heamship of decided mg
sharted to bring of Proops b HMS.Winchelsea. See on
prom
am work amships the under surf falls the which which be was were of presty her hanging as heavy 4 from gave of some logh her davits shelter one of
is
the
heligged as a boat rope made fast lo the S/s sterm
ach has get our boat out clear of he Gurf, bout
6
/
chelsea in she morning when going in from the
we out which If think was owing to the shock of
for load of Folders our engine
k
code around, we carried on in is the beach of
explosion of the bombs which were dropping
a
raded up with goldiers hauled out our boat be
other
4 boat cope regged to the Oftern of the steamship
who
gnabed to motor lannch which gave us her sofe
who
d howed us to the Winchelsea and continued lo low
going alonglide of Winchelsea with the last load
to and fro, all the daywill lake in the evening
6
eart ordered us she Crew of the: Two Rivers abound
m
Gless and could only drift about we Pharmeses were brought and
with the molor broke down and baking we were
ach h Dover and then went on to ready
ady to sahe another boat across if needed

Details

$ 10
r
83
contd.
morning and steering and was with tola jury the rmudder. craft Berthed in Ramsgate naro
I again left that evening with would be repaired ,8,B soon
Dunkirk late in the a War Dept Motor Boat
the larger ships. evening and troops were again transf arr
2am 8. return When this operation was completed at 8
ordered was made to Ramsgate. On Tuesday the 4th JU
to return to sheemess, out a few minutes before
the Petty Officer on the Mermaiden" advised me he was ne
having an officer to navigate the vessel back to weymout
myself
we lei
587
the ne
The crew behaved extrement well in d
duty carry ing on all she while under
continual air bombardment T machine
fire from shore bathery firing across H
to she finish and being web through the
noh stopping or having anything to eat f
all she croldiers had to be dragged a
had to wodde out in the surf up for
at himes to get to our boar. and with their
equipment on were helpless in she was
G.B Thomass Sea P.O.R.N.R

Details

601
566
led for Hun kish at 0 300 on heay 31ˢᵗ
8
th borough", their T slower process independently "Laty to me
pany with Q "No. meen's 101" Channel to & ordered Hoppers
anse of specds.
jallions Reach and Queenischamel assured at the
each 31ˢᵗ. to the East of Hem kisk Newbour at about osio
may
Twin to the effing like we could only take an board
gallions Reach eventually managed to get about
few tooops moring the forenoon and early efternoon.
official attached to the army.
one Belgian soldies and me French potal
123 French and British troops, including
at The Hoppers sailed independently from Huntrith
discretion various times rusing the evening at the
Hun of the Skippers tsailed from
wy
time kirk 3,st in и fallion's Reach at 2230 m
twas set considerably H my coutse in takin
Owing to enemy air attack during the night
Ramsjalie until about 0700 on time 11 in
avoiding action and tid not assure at
whence twas ordered to margate to disembark
troops.
MUSLINE - m just
clear general the suit, throw a proper line to the pulling boats
of then tow them out to the ships. One boat, heavily it
and laden in full equipment capsised just as
with men us. most of the men sank like stones treatment. but
we was reaching to recover one who reviewed after some
sunken the anchor and vain efferts by other boats, strong
While doing obstacle and rendered useless. the
managed this our screws became foul In of spite
suit of and ebbing tide soon drove as aground.

Details

CONFIDENTIAL 114
Report on Operation "DYNAMO".
8
Page 3. 11?
7. ENEMY EFFORTS TO FRUSTRATE OPERATION.
consisted
Attempts of the following:- by the enemy to frustrate the operation
(a) Minelaying by aircraft.
(b) Intensive air attack.
(c) Action by Motor Torpedo Boats.
(a) Gunfiro by coast artillery.
(e) Submarine operations.
(a) Minelaying hours by aircraft. Minelaying during the
and was probably commenced during the night 28th-29th, dark
following two nights. Not only were the Dunkirk the Roads
maintained with great intensity during
mined, including the Zuydecoote Pass, but also Route
x and the area round the Kwinte buoy. Folkestone
Dover Harbour entrances were also mined. Considering and
the number of mines laid, it is interesting to note
that only two British ships are known for certain to
have been mined, the personnel vessel MONA's QUEEN
and the F.A.A. Yacht GRIEVE. 1 Hospital Carrier was
damaged at anchor off Dover when a mine was blown up
by a LL. trawler sweeping close at hand. Two A/S
trawlers on patrol to the northward of the operational
area were blown up by what was at first thought to be
a M.T.B., but later evidence suggests they were
victims of moored mines. The impunity with which
degaussed ships were able to operate in this heavily
mined area alone made the operation possible and one
reaches the conclusion that if the enemy on this
occasion had had at hand the means of laying moored
contact mines by aircraft, instead of magnetic mines,
the results would have been very different.
(b) Air Attack. On the evening of the 29th, the first
occasion on which a massed target of ships was
presented in Dunkirk Harbour, the enemy seized the
opportunity for air attack in great strength, and it
was only by good fortune that the vital Dunkirk
Harbour channel was not blocked by sinking ships at
this early date. From then onwards the scale and
vigour of the air attack increased, and during the
1st June all ships in Dunkirk, off the beaches, or in
the approach channels, were subjected every two hours
to an unprecedented scale of air attack by aircraft
in such numbers, that the R.A.F. were unable to deal
with the situation. In this connection experience
appears to indicate that in simil ar circumstances
fighters must be present in such numbers that they
can simultaneously attack both enemy fighting and
bombing formations. Otherwise the enemy bombers
remain undisturbed to continue their bombing attacks.
The scale of enemy air attack on the 31st and
1st was primarily responsible for the suspension of
daylight evacuation from the 2nd June.
(c) Attack by M.T.B.s. These caused 4 casualties, namely, Route
two and two trawlers, while the north 26 miles
Y further was destroyers in use. the When south the westward, middle Route was brought X, some into though use
the to M.T.B. units failed to follow up, the the
continuous stream and the ships lying in Dunkirk Roads Commander. provi-
enemy of unescorted traffic during
ded dark a hours tempting target to any enterprising (a)/

Details

CONFIDENTIAL 116
Report on Operation "DYNAMO",
Page 5.
111
more so as the our outnumbered airmen was so
of the same evening, gallantry which of recounted the opposite story. The
obvious at the time, and was the admiration of all.
9.
No. 11 Group Fighter Patrols - Dunkirk area history.
Total flying
Enemy aircraft
Date. Patrols.
hours daily.
destroyed.
Enemy aircraft
driven down.
26/5
22
480
30
27/5
23
536
20
48
32
28/5
11
576
20
6
29/5
9
674
78
8
30/5
9
704
--
I
31/5
8
490
36
4
1/6
8
558
69
2/6
4
231
16
6
3/6
4
339
--
I
4/6
3
234
--
I
Total flying hours 4,822
Notes: (1) It will be observed that the number of patrols
decreased from 27th May onwards, whilst there was
an increase in the daily flying hours. This is
due to the fact that the fighters were employed in
increasingly bigger patrols as the enemy air
opposition increased.
(2) Operation Dynamo suffered most from enemy air
effort on 29/5 and on 1/6, after which latter date
the combination of enemy air attack and shore
artillery fire led to the suspension of the
operation by day.
10.
The position of enemy batteries had been located
by air reconnaissance by nightfall on 31st May, and
additional batteries in the Gravelines area on the Ist June.
Air bombardment of these batteries during the 1st and 2nd
June undoubtedly reduced their fire during dusk and dawn
on each of the nights 2/6 - 3/6 and 3/6 - 4/6, when seaborne
traffic was passing within range of the enemy batteries
commanding the south end of X Route, the Dunkirk Roads, and
Dunkirk Harbour. This was a valuable contribution by the
R.A.F. to the successful outcome of the operation. A
similar beneficial result was obtained by the bombing of the
batteries which had Dunkirk Pier and roadstead under fire.
11.
CONTROL OF ALLIED TROOPS.
In the earlier stages the large number of British
troops located in the dunes off the beach were of rear
formations with few officers. Command of these mixed units
was fact noticeable that Army by Officers' its absence, uniform aggravated, is indistinguishable no doubt, in by from the
that of other ranks. When Naval Officers appeared their
order in most cases was quickly restored,
to commands in a disciplined manner.
In the absence of any Army embarkation staff or organisation
a strong Naval party was required to form up and embark the
troops. Later, no difficulty was experienced when fighting/ troops of

Details

123
121
CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 2.
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
Monday, 27th May, 1940. (continued)
embarkation from beaches in the La Panne-Dunkirk area, as
such matters as crews, fuel and general organisation were
taken in hand. Five Personnel Vessels routed to start in day-
light completed the round trip during the 27th and lifted a
total of 3952. In addition 17 drifters of the Dover Command
sailed from Dover for the Malc beach, and during the night
X
lifted 2000 troops from the beach by ships' dinghies. During
the day destroyer patrols had been established to the North-
ward to cover the passage of merchant ships between Dunkirk
and the Downs, and the Admiralty asked Western Approaches to
reinforce the Dover destroyers.
6.
Commander-in-Chief, Nore, sailed 6 small skoots for
the South Downs to co-operate in Dunkirk, and sailed 4 skoots
loaded with Army stores direct to Dunkirk. In the evening
Naval Officer-in-Charge, Ramsgate, was asked to take over the
fuelling and despatching of all small power boats with the
attendant pulling boats forming the inshore flotilla. Some
unnecessary delays occurred at this stage as the majority of
the Naval Authorities and the Admiralty were directing the
small craft for Dunkirk to be routed to Dover, although the
Vice Admiral, Dover, had asked for the Downs to be their
destination. Once despatched by the Authorities no
communication with these vessels was possible until they
arrived at their destination, and so the requirements of
assembling these craft at the Downs or Ramsgate was in many
cases delayed by as much as 24 hours or more since during the
night misfortune befell many tows that came adrift due to
moderate weather or collisions and the business of rounding
them up could not be effected until daylight.
7. The Vice Admiral had intended to maintain a
destroyer at Dunkirk as a W/T link, but the S.N.O., on
arrival, decided that conditions at Dunkirk made this
impossible,
8. At 2025 the Vice Admiral, Dover, received a Most
Immediate message from the S.N.O., Dunkirk, who had just
reached his station, as follows: "Port consistently bombed
all day, and on fire. Embarkation possible only from beaches
East of harbour A.B.C.D. Send all ships and passenger ships
there to anchor. Am ordering WOLFHOUND to load there and sail
T.O.O. 2005/37". Meanwhile Vice Admiral, Lover, had asked
the Commender-in Chief, Nore, to send every available shallow
draught power boat, capable of ferrying from beaches to ships
lying off the beaches Eastward of Dunkirk, stocked with fuel
and provisions for two days; this move being made with a
view to saving time by cutting out the passage to, and
subsequent reorganisation, at Ramsgate, prior to proceeding
to the French Coast. It should be noted at this time
X
(2000/27) there were no pulling boats, cutters or whalers
immediately available for attendance on Power Boats. A
further signal: "Please send every available craft to beache
East of Dunkirk immediately. Evacuation tomorrow night is ir
problematicalTo01958/27 was received from S.N.O., Dunkirk.
Later that evening a roport WAS received from

Details

127
126
128
CONFIDENTIAL..
Page 7.
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
29/
Wednesday, 29th May (continued)
well as from Dunkirk harbour, both from the aspect of the
military situation and from the fact that Dunkirk was limited
by a bottle-neck, formed by the narrow gangway along the East
Pier to the points of embarkation. Furthermore, there was
every prospect of the weather improving and the surf reducing
as the tide rose. Nevertheless, an increased number of
H.M. ships was ordered to Dunkirk to augment the personnel
vessels, though it was feared that an accumulation of ships
alongside the East Pier at Dunkirk by day might well invite
intensive air attack,
Subsequently, this fear was fully to be justified.
25. Meantime, considerable anxiety was felt as to the
fate of the personnel vessels which had been despatched in a
steady stream to Dunkirk commencing the previous evening. The
first of these was due back at Dover about 0300, but by 0900
nothing had been sighted or reported. But at 0700, O.,
Dunkirk, had reported that the embarkation there was going on
at the rate of 2000 an hour, so it was presumed that the
transports had failed to enter the harbour during darkness,
had waited outside, and had commenced to enter in succession
at dawn. The necessity for continuous fighter protection in
view of the exposure of these unarmed ships while at Dunkirk
and during the dayligh passage through coastal waters, was
obvious, Constant touch was maintained with R.A.F. Commands
to obtain continuous fighter protection during the hours when
the Vice Admiral, Dover, estimated the largest concentration
of vessels would be present, it being realised that the R.A.F.
3
resources were not sufficient to provide continuous air cover, ed
and to dispense with full cover at less important periods.
26. At 0930 the belated return of the personnel vessels
from Dunkirk commenced, and proceeded steadily through the
day. In addition to the personnel vessels using Dunkirk the
Admiralty were informed of the necessity for X-lighters and
other self-propelled lighters to increase the facilities for
beach evacuation. A Medical Party was shipped in VERITY for
use on the beaches, and a Naval Medical Party was sent to
Dunkirk.
27. The considerable alarm as to the immediate safety
of the B.E.F. felt during the evening and early night of the
k
28th, which caused all available resources to be immediately
concentrated on the French Coast, eased during the 29th. But
e
emergency measures taken late on the 28th had an adverse
effect on the orderly organisation for evacuation so necessary
le
if effective measures were to be devised and put in force.
28. Meantime, in the early hours of the 29th, an un-
fortunate disaster occurred involving the loss or H.M.
destroyers WAKEFUL and GRAFTON, and the danlayer COMFORT.
WAKEFUL, after embarking troops at Bray, sailed for Dover at
2300/28 by the Zuydecoote Pass and North Channel. Approaching
the Kwinte Whistle Buo the speed of the ships was 20 knots,
and a zigzag of 40 degrees every 4 minutes was started. At
0045 two torpedo tracks were observed, one torpedo missed, the
other hit ship smidships. WAKEFUL broke in half and the two
portions sank in 15 secends, each remaining standing midship/ with the

Details

131
1?9
CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 9, 130
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
128
7/5
Wednesday, 29th May (continued).
route provided the passage between Calais Bell Buoy and
Dunkirk be made in darkness.
Route X passed some 26 miles to the South-westward of the
extreme N.E. point of the Northern Route Y, the locality in
which enemy M.T.B. attack threatened, and was shielded by the
French minefields in the Ruytingen and Dyck channels. It
appears that the enemy M.T.B. command failed to appreciate the
withdrawal of traffic to the S.W. and did not follow up.
In the evening it was reported that there was no congestion
anywhere on the coast, except at La Panne. The force at La
Panne was accordingly reinforced as ships became available.
30. An additional beach party of 7 officers and a number
of ratings under Captain J. Howson was sailed in SABRE at
1600 for Dunkirk, and Captain E. Bush, who had already visited
Dunkirk and was aware of the general conditions, was sent to
HEBE as S.N.O. afloat off the beaches. An M.T.B. was placed at
the disposal of the S.N.O. on the coast.
31. At about 1600 a heavy air attack commenced on the
East Mole Pier, Dunkirk harbour, mainly by dive bombing,
which lasted continuously for more than 2 hours. At the same
time, other air attacks took place on ships lying off Bray.
Attacks were renewed from time to time up till after 2000,
not only on Dunkirk, but on ships off Bray, in the Zuydecoote
Pass and those in the Southern end of x Route. These attacks
were to have a disastrous result on the evacuation arrangements
at Dunkirk. There were present alongside the inner side of
the Eastern Arm 2 destroyers GRENADE and JAGUAR, 3 Trawlers
ahead of the GRENADE and JAGUAR, 3 more trawlers ahead of them
with the CANTERBURY in the next berth, and a French destroyer
ahead of the CANTERBURY. Outside the harbour on the outside of
the Eastern Arm the Transport FENELLA was berthed opposite the
GRENADE and JAGUAR and the CRESTED EAGLE opposite the 6 trawlers.
In addition, the MALCOLM and VERITY were also in the harbour
but further inside. This presented a very good target and the
ships were soon hit and embarkation of troops ceased for the
time being. CANTERBURY, accompanied by JAGUAR, succeeded in
leaving harbour, but both were hit by bombs and damaged. Both
succeeded in reaching Dover, though JAGUAR had to be towed
part of the way and was subjected to many attacks on passage.
CANTERBURY reached harbour at 2115 and disembarked 1950 troops
but was sufficiently damaged to prevent her being used again
in these operations. To return to Dunkirk - FENELLA was lying
alongside on the outside of the pier, and was hit and sunk.
GRENADE and one of the trawlers on the East side were hit and
the trawler sank in the fairway. GRENADE sinking and on fire
had to be abandoned and appeared to be about to sink in the
fairway. A trawler was detailed to tow her clear. VERITY,
who witnessed this occurrence was continuously straddled by
bombs for 35 minutes. Passage all along the pier having
ceased, she cast off, and skirting the burning GRENADE and
trawler, proceeded out of harbour, grounding slightly on a
sunk drifter in the entrance. At about 1800 KING ORRY arrived
to find the harbour occupied only by burning and sinking ships, was
with no sign of any one on the pier nor any boat moving in thantly
harbour
uld
little
36

Details

138
CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 17." 136
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
31/5
Friday, 31st May.
51. The Admiralty informed the Vice Admiral that the
policy of H. M. Government was that both British and French
troops be given an equal opportunity of being evacuated in
British ships and boats.
52. Personnel ships had been sailed the previous evening
and throughout the night of the 30th/31st to provide for a
continuous flow into Dunkirk harbour. But at 0320 the S.N.O.
reported that once again the majority of these Personnel ships
had failed to enter the harbour during the dark hours. MALCOLM,
however, left Dunkirk with 1,200 troops at 0300, during heavy
shelling, on relief by IVANHOE. S.N.O. Dunkirk, however,
continued to call for more ships. No more destroyers were
available and there were no means of accelerating the arrival
of the vessels despatched there. By 0700 the Vice Admiral
had no news of the fate of the personnel ships that had sailed
the previous evening and during the night, None of these
ships had reached the U.K. to unload, and it appeared probable
that these ships may have concentrated in the narrow waters
close to Dunkirk, inviting a repetition of the heavy air
attacks with consequent damage and loss to transports which
had occurred on the two previous occasions when personnel
vessels, together with other ships, had been concentrated in
large numbers in the approaches to Dunkirk.
At this time there were no less than 9 personnel
vessels and 3 hospital carriers known to be on the round trip
U.K. - Dunkirk and back, and one other personnel vessel had
been ordered to sail during the night, but horwhereabouts was
unknown and it was feared that she had refused to sail.
In
addition, 3 other personnel vessels were under orders to sail
between 0900 and 1030. Pending the return of the ships en
passage, and while the coal-burners were being rebunkered, the
further sailing of personnel vessels was in suspense.
Note: Owing to the casualties to Personnel vessels at
this stage, coal burning cross channel steamers had to be
used for some of the trips and short endurance necessita-
ted coaling between trips which could not be done in the
vicinity of Dover, thus preventing a quick turn round.
53. During the night a considerable amount of enemy
minelaying activity by air was reported. Shelling was heavy
during the evening and night, and operations were greatly
hampered. Nevertheless, with the cessation of shelling at
about 0300, very good progress was made and by full dawn the
beaches were very nearly clear of troops. At 0530 attacks on
Dunkirk harbour and the beach from Dunkirk to Bray developed
more strength and the bombardment of Dunkirk continued.
Nevertheless, the S.N.O. reported that the embarkation there
was proceeding satisfactorily but stressed the need for more
ships and constant fighter protection. At this time French
troops began to appear at Dunkirk pier and on the beaches, and
were embarked with the British troops.
54. At 0600 VIMY sighted submarine off the N.W.
Goodwins/

Details

141
CONFIDENTIAL.
Page
20.
139
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
31/5
Friday, 31st May (continued).
effective quantities direct from the beaches, and to use the
special tows, ships lifeboats, power lifeboats and tugs, which
were on passage from Ramsgate, and which had been ear-marked
for lifting the final covering force.
In the afternoon, however, it was learned that the
Military plan had been changed, and that it was no longer
possible for the original covering position, as planned, to be
held by 4,000 troops who were then to withdraw to the beaches
for embarkation by boat. Instead, it was learned that the
Eastern-most Division was to be withdrawn Westward from the
La Panne area, and that the special flight of boats was to be
used to lift this force from the beaches. At the same time,
the troops in the Bray and Malo sectors were being thinned out
by movements Westward towards Dunkirk itself. This change of
plan involved concentrating the special tows and the mine-
sweepers - to which they were to transfer the troops - into
the stretch opposite the beach between Bray and one mile East
of La Panne, and also advancing the commencement of the
operation by one hour. The risk of this change of plan was
obvious as the boat tows were not in communication with the
Vice Admiral, and reliance had to be placed on the Minesweepers
to inform and see that the escorting M.A.S.B. would shepherd
the tows to the new positions. The minesweepers had anchored
so as to serve as guiding marks, as had been explained to the
Naval Officers in each tow.
Apart from the special tow, a very large number of
small power boats despatched, in most cases direct, from the
South East Ports, Newhaven to Sheerness, were arriving off the
beaches, and compensated in a large measure for the heavy
losses that had occurred amongst the original towing boats,
whalers, cutters, lifeboats and ships' boats, which had
31MM
occurred on the beaches during the preceding 3 days.
On the La Panne beaches after 1600 very good progress
was made. The piers of pontoons built by the Military the
previous day were extremely useful, and were largely respons-
ible for the rapid evacuation of troops. All the troops
that could be found were embarked by midnight and ferried off
to the ships. The local Beach-master (Captain R. Pim, R.N.V.R)
searched the adjacent beaches for stragglers at midnight, and
was informed by a Staff Officer that no more troops would
embark from the La Panne beaches, but would march to Dunkirk,
as it was anticipated that these beaches would be shelled and
probably be in German hands the following day. This, as it
turned out, was a correct forecast. The Beach-master
estimates that 5,000 men were lifted from the La Panne beaches
during the evening and up to midnight.
62. At 1920 all ships in the fleets were informed by
the Vice Admiral that the final evacuation of the B.E.F. was
expedted on the night lst/2nd June, and that the evacuation
of the French from Dunkirk and Malo beach would continue from
1st June by both British and French ships.
63/

Details

142
140
CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 21.
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
31/5
Friday, 31st May (continued).
63. General Lloyd informed the D.M.O. of the new plan,
stating that General Alexander had been placed in command of
the final phase of the evacuation. Composition of force not
known. Further, that it was impossible now to say how long
the French evacuation would take but that the Alexander force
would remain till the last. No firm information could be
obtained from the French as regards:-
(i) The number of French troops to be evacuated.
(ii) The nature and extent of French sea borne transport.
(iii) The French military plan for the defence of the
perimeter and the final withdrawal of French
troops.
64. General remarks: The main features of the day
were:-
(a) The increased enemy artillery activity on Dunkirk
and La Panne beach, and on the approach channels.
(b) The set-back to evacuation from the beaches that
occurred during the choppy weather of the forenoon,
followed by an excellent recovery inthe afternoon
and evening when large numbers were lifted from the
beaches.
(c) The change in the military plan as regards the
locality and time of lifting the final contingents
of the B.E.F.
It should be noted that in spite of (b) the rate
of embarkation had, in fact, come up to expectations, and if
other circumstances had permitted it would have been possible
to adhere to the original plan of lifting the final 4,000
B.E.F. off the beaches between 0130 and 0300 1st June.
65/

Details

143
CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 22
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events,
141
31/5
Friday 31st May (continued).
65. Casualties to H.M, Ships during 31st May,
M/S DEVONIA received damage from near miss bombs
whilst off La Panne. About 1600 ship was ordered to be beached.
At 0600 on the 1st, after having destroyed all useful
apparatus, and ammunition put overboard, ship was beached and
abandoned.
M/S HEBE, whilst off Dunkirk, was damaged by enemy
aircraft and returned under own power to Dover.
Destroyer EXPRESS. Damaged by enemy aircraft whilst
off Dunkirk.
Saturday 1st June.
66.
2 Hospital Carriers which had sailed the previous
1/6
evening returned shortly after dawn. Only one had succeeded
in entering Dunkirk Harbour, the other had laid off 4 hours
under heavy fire and returned to Dover. 4 personnel vessels
failed to enter Dunkirk during the night, but succeeded in the
early hours of the morning. One of these, the PRAGUE, was
bombed and severely damaged half-way across on the return
journey, but succeeded in making the Downs with the assistance
of tugs, where troops transferred to other ships particularly
A/S trawlers LADY PHILOMENE and OLVINA. The supply of person-
nel vessels was maintained throughout the day, not without a
series of setbacks caused by 3 ships refusing to sail and by
2 being turned back when on passage, by French Destroyers owing
to heavy bombing and shelling of the approaches to Dunkirk.
Of those that operated during the 24 hours, 1 was sunk, 2
damaged by bombs and shell-fire and 1 by collision.
67. During the middle watch it transpired that no further
troops were attempting to evacuate from La Panne off which
were stationed one paddle minesweeper, a fleet sweeper and two
destroyers, probably due to the heavy shelling from German
guns eastward, and later information was received that the
troops were marching from La Panne through Bray towards
Dunkirk. Accordingly, during the night the Rear Admiral,
Dover, instructed all small craft to move wast, with boats in
tow, towards Dunkirk, and the Vice Admiral directed all ships
under orders for La Panne to other positions further west,
concentrating the main effort on the beach immediately east
of Dunkirk.
To a request from Dunkirk for Hospital Ships, the
Vice Admiral replied at 0715 that the large ship berths
alongside at Dunkirk must be occupied by personnel ships and
the wounded that could conveniently be embarled should go with
personnel. This direction was in accordance with the Govern-
ment policy previously communicated to the Vice Admiral.
68. Soon after dawn enemy aircraft were active and
heavy bombing and machine gun attacks developed at 0500 over
the whole area from Dunkirk to La Panne. A second series of
attacks commenced at 0830 and lasted until 0900, during which
time nearly every ship off the coast was subjected to
intensive bombing and machine gunning, formations of 30 and 40
machines/

Details

145
34
CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 24'
143
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
1/6
Saturday, 1st June (continued).
71. As for personnel vessels, there was an increasing
unwillingness to sail, so steps were taken to place on board
each a Naval Lieutenant-Commander or Commander, with 10 seamen
acting as a moral stiffening, the officer acting as adviser
and persuader to the Master of the ship, and the seamen for
handling the wires and going alongside under fire. By this
means it was hoped not only to ensure the timely sailing of
these essential ships, but also to eliminate the many occasions
when these vessels had lingered outside Dunkirk harbour to
await a quiet opportunity to enter, or had failed to enter the
harbour at all.
72. Early in the forenoon a number of Senior Officers
were despatched from Dover in fast motor boats to round up all
stray motor boats in the Downs and along the routes, and
direct them back in the evening to the beach stretching 1½¹
miles eastward of Dunkirk, and a second large flight of tugs
with lifeboats was prepared at Ramsgate to send over for what
was hoped to be a final effort off the beach. In addition a
number of flotillas under Commodore Taylor and Captain Fraser
were reorganised for the night's effort.
73. General Alexander was informed at 0951 that on the
likely assumption that complete evacuation would be ordered
that night, the problem of transport made it essential to use
the beach adjacent to Dunkirk as well as the harbour facilities
and that the Vice Admiral was planning evacuation to start
at 2200.
74. At 1841 the following signal was received from
C.I.G.S. for the Senior Military Commander: "We do not order
any fixed moment for evacuation. You are to hold on as long
as possible in order that the maximum number of French and
British may be evacuated. Impossible from here to judge local
situation. In close co-operation with Admiral Abrial. You
must act in this matter on your own judgment."
75. S.N.O. Dunkirk, was informed that drifters and
other small craft would be sent into the inner harbour at
Dunkirk to take troops from the Felix Faure Quay, North Quay,
in the shipyard, and the quay in the new outer harbour.
76. The plan for the night provided for all minesweepers
including paddlers, skoots and all small craft, except certain
special flotillas especially organised, to go to the beach
stretching eastward 1/2 miles from Dunkirk. Dunkirk Harbour
was to be served by up to 7 personnel ships, 8 destroyers,
and the inner harbour 9 drifters and special power boats
organised from Ramsgate. The French vessels were to serve the
Quay in the new outer harbour and private small boats, the
Quay Felix Faure, and in addition about 100 French small beach
fishing craft and drifters for the beach immediately east of
Dunkirk. It was estimated that the British vessels could
lift about 17,000 between 2100/1 and 0300/2, probably in the
proportion/

Details

149
38
1.1%
148
146
CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 27
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
1/6
or
Saturday 1st June (continued).
and at 0815 was attacked by enemy aircraft. Ship was hit aft of
No.3 boiler room and put out of action. About 0945 another attack
took place but no hits were registered. A third attack took place
at about noon and the ship began to settle and the order to
abandon ship was given.
Destroyer KEITH attacked by enemy aircraft off Bray
r
severely hit and abandoned at anchor by No.8 buoy. Finally sank.
Harbour Defence Craft AMULREE sunk in collision by
VIMY at 0200.
2/6
Sunday, 2nd June.
80.
The arrangements to set in motion the night's evacua-
tion had proceeded smoothly as far as could be ascertained at
Dover. During the early hours, reports of sailings from Dunkirk
indicated that destroyers at least were doing well.
At about 0200, however, a signal was received from
LYDD, who was off the Dunkirk beach, as follows:-
"Brigadier tells me that C. in C. says it is essential that
rearguard B.E.F. embarks from the beaches east of Mole on
account of French congestion on Mole. Considerable number
British troops still on Mole. Military are expecting further
arrivals there. Rearguard expects to arrive at beach by 0230."
The Vice Admiral accordingly ordered all ships known to
y
be outside Dunkirk Harbour to endeavour to embark the rearguard
from the beach, remaining after 0300 if necessary. Owing to the
time in transit and coding it was feared that this signal would
reach few ships still on the coast, unless they had remained on
their own initiative after 0300, the previously ordered time of
withdrawal.
At 0200, authority was received from the Admiralty to
1
continue evacuation by destroyers from Dunkirk Harbour until
0700, transports to leave Dunkirk at 0300.
81. During the early hours there was considerable haze and
smoke off Dunkirk Harbour, Dunkirk East Beach, Dunkirk Roads and
the entrance therefrom to X Route. For this reason some of the
smaller vessels, including minesweepers, failed to make either
Dunkirk Harbour or Dunkirk East Beach, but on the whole it appears
Ly
that evacuation, both from the beach and from the harbour had
G
proceeded satisfactorily with the resources available.
Between 0200 and 0900, 6 personnel vessels reached
United Kingdom from Dunkirk Harbour with about 5,500 troops. 2
others had been turned back before reaching Dunkirk by 2 unknown
destroyers, and one had been in collision before reaching Dunkirk
and had to return.
82. Considerable doubt existed during the forenoon as to the
numbers remaining to be evacuated in Dunkirk. It was thought that
2,000, plus the 4,000 rearguard British troops, might well be
found in Dunkirk. The number of French troops remaining was in-
creasing from the 25,000 quoted the previous evening to figures
in the region of 50,000 to 60,000.
83. The Rear Admiral, Dover, arrived back from the coast
in a M.T.B. and during the forenoon a joint Naval and Military
conference was held to devise a plan for the forthcoming night's
evacuation. The fact that evacuation traffic was suspended in

Details

40
CONFIDENTIAL.
Page "30 151
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
149
3/6
Monday, 3rd June (continued).
that 4 ships were now alongside, that there were no French
troops. Reported again at 0115, "Plenty of ships cannot get
troops."
At 0312, Dunkirk reported that all ships were
leaving and that the block ships had entered.
When the ships returned to United Kingdom, it was
learnt that he flow of French troops had dwindled away shortly
after midnight. One ship waited 2-2 hours to embark her load
instead of the normal half hour. A possible explanation was
thought to be that a French counter attack, which had been
arranged for the afternoon of the 2nd, had had to be postponed
to the evening, no doubt deranging despatch of troops to the
rear for evacuation. The result was that between midnight
and 0300/3 a lifting capacity of about 10,000 was left empty
91. The night's embarkation at Dunkirk had been carried
out without disturbance by enemy action. During the forenoon
a conference was held at Dover to improve the arrangements for
the night 3/6 - 4/6 as a result of experience gained. The
general plan remained unaltered except that provision was made
for the use by British ships of the west pier in the New Outer
Port, since it appeared that the French had insufficient shi
at their disposal to make full use of this valuable berth.
Similarly a number of power boats which had been working off
the Malo Beach were, on this occasion, to be sent in to Quay
Felix Faure. No assurance could be obtained that this coming
night would terminate the operation and considerable anxiety
was felt regarding the effect of the gradual exhaustion of
officers and men of the ships taking part in the Dynamo. This
exhaustion was particularly marked in the Destroyer force
the remnants of which had been executing a series of round
trips without intermission for several days under navigation
considitions of extreme difficulty and in the face of
unparallelled air attack.
The Vice Admiral accordingly represented to the
Admiralty that the continuance of the demands made by
evacuation would subject a number of officers and men to test
which might be beyond the limit of human endurance, and
requesting that fresh forces should be used if evacuation had
to be continued after the coming night, with the acceptance
of any consequent delay.
92. The evacuation plan was communicated to Units
taking part at 1440 and was briefly as follows:-
Commence 2230/3, withdraw 0230/4. From East Pier evacuation
by Personnel Vessels, Destroyers and Paddle Minesweepers.
From West Pier, new outer port, by other Minesweepers,
Corvettes, Skoots and French vessels. Drifters and smaller
craft into the inner harbour, LOCUST remaining outside
entrance receiving loads ferried out by small boats. Tugsing
available outside entrance to assist ships in berthing is
in leaving.
lunteer
1
nt
the
channel with troops on board. It was acce
scided
to
inary/
have

Details

CONFIDENTIAL.
153
Page 32.
151
152
4/6
150
its
CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 31
it of
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
he
3/6
at
S
ed 33
h
Monday, 3rd June (continued).
d
93.
In the evening the Vice Admiral was informed by the
B.N.L.O. Marceau that it was estimated 30,000 French remained
and that the French Admiralty agree that evacuation should be
terminated that night if possible. Force used was to consist
of 9 Personnel Vessels with one in reserve, 9 Destroyers
(maximum number available), 4 Paddle Minesweepers, 7 Fleet
Minesweepers, 9 Drifters, LOCUST, 2 Corvettes, 4 French
Destroyers and a number of organised motor boat flotillas
including lifeboats from Ramsgate and Dover, together with a
large number of French and Belgian fishing vessels. The
lifting capacity of this force, if used to the full, was more
than 30,000, but it was certain that the facilities within
Dunkirk could not permit more than about 25,000 to be embarked
in the time available, and this number only if the French
troops moved with the greatest rapidity at all points of
embarkation. This point was impressed upon the French Liaison
Officers and a number of French officers and ratings added to
the augmented pier parties which were despatched to Dunkirk
at 2200 in advance of the evacuation force.
toots
94. The movements commenced according to plan. The
weather conditions at Dunkirk, although favourable as regards
ere
tide were adverse with a north easterly wind tending to blow
the
Personnel Vessels and Destroyers off the vital East Pier makin
berthing difficult. The MANXMAN, the seventh Personnel Ship
king
to
due to sail refused to sail, and her place was taken by the
theless,
ROYAL SOVEREIGN.
power
4/6
or
Tuesday, 4th June.
tretch
00/2/6.
95. At midnight when the earlier vessels had commenced
thin
the return voyage fog was reported in mid-channel and off the
cipally
Thanet coast and a number of ships had to anchor before
entering harbour. The EXPRESS and SHIKARI were the last ships llery the
to leave Dunkirk at 0318 and 0340 and carried approximately
1,000 troops and the British pier parties. Except for an air
attack on SHIKARI this final passage was made without inter-
e
ruption by the enemy and though the fog made navigation
r to
extremely difficult it undoubtedly served to shield the Armada
ne gun,
from enemy aircraft.
German
ceasing
96. When the count was taken later in the day it was
ements
ascertained that 27,000 troops had been evacuated as a result d as
of the night's operation and Admiral Nord agreed that the
operation should be considered as completed, observing that
all anmunition at Dunkirk had been expended and that the
olunteer
numbers left behind were small consisting principally of non-
combatant troops. This decision was agreed to by the French
1
Admiralty at 1100, and the operation Dynamo terminated by
Admiralty Message 1423/4.
97. It was realised that in all probability there might
be a number of open boats, barges, etc. tsmouth, bout in the
channel with troops on board. It was accr
scided
to
inary/
have

Details

CONFIDENTIAL.
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
Page 36 155
Inshore Flottllas and Naval Shore Parties (continued).
111. Locally, at oth Ramsgate and Dover a number of civi-
lian volunteers came forward to man the boats and to drive
their engines. These men did good work.
112. At both Ramsgate and Dover when the business of
manning these civilian power boats was set about the same
difficulties were experienced:-
(i) of obtaining drivers with knowledge of the very
varied types of internal combustion engines;
(ii) of making the engines of these boats run, most of
them having been laid up since the previous summer.
Throughout the operation all engines continued to
give trouble. Many engines were old and almost all were of
different types. Several boats could not be used as they had
diesel engines and no stokers or civilians trained in these
were available. Each engine, especially the older ones,
required careful nursing, and signs of distress from the
engines were not understood. These difficulties were partly
overcome by obtaining engine drivers from Chatham and by the
provision of cadet ratings, and Sub-Lieutenants, R.N.V.R.
from KING ALFRED who claimed knowledge of I.C. engines, but
many engines were of types unknown even to these.
These difficulties would never have arisen had the
civilian crews, or even their drivers, been willing to take
their boats across to Dunkirk.
113. Fresh water for the motor boats was difficult to
supply in sufficien quantity, owing to lack of water tanks
in most boats, especially those of the open type. Large
supplies were required as the troops were reported to be
suffering severely from thirst. Both at Ramsgate and Dover
the Base Staff provided as many galvanized iron cylinders and
tanks as could be found and made serviceable, and these
proved most satisfactory,
114. On two occasions skoots and small boats approaching
the coast were turned back through false information. On
the first occasion on the afternoon of 28th May, at least 6
skoots, who were without definite orders where to proceed,
encountered a returning skoot when about 10 miles off the
coast. This skoot stated that Dunkirk had already fallen into
German hands and that the evacuation had ceased. It is
believed that this report originated from an Army officer
embarked in the skoot. He had stated, consequent on the
capitulation of Belgian troops that the Germans would be
advancing along the coast that evening. As a result of this
ill-judged comment, the arrival of at least 6 skoots was
delayed at over 24 hours, until this situation had been clear-
ed up.
The second occasion occurred during the night of 1st
June and has been referred to in paragraph 76 of the
narrative. On this occasion although the services of a
number of small craft were lost to the coast, it transpired
that sufficient were already there to cope with the troops
available.
115./

Details

216
214
COPY.
SECRET.
c/o Admiralty,
Whitehall, S.W.1.
11th June, 1940.
GRENADE hithybomb
34
Sir,
May 29/1800 Sank
I have the honour to submit the following report
in accordance with your verbal instructions. The delay
has been occasioned by the difficulty in collecting the
necessary information from the Officers, some of whom
landed at Dover, some at Margate and some at Ramsgate.
During and just after the final attack so much was happening
at the same time that I have described firstly what
happened in the vicinity of the Bridge and what action I
took, and, secondly, what happened aft. As appendices
I have attached the report of the adventures of Mr. Crews,
Warrant Schoolmaster, after he had left the GRENADE and a
statement of the known damage done by the bombs.
2.
During the evening o? the 28th May I left
28/5 Dunkirque with over 900 troops for Dover; these troops
were disembarked without incident, and on the Forenoon of
29/5 the 29th of May I received orders from V.A. Dover to proceed
with all dispatch to Dunkirque, taking JAGUAR and GALLANT
with me. I was ordered to take route X to report if I
was subjected to shelling off !ravellines. No shelling
was experienced but all destrovers were subjected to a dive
bombing attack when close to the coast. GALLANT suffered
damage astern but as she did not appear to require assistance
I proceeded alongside the western side of the pier, berthing
JAGUAR outside me. A certain number of attacks were
experienced but no bombs came ery close to either ship.
GRENADE could not fire her guns owing to JAGUAR being on
her starboard side and the pier on her port side.
3.
JAGUAR was filled wi h troops and then proceeded,
being subsequently bombed and it whilst on passage. About
this time some bombs from a hi h level attack fell fairly
GRENADE
Dynams 319
213
ass
215
SUBJECT:
LOSS OF H.M.S. "GRENADE".
33
pm
FROM
THE CAPTAIN (D), FIRST DESTROYER FLOTILLA,
the
...
H.M.S. "CODRINGTON".
-
e
...
14th June, 1940.
NO. T.3.
DATE
GRENADF
ill
ibt
he
TO
THE VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER.
...
LE
The attached report from Commander Richard C Boyle,
Royal Navy, Commanding Officer of H.M.S. "GRENADE", is submitted
t
for your information.
BEAUMIRA
ly
As this is the only copy available in my office it is
rd
15 JUN 1940 requested 2. that it may be returned in due course.
*
ear
DOVER
GFSnom Guille.
CAPTAIN.

Details

216
214
COPY.
SECRET.
c/o Admiralty,
Whitehall, S.W.1.
11th June, 1940.
GRENADE hithybomb
34
Sir,
May 29/1800 Sank
I have the honour to submit the following report
in accordance with your verbal instructions. The delay
has been occasioned by the difficulty in collecting the
necessary information from the Officers, some of whom
landed at Dover, some at Margate and some at Ramsgate.
During and just after the final attack so much was happening
at the same time that I have described firstly what
happened in the vicinity of the Bridge and what action I
took, and, secondly, what happened aft. As appendices
I have attached the report of the adventures of Mr. Crews,
Warrant Schoolmaster, after he had left the GRENADE and a
statement of the known damage done by the bombs.
2.
During the evening o? the 28th May I left
28/5 Dunkirque with over 900 troops for Dover; these troops
were disembarked without incident, and on the Forenoon of
29/5 the 29th of May I received orders from V.A. Dover to proceed
with all dispatch to Dunkirque, taking JAGUAR and GALLANT
with me. I was ordered to take route X to report if I
was subjected to shelling off !ravellines. No shelling
was experienced but all destrovers were subjected to a dive
bombing attack when close to the coast. GALLANT suffered
damage astern but as she did not appear to require assistance
I proceeded alongside the western side of the pier, berthing
JAGUAR outside me. A certain number of attacks were
experienced but no bombs came ery close to either ship.
GRENADE could not fire her guns owing to JAGUAR being on
her starboard side and the pier on her port side.
3.
JAGUAR was filled wi in troops and then proceeded,
being subsequently bombed and it whilst on passage. About
this time some bombs from a hi gh level attack fell fairly
close to GRENADE but did no damage. No troops were put
into GRENADE as the S.N.O. stated that he wished a
destroyer to remain alongside. A transport ahead of
GRENADE left and this position was taken by 6 trawlers.
Acting on the instructions of the S.N.O. I order a V class
destroyer whose name I have fo 'gotten to proceed alongside
ahead of these trawlers.
29/5
4.
At about 15.00 the f rst deliberate attack on
GRENADE commenced; two bombs Cell about 20 - 25 yards from
the Starboard Bow, killing one and wouding one rating on
the Forecastle, damaging A-gun and woundingone rating on the
Searchlight Platform. Some ratings in the trawlers ahead
of GRENADE and one in the CRES ED EAGLE on the other side
le
of the pier were killed. I atched these bombs fall until
they were about 50 feet from the water and there is no doubt
that they were released simultaneously, as was, I think, the
case 0. the bombs which hit GR SNADE at 1800.
h
5.
At about 17.50 12 enemy aircraft circled over the
end of the pier and the second deliberate attack on
GRENADE commenced. Two planes commenced a dive bombing
attack and a number of bombs dropped. I have found it
bomb
difficult to discover exactly where GRENADE was hit, but I
am of the opinion that two bombs were dropped simultaneously
as in the earlier raid, No. 1 Talling close to the Starboard
Side between A & B guns, making ahole in the side, causing
a fire at the after end of the Fore Mess Deck and sinking
a trawler just ahead of GRENADE; No. 2 hitting the ship near
the Sick Bay, penetrating nearly to the bottom of the ship
before exploding.

Details

216
214
COPY.
SECRET.
c/o Admiralty,
Whitehall, S.W.1.
11th June, 1940.
GRENADE hithybomb
34
Sir,
May 29/1800 Sank
I have the honour to submit the following report
in accordance with your verbal instructions. The delay
has been occasioned by the difficulty in collecting the
necessary information from the Officers, some of whom
landed at Dover, some at Margate and some at Ramsgate.
During and just after the final attack so much was happening
at the same time that I have described firstly what
happened in the vicinity of the Bridge and what action I
took, and, secondly, what happened aft. As appendices
I have attached the report of the adventures of Mr. Crews,
Warrant Schoolmaster, after he had left the GRENADE and a
statement of the known damage done by the bombs.
2.
During the evening of the 28th May I left
28/5 Dunkirque with over 900 troops for Dover; these troops
were disembarked without incident, and on the Forenoon of
29/5 the 29th of May I received orders from V.A. Dover to proceed
with all dispatch to Dunkirque, taking JAGUAR and GALLANT
with me. I was ordered to take route X to report 1f I
was subjected to shelling off !ravellines. No shelling
was experienced but all destro ers were subjected to a dive
bombing attack when close to the coast. GALLANT suffered
damage astern but as she did not appear to require assistance
I proceeded alongside the western side of the pier, berthing
JAGUAR outside me. A certain number of attacks were
experienced but no bombs came ery close to either ship.
GRENADE could not fire her guns owing to JAGUAR being on
her starboard side and the pier on her port side.
3.
JAGUAR was filled wi in troops and then proceeded,
being subsequently bombed and it whilst on passage. About
this time some bombs from a high level attack fell fairly
close to GRENADE but did no damage. No troops were put
into GRENADE as the S.N.O. stated that he wished a
destroyer to remain alongside. A transport ahead of
GRENADE left and this position was taken by 6 trawlers.
Acting on the instructions of the S.N.O. I order a V - class
destroyer whose name I have fo gotten to proceed alongside
ahead of these trawlers.
29/5
4.
At about 15.00 the first deliberate attack on
GRENADE commenced; two bombs 'ell about 20 - 25 yards from
the Starboard Bow, killing one and wouding one rating on
the Forecastle, damaging A-gun and woundingone rating on the
Searchlight Platform. Some ratings in the trawlers ahead
of GRENADE and one in the CRES EAGLE on the other side
e
of the pier were killed. I atched these bombs fall until
they were about 50 feet from the water and there is no doubt
that they were released simultaneously, as was, I think, the
case of the bombs which hit GR SNADE at 1800.
5.
At about 17.50 12 enomy aircraft circled over the
end of the pier and the second deliberate attack on
GRENADE commenced. Two planes commenced a dive bombing
attack and a number of bombs were dropped. I have found it
bomb
difficult to discover exactly here GRENADE was hit, but I
am of the opinion that two bombs were dropped simultaneously
as in the earlier raid, No. 1 falling close to the Starboard
Side between A & B guns, making ahole in the side, causing
a fire at the after end of the Fore Mess Deck and sinking
a trawler just ahead of GRENADH; No. 2 hitting the ship near
the Sick Bay, penetrating nearly to the bottom of the ship
before exploding.

Details

260
2
Royal Naval Hospital,
Cha tham.
Dynamo 251,
B14/0/1276
263
6th
June,
1940.
259
H.M.S. GRIVE - REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS. 262
to GRIVE
(Report from Sub Lt. J.K.B. Miles, R.N.V.R.,
dated 6th June, 1940.)
the movements of
1 The Hon. L.J.O. Lambart
bn
II.
5m Portsmouth on Wednesday
to notify the changes in
80
and which may possibly
y in compiling CR ualty list
No. 0221/80.
ers to proceed from
VICE ADMIRAL, DOVER.
5-40) S/Lt. F.B. Hobson
seen the Medical Officer
Forwarded. It is suggested that
e of which he was
recommendations for awards to officers should
meantime Captain Lambert
be made on the contents of this letter, and
Lee-on-Solent as an
after further reference to Sub Lieut. Miles
operations and he joined
as regards ratings. I would like to add
that Captain the Hon. Lionel Lambart was 67
years of age and was one of the happiest men
th at 1530 on the
in England when he came to say goodbye before
2400 awaiting further
sailing for Dover.
re at 0800 30th and
mander-in-Chief Dover,
the evening tide at
Hames
00 and we proceeded
Portsmouth.
ach with our two whalers
10th June, 1940.
Admiral.
ed however that for the
d carry this method was
CADMIRAL
VE" remained about two
ver A.M. 31st with
n air raid on the town
13JUN 1940
but the beach remained
SV-R
attack at the Eastern
guns.
at 1400 31st, "GRIVE
bout 2000, and took O
psoy 400 troops Irom the Jetty, more might have been
e 2891 but there was a very severe air raid and as the
This were three abreast at the jetty Captain Lambart
theade 1 to withdraw and reduce the target. This air maid
BMS'S med out to sea and just after clearing the harbour
1th0 uconfidentally thought that "GRIVE'S" after 12 pounder
£8006 for an enemy machine. Returning to Dover by
Heanr 6. June, "GRIVE" landed her troops, and although having
ounds of ammunition per gun, set out again at 0300.
IBB-0 moon
a NORBE. Joproaching Dunkirk about 0800 "GRIVE" proceeded in
spett to a signal to the assistance of H.M.S. "IVANHOE",
gruer Accourival found another vessel alongside already. I
EBHI SETho armanted to Captain Lambart that I could see a group
contien anrine owne on the jetty and he accordingly proceeded alongside
ca Bk them off undergoing very heavy bombing attacks
in De Domenthe babunately left us unharmed although one salvo dropped
Lunde the jetty while we were on the inside. We
mcvoe.dh edot missenrom the harbour and proceeded to sea, a tremendous
was proceeding all this time.
and
[over

Details

260
2
Royal Naval Hospital,
Chatham
263
6th June, 1940.
The Commander-in-Chief,
H.M. Ships & Vessels.
Portsmouth.
to GRIVE
Sir,
I have the honour to report the movements of
H.M.S. "GRIVE", commanded by Captain The Hon. L.J.O. Lambart
g
D.S.O., R.N., from her departure from Portsmouth on Wednesday
29th May, 1940, and also especially to notify the changes in
officer personnel which took place and which may possibly
have caused confusion or uncertainty in compiling CA ualty list
At the time of receiving orders to proceed from
Portsmouth to Dover (i.e. 1300. 29-5-40) S/Lt. F.B. Hobson
R.N.V.R. was unwell and had already seen the Medical Officer
at R.N.B. Portsmouth, in consequence of which he was
immediately put ashore, but in the meantime Captain Lambert
had obtained Lt. Branwell R.N. from Lee-on-Solent as an
additional officer for the pending operations and he joined
the ship just before sailing.
H.M.S. "GRIVE" left Portsmouth at 1530 on the
29/5 29th May and anchored off Dover at 2400 awaiting further
orders. Captain Lambart went ashore at 0800 30th and
after receiving orders from the Commander-in-Chief Dover,
decided to sail at 1400 and utilise the evening tide at
Dunkirk.
30/5
Dunkirk was reached about 1900 and we proceeded
to take off troops from the East beach with our two whalers
and two motor boats, it was evidenced however that for the
number of troops which "GRIVE" could carry this method was
not an economic proposition. "GRIVE" remained about two
and a half hours and returned to Dover A.M. 31st with
just under 300 troops. There was an air raid on the town
during the period of "GRIVE'S" stay but the beach remained
untouched except for some artillery attack at the Eastern
end, directed I think, against A.A. guns.
Setting out again from Dover at 1400 31st, "GRIVE"
31/5
this time entered Dunkirk Harbour about 2000, and took O
nearly 400 troops from the jetty, more might have been
taken, but there was a very severe air raid and as the
ships were three abreast at the jetty Captain Lambart
decided to withdraw and reduce the target. This air maid
continued out to sea and just after clearing the harbour
it was confidentally thought that "GRIVE'S" after 12 pounder
accounted for an enemy machine. Returning to Dover by
0100 lst June, "GRIVE" landed her troops, and although havin,
8
only 5 rounds of ammunition per gun, set out again at 0300.
1/6
Approaching Dunkirk about 0800 "GRIVE" proceeded "IVANHOE" in
to a signal to the assistance of H.M.S. I
but response arrival found another vessel alongside already.
of on the jetty and he accordingly proceeded attacks alongsidle
then on reported to Captain Lambart that I could see a group
troops them off undergoing very heavy bombing
and which we fortunately took left us unharmed although one salvo dropped lle
withdrew just from the harbour and proceeded to sea, a tremendouss
outside the jetty while we were on the inside.
ned
air battle was proceeding all this time.
[over

Details

262
Royal Naval Hospital,
265
Chatham.
6th June, 1940.
The Commander-in-Chief,
H.M.Ships & Vessels.
GRIVE
Portsmouth.
Sir,
83
I have the honour to report the movements of
H.M.S. "GRIVE", commanded by Captain The Hon. L.J.O.Lambart
D.S.O., R.N., from her departure from Portsmouth on Wednesday
29th May, 1940, and also especially to notify the changes in
officer personnel which took place and which may possibly
have caused confusion or uncertainty in compiling casualty lists.
At the time of receiving orders to proceed from
Portsmouth to Dover (i.e. 1300. 29-5-40) S/Lt. F.B.Hobson
R.N.V.R. was unwell and had already seen the Medical Officer
at R.N.B. Portsmouth, in consequence of which he was
immediately put ashore, but in the meantime Captain Lambert
had obtained Lt. Branwell R.N. from Lee-on-Solent as an
additional officer for the pending operations and he joined
the ship just before sailing.
H.M.S. "GRIVE" left Portsmouth at 1530 on the
29th May and anchored off Dover at 2400 awaiting further
orders. Captain Lambart went ashore at 0800 30th and
after receiving orders from the Commander-in-Chief Dover,
decided to sail at 1400 and utilise the evening tide at
Dunkirk.
Dunkirk was reached about 1900 and we proceeded
to take off troops from the East beach with our two whalers
and two motor boats, it was evidenced however that for the
number of troops which "GRIVE" could carry this method was
not an economic proposition. "GRIVE" remained about two
and a half hours and returned to Dover A.M. 31st with
just under 300 troops. There was an air raid on the town
during the period of "GRIVE'S" stay but the beach remained
untouched except for some artillery attack at the Eastern
end, directed I think, against A.A. guns.
Setting out again from Dover at 1400 31st, "GRIVE"
this time entered Dunkirk Harbour about 2000, and took off
nearly 400 troops from the jetty, more might have been
taken, but there was very severe air raid and as the
ships were three abrenst at the jetty Cantain Lambart
decided to withdraw and reduce the target. This air maid
continued out to sea and just after clearing the harbour
it was confidentally thought that "GRIVE'S" after 12 pounder
accounted for an enemy machine. Returning to Dover by
0100 1st June, "GRIVE" landed her troops, and although having
only 5 rounds of ammunition per gun, set out again at 0300.
response to a signal to the assistance of H.M.S. "IVANHOE", I
Approaching Dunkirk about 0800 "GRIVE" proceeded in
but arrival found another vessel alongside already.
of on the jetty and he accordingly proceeded attacks alongside
then on reported to Captain Lambart that I could see a group
and troops took them off undergoing very heavy bombing
just outside the jetty while we were on the inside.
hich we fortunately left us unharmed although one salvo We dropped
withdrew from the harbour and proceeded to sea, a tremendous
air battle was proceeding all this time.
[over

Details

Royal Noval Hospital Chatham 267
June 6" 1940.
The Commander in Chief
264
H.M. Ships of Vessels.
GRIVE
Portsmouth
original
95
Su
I have the honour to report the movements of
H.M.S. grive commanded by Captain the Hon
L.J.O. Lambart D.S.O. R.N., from her departure
from Partsmouth on Wednesday 29th Way 1940,
o also especially to notify the changes m
officer personnel which took place D which may
possibly have caused confision or uncertainty
in compiling casualty lists.
at the time of receiving orders to proceed from
Portsmouth to Dover (ie. 1300 29-5-40) S/Lt
F.B. Hobson R.N.U.R. was unwell D had already
seen the medical officer at R.N.B. Partsmouth,
in consequence of which he was immediately
put ashore, but in the meantime Capt. hambart
had obtained ht Branwell R.N. from Lee-on-Solent
as an additional officer for the pending
operations 0 he joined the ship just before
sailing H.M.S. grive left Partsmouth at 1530 m the
29th may 0 anchored off Dover at 2400
awaiting further orders. Capt. Lambart went
ashore at 0800 30th Q after receiving orders
from the commander in chief Dover, decided
to sail at 1400 of utilise the evening tide at
Dunkisk
Dun kish was reached about 1900 I we proceeded
[over

Details

8
300
KEITH'S I learnt boats he sent in, but Gort was not in 207 and
No one his staff: heavy air attack trips necessary time.
to bring off was in HEBE already. Three first boat
(21)
ships and was hit, though narrow escapes. Many during this on
increase beaches; HEBE shot down a Heinkel. attacks
(19)
of shell fire off Braye, where CLAN Great
was and a valuable decoy: she was hit and bombed MACALLISTER several times
blindly into this area, as shells fell near CLAN MACALLIS-
started burning again. Enemy guns seemed to be firing
TER but not among ships loading which were some inshore
of her. Later, these ships did come under fire, way and
VIVACIOUS was hit twice and had 11 casualties - 2-300
troops on board. Ordered her to go into Dunkerque and
fill up there.
Lees was Senior Staff Officer of H. Q. Staff, and I thought
it would be a good education for him to see something of
what the naval problem was, so I kept him on the bridge
with me. As Gort was in HEBE I felt he was safe, and as
HEBE was doing good work embarking troops I did not send
her back to Dover with him at once. Therein, perhaps, I
was wrong, as I had not realized the anxiety of Government
to have him safe and sound at home, but felt he would
1st
sooner the ship helped to bring off more men than he should
land a few hours earlier in England.
During the day made signal to all ships with instructions
for supporting fire against enemy tanks and lorries on the
beach. Critical place likely to be at La Panne after the
line was evacuated; intended to be there myself in KEITH
at daybreak next morning. Also kept BASILISK free of
(22) troops for same purpose.
1700
Weather improved gradually. Signal = "Weather off beaches
now good: many more boats should come into use again as
tide rises. General movement of troops westward towards
Dunkerque. No petrol supply yet and many boats getting
short off La Panne and Braye. Movement from Dunkerque
continues. Great air activity. "
1815
Drifters with petrol arrived.
After embarking H. Q. Staff I returned to Dunkerque and
found Wynne-Edwards had been doing good work. Saw for the
first time that strange procession of craft of all kinds
that has become famous - small motor yachts, motor launches
drifters, Dutch schuyts, Thames barges, fishing boats,
pleasure steamers, tugs towing dinghies, lifeboats and all
manner of pulling boats.
(20)
As tows of boats appeared they were told to which beach be
they should go; particularly anxious there should
sufficient at La Panne which was farthest off. Directed 10
miles up the coast; and as light was beginning the remaining to fail,
several tows to go on to La Panne, telling them it was
Motor I left and Wynne-Edwards went on up to in La a MA/SB Panne myself. to direct Off Panne Braye were I saw
tows I had feared - that tows ordered to La
stopping what at Braye: got there just in farther time to on. warn
CODRINGTON (off Braye) to send them
out to Lees how easy it was to talk about ten-mile distribu-
Pointed boats and craft at certain places along different a
ting of coast, but that it was a very craft which thing
stretch it done in practice, in the dark, by to help
to get not been there before and with no lights the first place them. they
had inevitable tendency was to stop assembled. at
The where other craft were
In the (on a his return to me at about off was La Panne.
came to end pretty fair distribution was 2230) made, and able Wynne- to
Edwards report that it was there this were evening a number that of I boats saw 2 would transports be bombed. go into
Dunkerque and out was just as it was getting from dark, that direction.
I think very nervous that they and shortly
They moved heard very heavy bombing aircraft attacking off
Actually, afterwards bombing was from our NOW own dark and I remained
batteries La Panne in down company the coast. with HEBE and several other Stayed ships.

Details

328
325
- or
31/5
As the town of boats appeared they were told to which beach they should go,
and I was particularly anxious that there should be sufficient at La Panno
which was farthest off. I directed several town to 80 on to In Penno, tolling
them it was ten miles up the coast, and shortly after, as the light WDD
failing, I decided to leave Wynne-Edwards in an M.A.S.B. to direct the remaining
town and go Q11 up to La Panne myself. are Braye I saw what I had fourd, that
the tows I had ordered to La Panne were stopping at Braye and I arrived there
just in time to warn "CODRINGTON," who was off Braye, to send them on. further.
I had General Lees on the bridge and I remember pointing out to him how easy
Z
it was to talk about distributing boats and craft at certain places along a
ten mile stretch of coast, but that it was a very different thing to get it
done in practice, In the dark, by craft which had not been there before and
with no lights to help them. The inovitable tendency was to stop at the first
place they came to where other craft were assombled.
However, in the end a protty fair distribution vas made and Wynno-
Edwards, when he returned to me at about 2230, was able to tell no that there
were a number of boats off LQ Panne.
It must have been on this evening that I saw two Transports go into
Dunkirk and I was very nervous that they would be bombed. Just as it was
getting dark they moved out and shortly after there came the sounds of Very
heavy bombing from that direction. I felt sick SC I thought that these two
ships were being attacked, but I learnt later that 10 was not so, and this
bombing, I think, was from our own aircraft attacking battorios down the posst.
It was now dark and I remained off La Panne in company with and
Hebe
several other ships.
Once it was dark I ase not feel that much could be done by moving about,
so I stayed off LA Panne during the night. I waited there wordoring how things
were going. Everything was Back, ships and boats end shore showed no lights
though I had asked for a light to be shown ssaward to guide boats inchore. So
far as I know the rearguard was falling back and 1t was a question whother to
could got off before the Germans found out and could follow up. Shelling was
continuous and by the sound some shells were falling among the ships at the
anchorage. what nows I had was conflicting - a message from shore to Day that

Details

CONFIDENTIAL
Report on Operation "DYNAMO"
Page 3.
7. ENEMY EFFORTS TO FRUSTRATE OPERATION.
Attempts by the enemy to frustrate the operation
consisted of the following:-
(a) Minelaying by aircraft.
(b) Intensive air attack.
(c) Action by Motor Torpedo Boats.
(a) Gunfire by coast artillery.
(e) Submarine operations.
(a) Minelaying by aircraft. Minelaying during the dark
hours probably commenced during the night 28th-29th,
and was maintained with great intensity during the
following two nights. Not only were the Dunkirk Roads
mined, including the Zuydecoote Pass, but also Route
X and the area round the Kwinte buoy. Folkestone and
Dover Harbour entrances were also mined. Considering
the number of mines laid, it is interesting to note
that only two British ships are known for certain to
have been mined, the personnel vessel MONA's QUEEN
and the F.A.A. Yacht GRIEVE. 1 Hospital Carrier was
damaged at anchor off Dover when a mine was blown up
by a LL. trawler sweeping close at hand. Two A/S
trawlers on patrol to the northward of the operational
area were blown up by what was at first thought to be
a M.T.B., but later evidence suggests they were
victims of moored mines. The impunity with which
degaussed ships were able to operate in this heavily
mined area alone made the operation possible and one
reaches the conclusion that if the enemy on this
occasion had had at hand the means of laying moored
contact mines by aircraft, instead of magnetic mines,
the results would have been very different.
(b) Air Attack. On the evening of the 29th, the first
occasion on which a massed target of ships was
presented in Dunkirk Harbour, the enemy seized the
opportunity for air attack in great strength, and it
was only by good fortune that the vital Dunkirk
Harbour channel was not blocked by sinking ships at
this early date. From then onwards the scale and
vigour of the air attack increased, and during the
1st June all ships in Dunkirk, off the beaches, or in
the approach channels, were subjected every two hours
to an unprecedented scale of air attack by aircraft
in such numbers, that the R.A.F. were unable to deal
with the situation. In this connection experience
appears to indicate that in similar circumstances
fighters must be present in such numbers that they
can simultaneously attack both enemy fighting and
bombing forma ons. Otherwise the enemy bombers
remain undisturbed to continue their bombing attacks.
The scale of enemy air attack on the 31st and
1st was primarily responsible for the suspension of
daylight evacuation from the 2nd June.
(c) Attack by M.T.B.s. These caused 4 casualties, namely,
two dostroyers and two trawlers, while the north Route
Y was in use, When the middle Route x, some 26 miles
further to the south westward, was brought into use
the enemy M.T.B. units failed to follow up, though the
continuous stream of unescorted traffic during the
dark hours and the ships lying in Dunkirk Roads provi-
ded a tempting target to any enterprising Commander.
(a)/

Details

CONFIDENTIAL
Report on OPeration "DERTAMO".
Page 5.
of the same evening, which recounted the opposite story. The
more so as the gallantry of our outnumbered airmen was so
obvious at the time, and was the admiration of all.
9.
No. 11 Group Fighter Patrols Dunkirk area history.
Total flying
Enemy aircraft
Enemy aircraft
Date. Patrols.
hours daily.
destroyed.
driven down.
26/5
22
480
30
20
27/5
23
536
48
32
28/5
11
576
20
6
29/5
9
674
78
8
30/5
9
704
:
--
31/5
8
490
36
4
1/6
8
558
69
I
2/6
4
231
16
6
3/6
4
339
I
I
4/6
3
234
--
-
Total flying hours 4,822
Notes: (1) It will be observed that the number of patrols
decreased from 27th May onwards, whilst there was
an increase in the daily flying hours. This is
due to the fact that the fighters were employed in
increasingly bigger patrols as the enemy air
opposition increased.
(2) Operation Dynamo suffered most from enemy air
effort on 29/5 and on 1/6, after which latter date
the combination of enemy air attack and shore
artillery fire led to the suspension of the
operation by day.
10.
The position of enemy batteries had been located
by air reconnaissance by nightfall on 31st May, and
additional batteries in the Gravelines area on the 1st June.
Air bombardment of these batteries during the 1st and 2nd
June undoubtedly reduced their fire during dusk and dawn
on each of the nights 2/6 - 3/6 and 3/6 - 4/6, when seaborne
traffic was passing within range of the enemy batteries
commanding the south end of X Route, the Dunkirk Roads, and
Dunkirk Harbour. This was a valuable contribution by the
R.A.F. to the successful outcome of the operation. A
similar beneficial result was obtained by the bombing of the
batteries which had Dunkirk Pier and roadstead under fire.
11.
CONTROL OF ALLIED TROOPS.
In the earlier stages the large number of British
troops located in the dunes off the beach were of rear
formations with few officers. Command of these mixed units
was noticeable by its absence, aggravated, no doubt, by the
fact that Army Officers' uniform is indistinguishable from
that of other ranks. When Naval Officers appeared in their
unmistakable uniform, order in most cases was quickly restored,
the troops responding to commands in a disciplined manner.
In the absence of any Army embarkation staff or organisation
a strong Naval party. was required to form up and embark the
troops. Later, no difficulty was experienced when troops of
fighting/

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CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 2.
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
Monday, 27th May, 1940. (continued)
embarkation from beaches in the La Panne-Dunkirk area, as
such matters as crews, fuel and general organisation were
taken in hand. Five Personnel Vessels routed to start in day-
light completed the round trip during the 27th and lifted a
total of 3952. In addition 17 drifters of the Dover Command
sailed from Dover for the Malc beach, and during the night
lifted 2000 troops from the beach by ships' dinghies. During
the day destroyer patrols had been established to the North-
ward to cover the passage of merchant ships between Dunkirk
and the Downs, and the Admiralty asked Western Approaches to
reinforce the Dover destroyers.
6.
Commander-in-Chief, Nore, sailed 6 small skoots for
the South Downs to CO operate in Dunkirk, and sailed 4 skoots
loaded with Army stores direct to Dunkirk, In the evening
Naval Officer-in-Charge, Ramsgate, was asked to take over the
fuelling and despatching of all small power boats with the
attendant pulling boats forming the inshore flotilla. Some
unnecessary delays occurred at this stage as the majority of
the Naval Authorities and the Admiralty were directing the
small craft for Dunkirk to be routed to Dover, although the
Vice Admiral, Dover, had asked for the Downs to be their
destination. Once despatched by the Authorities no
communication with these vessels was possible until they
arrived at their destination, and so the requirements of
assembling these craft at the Downs or Ramsgate was in many
cases delayed by as much as 24 hours or more since during the
night misfortune befell many tows that came adrift due to
moderate weather or collisions and the business of rounding
them up could not be effected until daylight,
7. The Vice Admiral had intended to maintain a
destroyer at Dunkirk as a W/T link, but the S.N.O., on
arrival, decided that conditions at Dunkirk made this
impossible.
8. At 2025 the Vice Admiral, Dover, received a Most
Immediate message from the S.N.O., Dunkirk, who had just
reached his station, as follows: "Port consistently bombed
all day, and on fire. Embarkation possible only from beaches
East of harbour A.B.C.D. Send all ships and passenger ships
there to anchor. Am ordering WOLFHOUND to load there and sail.
T.O.O. 2005/27". Me while Vice Admiral, Dover, had asked
the Commender-in Chier, Nore, to send every available shallow
draught power boat, capable of ferrying from beaches to ships
lying off the beaches Eastward of Dunkirk, stocked with fuel
and provisions for two days; this move being made with a
view to saving time by cutting out the passage to, and
subsequent reorganisation, at Ramsgate, prior to proceeding
to the French Coast. It should be noted at this time
(2000/27) there were no pulling boats, cutters or whalers
immediately available for attendance on Power Boats. A
further signal: "Please send every available craft to beaches
East of Dunkirk immediately. Evacuation tomorrow night is
problematical. 1958/27" was received from S.N.O., Dunkirk.
Later that evening a roport was received from
2/:

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CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 7.
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events,
Wednesday, 29th May (continued)
well as from Dunkirk harbour, both from the aspect of the
military situation and from the fact that Dunkirk was limited
by a bottle-neck, formed by the narrow gangway along the East
Pier to the points of embarkation. Furthermore, there was
every prospect of the weather improving and the surf reducing
as the tide rose. Nevertheless, an increased number of
H.M. ships was ordered to Dunkirk to augment the personnel
vessels, though it was feared that an accumulation of ships
alongside the East Pier at Dunkirk by day might well invite
intensive air attack,
Subsequently, this fear was fully to be justified.
25. Meantime, considerable anxiety was felt as to the
fate of the personnel vessels which had been despatched in a
steady stream to Dunkirk commencing the previous evening. The
first of these was due back at Dover about 0300, but by 0900
nothing had been sighted or reported. But at 0700, S.N.O.,
Dunkirk, had reported that the embarkation there was going on
at the rate of 2000 an hour, so it was presumed that the
transports had failed to enter the harbour during darkness,
had waited outside, and had commenced to enter in succession
at dawn. The necessity for continuous fighter protection in
view of the exposure of these unarmed ships while at Dunkirk
and during the daylight passage through coastal waters, was
obvious. Constant touch was maintained with R.A.F. Commands
to obtain continuous fighter protection during the hours when
the Vice Admiral, Dover, estimated the largest concentration
of vessels would be present, it being realised that the R.A.F.
resources were not sufficient to provide continuous air cover,
and to dispense with full cover at less important periods.
26.
At 0930 the belated return of the personnel vessels
from Dunkirk commenced, and proceeded steadily through the
day. In addition to the personnel vessels using Dunkirk the
Admiralty were informed of the necessity for X-lighters and
other self-propelled lighters to increase the facilities for
beach evacuation. A Medical Party was shipped in VERITY for
use on the beaches, and a Naval Medical Party was sent to
Dunkirk.
27. The considerable alarm as to the immediate safety
of the B.E.F. felt during the evening and early night of the
28th, which caused all available resources to be immediately
concentrated on the French Coast, eased during the 29th. But
emergency measures taken late on the 28th had an adverse
effect on the orderly organisation for evacuation so necessary
if effective measures were to be devised and put in force.
28. Meantime, in the early hours of' the 29th, an un-
fortunate disaster occurred involving the loss of H.M.
destroyers WAKEFUL and GRAFTON, and the danlayer COMFORT.
WAKEFUL, after embarking troops at Bray, sailed for Dover at
2300/28 by the Zuydecoote Pass and North Channel. Approaching
the Kwinte Whistle Buoy the speed of the ships was 20 knots,
and a zigzag of 40 deg es every 4 minutes was started. At
0045 two torpedo tracks were observed, one torpedo missed, the
other hit ship amidships. WAKEFUL broke in half and the two
portions sank in 15 seconds, each remaining standing with the
midship/

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CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 9.
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
Wednesday, 29th May (continued).
route provided the passage between Calais Bell Buoy and
Dunkirk be made in darkness.
Route X passed some 26 miles to the South-westward of the
extreme N.E. point of the Northern Route Y, the locality in
which enemy M.T.B. attack threatened, and was shielded by the
French minefields in the Ruytingen and Dyck channels. It
appears that the enemy M.T.B. command failed to appreciate the
withdrawal of traffic to the S.W. and did not follow up.
In the evening it was reported that there was no congestion
anywhere on the coast, except at La Panne. The force at La
Panne was accordingly reinforced as ships became available.
30. An additional beach party of 7 officers and a number
of ratings under Captain J. Howson was sailed in SABRE at
1600 for Dunkirk, and Captain E. Bush, who had already visited
Dunkirk and was aware of the general conditions, was sent to
HEBE as S.N.O. afloat off the beaches. An M.T.B. was placed at
the disposal of the S.N.O. on the coast.
31. At about 1600 a heavy air attack commenced on the
East Mole Pier, Dunkirk harbour, mainly by dive bombing,
which lasted continuously for more than 2 hours. At the same
time, other air attacks took place on ships lying off Bray,
Attacks were renewed from time to time up till after 2000,
nt only on Dunkirk, but on ships off Bray, in the Zuydecoote
Pass and those in the Southern end or X Route. These attacks
vere to have a disastrous result on the evacuation arrangements
at Dunkirk. There were present alongside the inner side of
the Eastern Arm 2 destroyers GRENADE and JAGUAR, 3 Trawlers
head of the GRENADE and JAGUAR, 3 more trawlers ahead of them
vith the CANTERBURY in the next berth, and a French destroyer
head of the CANTERBURY. Outside the harbour on the outside of
;he Eastern Arm the Transport FENELLA was berthed opposite the
RENADE and JAGUAR and the CRESTED EAGLE opposite the 6 trawlers.
in addition, the MALCOLM and VERITY were also in the harbour
ut further inside. This presented a very good target and the
hips were soon hit and embarkation of troops ceased for the
ime being. CANTERBURY, accompanied by JAGUAR, succeeded in
eaving harbour, but both were hit by bombs and damaged. Both
succeeded in reaching Dover, though JAGUAR had to be towed
art of the way and was subjected to many attacks on passage.
ANTERBURY reached harbour at 2115 and disembarked 1950 troops
ut was sufficiently damaged to prevent her being used again
n these operations. To return to Dunkirk - FENELLA was lying
longside on the outside of the pier, and was hit and sunk.
RENADE and one of the trawlers on the East side were hit and
he trawler sank in the fairway. GRENADE sinking and on fire
ad to be abandoned and appeared to be about to sink in the
airway. A trawler was detailed to tow her clear. VERITY,
no witnessed this occurrence was continuously straddled by
ombs for 35 minutes. Passage all along the pier having
eased, she cast off, and skirting the burning GRENADE and
rawler, proceeded out of harbour, grounding slightly on a
ink drifter in the entrance. At about 1800 KING ORRY arrived
o find the harbour occupied only by burning and sinking ships,
th no sign of any one on the pier nor any boat moving in the
harbour/

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CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 17.
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
Friday, 31st May.
51. The Admiralty informed the Vice Admiral that the
policy of H. M. Government was that both British and French
troops be given an equal opportunity of being evacuated in
British ships and boats.
52. Personnel ships had been sailed the previous evening
and throughout the night of the 30th/31st to provide for a
continuous flow into Dunkirk harbour. But at 0320 the S.N.O.
reported that once again the majority of these Personnel ships
had failed to enter the harbour during the dark hours. MALCOLM,
however, left Dunkirk with 1,200 troops at 0300, during heavy
shelling, on relief by IVANHOE. S.N.O. Dunkirk, however,
continued to call for more ships. No more destroyers were
available and there were no means of accelerating the arrival
of the vessels despatched there. By 0700 the Vice Admiral
had no news of the fate of the personnel ships that had sailed
the previous evening and during the night. None of these
ships had reached the U.K. to unload, and it appeared probable
that these ships may have concentrated in the narrow waters
close to Dunkirk, inviting a repetition of the heavy air
attacks with consequent damage and loss to transports which
had occurred on the two previous occasions when personnel
vessels, together with other ships, had been concentrated in
large numbers in the approaches to Dunkirk.
At this time there were no less than 9 personnel
vessels and 3 hospital carriers known to be on the round trip
U.K. - Dunkirk and back, and one other personnel vessel had
been ordered to sail during the night, but herwhereabouts was
unknown, and it was feared that she had refused to sail. In
addition, 3 other personnel vessels were under orders to sail
between 0900 and 1030. Pending the return of the ships en
passage, and while the coal-burners were being rebunkered, the
further sailing of personnel vessels was in suspense.
Note: Owing to the casualties to Personnel vessels at
this stage, coal burning cross channel steamers had to be
used for some of the trips and short endurance necessita-
ted coaling between trips which could not be done in the
vicinity of Dover, thus preventing a quick turn round.
53. During the night a considerable amount of enemy
minelaying activity by air was reported. Shelling was heavy
during the evening and night, and operations were greatly
hampered. Nevertheless, with the cessation of shelling at
about 0300, very good progress was made and by full dawn the
beaches were very nearly clear of troops. At 0530 attacks on
Dunkirk harbour and the beach from Dunkirk to Bray developed
more strength and the bombardment of Dunkirk continued.
Nevertheless, the S.N.O. reported that the embarkation there
was proceeding satisfactorily but stressed the need for more
ships and constant fighter protection. At this time French
troops began to appear at Dunkirk pier and on the beaches, and
were embarked with the British troops.
54. At 0600 VIMY sighted submarine off the N.W.
Goodwins/

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Page 20.
CONFIDENTIAL.
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
Friday, 31st May (continued).
effective quantities direct from the beaches, and to use the
special tows, ships lifeboats, power lifeboats and ear-marked tugs, which
were on passage from Ramsgate, and which had been
for lifting the final covering force.
In the afternoon, however, it was learned that the
Military plan had been changed, and that it was no longer
possible for the original covering position, as planned, to be
held by 4,000 troops who were then to withdraw to the beaches
for embarkation by boat. Instead, it was learned that the
Eastern-most Division was to be withdrawn Westward from the
La Panne area, and that the special flight of boats was to be
used to lift this force from the beaches. At the same time,
the troops in the Bray and Malo sectors were boing thinned out
by movements Westward towards Dunkirk itself. This change of
plan involved concentrating the special tows and the mine-
sweepers - to which they were to transfer the troops - into
the stretch opposite the beach between Bray and one mile East
of La Panne, and also advancing the commencement of the
operation by one hour. The risk of this change of plan was
obvious as the boat tows were not in communication with the
Vice Admiral, and reliance had to be placed on the Minesweepers
to inform and see that the escorting M.A.S.B.'s would shepherd
the tows to the new positions. The minesweepers had anchored
so as to serve as guiding marks, as had been explained to the
Naval Officers in each tow.
Apart from the special tow, a very large number of
small power boats despatched, in most cases direct, from the
South East Ports, Newhaven to Sheerness, were arriving off the
beaches, and compensated in a large measure for the heavy
losses that had occurred amongst the original towing boats,
whalers, outters, lifeboats and ships' boats, which had
occurred on the beaches during the preceding 3 days.
On the La Panne beaches after 1600 very good progress
was made. The piers of pontoons built by the Military the
previous day were extremely useful, and were largely respons-
ible for the rapid evacuation of troops. All the troops
that could be found were embarked by midnight and ferried off
to the ships. The local Beach-master (Captain R. Pim, R.N.V.R.)
searched the adjacent beaches for stragglers at midnight, and
was informed by a Starf Officer that no more troops would
embark from the La Panne beaches, but would march to Dunkirk,
as it was anticipated that these beaches would be shelled and
probably be in German hands the following day. This, as it
turned out, was a correct forecast. The Beach-master
estimates that 5,000 men were lifted from the La Panne beaches
during the evening and up to midnight.
62. At 1920 all ships in the fleets were informed by
the Vice Admiral that the final evacuation of the B.E.F. was
expedted on the night lst/2nd June, and that the evacuation
of the French from Dunkirk and Malo beach would continue from
1st June by both British and French ships.
63/

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Page 21.
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
Friday, 31st May (continued).
63. General Lloyd informed the D.M.O. of the new plan,
stating that General Alexander had been placed in command of
the final phase of the evacuation. Composition of force not
known. Further, that it was impossible now to say how long
the French evacuation would take but that the Alexander force
would remain till the last. No firm information could be
obtained from the French as regards:-
(i) The number of French troops to be evacuated.
(ii) The nature and extent of French sea borne transport.
(iii) The French military plan for the defence of the
perimeter and the final withdrawal or French
troops.
64. General remarks: The main features of the day
were:-
(a) The increased enemy artillery activity on Dunkirk
and La Panne beach, and on the approach channels.
(b) The set-back to evacuation from the beaches that
occurred during the choppy weather of the forenoon,
followed by an excellent recovery inthe afternoon
and evening when large numbers were lifted from the
beaches.
(c) The change in the military plan as regards the
locality and time of lifting the final contingents
of the B.E.F.
It should be noted that in spite of (b) the rate
of embarkation had, in fact, come up to expectations, and if
other circumstances had permitted it would have been possible
to adhere to the original plan of lifting the final 4,000
B.E.F. off the beaches between 0130 and 0300 1st June.
65/

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Page 22
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events,
Friday 31st May (continued).
65. Casualties to H.M. Ships during 31st May,
M/S DEVONIA received damage from near miss bombs
whilst off La Panne. About 1600 ship was ordered to be beached.
At 0600 on the 1st, after having destroyed all useful
apparatus, and ammunition put overboard, ship was beached and
abandoned.
M/S HEBE, whilst off Dunkirk, was damaged by enemy
aircraft and returned under own power to Dover.
Destroyer EXPRESS. Damaged by enemy aircraft whilst
off Dunkirk.
Saturday 1st June.
66. 2 Hospital Carriers which had sailed the previous
evening returned shortly after dawn. Only one had succeeded
in entering Dunkirk Harbour, the other had laid off 4 hours
under heavy fire and returned to Dover. 4 personnel vessels
failed to enter Dunkirk during the night, but succeeded in the
early hours of the morning. One of these, the PRAGUE, was
bombed and severely damaged half-way across on the return
journey, but succeeded in making the Downs with the assistance
of tugs, where troops transferred to other ships particularly
A/S trawlers LADY PHILOMENE and OLVINA. The supply of person-
nel vessels was maintained throughout the day, not without a
series of setbacks caused by 3 ships refusing to sail and by
2 being turned back when on passage, by French Destroyers owing
to heavy bombing and shelling of the approaches to Dunkirk.
Of those that operated during the 24 hours, 1 was sunk, 2
damaged by bombs and shell-fire and 1 by collision.
67. During the middle watch it transpired that no further
troops were attempting to evacuate from La Panne off which
were stationed one paddle minesweeper, a fleet sweeper and two
destroyers, probably due to the heavy shelling from German
guns eastward, and later information was received that the
troops were marching from La Panne through Bray towards
Dunkirk. Accordingly, during the night the Rear Admiral,
Dover, instructed all small craft to move west, with boats in
tow, towards Dunkirk, and the Vice Admiral directed all ships
under orders for La Panne to other positions further west,
concentrating the main effort on the beach immediately east
of Dunkirk.
To a request from Dunkirk for Hospital Ships, the
Vice Admiral replied at 0715 that the large ship berths
alongside at Dunkirk must be occupied by personnel ships and
the wounded that could conveniently be embarked should go with
personnel. This direction was in accordance with the Govern-
ment policy previously communicated to the Vice Admiral.
68. Soon after dawn enemy aircraft were active and
heavy bombing and machine gun attacks developed at 0500 over
the whole area from Dunkirk to La Panne. A second series of
attacks commenced at 0830 and lasted until 0900, during which
time nearly every ship off the coast was subjected to
intensive bombing and machine gunning, formations of 30 and 40
machines/

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CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 24
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
Saturday, 1st June (continued).
71. As for personnel vessels, there was an increasing
unwillingness to sail, so steps were taken to place on board
each a Naval Lieutenant-Commander or Commander, with 10 seamen
acting as a moral stiffening, the officer acting as adviser
and persuader to the Master of the ship, and the seamen for
handling the wires and going alongside under fire. By this
means it was hoped not only to ensure the timely sailing of
these essential ships, but also to eliminate the many occasions
when these vessels had lingered outside Dunkirk harbour to
await a quiet opportunity to enter, or had failed to enter the
harbour at all.
72. Early in the forenoon a number of Senior Officers
were despatched from Dover in fast motor boats to round up all
stray motor boats in the Downs and along the routes, and
direct them back in the evening to the beach stretching 1/2
miles eastward of Dunkirk, and a second large flight of tugs
with lifeboats was prepared at Ramsgate to send over for what
was hoped to be a final effort off the beach. In addition a
number of flotillas under Commodore Taylor and Captain Fraser
were reorganised for the night's effort.
73. General Alexander was informed at 0951 that on the
likely assumption that complete evacuation would be ordered
that night, the problem of transport made it essential to use
the beach adjacent to Dunkirk as well as the harbour facilities
and that the Vice Admiral was planning evacuation to start
at 2200.
74. At 1841 the following signal was received from
C.I.G.S. for the Senior Military Commander: "We do not order
any fixed moment for evacuation. You are to hold on as long
as possible in order that the maximum number of French and
British may be evacuated. Impossible from here to judge local
situation. In close co-operation with Admiral Abrial. You
must act in this matter on your own judgment."
75. S.N.O. Dunkirk, was informed that drifters and
other small craft would be sent into the inner harbour at
Dunkirk to take troops from the Felix Faure Quay, North Quay,
in the shipyard, and the quay in the new outer harbour.
special flotillas especially organised, to go to the beach
including paddlers, skoots and all small craft, except certain
76. The plan for the night provided for all minesweepers
stretching eastward 1 1/2 miles from Dunkirk. Dunkirk Harbour
was and to be served by up to 7 personnel ships, 8 destroyers,
the inner harbour 9 drifters and special power boats
organised from Ramsgate. The French vessels were to serve the
Quay in the new outer harbour and private small boats, the
Quay Felix Faure, and in addition about 100 French small beach
Dunkirk. It was estimated that the British vessels could
fishing craft and drifters for the beach immediately east of
lift about 17,000 between 2100/1 and 0300/2, probably in the
proportion/

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CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 27
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
Saturday 1st June (continued).
and at 0815 was attacked by enemy aircraft. Ship was hit aft of
No.3 boiler room and put out of action. About 0945 another attack
took place but no hits were registered. A third attack took place
at about noon and the ship began to settle and the order to
abandon ship was given.
Destroyer KEITH attacked by enemy aircraft off Bray
severely hit and abandoned at anchor by No.8 buoy. Finally sank.
Harbour Defence Craft AMULREE sunk in collision by
VIMY at 0200.
Sunday, 2nd June.
80. The arrangements to set in motion the night's evacua-
tion had proceeded smoothly as far as could be ascertained at
Dover. During the early hours, reports of sailings from Dunkirk
indicated that destroyers at least were doing well.
At about 0200, however, a signal was received from
LYDD, who was off the Dunkirk beach, as follows:-
"Brigadier tells me that C. in C. says it is essential that
rearguard B.E.F. embarks from the beaches east of Mole on
account of French congestion on Mole. Considerable number
British troops still on Mole. Military are expecting further
arrivals there. Rearguard expects to arrive at beach by 0230."
The Vice Admiral accordingly ordered all ships known to
be outside Dunkirk Harbour to endeavour to embark the rearguard
from the beach, remaining after 0300 if necessary. Owing to the
time in transit and coding it was feared that this signal would
reach few ships still on the coast, unless they had remained on
their own initiative after 0300, the previously ordered time of
withdrawal.
At 0200, authority was received from the Admiralty to
continue evacuation by destroyers from Dunkirk Harbour until
0700, transports to leave Dunkirk at 0300.
81. During the early hours there was considerable haze and
smoke off Dunkirk Harbour, Dunkirk East Beach, Dunkirk Roads and
the entrance therefrom to X Route. For this reason some of the
smaller vessels, including minesweepers, failed to make either
Dunkirk Harbour or Dunkirk East Beach, but on the whole it appears
that evacuation, both from the beach and from the harbour had
proceeded satisfactorily with the resources available.
Between 0200 and 0900, 6 personnel vessels reached
United Kingdom from Dunkirk Harbour with about 5,500 troops. 2
others had been turned back before reaching Dunkirk by 2 unknown
destroyers, and one had been in collision before reaching Dunkirk
and had to return.
82. Considerable doubt existed during the forenoon as to the
numbers remaining to be evacuated in Dunkirk. It was thought that
2,000, plus the 4,000 rearguard British troops, might well be
found in Dunkirk. The number of French troops remaining was in-
creasing from the 25,000 quoted the previous evening to figures
in the region of 50,000 to 60,000.
83. The Rear Admiral, Dover, arrived back from the coast
in a M.T.B. and during the forenoon a joint Naval and Military
conference was held to devise a plan for the forthcoming night's
evacuation. The fact that evacuation traffic was suspended in
daylight/

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Page 30
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
Monday, 3rd June (continued).
that 4 ships were now alongside, that there were no French
troops. Reported again at 0115, "Plenty of ships cannot get
troops."
At 0312, Dunkirk reported that all ships were
leaving and that the block ships had entered.
When the ships returned to United Kingdom, it was
learnt that he flow of French troops had dwindled away shortly
after midnight. One ship waited 2-1/2 hours to embark her load
instead of the normal half hour. A possible explanation was
thought to be that a French counter attack, which had been
arranged for the afternoon of the 2nd, had had to be postponed
to the evening, no doubt deranging despatch of troops to the
rear for evacuation. The result was that between midnight
and 0300/3 a lifting capacity of about 10,000 was left empty
91. The night's embarkation at Dunkirk had been carried
out without disturbance by enemy action. During the forenoon
a conference was held at Dover to improve the arrangements for
the night 3/6 - 4/6 as a result of experience gained. The
general plan remained unaltered except that provision was made
for the use by British ships of the west pier in the New Outer
Port, since it appeared that the French had insufficient ships
at their disposal to make full use of this valuable berth.
Similarly a number of power boats which had been working off
the Malo Beach were, on this occasion, to be sent in to Quay
Felix Faure. No assurance could be obtained that this coming
night would terminate the operation and considerable anxiety
was felt regarding the effect of the gradual exhaustion of
officers and men of the ships taking part in the Dynamo. This
exhaustion was particularly marked in the Destroyer force
the remnants of which had been executing a series of round
trips without intermission for several days under navigation
considitions of extreme difficulty and in the face of
unparallelled air attack.
The Vice Admiral accordingly represented to the
Admiralty that the continuance of the demands made by
evacuation would subject a number of officers and men to a test
which might be beyond the limit of human endurance, and
requesting that fresh forces should be used if evacuation had
to be continued after the coming night, with the acceptance
of any consequent delay.
92. The evacuation plan was communicated to Units
taking part at 1440 and was briefly as follows:-
Commence 2230/3, withdraw 0230/4. From East Pier evacuation
by Personnel Vessels, Destroyers and Paddle Minesweepers.
From West Pier, new outer port, by other Minesweepers,
Corvettes, Skoots and French vessels. Drifters and smaller
craft into the inner harbour, LOCUST remaining outside
entrance receiving loads ferried out by small boats. Tugs
available outside entrance to assist ships in berthing and
in leaving.
93.,
val

Details

CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 32.
CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 31
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
Monday, 3rd June (continued).
93. In the evening the Vice Admiral was informed by the
B.N.L.O. Marceau that it was estimated 30,000 French remained
and that the French Admiralty agree that evacuation should be
terminated that night if possible. Force used was to consist
of 9 Personnel Vessels with one in reserve, 9 Destroyers
is
(maximum number available), 4 Paddle Minesweepers, 7 Fleet
Minesweepers, 9 Drifters, LOCUST, 2 Corvettes, 4 French
Destroyers and a number of organised motor boat flotillas
including lifeboats from Ramsgate and Dover, together with a
large number of French and Belgian fishing vessels. The
lifting capacity of this force, if used to the full, was more
than 30,000, but it was certain that the facilities within
Dunkirk could not permit more than about 25,000 to be embarked
in the time available, and this number only if the French
troops moved with the greatest rapidity at all points of
embarkation. This point was impressed upon the French Liaison
Officers and a number of French officers and ratings added to
the augmented pier parties which were despatched to Dunkirk
at 2200 in advance of the evacuation force.
94. The movements commenced according to plan. The
weather conditions at Dunkirk, although favourable as regards
tide were adverse with a north easterly wind tending to blow
S,
Personnel Vessels and Destroyers off the vital East Pier making
berthing difficult. The MANXMAN, the seventh Personnel Ship
due to sail refused to sail, and her place was taken by the
ROYAL SOVEREIGN.
Tuesday, 4th June.
95. At midnight when the earlier vessels had commenced
the return voyage fog was reported in mid-channel and off the r
Thanet coast and a number of ships had to anchor before
entering harbour. The EXPRESS and SHIKARI were the last ships
to leave Dunkirk at 0318 and 0340 and carried approximately
1,000 troops and the British pier parties. Except for an air
attack on SHIKARI this final passage was made without inter-
ruption by the enemy and though the fog made navigation
extremely difficult it undoubtedly served to shield the Armadas
from enemy aircraft.
I
96. When the count was taken later in the day it was
ascertained that 27,000 troops had been evacuated as a result
of the night's operation and Admiral Nord agreed that the
operation should be considered as completed, observing that
all anmunition at Dunkirk had been expended and that the
numbers left behind were small consisting principally of non-
combatant troops. This decision was agreed to by the French
Admiralty at 1100, and the operation Dynamo terminated by
Admiralty Message 1423/4.
97. It was realised that in all probability there might
be a number of open boats, barges, etc. drifting about in the
channel with troops on board. It was accordingly decided to
have
val

Details

CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 36
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
Inshore Flottllas and Naval Shore Parties (continued).
111. Locally, at both Ramsgate and Dover a number of civi-
lian volunteers came forward to man the boats and to drive
their engines. These men did good work.
112. At both Rams ate and Dover when the business of
manning these civilian power boats was set about the same
difficulties were experienced:-
(i) of obtaining drivers with knowledge of the very
varied types of internal combustion engines;
(ii) of making the engines of these boats run, most of
them having been laid up since the previous summer.
Throughout the operation all engines continued to
give trouble. Many engines were old and almost all were of
different types. Several boats could not be used as they had
diesel engines and no stokers or civilians trained in these
were available. Each engine, especially the older ones,
required careful nursing, and signs of distress from the
engines were not understood. These difficulties were partly
overcome by obtaining engine drivers from Chatham and by the
provision of cadet ratings, and Sub-Lieutenants, R.N.V.R.
from KING ALFRED who claimed knowledge of I.C. engines, but
many engines were of types unknown even to these.
These difficulties would never have arisen had the
civilian crews, or even their drivers, been willing to take
their boats across to Dunkirk.
113. Fresh water for the motor boats was difficult to
supply in sufficient quantity, owing to lack of water tanks
in most boats, especially those of the open type. Large
supplies were required as the troops were reported to be
suffering severely om thirst, Both at Ramsgate and Dover
the Base Staff prov. .ed as many galvanized iron cylinders and
tanks as could be found and made serviceable, and these
proved most satisfactory.
114. On two occasions skoots and small boats approaching
the coast were turned back through false information. On
the first occasion on the afternoon of 28th May, at least 6
skoots, who were without definite orders where to proceed,
encountered a returning shoot when about 10 miles off the
coast. This skoot stated that Dunkirk had already fallen into
German hands and that the evacuation had ceased. It is
believed that this report originated from an Army officer
embarked in the skoot. He had stated, consequent on the
capitulation of Belgian troops that the Germans would be
advancing along the coast that evening. As a result of this
ill-judged comment, the arrival of at least 6 shoots was
delayed at over 24 hours, until this situation had been clear-
ed up.
The second occasion occurred during the night of 1st
June and has been referred to in paragraph 76 of the
narrative. On this occasion although the services of a
number of small craft were lost to the coast, it transpired
that sufficient were already there to cope with the troops
available,
115./

Details

tions of Commander
k.
der Dove, Sub Lieutenant
N.V.R. The object was to erect
7th June, 1940.
rt of Dunkirk. Commander Dove
atsuki" on May 2000 with 200
-Admiral Sir James
ut. Field and Sub Lieut Addis
Somerville, K. C.B., D.S.O., .
taul". On instructions from
took command of the Drifter
On the orders of Commander Yates, we
iled from Dover 6345 Friday
the honour to submit the following
es for the demolition party, 4
ort on the activities of Commander
officer Major Russell, 1 Army
e's party at Dunkirk.
3 signal ratings. After an
Dunkirk 0930 to find a large
We have the honour to be, Sir,
rogress. We noted then, and for
that in spite of the courage and
Your obedient Servants,
the great majority of their
targets. We immediately entered
J.L. Field Subtient RNVILE
the South Quay.
R.G.addis Subtient RMVR.
ratings, we reported to Cdr.
La Rentaul" to keep clear of the
nent which had recommenced. We
emolition party that we had
afterwards made contact with
portion of a demolition party.
re-enter the harbour and took
CS.
threatening to block completely
a done at once it would have
32" the hospital and personnel
y. The, "Gervaise" was man-
a side to avoid the risk of her
ion in the fairway. Ammunition
nd handed over to Cdr Banks who
y primersor detonators for the
a two hospital ships which were
$
The attached papers have been
ng these was just put in hand
seen by the Vice Admiral, Dover, and note made
* available at any time during
for his list of personnel recommendations.
himself and with help of his
the necessary work. Now the
Yours sincerely,
ble for further hospital and
During these operations Cdr.
e situation in Dunkirk was so
he opportunity nor the facilitie
hadch Cress
rk. Furthermore there was a re-
1" dive bombing until Monday 27th
old Cdr Dove that there was no
ommandeered a car and bought
SECRETARY to
rom estaminets which were still
VICE ADMIRAL.
de tour of inspection and found
property and personnel was
il tanks on the south side of the
atening the railway and timber
S. to S.W. which blew a pall of
scene appear far worse than
evening the work of loading ship
eady a large number of noncom-
our besides an increasing number
quay. The night was quiet
planes sincleithe town for over*
ely small number of bombs. Early
ho had been instructed by Cdr.
for safety, reported that magnet
mines nad Deen 1814 near the entrance and that a French merchantmen
had been blown up.
ore dawn, the situation will become extremely grim'

Details

Statement of the operations of Commander
Dove's party at Dunkirk.
Prefatory Note.
The party consisted of Commander Dove,R.N., Sub.Lieutenant
Field, and Sub.Lieutenant Addis, R.N.V.R. The object was to erect
& lethal kite barrage round the port of Dunkirk. Commander Dove
sailed with H.M.D. "Boy Roy" and "Natsuki" on May 2014 with 200
sets of lethal kite year. ,Lieut, Field and ub.Lieut Addis
left Daver with H.M.D. "Gervais Rentaul". On instructions from
Captain A/P Dover, .Lieut. Field took command of the Drifter
(skipper Mr.Burgess,R.N.R)
Report.
Sub.Lieut Field and Addis, sailed from Dover 6345 Friday
May 25th with 9 tons high explosives for the demolition party, 4
tons of medical stores, 1 Medical officer Major Russell, 1 Army
liaison officer Captain Hill, and 3 signal ratings. After an
uneventful passage, we arrived off Dunkirk 0930 to find a large
scale air attack by the enemy in progress. We noted then, and for
the whole time we were in Dunkirk that in spite of the courage and
persistence of the shore A.A.units the great majority of their
salvoes were well astern of their targets. We immediately entered
the harbour and made fast alongside the South Quay.
ratings, we reported to Cdr.
La Rentaul" to keep clear of the
nent which had recommenced. We
emolition party that we had
afterwards made contact with
OFFICE OF
portion of a demolition party.
FLAG OFFICER COMMANDING DOVER.
re-enter the harbour and took
threatening to block completely
a done at once it would have
32" the hospital and personnel
18th June, 1940.
7. The, "Gervaise" was man-
1 side to avoid the risk of her
ion in the fairway. Ammunition
nd handed over to Cdr Banks who
Dear Gleadowe,
y primersor detonators for the
The attached papers have been
a two hospital ships which were
seen by the Vice Admiral, Dover, and note made
ng these was just put in hand
for his list of personnel recommendations.
* available at any time during
himself and with help of his
the necessary work. Now the
Yours sincerely,
ble for further hospital and
During these operations Cdr.
8 situation in Dunkirk was so
he opportunity nor the facilitie
hadch Cres
rk. Furthermore there was a re-
1" dive bombing until Monday 27th
old Cdr.Dove that there was no
ommandeered a car and bought
SECRETARY to
rom estaminets which were still
VICE ADMIRAL.
de tour of inspection and found
property and personnel was
il tanks on the south side of th
atening the railway and timber
S. to S.W. which blew a pall of
scene appear far worse than
evening the work of loading shi
eady a large number of noncom-
our besides an increasing number
quay. The night was quiet
planes circledthe town for over*
ely small number of bombs. Early
ho had been instructed by Odr.
for safety, reported that magnet
mines nad been 1810 near the entrance and that a French merchantmen
had been blown up.
ore dawn, the situation will become extremely grim'

Details

Statement of the operations of Commander
Dove's party at Dunkirk.
Prefatory Note.
The party consisted of Commander Dove, b.Lieutenant
Field, and Sub.Lieutenant Addis, R.N.V.R. The object was to erect
a lethal kite barrage round the port of Dunkirk. Commander Dove
sailed with "Boy Roy" and "Natsuki" on May 2004 with 200
sets of lethal kite gear. Sub,Lieut,Field and Sub.Lieut Addis
left Daver with H.M.D. "Gervais Rentaul". On instructions from
Captain A/P took command of the Drifter
(skipper Mr.Burgess,R.N.R)
Report.
Sub.Lieut Field and Addis, sailed from Dover 6345 Friday
May 25th with 9 tons high explosives for the demolition party, 4
tons of medical stores, 1 Medical officer Major Russell, 1 Army
liaison officer Captain Hill, and 3 signal ratings. After an
uneventful passage, we arrived off Dunkirk 0930 to find a large
scale air attack by the enemy in progress. We noted then, and for
the whole time we were in Dunkirk that in spite of the courage and
persistence of the shore A.A.units the great majority of their
salvoe were well astern of their targets. We immediately entered
the harbour and made fast alongside the South Quay.
Army Officers and signal ratings, we reported to Cdr.
Henderson B.N.L.O. who order "Gervais Rentaul" to keep clear of the
harbour to avoid the aerial bombardment which had recommenced. We
then reported to Cdr. Banks of the demolition party that we had
brought his explosives, and shortly afterwards made contact with
Cdr. Dove who had taken charge of a portion of a demolition party.
Cdr.Dove now signalled the G.R. to re-enter the harbour and took
in tow two sinking tugs which were threatening to block completely
the South Quay. If this had not been done at once it would have
been difficulty if not impossible for the hospital and personnel
ships to make fast to the South Quay. The, "Gervaise" was man-
eeuvred to a small lock on the south side to avoid the risk of her
being hit and exploding the ammunition in the fairway. Ammunition
medical stores were then unloaded and handed over to Cdr. Banks who
up to that time had not received any primersor detonators for the
depth charges.
Cdr.Dove then signalled in two hospital ships which were
in the offing and the work of loading these was just put in hand
inmediately. As there was no. labour dock available at any time during
our stay in Dunkirk Commander Dove himself and with help of his
officers organised and carried out the necessary work. Now the
South Quay was cleared it was possible for further hospital and
personnel ships to enter and load. During these operations Cdr.
Dove reached the conclusion that the situation in Dunkirk was so
grave that we should have neither the opportunity nor the facilitie
to erect a kite barrage round Dunkirk. Furthermore there was a re-
grettable lack of wind and no low or dive bombing until Monday 27th
At midday dr.Henderson told Cdr. Dove that there was no
water in Dunkirk and we therefore commandeered a car and bought
sufficient vichy and perier water from estaminets which were still
open in Malo form H.Q.staff. We made tour of inspection and found
that up to date the damage done to property and personnel was
surprisingly little, although the oil tanks on the south side of th
town were blazing flercely and threatening the railway and timber
yards. There was a light uir from S. to S.W. which blew a pall of
smoke over the harbour and made the scene appear far worse than
reality. During the afternoon and evening the work of loading shi
went on smoothly but there were already a large number of noncom-
batant forces crowded into the harbour besides an increasing number*
of ambulances lined up on the south quay. The night was quiet
except for one air-raid when German planes circledthe town for over
(ca hour before dropping a comparatively small mimber of bombs. Early
next morning May 26th, r.Burgess who had been instructed by Cdr.
Dove to anchor outside the harbour for safety, reported that magnet
mines had been laid near the entrance and that a French merchantmen
had been blown up.
dawn, the situation will become extremely grim'

Details

[HCLOSURE
No.
TO DOVER LETTER OF 18 guay 1940
REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS AT BRAYDUNE AND LA PANNE.
Sir,
I have the honour to submit the following report.
On the night of Tuesday, 28th. May 1940, while serving in
H.M.S. "Harvester", under your command, I went ashore in the motor boa
accompanied by Petty Officer Pleasance, Signalman Bird and Able Seamer
Potter and Law. We landed at Bray Dune where we found about 4,000
oldiers awaiting embarkation. I remained on shore with Signalman Bird and
Able Seaman Law. There was a strong cross sea and sand bars made the
launching of boats difficult. Throughout the night we managed to
evacuate about 700 which included about 100 wounded. Discipline was
very bad.
At 0400 Wednesday, the supply of boats for embarkation ceased
and I returned with Bird and Law to H.M.S. "Harvester".
There had been considerable wastage of boats through lack of
discipline in the troops; overcrowding was hard to control as the
embarkation beach extended for over one mile.
About 0500 Wednesday, H.M.S. "Harvester" moved eastward to
La Panne and I landed in the motor skiff with Petty Officer Shrimpton,
and Leading Seaman Kendall. Mr. Robinson, Gunner T, H.M.S. "Harvester
Petty Officer Steward Beale, Able Seamen Potter and Law also landed
and evacuation was resumed. On the beach we found 14 boats which we
launched. A line ferry was established from a paddle steamer which
was aground close in shore and this steamer served as a pier alongside
which other boats were able to come. A.B. Potter remained on shore,
the others continued ferrying. Throughout the day embarkation
continued.
About 1400 Wednesday bombing commenced - there were no
casualties though 8 heavy bombs fell within 100 yards of the place
of embarkation. A supply ship to the right of the beach was fired
and destroyed by a near miss, and a destroyer was hit by an
incendiary bomb but continued in action. I joined up with the Army
Staff controlling evacuation - there were no other Naval Officers at
La Panne. There was some panic among troops, one boat overturning
and seven men were drowned in four feet of water. We were unable to
revive these men.
About 1700 Wednesday the following requests were telephoned
to the Admiralty :- that Naval staff be sent, that fighter protection
be extended to La Panne and that numerous flat bottomed boats be sent
immediately. (Two Lieutenants R.N. and some seamen arrived at La Panne
early on Thursday morning, Lieut. Cmdr. McCullough and signal staff on
Thursday evening and some fighter protection was given.) There was
but it did not interfere; enemy planes raided in the gaps between
occasional shelling to the right of the beach throughout Wednesday
immediately. There was A.A. protection on the beach - the four
our fighter patrols and a destroyer was hit by a heavy bomb and sank
Bofors proving most effective.
but was told nothing could be done that night. Owing to lack of
About 2300 Wednesday I requested that piers should be built
boats the only a few men removed morning that and night. asked what could Lord be Gort done arrived to assist. on
1 The
The erection of piers, and under Colonel Porter's
the pier at La Panne being ready and in use
action and destroyed some of our own fighters; there appeared to
No bombing occurred on Thursday but the beach guns were in
Sta. 47/88.
U. E. 7881/1922.
81500 We 12/11/0514 450,000 3/39-McO & Co Ltd-T. 3255

Details

(1952) Wt. 20006/971* 100
CW. 24984/40
51.
(Revised-June, 1933.)
740
FROM WHOM
DATE
5.6.40.
MARKINGS TO BOARD,
ENCLOSURE Mo.
to DOVER LETTER OF 18 July 1961
no signals from the fighters and the guns' crews had no information
th
regarding recognition signals.
Up till 2000 Thursday, it is estimated that 17,000 men were
embarked from La Panne.
On Thursday evening a method of identifying the beaches was
established - two lights being shown at La Panne and one at Bray Dune
and communicated to the Admiralty, Dover. The Admiralty were also
asked to send more ships.
On Friday embarkation at La Panne was slowed up as shelling
caused some ships to move westward to Bray Dune. The rest camp in the
rear of La Panne beach and a small arms ammunition hut were hit during
bombing attacks which continued throughout Friday and ships also
suffered shell fire.
Early Friday afternoon the 12th Lancers, who had been
marshalling the beaches for 24 hours were relieved and marched to
Dunkirk.
On Friday evening German Gunners found the range of the beach
and were aided by two observation balloons which we did not manage to
destroy. Lord Gort and his staff were embarked in a whaler from
La Panne and taken to a patrol vessel. Lieut. Cmdr. McCullough
ordered me to embark in H.M. Yacht PHELE and I went with the remainder
of the Commander-in-Chief's staff. About 2000 the enemy sent over a
large number of planes accompanied by fighters, but the intensive
bombing appeared to have little effect, though it provided ten minutes
of extreme discomfort. Throughout the night H.M.Y.PHELE continued
to assist with evacuation. Shelling at La Panne was intensified, the
pier being the objective.
At 0200 Saturday La Panne was abandoned as a place of
embarkation and H.M.Y. PHELE sailed to Bray Dune and thence to Dover
where we arrived without further incident at 10.30 Saturday.
Except during the first day of evacuation, the bearing of the
B.E.F. at La Panne was magnificent.
I was not given orders to remain ashore, but as at La Panne
there was no liaison between Army and Navy I realised I could do a
much more useful job by remaining there.
I have the honour to be, Sir,
ER.
Your obedient Servant,
(signed) EDMUND C. CRESSWELL.
Sub Lieutenant Royal Navy
24th June, 1940.
Royal Naval Hospital,
Haslar.
To
The Commending orficer,
Sta. 47/88.
U. 10. 7881/1922.
21500 Wt. 12/11/0514 430,000 8/39-McO & Co Ltd-T. 3255

Details

Operation "DYNAMO" - Recommendations of Personnel. Page
70
H.M.S. BIDEFORD This - Lieutenant Commander John Hugh Lewes, R.N.
being off the bombed beach vessel and proceeded machine-gunned to Bray on beach the on the 29th May
bombing blown was quarter gun In spite platforms grounded away, deck, attack of No.2 the aft embarking wrecked, about took damage and gun 40 place. put of done, feet in the troops out addition casualties of The of of stern in the action ship the to fact being was much evening, way and that struck other completely the across. the 0.5 the on damage. ship machi While the third
and continued 13 men killed, 1 officer and 18 men suffered (3 BIDEFO offic
eventually England towed off and home, carried 400 troops and when to
to embark troops during the night, wounded),
on the 31st May.
Recommendations.
OFFICERS.
Lieutenant Commander John Hugh Lewes, R.N.
In spite of the severe damage to his ship by
D.S.C
bombs and the fact that his ship was aground, he
continued to rescue troops from Bray beach, and
eventually carried 400 to England.
M
Recommended for mention.
Surgeon Lieutenant John Jordan, M.B., B.Ch., R.N.
Displayed zeal and unswerving devotion to duty
throughout the period 29th-31st May, when he was an
outstanding example to all. His sick berth
attendant seriously wounded, he doalt with some 50
casualties, many horribly mutilated or dangerously
wounded, and performed several major operations,
having organised his limited resources to their
utmost. Throughout the period tended his patients
continuously and at all times displayed great
ability, patience and understanding. No effort was
too much for him - no call was left unanswered.
He was completely selfless and upheld the traditions
of the Royal Navy and of his profession in a most
worthy manner.
D.S.O. D.S.C.
Recommended for decoration.
RATINGS.
Private George William Crowther, 6th Field Ambulance
B. Company, No. 7354480.
DSM.
(D.M)
This man had been embarked from Bray beach. After
was Office
to assist the Surgeon. An hour later, when the troop
the ship was struck by bombs he immediately volunteer
on said he would remain in BIDEFORD and continu was
board had been transferred to another ship,
Crowther work there, knowing full well that BIDEFORD time
his severely damaged. and aground, and at the that ship
very considered highly improbable that to
would it was reach England, but he gave up his comrades. chance
Carried get away out his voluntary duties for all but hor
in order to tend his wounded 48
continuously in a most efficient manner.

Details

Operation "DYNAMO" Les Recommendations of Personnel.
Page 74
H.M.S. LOCUST - Lieutenant Ackroyd Norman Palliser Costobadie R.N.
batteries, not This only evacuating ship played troops a prominent but in part in Operation DYNAMO,
hour passage, and and in taking BIDEFORD bombarding in tow to shore
MOSQUITO to out demolition work in the saving of
ship. Also carried is probably responsible for Dover, a that 30
and other ensure the destruction of all wreck
matter. already The taken the correct steps to safeguard MOSQUITO secret
had gear, it not then being known that secret books
fortnight prior to joining this operation.
ship had only been in commission for a
Recommendations.
OFFICERS.
Lieutenant Ackroyd Norman Palliser Costobadie, R.N.
Displayed good judgment and initiative throughout
the operation, frequently under fire from shore
artillery and under air bombardment, particularly
when he found himself the Senior Officer afloat off
La Panne beach on the evening of the 29th, and his
personal efforts in organising the various inshore
boats and the troops ashore resulted in more than
1,000 troops being lifted from the beach to his ship
and other offshore craft, there being no Army
officers present in charge of these troops.
D.S.C
Recommended for decoration.
Lieutenant Arundell Holdsworth. R.N.
Did excellent work on board and on shore, where
on the last night of beach evacuation he hunted up
several small parties of troops hidden amongst the
sand dunes, thereby ensuring their safety. He also
iring
took charge of the successful demolition work in
tere
MOSQUITO, a job of great difficulty owing to the
vors
movement of the wreck in the swell. At all times
he displayed exceptional initiative.
vas
whom
Recommended for mention.
RATINGS.
Signalman E. E. Roden, C/D.360.
Signalman H. O. Carter, C/SSX.17317.
Accompanied the officers when they landed. Behaved
with great courage and resource and were personally
instrumental in organising the soldiers and handling
the boats, and in detailing the military for embark-
ation. Their initiative and bearing set a fine examplo
to the soldiers, who certainly would have failed to
launch the boats without their leadership.
MM (?DSM) Recommended for mention.

Details

Operation "DYNAMO" - Recommendations of Personnel.
Page 101.
RATING:
Engineer C. Coggins.
This civilian kept the engines of this motor
yacht running the whole time, in spite of propeller
required. He also put the engines of several other
being fouled frequently and the continuous running
boats to rights when they broke down. He ably
assisted the Skipper throughout the operations.
Recommended for mention.
30 ft. Motor Yacht MAID ERRANT. - Able Seaman S. Palmer, D/JX.
148052.
Recommendations.
Able Seaman S. Palmer. D/JX. 148052.
Sailed from Sheerness on Friday, 31st May, in
convoy for Dunkirk. En route rescued survivors
of a French destroyer, then proceeded to the beaches.
There he was swamped by French soldiers swarming
over his boat, which drifted ashore. Later the
boat refloated and he took one V.C.O. and 8 British
soldiers; he had no crew except one Stoker, who had
great difficulty with the engine. Off Dunkirk, on
the way home, the engine broke down, so he broke up
the yacht's wood fittings and made the 8 soldiers
paddle the boat. Later, the engine restarted after
furing
an 18 hour voyage. Next day, without orders, he
ister
sailed with a crew of one other Able Seaman, but was
vivor
turned back as his craft was too slow to take part
in the night evacuation ordered for that evening.
was
Able Seaman Palmer states that he passed for
whom
Leading Seaman in May, 1927. He states he
D.S.M.
possesses the L. S. & G. C. Medal.
n
Recommended for immediate advancement.
Drifter OCEAN BREEZE, War Department Launch HAIG and Skoot PASCHOLL.
(Lieutenant Victor Alexander Christian Henry George de Mauny,
R.N.Retired.
Recommendations,
X
Lieutenant Victor Alexander C.H.G. de Mauny, R.N.
Between noon on the 30th May and 0815 4th June
continuously engaged under way on evacuation
was duties without any intermission. Commanded in
of a group of skoots in PASCHOLL. Brought back more
succession OCEAN BREEZE, HAIG and then as Navigator
conditions on two separate occasions. Was notably
than 300 troops from Dunkirk beach in surf

Details

Page 70
Operation "DYNAMO" - Recommendations of Personnel.
H.M.S. BIDEFORD - Lieutenant Commander John Hugh Lewes, R.N.
This vessel proceeded to Bray beach on the 29th May,
being bombed and machine-gunned on the way across. While
off the beach embarking troops in the evening, the third
bombing attack took place. The ship was struck on the
quarter deck, about 40 feet of stern being completely
blown away, No.2 gun put out of action and the 0.5 machin
gun platforms wrecked, in addition to much other damage.
In spite of the damage done, of the fact that the ship
was grounded aft and of the casualties suffered (3 office
and 13 men killed, 1 officer and 18 men wounded), BIDEFOR
continued to embark troops during the night, and when
eventually towed off and home, carried 400 troops to
England on the 31st May.
Recommendations.
OFFICERS.
Lieutenant Commander John Hugh Lewes, R.N.
In spite of the severe damage to his ship by
bombs and the fact that his ship was aground, he
continued to rescue troops from Bray beach, and
D&C eventually carried 400 to England.
Recommended for mention.
Surgeon Lieutenant John Jordan. M.B., B.Ch., R.N.
Displayed zeal and unswerving devotion to duty
throughout the period 29th-31st May, when he was an
outstanding example to all. His sick berth
attendant seriously wounded, he doalt with some 50
casualties, many horribly mutilated or dangerously
wounded, and performed several major operations,
having organised his limited resources to their
DSD.
utmost. Throughout the period tended his patients
continuously and at all times displayed great
ability, patience and understanding. No effort was
too much for him - no call was left unanswered.
He was completely selfless and upheld the traditions
of the Royal Navy and of his profession in a most
worthy manner.
Recommended for decoration.
RATINGS.
Private George William Crowther, 6th Field Ambulance
B. Company, No. 7354480.
= Dsmandard byour
This man had been embarked from Bray beach. After
to assist the Surgeon. An hour later, when the troops
the ship was struck by bombs he immediately volunteere
board had been transferred to another ship,
Crowther on said he would remain in BIDEFORD BIDEFORD and continue
his severely damaged and aground, and that at the
work there, knowing full well that that time was
very considered highly improbable chance ship to
would in order to tend his wounded for all but
it was reach England, but he gave up his comrades.
get away out his voluntary duties manner. 48 hours
Carried continuously in a most efficient

Details

Page 74
Operation "DYNAMO" - Recommendations of Personnel.
H.M.S. LOCUST - Lieutenant Ackroyd Norman Palliser Costobadie R.N.
This ship played a prominent part in Operation DYNAMO,
not only evacuating troops but in bombarding shore
batteries, and in taking BIDEFORD in tow to Dover, a 30
hour passage, and is probably responsible for saving that
ship. Also carried out demolition work in the wreck of
MOSQUITO to ensure the destruction of all secret books
and other gear, it not then being known that MOSQUITO
had already taken the correct steps to safeguard secret
matter. The ship had only been in commission for a
fortnight prior to joining this operation.
Recommendations.
OFFICERS.
Lieutenant Ackroyd Norman Palliser Costobadie, R.N.
Displayed good judgment and initiative throughout
the operation, frequently under fire from shore
artillery and under air bombardment, particularly
when he found himself the Senior Officer afloat off
La Panne beach on the evening of the 29th, and his
personal efforts in organising the various inshore
boats and the troops ashore resulted in more than
1,000 troops being lifted from the beach to his ship
and other offshore craft, there being no Army
officers present in charge of these troops.
ase
Recommended for decoration.
Lieutenant Arundell Holdsworth, R.N.
Did excellent work on board and on shore, where
on the last night of beach evacuation he hunted up
several small parties of troops hidden amongst the
sand dunes, thereby ensuring their safety. He also
took charge of the successful demolition work in
MOSQUITO, a job of great difficulty owing to the
movement of the wreck in the swell. At all times
he displayed exceptional initiative.
M
Recommended for mention.
RATINGS.
Signalman E. E. Roden, C/D.360.
Signalman H. O. Carter, C/SSX.17317.
Accompanied the officers when they landed. Behaved
with great courage and resource and were personally
instrumental in organising the soldiers and handling
the boats, and in detailing the military for embark-
ation. Their initiative and bearing set a fine example
to the soldiers, who certainly would have failed to
launch the boats without their leadership.
Recommended for mention.

Details

COPY 3.
Sir,
I have the honour to report that, in accordance with
the Instructions of 10 June 1940 received by me from the
Secretary of State for War, I duly left SOUTHAMPTON by
ship at 1400 hours on 12 June, and reached CHERBOURG at
2130 hours the same evening.
For reasons connected with local French orders, it was
not possible to disembark until 0030 hours on 13 June when
Brigadier G. Thorpe (Base Commandant) came out to the ship
in a tug and took me ashore with my staff.
2. At 0800 hours 13 June I left CHERBOURC by car, and
reached LE MANS at-1400 hours after & journey much hampered
by the crowds of refugees on the roads.
Communication Troops, and Brigadier J.G. des R. SWAYNE.
KARSLAKE, Major-General P. de FONBLANQUE, G.O.C., Lines of
There I was met by Lieutenant-General Sir Henry
General I at once KARSLAKE. I instructed him to return to England,
took command of all British troops in France from
which he did by plane that afternoon.
3. At 1500 with General WEYGAND and, after a journey 1 Mission
hours I left LE MANS with Brigadier SWAYNE of for
)
an interview reached the Headquarters of 2000 No. hours that
(Major-Ceneral some 170 miles, Sir Richard HOWARD-VYSE) at
evening. was away at a Cabinet meeting, would see but, me on
his return, General he WEYGAND sent a message to say that he
at 0830 hours on 14 June.
4. I had left as my it was known by The General general inference
staff at LE MANS to get KARSLAKE in touch and with of
to bulk be of that, the after troops crossing engaged
would the SEINE move South in to encircle PARIS.
/ The
FOOTNOTE: ( ) THE THE
MARKET

Details

CU] 1 1
The situation on the front that evening, SO far as it
was known, was that the Tenth French Army, which included
the 157 Infantry Brigade of the 52nd Division, Armoured
) Division (less one Brigade) and BEAUMAN Force, was holding
a line from the Sea West of the SEINE to NEUBOURG and
thence to CONCHES. Between the Southern flank of the
157 Infantry Brigade and DAMVILLE, there was & gap of some
8 miles, which was only lightly held by elements of the
3rd D.L.M. South of this area the Army of Paris was
supposed to be holding & line from DREUX to BONNECOURT on
the SEINE, but there was no confirmation that this Army
was actually in position.
14 JUNE
5. At 0830 hours I saw General WEYGAND. He spoke most
frankly and explained the situation to me. He said that
the French Army was no longer capable of organised resistance,
that it had now broken up into four groups - one of which
was the Tenth Army (General ALTMAYER) with which the B.B.F.
was operating - and that considerable gaps existed between
the groups.
the orders The of their own Commanders, but co-ordinated
Armies he explained, would continue to fight action under
of the force as & whole would no longer be possible. out.
Reserves were exhausted and many formations worn
He then Allied Covernments, BRITTANY was vicinity to of
informed me that, in accordance with be at defended decision
taken by the line across the peninsula in the to General
GEORGES' RENNES. by holding Headquarters He & suggested to that discuss we should with him proceed the details of
this project.
/ We
BEAUMAN Division was an improvised was
FOOTNOTE: ( )
organised as follows:-
The formation which, on 13th June,
of personnel from auxiliary military
"B" Bde Bde - - THE
212 213 - - - Army Engineers.
"E" "E" "C" 4 Provisional reonnel. - the the (improvised). Engineers.

Details

- 8 -
25. I had previously arranged that 90,000 rations, as well
as ammunition, should be sent up to CHERBOURG, as this was
the port on which NORMAN Force would be based. Any altera-
tions to this plan at this stage would have caused & break-
down in the supply arrangements which were very difficult
because the roads were congested and the railways working.
spasmodically.
26. During that evening I was in touch with Ma.jor-General
J.S. DREW commanding the 52nd Division. He informed me
that he had embarked one of his brigades and expected to
proceed to the United Kingdom with his second brigade.
get the other away the next day. I gave him orders to
) 27. Brigadier J.G. des R. SWAYNE, Head of No. 2 Mission,
reported to me on his way to the United Kingdom.
I also dispatched Brigadier N.M. RITCHIE, B.G.S., 2nd
Corps to the United Kingdom that night, as there was no
longer need for his services in France on account of the
reduction of the number of troops.
28. Throughout the day the Germans maintained evening their
pressure on received from General MARSHALL-CORNIALL in
the Tenth French Army. In the &
message which he was it as his opinion that the Tenth French This Army
would disintegrate gave if it were seriously attacked.
R. was R.T.R.) who called at my Headquarters front the
opinion confirmed by his G.S.O.1 (Lieutenant-Colonel about
German hours continued, and the gap between the Tenth miles
2300 Briggs, that night. On the rest of the
wide. Army German forces were in this gap it was impossible and
French advance and the Army of Paris was well over 50
air say, reconnaissance as no was much hampered by low
to What allied fighting troops were in cloud the area and
thunderstorms.
29. the previous 24 hours about 47,000 have troops been and
250 vehicles During of all kinds were reported to
embarked.
17 JUNE
30. morning I received a message from French General
was in full retreat troops to CHERBOURG. His own CHEREOURG. Headquarters
MARSHALL-CORNWALL on LAVAL and RENNES, and
Early that to the effect that the Tenth that he was Army
withdrawing his AVRANCHES and would go next explained to the
were At 1015 moving hours, to I spoke to the C.I.G.S. and
situation to him.
/ On
to
FOOTNOTE:
(
)
a
Operations).

Details

- 9
On receiving General MARSHALL-CORNWALL's report I
ordered Air Commodore COLE-HAMILTON - Commanding the Air
Component - to move with two fighter squadrons and his one
flight of reconnaissance aircraft to the Channel Islands
whence he was to co-operate with NORMAN Force by carrying
out reconnaissance tasks and by protecting the embarkation
of that Force at CHERBOURG. As soon as he had completed
these tasks he was to proceed to the United Kingdom. The
remaining Fighter Squadron was to operate from BREST to give
close protection to that port during the embarkation of the
B.E.F.
31. At 1130 hours, I spoke to Air Marshal BARRATT, and
explained my plan to him. I also discussed with him the
arrangements for the withdrawal from LA ROCHELLE of his
party, which was defending NANTES and ST. NAZAIRE during the
evacuation. He expressed himself as satisfied with the
arrangements that were being made.
32. At 1300 hours, the C.I.G.S. telephonedand informed me
that the B.B.C. had reported that the PETAIN Covernment had
asked the Germans for an Armistice (this was subsequently
confirmed by Capitaine MERIC of the French Mission). He
directed to getting personnel away and afterwards, if the
agreed that, in view of this, all efforts should now be
situation allowed it, as much material as possible. He
United Kingdom that evening. I said that I would ring up
further agreed that I should leave with my staff for the
again about 3 to see if there were any final orders
and that, if I p.m. should be unable to communicate owing to the
cable being out, I would embark as arranged.
Officer (Captain ALLEN, R.N.) explained the situation and
I then saw General de FONBLANQUE and the Senior Naval
ordered them to make every effort to get all personnel away,
and also as many guns and vehiclesas possible.
33. hours I rang up the C.I.G.S. as arranged, hours but I
he had At 1445 returned to the War Office. At 1530 all
communications up again, with LONDON had been cut with at RENNES, any port and except that
rang not but was informed by Signals that
NANTES. did it was at also 1615 I, hours impossible therefore, - and Senior to proceeded decided get Naval in with to touch Officer leave my staff REDON to a and - point which the G.O.C. about I
H.M.S. hours. for 4 L. 34. miles of At C. outside Area and ST. the NAZAIRE. ST. NAZAIRE There Western I in remained which the Approaches armed in had until carrying been trawler 2045 was
not sent
enemy time,
survivors remained my available aircraft in from the that raids harbour afternoon. took during place, the which The but night. "CAMERIDGESHIRE" no had damage been During sunk was that done, by
although three enemy a few air bombs were dropped ashore.
/ 18 JUNE

Details

or 1 I
18 JUNE
0300 hours. The "CAMBRIDGESHIRE" sailed as escort to
a slow convoy.
19 JUNE
1800 hours. The "CAMBRIDGESHIRE" reach PLYMOUTH.
I went up to the Commander-in-Chief's house where I rang
up the C.I.G.S. and reported my arrival in the United
Kingdom.
That evening, with my staff, I caught the midnight
train to LONDON and reported to the C.I.C.S. at 0900 hours
on 20 June.
I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
(Sgd.) Am F. BROOKE.

Details

Dynamo
16
B14/0/
CC FIDENTIAL
Sea Transport Office,
shorlw trevell of 8 Date
NAVAL ASSISTANT
19
.moor 9dd of
Fowey, Cornwall.
doldw втебто TOT vd bited's 0J
3 JUN1940
caedT to nevig 90 of
*
6th, June 1940.
no on Dr.s beliecass
of
Sir,
9dd at REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS OF H.M.S. "DOLPHIN"
noon Ilfm(Sub-Lieutenant Cornish-Bowden' S) Minute I dated
dotsqaeb brts POWER BOAT. egrado
I have the honour to report that, in company with Lieutenants
6th June, 1940.)
MacKewan & Nettle, RNR and Lieutenant Blandy, RIVR, I proceeded
at 1150 hours, 26th.May 1940 from Dover to Dunkirk in S.S. MAID
OF ORLEANS".
.SI
At 1300 hours the vessel was shelled by shore guns from Calais
of at to
JI Isreves II. wod II
but although several shots fell close and the superstructure was
splintered, no direct hits were registered.
ent TOT e.Idstivanu
ni bevolams nismer of
Throughout the night of 26th.May and during the 27th.May I was
No.2198/199.
VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER. JB to
engaged in supervising the embarkation of troops from the Monitor
(Gopies to :-
Quay, despatching the vessels as soon as loaded.
During the
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, PORTSMOUTH.
whole of this time, the operations were subjected to incendiary
VICE-ADMIRAL (s) )
and high explosive bombing by enemy planes at about 10 minutes'
900L no 8181 Js Tevol rotom
.EI
intervals.
edT
JBOD edd areo JB Forwarded. To
During the forenoon of 27th.May, the adjacent buildings to the
enigne to
D.S.T.O.'s Office were set on fire by incendiary bombs followed by
ts
To
RBDanke
heavy bombs,
All official documents and property in this
Office were collected and placed in a Military van, ready for
CAPTAIN (s),
removal.
Commander Lewis and myself approached the Police
H.M.S. "DOLPHIN".
10th June, 1940.
FIFTH SUBMARINE FLOTILLA.
de Navigation and maraged to obtain temporary accomodation near
the Semaphore but it was subsequently found impossible to get the
bits To
to
van to this location owing to intense enemy fire and heavy bombing,
rtf of
rendering the roads impassable.
OF
of
During the early evening of 27th.May I contacted with Commander
VI98
Lewis at the Caisson and arranged for the destruction of all codes
tsod orfit
VICE ADMIRA
to
niawaxoo
and secret documents.
Eventually, Lieutenant Commander
Seymour, RNVR reached the Base by diverse routes and in my presence,
12JUN 1940
extracted and destroyed the secret documents, opened the Deed Box
*
and destroyed its contents, anid heavy bombing by enemy planes.
DOVER
The Office was then abandoned and members of the D.S.T.O.'s
staff removed but it was not possible to save any personal belongings
(a)
or kit.
All personnel proceeded to the Caisson in three
conveyances and parties were formed to superintend the evacuation
and embarkation of the troops.
In this connection, Destroyers had previously landed about 160
nen with Officers for Beach Grouping and embarkation of troops.by
boats which were sent off to the ships.
for Officers to be distributed among the various ships and to proceed
Commander Lewis then issued orders for imediate evacuation and
H.
10
Jurro
18 ready.
Box at the D.S.T.O's Office, which was subsequently handed to the
Cash to the value of 1,000 Francs was extracted from the Deed
Secretary to the P.S.T.O. at Dover, whose receipt is attached.
T.S.S. "QUEEN OF THE CHANNEL".
During the early hours of
28th.May, in embarking troops from the beach at the
eastern side I was of the engaged Harbour entrance in this vessel's five lifeboats. were
200 men were brought alongside in this manner and others
:aken to other craft In the vicinity.
During these
heat last,

Details

32
CONFIDENTIAL
(2)
Sea Transport Office,
NAVAL ASSIS TANT
Fowey, Cornwall.
33
*
8 JUN1940
6th. June 1940.
*
Sir,
of
I have the honour to report that, in company with Lieutenants
MacKewan & Nettle, RNR and Lieutenant Blandy, RNVR, I proceeded
at 1150 hours, 26th. May 1940 from Dover to Dunkirk in S.S. "MAID
OF ORLEANS".
At 1300 hours the vessel was shelled by shore guns from Calais
but although several shots fell close and the superstructure was
splintered, no direct hits were registered.
Throughout the night of 26th.May and during the 27th.May I was
engaged in supervising the embarkation of troops from the Monitor
Quay, despatching the vessels as soon as loaded.
During the
3,
whole of this time, the operations were subjected to incendiary
and high explosive bombing by enemy planes at about 10 minutes'
intervals.
D.S.T.O. Office were set on fire by incendiary bombs followed by
During the forenoon of 27th.May, the adjacent buildings to the
heavy bombs.
All official documents and property in this
Office were collected and placed in a Military van, ready for
Commander Lewis and myself approached the Police
de removal. Navigation and manged to obtain temporary accommodation near
van to this location owing to intense enemy fire and heavy bombing,
the Semaphore but it was subsequently found impossible to get the
rendering the roads impassable.
the early evening of 27th.May I contacted with all Commander codes
Lewis During at the Caisson and arranged for the destruction of
and secret documents.
Eventually, Lieutenant Commander
Seymour, RNVR and destroyed the secret documents, opened planes.
reached the Base by diverse routes and the in my Deed presence, Box
and extracted its contents, amid heavy bombing by enemy D.S.T.O.'s
staff The removed Office but was it was not possible to save any personal in belongings three
destroyed then abandoned and members of the
or conveyances kit. and parties All were formed to superintend the
personnel proceeded to the Caisson evacuation
and the troops.
embarkation of Destroyers had previously landed about 160 by
men with In this Officers connection, for Beach Grouping and embarkation of troops.
boats which were sent off to the ships.
issued orders for immediate evacuation to proceed and
for Commander Officers to Lewis be distributed then among the various ships and
as ready.
Cash to the value which was subsequently attached.
of 1,000 Francs was extracted handed from the to Deed the
Secretary Box at the to D.S.T.O's the P.S.T.O. Office, at Dover, whose receipt is
28th.May, eastern T.S.S. 1 was the engaged Harbour in embarking entrance in troops this this manner from vessel's and others five lifeboats. were
"QUEEN OF THE CHANNEL".
During the early beach hours at the of
the
side were of brought alongside in During these
taken 200 to men other craft in the vicinity.
operations one boat was lost.

Details

II
7
whick, we arrived off this port at 11 PM 65
L could find notody to inform us
ere troops were to be found; we
led up and down past Dunknik,
eaking several other versels during the
ght but could get no information,
6.00 Am on 31st we proceeded into
kink Harbour where we moored
ngside breakwoter and there we
barked some 550 soldies and
led for Mangate at 10.30 Am the same
L. we anived and discharged our
ops at Margate at 3.00 PM and on
wing Margate pin we serored this our
gausing cable, on account of
were ordered to anchor in
urgate roads and await further
less, we remained th there till
cered to Sheernen for repairs
evening of June 4 when we to were
cable. I am Ser
yours faithfully
Master

Details

84
.0's 1700 & 1723. - VESSELS TAKING PART IN OPERATION DYNAMO.
C.E.in C. DEPARTMENT HOPPER BARGE W.95.
REPORTS OF MASTER AND ENGINEER.
We left Fountain Lake about 1.15 a.m. 30/5/40 and
proceeding through the barrage to Nab End Buoy, set course
for the Ower's Light vessel passing same about 3.45 a.m.
Conditions being normal, set course for Royal Soverign Light
Ship, during which time visibility became worse, passed Royal
Sovereign Light Ship, soon after noon, set course for Dungeness,
and although by this time, we were somewhat troubled with fog,
we reached our mark without any incident worth noting, from
Dungeness we had to reduce speed, but managed to keep going and
reached Ramsgate about 6 p.m., on the whole being satisfied
with our trip. Nothing worth noting came out way at Ramsgate
as our services were not utilized, although we were expecting
to move at any moment, we remained at anchor until Saturday
morning 10 a.m. when we were ordered to return to Portsmouth,
St. Helens Roads, at 10.15 p.m. on Saturday evening, dropping
at full speed, from leaving Ramsgate to arriving at Portsmouth,
the passage home was practically a perfect one, we were moving
anchor for the night, proceeding to harbour on Saturday morning.
(sa.) F.J. Tope,
Master.

Details

Deprements 273.
117
Southern Railway
102
Reference
DESABLED
ROYAL MAIL SERVICE,
My
TELEGRAPHIC ADDRESS:
"FOREMOST, DOVER.
Your
TELEPHONE No.
DOVER 000.
H.M.T. "CANTERBURY",
EXTN.
c/o G.P.O.,
Slower
London.
7th June, 1940.
Commodore Dukes-Hughes, R.N.,
Principal Sea Transport Officer,
Lord Warden Hotel,
Dover.
Dear Sir,
narrative of In events covering the period 26th May to 4th June in
reply to your request of the 5th instant, re a
which the above the ship 26th was May employed; we left Dover for Dunkirk at 17.58,
24/5
passing on by a German shore battery, the shots and after short.
Calais On through the Dunkirk channel. When off No. falling 6 buoy,
We arrived at troops, left again at 00.20 on the 27th, the arriving same day
we were fired the Gare Maritime, Dunkirk, at 20.30
27/6
embarking 1,340 at 03.09. Orders were received through
at No. 4 berth Dover this vessel left Dover at 14.38, passing Arriving at the the
Maritime, we Maritime at 20.58, we returned by and stood by for
Downs, across embarked to 457 personnel & wounded, including the same route,
to return, and Zuidcote pass thence into Dunkirk. 140 stretcher
arriving alongside day short notice. Vessel Pier at 14.00,
cases. Leaving the Dover at 02.25 on the 28th May, again left for 29/5 28/5
the remainder of the the 29th, on arriving at the East vessel was
when 1950 troops were aircraft, embarkation being delayed. from the time left she
Dunkirk at 09.30 on embarked. During this operation, Vessel
bombed by hostile & was bombed continually, salvo of bombs
left until she passed Port Quarter that damage crew's was galley and to
at 16.50 on her return Neuport Bank buoy, the last sustained
bursting 80 close delivery to the lines, coupling bolts, funnel guys
steam pipes, oil peak bulkhead strained & buckled, has since been
lavatories, carried away after & the gun put A seaman out of member action of (this the the gun's same crew evening was wounded at
replaced by a new gun). Vessel arrived at Dover the Granville
21.46. Vessel was taken May, remaining there until had been the effected. of
during these attacks. off the service & entered morning
Dock, the 3rd Dover June, on by the which 31st time temporary repairs

Details

Daynam 262
140
All Cheques and Money Orders to be made payable to DAVID MACBRATNE LTD., and crossed.
8
ALL PASSENGERS, LUCCAGE, COODS AND LIVE STOCK, ARE CARRIED SUBJECT TO THE CONDITIONS
SPECIFIED ON THE COMPANY'S SAILING BILLS, NOTICES AND ANNOUNCEMENTS.
124
ДАТТИНСТЧИОС
- 2 -
"LIVENWOOD"
GLASGOW AND HIGHLAND ROYAL MAIL STEAMERS
21
DAVID MACBRAYNE Limited,
REFER TO
time.
the tide. I sent the boat away a gain and this time the
We carried on like this for 3 hours until
STEAM PACKET OFFICE.
soldiers got into it that she was swamped, We kept so
5th June
1940
men in her as possible, and I told my men to hang on as to
To Principal Sea Transport, officir. Dover.
as she was floating on the tanks, and I hauled her back
"long messenger",
Subject narrative of Events.
I could not do any MOTERVIC more. The other boat was hale
and I had to back off then, as I was afraid the ship would
slew round towards the beach and I should catch my screw in
sand. I should never have got off again if that had
forward with the gratest possible accuracy the
In answer to your request for the above, I hereith the
happened. I gave her full astern, came off to deep water
dropped anchor again,
but a I launch had not came as many along troops and told as me I wanted, to get out about with 60 Lochgarry andhol was corrived dropped in we the were Downs quested anchorage, with before a hail the of
events in question On Friday 24.. may at
all,
I had. We left Dunkerque at 8 Damo on the 31st May, sailed:
machine bullets ion the vessel port own. side, I either cannot from
Dover and landed everybody safely.
near other four railway us, or five boat the anchoring and other nearest myself ships being in put deep near only our water us 100 ships at and Dunkerque, yards on sending to away. the off but beach, There only to the In the examination the morning a we boat how off up Douer anohor for order. and closed Having further received
We had been constantly bombed, the bombs falling which enemy Oas fight was in process in with
an gun plane, -or from one of our overhead at the time say
way,
beach, was much too slow.
rden we proceeded back at 5.15.pm to the anchorage, you monday awaiting 27 - may 1940.
The soldiers were panic all very at all, good and indeed. this also They orders the which -come to proceed to Dunkergue that as board, the face we
very fireman, to the tired French R. but Moodey, troops, there kept was I out going no only to saw overboard, the one boats French and swimming encouraging Officer, to the was orders low, and wire to we had out no those suitable orders, charli the on am at 28ᵗʰ 6.am
men He tired soldiers would to that help who go they themselves, to were the would wading beach otherwise and and often swim have swam back given with to the up. those boats He who this with forced were for get were may and Orders unable received were the received carry required to proceed amount to of Dovi fuel for anchord from fuel the
who
could
not
swim
themselves.
He
carried
on
like
and
much
3
hours.
There
was
a
heavy
swell
the
whole
time,
War maide Sepoy Detached finishing mole at for furthers ame until and then 6. Piir form when the
The surf. Merchant The and Navy two brought Gunlayer soldiers down on at an the the enemy 12 Bren pounder, plane gun did with Go splendid Knight, his first work the the vessel ussel was was alongside required all pier the and adminity probisions on loaded voyage. 7.5/m out &
The excellently Chief Officer worked the 28 Lewis rounds gun. of All 12 pdr. the ammuni 303
ammunition
was
expended
and
various U- preparations cast made from for admirally procuding set Put, land us.
fired.
of until at pm following when we got hold of
8. the 56. from Harbour we off the route as the forth N. goodwin
may
*16TC
to Dunkirk at 0030 on the the East Ist inst. Mole. arriving Low water just and before wreks
Proceeded daybreak berthing again at difficult.,A the end berth destroyers of ship. berthed alongside this ship
making and berthing then loaded embarked more over I856 the deck troops of this (including bombers became about 400 more French active, troops) both
This By this ship time it was was alongside daylight and and after enemy she had left to return to Dover, Dunkirk at
which when the port evening ship we arrived of the during same day the orders morning. were received to proceed to holing
and While On the this leaving vessel Dover left Harbour, at 2030 H.M.S. Worcester collided with this ship,

Details

14
All Cheques and Money Orders to be made payable to DATED MACBRATSE Lro., and crossed.
8'
ALL PASSENGERS, LUCGAGE, 00008 AND LIVE STOON, ARE CARRIED SUBJECT TO THE CONDITIONS
SPECIFIED ON THE COMPANY'S SAILING BILLS, NOTICES AND ANNOUNCEMENTS.
125
GLASGOW AND HIGHLAND ROYAL MAIL STEAMERS
DAVID MACBRAYNE Limited,
REFER TO
STEAM PACKET OFFICE.
19
To
II
Subject
it Vessel which was not lit, we chopped the Slar
wer with 4 5. fthms cable, as the night was chark +
until 3 some on the 29 may when we proceeded at the
may, -gmal 00 11. 25, am alongside and Demkingue we had to wait
but Hinder Buy st 6.48am and at Breakwater. nieupost
ary, speed along the route channel, 8.45am arriving at the
im in the offing, slow there to respond being so to many the helm ships alongside. m the
tide was low, and falling, our
wr turn for going alongside when * shallow "Killarney"
hallow the vissel water, was and drawing 16 ft aft draft. the We missed
sipped in ahead of us and pinshed birth I
inished loading. a turn screw vissel the of berth we draft
ight to will have gott the The brakwater next available where the water was mishap, could were
EM was shallow, but up we slipped into it without any DN three
nd immediately commenced embarking troops for of aft.
have ang Leistenant ways we met which commander, two wore very regged brave who up wore min, temporary carrying The Ammander on their and work,
nd directing operations shells the wore some chroping as of no in but danger the Harhar
his cisted bout 50 yards The Jerry from the fow There of the was vessel, nothing ama but Comate they
longside of every us, and loaded his our
and not pine appear where to explode around, a Destroyer complainent THE up
XIII
E A
to DUILKIPK at 0030 on the Tat inst. Mole. arriving Low water just and before wroks
Proceeded again at the end borth of the Tast alongaide this ship
daybreak berthing berthing more difficult. destroyers ship. berthed
making and loaded over I856 the deck troops of this (including about 400 French active, troops) both
when By this the time ship it was alongside and after she had at
This ship then embarked was daylight and enemy bombers left became to more return to Dover,
which On the port evening we arrived of the during same day the orders morning. were received to proceed to Dunkirk
and while this leaving vessel Dover laft Harbour, at 2030 H.M.S. Worcester collided with this ship, holing
third tal thi @ ar
inileile 1smg of th
this Dover laft Ha

Details

clast
142
All Cheques and Money Orders to be made payable to DAVID MACBRATNE Lm. and crossed.
18
ALL PASSENGERS, LUGGAGE, 00008 AND LIVE STOCK, ARE CARRIED SUBJECT TO THE CONDITIONS
SPECIFIED ON THE COMPANY'S SAILING BILLS, NOTICES AND AMMOUNCEMENTS.
126
GLASGOW AND HIGHLAND ROYAL MAIL STEAMERS
21
DAVID MACBRAYNE Limited,
REFER TO
STEAM PACKET OFFICE.
19
To
III
Subject
used While this was taking place, we had our first
me specks in the sky, working in the Destroyers come down
sample of an air raid. The Juny planes sumwards, we saw, as
"
like in um front electric like of serving bullets. the ening machines, The which gums until shattered finally going him a the large th next match shell lot come work burst Dd 46
them all was quiel for a while until likewise Having
along, completed loading 2,500 a Jug or about boat was told do 10L to give Brak was us
and he was dealli with we east of the
three a lift Destromers of abread astim of us. He made Stomwise. fast
Waler at 2. the Brakwater by the stem, there our
He Horboard did quarter his rope too to well, his bow. pulled and us accross, public well out, he and when
6 straightin us up m and the thus chamul cutting our D/G the in two
he thought job we were going too for by giving we a nose
Hunder places, I the did not counter, want his "nose off the pitch of us
bropellor and the helm would have straightened I could have up
neely, and if kick that about was on not the sufficient, starband the helm which boat
did been given would not her curtainly have al in live the have necessary done quickly the patience, trick, short but The circulid D/G on the whe Ing and Pur having cought hlads
cut places, Some Frunchmen I ordered the current
fine noticed emded it first, the countrie, and raised the alam or
or May Stat.
GO DUIKITK at 0030 on the East Tat inst. Mole. arriving Low water just and before wroks
Proceeded daybreak berthing berthing again more at difficult., the end borth destroyers of this the ship. berthed alongside this ship
Destroy
making and loaded over I856 the deak troops of (including about 400 French active, troops) both
when By this the time ship it was alongside and after morning. she Dunkirk at
This ship then embarked was daylight and enemy bombers had left became to more return to Dover,
que
his
which On the port evening we arrived of the during same day the orders were received to proceed to
thought
and While this leaving vessel Dover left Harbour, at 2030 H.M.S. Worcester collided with this ship, holing
aightin
th
I
do

Details

clost
All Cheques and Money Orders to be made payable to DAVID MACHEATSE Lro., and crossed.
143
18
ALL PASSENGERS, LUGGAGE, 00008 AND LIVE STOON, ARE CARRIED SUBJECT TO THE CONDITIONS
SPECIFIED ON THE COMPANY'S SAILING BILLS, NOTICES AND AMNOUNCEMENTS.
127
GLASGOW AND HIGHLAND ROYAL MAIL STEAMERS
DAVID MACBRAYNE Limited,
REFER TO
STEAM PACKET OFFICE.
19
To
II
Subject
as already cut off as the thgmins The male already was some
be cut off, by phone to the had and I think noticed it
omething amise the the switchboard the
his 2 happed while we wire backing out of ander control
the job with a fire spray. and flames the harbows, and . 6
3,mg inder the countries it was difficult and get did the his
was Do quali relief when the fire was to reporties at, but the
d
poli hass mention, that we were at a disationtage
slid down a rope like a monkey
writing trough so that the matt and myself the channel, we more
would the 2nd male leaving the ship at had Done to share his
raiting for our order beacort: He H.14, suddenly Distroyer F.34. jumped Grayhound, ahead and which sig- Zag
duties between us! Having got mh while he
to X. The salvo short missed distime, the third one caught I Destroyer the
vas shouling him, the se cond one dropped the
amidships close is, and he should "Carry left alone
us -20 and put her out of action passed we by then
one estroyer away full batter and from rig- zaged the shore. and a were small attement
was a a while, no shelling in the chammels full this of troppe, we
bassed above that of we and then had fow, small
a
only, owe starboad both
Gracic hospital Fields", ship going I think in on on our I saw port them bow. they both getting wave the
3g- salvas. zaging but vigan two only. Lewis and game on the bridge opened fire
use morning of May Stat.
to Dunkirk at 0030 on the Tat tnst. arriving Low water just and before wroke
making daybreak berthing berthing more difficult.,* destroye ship. berthed alongside
Proceeded again at the end borth of the East Mole. this ship
and state loaded embarked over I856 the deck troops of this (including about 400 French active, troops) both
when By this the time ship WELD was alengside and after she had laft to return at
This ship than it daylight and enemy bombers became more to Dover,
which On the port evening we arrived of the during same day the orders morning. were received to proceed to Dunkirk
and While this leaving Dover Harbous,H.M.S. Woreaster collided with this ship, holing
vessel left at 2030

Details

All Cheques and Money Orders to be made payable to DATED MACBRATSE Lro., and crossed.
145
ALL PASSENGERS. LUGGAGE, 00008 AND LIVE STOCK, ARE GARRIED SUBJECT TO THE CONDITIONS
129 148°
SPECIFIED ON THE COMPANY'S SAILING BILLS, NOTICES AND ANNOUNCEMENTS:
GLASGOW AND HIGHLAND ROYAL MAIL STEAMERS
DAVID MACBRAYNE Limited.
REFER TO
STEAM PACKET OFFICE.
19
To
VI
1
Subject
bulir harbor. and brought in to ferry Jetty at 5.pm on
1ˢᵗ where the the usual D/G routine whing work is being of the repaird, vessel
is and being corried on, without any special the value occurances of
.
ng zaging in I such believe circumstimes, it saved us on all occasism
up to 4 the gune 1940. In my opinion cannot be four
ag
ed
sufficient, we Ten, work would be near it. the mark. a gime for
when stressed, as attacked, Two, Luvis gume me ml
every seamens that could use
I any
Faithfully
Mastir s/s Laohgary:
and not touch
on the morning of May 31st.
making borthing more difficult." destroyers berthed alongaide this ship
daybreak berthing at the end borth of the East Mole. Low water and wroks
Proceeded again to Dunkirk at 0030 on the Tat inst. arriving just before
and loaded over the deck of this ship.
This ship then embarked I856 troops (including about 400 French troops)
when the ship was alongside and after she had left to return to Dover, at
By this time it was daylight and anemy bombers became more active, both
which port we arrived during the morning.
On the evening of the same day orders were received to proceed to Dunkirk
and this vessel laft at 2030
while leaving Dover Harboub, H.M.S. Worcester collided with this ship, holing

Details

Dynam 26%
148
132
Transport AC
H.M.T.Maid of Orleans
he P.S.T.O.
SOUTHAMPTON
OVER
June 6th 40
Narrative of events-Period 26th May-4th June 40
n
Sir
26th May, this vessel received orders to proceed to Dunkirk. for
Prior at that port, together with other stores, cases maps of A.S.C.
On to leaving 6,000 (2gall)cans of water were put aboard of use etc.
A. of detachment troops of troops, in number, consisting of details
Signals at were II00 also and embarked. proceeded to Dunkirk, taking the short falling sea route.
Left Game Dover under fire from a battery near Calais. Shells although close,
registered Arrived off no Dunkirk, hits on but this did vessel. not enter port, but returned to Dover, arriving
off that port during to return the afternoon. to Dunkirk, this time with an escort Queen and at arrived the
Received about 5.30 orders Entered Dunkirk and berthed alongside Monas
Gare Maritime. already loaded with troops and this allowing vessel could this
The dischage latter vessel until was the Mona's Queen had pulled out, and thus stores.
not ship to go alongside interference the quay from to aircraft, land the probably water due to oil the reservoirs fact that a
There thick pall was no of smoke covered the ship from the burning
nearby. collaborated in discharging the water.This This work was proceeded done by
until forming an a order chain from from the quay was given to stop.The water
All hands then the Well deck to the gangway supply being
Troops considered difficulty were sufficient. then was embarked experienced and the on ship leaving left owing about to 3.0am. the low state of
water Some and the port propeller plane was which slightly dropped damaged. two bombs, but did on not this succeed trip
Were attacked by enemy total number of troops carried discharged.
were The same 988, afternoon including (May 27th) this vessel from returned the Dunkirk (Conveyed
in touching this vessel. 8 civilians. The irrived at Dover at 0600 to Dunkirk, and but, on by
arrival at the )not Roads to received enter, 30 orders returned to Dover and enchored to Dunkirk in Harbour. and berth-
S.S. On the Centerbury morning of 29th May.at as 0432 far in this as ship possible.Shirted returned ship three times
as ed Vessel alongside tide was ebbed alongside the making East passed about inner Mole, through berths five hours, at an pier area during untenable. where which a aubmarine time at Dover the pier hunt and was was dis- in
shelled. progress. charged On the Vessel leaving, I372 subjected troops carried to bombing and which attacks. included Arrived a number of stretcher
cases. Left again at for the Dunkirk East Mole at at taking the long to route usable heavy and damage being
arriving the one at the extreme and Embarked as 37 aff 1216 including Restaurant 42 stretcher
from cases) shell The latter fire and were bombs. made as comfortable was as exemplary. possible in the
Subjected and this Saloons. vessel, as which The usual discipline returned to attacks at of to Dover 0030 from the troops on bombing on the the Ist morning planes inst. but of arriving Low May which water 31st. did just and not before wroks touch
Proceeded berthing again to at Dunkirk the end borth of the East berthed Mole. alongaide this ship
daybreak berthing more difficult. destroyers this ship.
making and loaded embarked over I856 the deck troops of (including about became 400 more French active, troops) both
This By this ship time then it was alongside daylight and and after enemy she bombers had left to return to Dover, at
which when On the the port evening ship we arrived was of the during same day the orders morning. were received to proceed to Dunkirk
and While this leaving vessel Dover left Harbour, at 2030 H.M.S. Worcester collided with this ship, holing

Details

Dynam 26%
148
132
Transport A@
H.M.T.Maid of Orleans
he P.S.T.O.
SOUTHAMPTON
OVER
June 6th 40
Narrative of events-Period 26th May-4th June 40
Sir On to 26th leaving 6,000 (2gall) cans of water were put aboard of maps use etc.
May, this vessel received orders to proceed to Dunkirk. for
Prior at that port, together with other stores, cases of A.S.C.
A. of detachment troops of troops, 250 in number, consisting of details
Signals etc.were at II00 also and embarked. proceeded to Dunkirk, taking the short falling sea route.
Came Left Dover under fire from a battery near Calais. Shells although close,
registered Arrived off no Dunkirk, hits on but this did vessel. not enter port, but returned to Dover, arriving
off that port during return the afternoon. to Dunkirk, this time with an escort and at arrived the
Received about 5.30 orders pm.Entered to Dunkirk and berthed alongside Monas Queen
Gare Maritime. was already loaded with troops and thus this allowing vessel could this
The latter vessel until the Mona's Queen had pulled water out, and stores.
not ship dischage to go alongside interference the quay from to aircraft, land the probably due to oil the reservoirs fact that a
There thick was pall no of smoke covered the ship from the burning
nearby. collaborated in discharging the water. This This work was proceeded done by
until All forming hands an a order then chain from from the the quay Well was deck given to the to gangway. stop.The water supply being
Troops considered were sufficient. then was embarked experienced and the on ship leaving left damaged. owing about to 3.0am. the low state of
water Some difficulty and the port propeller plane which was slightly dropped two bombs, carried but did on not this succeed trip
Were attacked by enemy The total number of troops and discharged.
were 988, including 8 (May 27th) this vessel returned the Dunkirk (Conveyed
in touching this vessel. civilians Arrived at Dover at 0600 to Dunkirk, but, on
The same afternoon received orders from anchored in Harbour. by
arrival S.S. Canterbury at the )not Roads to enter, go 0437 returned this ship to Dover returned and to Dunkirk and berth-
On the morning of 29th Mole,a May.at far in as possible.Shirted untenable. ship three times
as Vessel ed alongside tide was ebbed alongside the making East about inner berths five hours, at an pier area during where which a submarine time the hunt pier was was in
shelled. On leaving, passed through to bombing attacks.Arrived included number at Dover of and dis-
progress. charged the Vessel I372 subjected troops carried and which the a long route stretcher
cases. Left again for Dunkirk at the usable being
and
arriving at the East Mole heavy damage
from the cases)! one shell The at latter fire the extreme and were made and as of the troops was as possible exemplary. but in the Restaurant 42 stretcher
Subjected this vessel, as which usual returned to attacks to Dover 0030 on on the the Tat morning inst.arriving 31st. just before touch
and Saloons. The disciplina from bombing planes of May which did not
Proceeded daybreak berthing again to at Dunkirk the end at borth TIME adjusts IND. Sast Mole.Low alongside water this and wroks ship
making berthing more difficult QUESTE can usevel at
and loaded over DDD RESE shing duag
This ship then wasse
when By this the time ship it SEAL THE ÉELIC Dan carwas neibs serve Dewoite aDover,
at
which port we GREE backed CORIA inconce 2010 48 minutse Nasse
and While this leaving vessel LIMIT Via séuides to -
On the evening of VISA MENT anênial was SQRATED the Wilnes

Details

Dynam 26H
149
Continued)
133
shell plating and causing damage too serious for this vessel to proceed to
sea Returned to anchor in Dover Harbour.
The ship left for Folkestone on the evening of the 2nd June and berthed in
the Inner Harbour where the damage was inspected and the ship made sea-
worthy preparatory to leawing for Southampton.
During Monday the 3rd inst. work proceeded and the ship left for Southampton
on Tuesday afternoon, the 4th June. and arrived at the latter port at 2I00.
The total carryings for this vessel from Dunkirk was 5.5II

Details

-2-
202
181
"Blved 108" .0.H
185
ЛОВ ols
June 1st.
ship's port quarter, causing damage
(Contd.)
to port engine shaft and other machinery,
21
JUST
also multiple damage to fittings,
compasses etc. Port engine reported by
1
Engineers to be out of action. Made
contact with Naval authorities at Dover,
and instructions received to proceed
to Southampton for repairs.
avneve to ovidevism of
and amtrevoo 'Tensey sids
9.0 pm. Hove up and proceeded for Southampton.
14t
altegob of
Found compasses practically useless,
no
showing deviations of 16 degrees on
.TOVOL 101 nevsdven .NOOR
standard, and 30 degrees on steering
3
compass, and changing rapidly with
set Todors or спарто bevieeen -ATCH 04.8 80.8
FIRT
every alteration of course. Decided
to return to Dover to obtain compass
OBI
anwo de
adjuster.
10
June 2nd. 3.10 am.Anchored in Downs.
1077
of Dessora OJ are Bito bevieesh .100 08.8
7.8 am. Weighed anchor, and proceed to Dover.
The
.0 gesedors JOSE 38.8
Requested adjuster.
124
- CA.P
3.30 .Adjuster on board. Unable to repair
.781° eblagnole UBST ebell THE 8.8
damage owing to injury to springs etc.
JN mot no
Bearings of sun taken all day on courses
TO сдешаб oil
required. Decided to leave in evening if
weather clear.
admotted PAT .zeveu
7.32 pm.Left Dovel for Southampton.
Difficulties with compasses experienced,
based DO
also steering owing to port engine out
TOVOL T10
of action.
neveriment besport &debro Бетесоей .mo08.91
of Dre -SIT 88.4
bast
June 3rd. 6.5 am. Off Received Nab Tower, orders Southampton. to anchor, Port closed.
4.7 pm. Received word, Port open, proceeded
thos
to
towards Docks.
6.52pm. Made fast alongside.
of covisivell 3264 ALS 8.2
où Decease od croivoundent 220 - 68.8 4.1
add that the Officers and difficult Crew behaved voyage. with
you Tedia TODA 0410
splendid I can only coolness throughout this very
the - SM.D
Reflex 110 .DU 81.8
Respectfully yours,
.of
Tennov and EA.9
B. Mendul
vd become and
Master.
Mer
cor
CosseV to brown
DO
VS obto
THE
unit
dud
berieve
of behbadre attend
of or
PO Scadnoo 09.
03 had
swote to
of Na 1000
Coob
Principal Sea Transport Officer,
To/ The Commodore, R.N.
00
Lord Warden Hotel,
DOVER.
T10
LEASE

Details

Details

enut does ИАМХИАМ .oner OT YTHAT JAOI.COM
-2-
237
VO benifit .0401
mate was suffering from shock and exhaustion, and found unfit for
further duties. Other members of the crew were suffering from
0808 .X .A ,1.8.8
0028 .X .7 ,A.8.2.11
various degrees of shock. The condition was not improved when on
Sunday June 2nd 1940 a magnetic mine was exploded by a sweeper in
.8805 Х.ИАМЯАНО .H 1.8.2
the path the ship had taken half an hour previously to anchorage.
Certain members of the crew were treated and others advised, and
,biswrot 008 IO alris JeHoso msets neM TO efat
were were able to sail for Dunkirk that evening. Again the Sick
403 alwed S Drts TIS HUZ NOTE S dr.br IS at This
Berth staff did not join in these apprehensive actions, and
Noeb effT Teach Nota OF beasesseg bres VITA smit
conversations, and materially assisted in raising the general
bits DILG tsod ent neewted JIE betensta Midso viemente
confidence of the ship's company.
end Deverest TOI asw noolsa offt 10 ebja ело ..bebruow DUE two
Tol S 28 020 TOI
The ship, was unattached, and at dawn the jetty at Dunkirk
reached, and cleared of all troops. There were only about 450
Surgeela as beview bris ass 300 10 nots
was troops present and all these were embarked. The wounded, all but
one than those found on the previous voyage, and only involved cleansing
of whom could walk were treated. The wounds were less severe
to of GETT епо .5003 Jon 2.SW Were edit to
and dressing.
need DNS edT Vsb elstos
to sonsibiovs DNG egainst avoiveta
soldiers were sighted in a dinghy, exhausted and unable to warmed handle
Off the beach at Dunkirk, whilst returning, eight British
qida ent to eds
efft misb JS DNS Juods JS
and able to walk off the ship with the other troops The
their their clothes dried. After this treatment, and food when drink, the
boat efficiently. They were all picked up, bathed, and
moth .0.0 08.8 tuods belief .ONEI yelf
they were reached Dover on Monday June 3rd. Tuesday June 4th. at 8 party p.m.
-Itns evisnetmt ch begsane to OWJ
quite ent a twode ITAU beforer Jon 86W viset en?
for cancelled. It must be recorded that the stck
rejoined Dunkirk. However insufficient crew could be mustered, berth
ship the ship at 5 p.m. The ship, was ordered to sail and the
adoctt Natting award Serm TOT .aredriod ушэле NO
billib 9bsm B.SW associa edT .atedoventa belinest eseds
081 tuods 311x1sdme 111 nexet asw emit
ratings experience for this trip and were disappointed was
orders were had re-arranged and improved the sick bay in the that light the of
seriodes NO STOW behruow
edt TOI Tolq shit to DND odt of
at ship 10.30 p.m. and the party returned to Chatham the following
previous did not takeits place in this final effort. The ship left
afternoon.
nature of the ship which was dirty, and lacked many naval
Notger efft Mede of emit atdt Js oals ужене
facilities, medical valise would have simplified certain treatment,
From the many improvisations had to be made. The use 0.8. of a
to nottsxisdme ent berthed
abeega only mt VISVO 9VSS dired
catheterisation and made treatment more adequate.
-JUO earlased тельтетта MJIW betatass IIS DNS
to NOTAUTNOS DNS sitt Ilena SHIWOTTED edj Vd
The sick berth ratings were untiring in suggesting and
The ent .JISTOTLE Jantsas
carrying out improvisations.
beauso atdso a'TeaTHo ont of essens tdalla TOI
ont to OWT satyl nus 8 S 10
(Synia) B.T. Stutter
TONIN
Surgeon Lieut. R.N.V.R.
DAS ,DISOdE aqoots 080 HJW befiss girls add .M.S
DILSW OJ elds behillow 08 JUOUA NO
to OUT .ot bebnetts JICINCO Drus There
GRT edit no both Returnt elgitive now
10 tw vivint [smiqa IO aeaso out
ilse[] 03161 at SHOTTING 863 twetgtont 10
петвиев BAB\TO atinu 000.01 rff.tw Detsett STOW
.A.H enT IJHS aredto offi
mori Ittate constates evs3 antilevers
ritted Nota ont IIA .J2ST of Dellegmos BEW 9d
DNS jelup B nt exevov strit
efolite DUE assemily silt heasement
DMS tremont ONO TOI OIDI for ase all ДЛОТЕВАЯ
Hast VIeve tuo DELITED 0808 X A
.bebruow ent 10 Protmoo eat of bebmesse
S DISNLOT JB bexasdments etew Debrutor Dris EQ0017
ets dissed Hold ONCE JOIE VSM Vebity do
bebrition to Invoner OCU
JB benterer active

Details

289
267
From:- Act. Sub. Lt. K.H. Martin, R.N.
B.
Date:- 5th June, 1940.
To:- Naval Officer in Charge, Ramsgate.
Noteworthy action of crew of five of "Excellent"
motor boat attached to Hopper FOREMOST 102. On the
evening of May 31st, during a bombing raid on Bray
beach, east of Dunkirk harbour, their boat was thrown
over and capsized, throwing themselves and about twenty
French soldiers into the sea. The crew then proceeded
to drag the Frenchmen ashore, saving nearly all of them,
and then tirelessly proceeded to right their doat and
used it further to get more soldiers aboard.
Names of crew: Ldg. Sea. H.H. Dixon - PJX 131223
Ldg. Sto. W.C. Ingram - PK 20348
A.B. L.C.F. Cass
- PJ 95180
A.B. J. Maynard
- PJ 102850
A.B. E. Davies
of PJX 128361
also courage and endurance of P.O. J.S. Wood P.J.108457
and Stoker 11. Carr P.K. 61925 in keeping their boat and
engine running when half waterlogged in same raid.
May I mention particularly the spirit of civilian
of crew of Hopper FOREMOST 102 who continued
members rescue work for over five hours in the surf, and all of
whom volunteered for further rescue work.
(sgd) K.H. MARTIN
Acting Sub-Lieutenant,
Royal Navy.

Details

Dyram. 122.
302
279
FROM .... SUB. LT. T.K. EDGE-PARTINGTON. R.N.
DATE
****
6th June, 1940.
TO .... THE COMMODORE-IN-CHARGE, SHEERNESS.
Tuesday, 28th May, 1940,
1830. Left Sheerness in Motor Boat "Vera" which
broke down twice during the night, and was eventually towed
into Ramsgate on the afternoon of Wednesday, 29th May, 1940.
I was then given command of the converted Dutch Eel
boat "CHANTECLER" of 13 tons.
I left Ramsgate at 2200 that evening, in convoy with
"GOLDEN LILY" and "JOHANNA", after about a quarter of an hour we
left the convoy as we were only making good 4 knots.
I carried on alone endeavouring to navigate by a
compass which So was situated over the engine and which revolved
slowly round and round.
arrived off Dunitirk at approx. 0900 on the side 30th,
having had We a drifting mine scraping past our Starboard
during the night.
We passed before grounding. The soldiers off
Dunkirk wide and proceeded into the waded 3. beach out
as far as possible hauled about 30 of them aboard, before shoving of any
to us and we course back home. We saw no cloud signs and mist.
and enemy setting aircraft our during the day due to very low
Dunkirk at 1030 and sighted what I to thought find it to
be the N. Goodwin Light, so rather than go on up soldiers. I
We left Light at 1800, and steamed on only to Ramagate,
was went the into S. Dover Goodwin at 2200 and landed the 30 British
We spent the night at Dover and returned to Ramagate at
1300 on the 31st May.
Ramsgate that evening and returned Hunt. to Sheerness
in the Motor I left boat "LIEBESTRAUM" with S/Lt. Carew
following afternoon June 1st, 12. I took Te the arrived Notor Yacht at
"ALHENA" round The to Ramagate in a convoy of
1900 and spent the night there.
day, June 2nd, we were informed to that go only in
fast craft would "MARLBOROUGH", navigator. Lewis gunners. Captain,
The following be wanted that night, ao I volunteered S/Lt. Don was
S/Lt. the W.O.M/L Pool Cocewain and engineers S/Lt. as Carew and Hunt one N.T.B. one of stoker, the two A.B.'s
We and took two civilians the two R.A.P. from the Treasury!
One civilian, Pollock by name, was invaluable as he
spoke fluent French.
at 1930 in company with V.D. the M/L harbour "HAIG"
and arrived We at left Dunkirk Ramagate one at of approx. the inner 2230. piers. We entered Enemy opened aircraft fire
with were our flying Lewis gun with tracer
and secured over, alongside and, as many other ammunition. ships did, we
were shelling the harbour at vicinity. intervals and
shells were The exploding Germans at reqular intervals in the

Details

30.
-2-
in 280
We took 36 French soldiers aboard and left Dunkirk at
0000 approx.
We had a quiet journey back and arrived at Ramsgate at 0400
The following evening June 3rd, we again went out in the
"MARLBOROUGH" with special orders to Rendezvous with Admiral Taylor,
who had left at 1600.
We contacted him at about 2100 in mid channel and took him
aboard, then proceeding on our way to Dunkirk.
We arrived at 2230
and entered, going right up as far as we could past the wooden pier
into the inner basin, under Admiral Taylor's directions.
Here we secured alongside the wall and the Admiral went
ashore to find the French Naval Attache.
We remained alongside for about an hour with shells bursting
all around us, one actually bursting the other side of the jetty, and
a rainstorm of shrapnel came dropping around us!
The Admiral then sent us out again to find the small craft,
and show them where to come in and take off the troops.
A few of them followed us in and we secured alongside the
The shells were still dropping around us and by this
wall time we again. could hear the German machine gunners in the streets back not 400 and
yards away.
We were very relieved when the Admiral came
told us to shove off.
left at about 0130.
On our way out we were hammed in
the We jetty by a destroyer and went straight over a part the of boat the
nearly capsized, but fortunately righted herself.
close jetty which had been shelled and fallen into the fairway,
We found she was making no water, but we had lost both screw
and rudder.
M.A.S.B. offered to give us a tow but she could Pool not
astern A and fast consequently rammed the jetty herself. her. S/Lt.
go jumped aboard her to bear her off and got stranded
Three French trawlers refused to give us a tow back, and
eventually the Motor Yacht "GULZAR" took us in tow.
aground, for It had was, we gone over we would in all probability hit by
after all, possibly fortunate that we did been run
a shell which burst 30 yards ahead of us.
once during the night but we managed Pool to get who
in tow again The and tow arrived broke back in Dover at 0700, less S/Lt.
was in M.A.S.B.S07.
We left the "MARLBOROUGH" at Dover and returned to Ramagate
by lorry.
(Sgd) T.K. KDGE- PARTINGTON.
SUB- LIEUTENANT, R.N.

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22
294
REPORT OF OPERATIONS AT DUNKIRK.
1st Trip.
Left Ramsgate a.m. Thursday 30th May in motor
yacht Rygate II with a crew of 4 civilians. Boat broke
down en route, and I had a tow from the "Hortse", who sent
a stoker aboard to see whether he could repair the engine.
After an hour he reported that he couldn't repair it, so
we were taken onboard the Hortse, leaving Rygate II
anchored. It was decided that my crew and myself should
pull ashore in the 3 ship's skiffs and bring the troops off
This we did, having two men in each boat. Whilst pulling
in on one occasion a salvo of bombs burst on the beach
killing many French troops, and an Able Seaman pulling
ashore with me received a machine gun bullet in the groin.
Another bomb fell approximately 20 yards from Hortse, but
caused no damage.
There was a heavy surf running, which made
pulling awkward. My skiff capsized twice, but we managed
to pull her to the beach, empty and refloat her. About
midnight the captain of the "Hortse" decided to move farther
in as the tide was rising. The anchor was fouled however,
and the donkey broke down. As the cable was being out,
the Chief E.R.A. remorted that the engines wouldn't work.
Whilst Lieutenant Sargeant R.N.R. pulled to other boats to
continued bringing troops aboard, and then set about the
try and get them alongside and take the troops off, I
The British troops responded well, but the French were rather
task of rousing them, and preparing them to abandon ship.
difficult. Finally a boat came alongside, and we managed
the beach, We then transferred to this other boat, the
to and some shells were getting too close to
transfer the troops. The Germans were now shelling be
name comfortable. I do not know, and proceeded back to Ramsgate, arriving
about noon Friday 31st May.
2nd Trip.
Left Dunkirk in "Quicksilver". Took troops shelled and beach
Ramagate Saturday 1st June,a,m., and off pro-
ceeded to transports. The beach was being shrapnel.
bombed, to larger but the boat waan't even hit with
was uneventful, and we left Dunkirk late in
the evening The when trip fuel was getting short, arriving
Saturday night.
3rd Trip.
Ramsgate 1900 Sunday June 2nd ordered. in Quicksilver,
caught up Left and followed the scoot "Hilda" as
2 whalers into the beach British and anchored troops
about 50 yards Took out. her I was on ordered the beach. to find I could see none
from my anchorage, we drifted got clear,
that were supposed so to I be sent one into whaler the in beach, to investigate. the anchor
Whils was probably she as dragging. away, I went full astern and but

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321
322
ITWOD boowing
-2-
297
soldiers, some 370 mostly french were disembarked
considerable difficulty. We arrived without furth
COPY.
incident at Ramsgate next morning.
24
To:
D.M.O., Admiralty House, Sheerness.
I returned from Ramsgate to Margate and
to assist S.N.T.O. Now Lieutenant Commander Givin
Shift
On 31/5/40 I boarded H.M.S. "Nelson" (motor
31/5
On Monday evening at 1900 I sailed in
launch) in Ramsgate Harbour under orders to proceed
"Guillemot" for Dunkirk, she had not previously been
to Dunkirk. At 1310 I left the Harbour in company
prgme
3th
and so took me on as Navigator. We arrived at
with H.M.S. "Fervent" in charge of Lieutenant-
entrance at about 2330 after an uneventful trip
Commander Clements, R.N.R. The starboard engine of the
sinking a floating mine. We went alongside the
motor launch was out of repair and on getting outside
and embarked 400 Frenchmen without incident.
the harbour both the centre and port engines developed
air locks which made it neessary to return to harbour.
On our return we ran into fog at the last
After a strenuous afternoon's work the engineer
before the Goodwin and proceeded at slow speed with
cleared the air locks and at about 1645 I again left
the harbour. When about 2 miles south of the
mi
visibility about a cable. We made the North Good
Goodwin Light Vessel I was signalled to by Lieutenant
set course for the elbow and North Foreland buoys,
Newell, R.N.R. in charge of the Northern Inspection had Tug.
unable to find them we anchored tillthe fog lifted,
we found the North Foreland buoy a quarter mile 00
His struck tug a submerged wreck and was listed about
was standing by the trawler "Jacita" which 25°
Starboard beam; we set course for Margate pier and
to port. There were about 300 French colonial asked troops no
second ship alongside.
the trawler and Lieutenant-Newell, R.N.R.
TO I humathed working Lieutenant Commander Gin
refloat to the vessel. He was afraid that the I trawler
in transfer them to his tug before he attempted to
the S T.O. S office was closed on Wednesday, thes
would spent about one hour in transferring return the
be holed and sink during refloating.
reported first to Ramsgate as ordered and then to &
finally proceeding on leave that evening.
accordingly which left barely enough petrol for arriving the at
troops from Dunkirk. I then proceeded, The harbour
Throughout the evacuation I was impressed
voyage Mole, Dunkirk at about 2200. but
necessity of sending in boats fully manned by navel bosts
the East shelled a few minutes before I entered, in on
had been alongside the Mole I found British troops ships.
shallow draught, not necessarily powerfully used.
to the beach, or better still sending in power engined
large numbers onto the Mole and asked an Thereafter Officer to we detail
getting going along the Mole to other
few if any of this type of boat was being
82 men for my and after having nearly run 79 returned by an
I climbed up launch, which he did. down
bas I have the honour to be
left the harbour minesweeper in Dunkirk channel, we anchored till
overtaking and reaching the Downs and landed
Sir
by daylight buoys V.V and then on entered Ramsgate Harbour
the troops.
doinw WOTD Bre Your obedient servant.
BBW
and
as
food
(Sgd)
(Sgd.) W. Barham.
Das
S/L, R.N.
Lt. H.L. Holman, R.N.V.R.
I
24
driver Jast I
no
to
RN.
поодчедже IIII
as
the
0081
NO
to B 8

Details

323
298
3
COPY.
25
To: D.M.O. Admiralty House, Sheerness.
between I
From: Lt.Cmdr. W.R.T. Clements, R.N.R.
Tabro edd modull
1982
E
JSTO
1A
to ogzado mt
The Dutch motor vessel "TILLY" was taken over
tosta eill
at Tilbury on 25/5/40 by Lt.Cmdr. W.R.T.Clements, R.N.R.,
no Dre Tister to two asw
Lt. L. Holman, R.N.V.R. and 9 naval ratings. She was
duby Date eitheo cald
taken to Sheerness to load stores and thence to an
anchorage in the Downs where she arrived at 1035 on 27/5/40.
or ti about nolds
At 1500 orders were received to proceed to Dunkirk.
How
It is remarkable that no instructions were given regarding
twods to bre Tooke The odd
the reason for sailing to Dunkirk and save that we had
Belim S doods nedi7
received on board lifebelts and life-rafts sufficient for
ellangia BBW I Isseev Jdgld
about 450 people we had no idea what was required of
ПРТОЙ end to syreds at ...И.Я
us on arrival. It was clear, however, that at that
odd 8d BB7
time the operation was of a highly secret nature. We
Jail asw Date HOBIN
CHETH 008 toods DIST eredT-
namely by the West Hinder, Dyck and Middelkirk Bank
proceeded on the route given to us at the time of sailing,
has
8 or 9 miles from Dunkirk we observed two large hospital
buoys. At about 2200 having reached a position about
stoted got ald 03
Distts 887 oH .leasev
ships escorted by an armed merchant cruiser coming from
the direction of Dunkirk. These vessels had overtaken
Nate broo belod
earlier in the day. A morse signal was therefore
at mon эдо duode imaga
us received from the armed merchant 0 uiser to the
dycone vieied the
following thereupon effect :- "Dunkirk has fallen and is in enemy with
no.id I
twode to
hands. Keep other small motor vessels, and at this time one R.N.R. of
clear". We had set out in company
exoted
some five in charge of t.Barwell, R.N. and Hutchinson, the rest
bruot I sToM add
those about mile distant on the starboard beam and towards
sloM odd anoie gatus
was astern. No thereupon altered course
Delas bre offor edd osno
Lt. After consideration as to the proper I was
was Barwell's further vessel and repeated to him by morse action the signal
.516 or dolde
тейте
bris
at
wholly ignorant be useless to attempt to
to take in of what was required of me if proceed. I get I
received. the circumstances I considered that as could
add
TO
also to Dunkirk observed it would that the armed merchant cruiser and hospital
ejegament
benefits
ships continued on their homeward course.
near, the ship On the passage back we R.N., and the
Shortly was put about to return to came the up with for
afterwards when the Nieuport Buoy Downs was
(5g8)
.I.H
"Brendaris" further orders. in charge the of Commander information Euman, we had and received. intended He
stated informed he him had also received of the same information
returning to the Downs for orders.
On orders 29/5/40 were received to proceed owing to to in
at 1735 whilet lying at anchor Dunkirk off
Deal order information Pier to evacuate received troops. the previous report At this on evening voyage time, No. from 1) an we minutes armed thought
merchant cruiser (see my hands of the enemy. Ten half dozen
later we small have motor up vessels we proceeded was by on buoys our '0', IV'
that Dunkirk was in anchor the and, followed by some voyage. and
other The route taken on off this Dunkirk occasion at about waited 2300 near and the observed
'W'. We arrived flames. We to entrance enter
for that the the best town part was of in an hour further considering to the whether Nastward in an
attempt the harbour to take or to soldiers proceed off the beach. We then proceeded
$

Details

Laurno
Deprams 323.
13/34/0/1343
329
3
302
Kingmead,
Riding Mill,
Northumberland.
Friday 7th June, 1940.
Sir,
g
I have the honour to submit the following account of my
movements from Tuesday 28th May until Wednesday 5th June.
On my arrival at Sheerness I found a convoy of sixteen
motor boats being prepared to assist in the evacuation of Flanders.
I took charge of a small boat "LIEBESTRAUM" and we
proceeded for Dover towing whalers, at about 1730 on Tuesday.
About six miles outside Sheerness we broke down and were picked
up by the Trawler "ASAMA" who towed us to Deal and then back to
Ramsgate where we arrived on Wednesday morning.
At Ramsgate I reported on the state of my boat and was
appointed to the Dutch sel boat "JOHANNA" which had a diesel engine
and was capable of about 6 knots. The crew consisted of a Leading
Hand and four ratings and three Dutchmen, who owned the boat and
could not speak English. We set out in convoy that night with a
Motor boat under the Command of a Lieutenant Commander and/other
eel boat commanded by Sub-Lieutenant T.K.Edge-Partington R.N.
Finding the second eel boat only capable of 4 knots the motor boat
left her behind and soon after left me. I had no charts so after
casting around for a bit I secured alongside a ship, the name of
which I did not find out, near the North Goodwin and stayed there
for the night. Sub.Lt.Edge-Partington in the 'Chanticler' with great
determination took his boat across, navigating by an extremely
faulty compass and managed to bring troops back to Dover.
The next morning, Thursday, I returned to Ramsgate and
succeeded in joining up with the Dutch Schoot "Jutland" who towed
me that evening. We had an uneventful crossing and
anchored across about two miles east of Dunkirk at 2330. The Cutter and
Whaler went ashore. The Whaler returned to report that the cutter
was I volunteered to the Captain of the Schoot to go
and see aground. what I could do but before we had got back the Petty Officer
had succeeded in floating the boat.
I could By boats within 100 yards of the shore because
this time the beach was swarming with French soldiers of
the shallowness not get my of the water. I summoned my limited store of French
to aid and with cries of "En Avant mes heros" and "Courage mea
enfants" my tried to tempt them into the water. My efforts first were
unavailing into water took me into the only deep patch for miles
I and so I had to go and fetch them myself. My and I leap
went in the to neck. Struggling out of the hole I waded rush and ashore. I
Seeing up my to my waist the French came on in a This was
board. strong did six trips and brought off about 200 in all, of time the
were quietened enough to get in so my crew and I had to lift each
compelled to them down a bit but when they get to the boats only them a oh few
me only draw up my revolver and brandiah it threateningly.
I had We into the water and get them. At 0230 the Frenchmen Captain on
board the "JOHANNA" as it was a bit choppy and all had to go below.
Schoot to reckoned go it was time to go. I only had ten
They all suffered from sea sickness on the way back.
return to Ramagate I was sent back to Sheerness On in
charge Saturday of a convoy of 12 motor boats all of which reached Ramagate.
my at 1500 I left Sheerness in the Motor boat
old boat On the our "LIEBESTRAUM" and I arrived at 2230 "THARKS" on Friday. in

Details

346
320
28/5
Signal 0840 to V.A. Dover :-
"Evacuation practicable. Vessels urgently
required.
In the meantime some destroyers and small craft,
including some Dutch Skoots, had arrived off Bray beaches,
and I sent an M.T.B. down there to supervise the embarkation
arrangements. I ordered the Dutch Skoots to anchor as
close to the shore as possible and the destroyers to send
all their boats to ferry the troops between the shore and
the Skoots. As soon as the skoots were full they went
alongside the destroyers to discharge their troops and then
returned to their position near the beach. In this way
we were able to get some 4000 men away during the afternoon
and evening. This operation was continued through the
night and it was estimated that a further 3000 men were
embarked. On her return the N.T.B. was sent home as she
was running short of fuel.
At 1420 heavy bombing on Bray took place and I ordered
more troops to march to Dunkirk. During daylight hours
probably 18000 troops were embarked from the Eastern Mole.
At 1725 the lowing signal was made to Admiralty :-
"Suggest used from Dunkirk 18 advisable and preferable at
magnetic minesweeping of channel being
night."
1835 signal made :-
signal sent #pressing "breed" be for all sent possible for troops shipping during whatever dark hours.* their
Night of 28th May.
Evaquation from the Eastern Arm proceeded steadily,
embarkation being at average rate of 2000 an hour. Enemy

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348
322
29/5
Embarkation proceeded at rate of 3 to 4,000 an hour.
Troops were now consisting mainly of the Fighting Corps,
all the non-combatant troops in the area having been
evacuated. The display of this Corps Troops was
noticeably superior - previous detachments had reached the
embarkation point in a straggling manner with scarcely
any semblance of order. The Corps Troops marched in
formation along the beaches, quickly scattering during
an air raid, and reforming and continuing afterwards.
It was this order which enabled such 8 high rate of
embarkation to be maintained.
At 1200 I proceeded with Brigadier Parminter by
Motor Boat to La Panne to G.H.Q. to report on the difficult
situation vis-a-vis the French over the evacuation. when
on board EXPRESS I made a signal to the Admiralty and to
V.A. Dover giving an appreciation of the situation as
follows
:-
"Bombing of beaches and Dunkirk pier has now commenced
without opposition from fighters, If they hit
Dunkirk pier embarkation will become very jammed.
Beach at La Panne covered with troops congregating
in large numbers. Very slow embarkation taking place
from Restern Beach.
The French Staff at Dunkirk feel strongly that they
are defending Dunkirk for us to evacuate, which is
largely true. To continue evacuation my appreciation
is as follows -
The perimeter must be strongly hold, food and stores
immediately provided, and bombing of Dunkirk pier
must be prevented.
There is no other alternative evacuation to take off
more than a tithe of men now on beach before they
are bombed continuously."
1358/29
In Dunkirk itself we were left in comperative peace
by enemy aircraft until the evening. V.A. Dover's 1906/29
received, reading :-
"Evacuation of British troops to continue at
maximum speed during the night. If adequate
supply of personnel vessels cannot be maintained

Details

349
323
to Dunkirk East Pier destroyers will be
sent there as well. All other craft
except Hospital Carriers to embark from
beach which is extended from one mile East
of Dunkirk to one mile East of La Panne.
Part 2 follows,
Part 2 received as follows :-
"Whole length is divided into 3 equal ports
referred to as La Panne, Bray, Malo, from
East to West with a mile gap between each
port. La Panne and Bray have troop
concentration points each end and in middle;
Malo at each end. These points should be
tended by inshore craft.
Pass this message by V/S to ships not equipped
W/T, as opportunity offers. Destroyer at
Dunkirk pass to S.N.O. Dunkirk."
This was exactly what was required.
In the evening a series of fierce air attacks
were made on the Eastern Arm. These resulted in H.M.S. GRENADE 7
being bombed while embarking troops. It looked for the
moment as though she might sink and block the entrance to the
harbour but 8 trawler and drifter were sent to assist her
and managed to guide her into 8 pocket to the Westward of
the main channel. She burned fiercely for some hours and
eventually blew up with a loud explosion.
A trawler was also bombed and sank in the in channel
about 50 yards from the East pier about two cables/from the
Eastern Lighthouse.
The transport FENELLA was sunk while loading at
the outside extremity of the Eastern Arm. She was practically
fully loaded but the troops were transferred to mother ship
with very little loss
A troop transport CRESTED BAOLS was bombed and
rendered unusable. She drifted down towards Bray where she
ran aground. A "J" Class destroyer was bombed off the
beaches but was taken in tow by another destroyer.

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355
329
Friday 31st May.
The following signals were made:-
0320, "Request more shipsto load Dunkirk."
0445. "Every available ship will be required at Dunkirk
during the next two hours to evacuate rest of
army.
0605. "Embarkation proceeding satisfactorily in spite
of bombardment. I would again stress the need
for more ships and constant fighter protection
0638. "Am now receiving a number of Frenchmen. I have
raised no objection to their embarking in British
ships and am allowing them to do so.
0940. "Request you will inform me whether troops are
now being ordered to march to Dunkirk from the
beaches.
0945.
"Sun is now coming through and I have a big
target of ships in harbour. Request special air
protection for next two hours.
0957. "Lord Gort has agreed that 5,000 Freich troops
should be embarked here this evening after dark
in British vessels. Request necessary ships may
be sent to arrive at dusk.
1044. "We have been continually heavily bombarded and
they are gradually finding the range of our as loading
I would rather only enter ships
necessary berth. for the flow of troops.
Continuous and heavy shelling all the morning, but the
evacuation proceeded fairly speedily. At last ships were
arriving in large numbers and strong a 1. protection kept
bomeing attack away. The only thing necessary was to tostop the
shelling. At 1200 a signal was received from the Air Liaison
Officer at Dover asking for position of enemy battery. This
was not known with any certainty as the battery was probably
mobile, but it was in the district of Loon Plage Brouge Kerk
Soch. A reply was made to this effect. The bombardment,
nevertheless, become more intense and a great deal more accurate.
Very heavy attacks were delivered during the evening but were Dive
concentrated chiefly upon derelict ships in the roads.
bombing attacks were carried out on the ships loading but without
success. The embarkation proceeded smoothly.

Details

Dynamo 219
388
362
ADMIRALTY, S.W.1.
(Room 59, Bank Block V)
11th June, 1940.
No.MC.1/40.
Sir,
I have the honour to submit the following report
on evacuation of B.B.F. from Dunkirk.
Having under your orders, of the Eastern end of
received instructions from you that I was to the take
at about 22.00 and then to a small motor-launch
evacuation charge, area off La Panne, I transferred to drifter
control the movements of tows and of ships.
"TERINGNIS", from which I could the more easily
2. A.M. Conferred with Lord Gort and their
Thursday, 30th May, landed to communicate informed his with
the Army. that I would hold & motor-yocht at
disposal staff to embark the Commander-in-Chief.
G.H.Q. re draft vessels, grass hawsers, also snatch M.N.B. blocks and
3. position at La Panne; asked
Communicated with Admiralty by telephone for more from
anchors to piers. Requested Ambarkation planked to
shallow haul off tows from beach; General
This run lorries I saw started before leaving
pontoons or into sea to act as piers the when beach. over.
4. with Army Embarkation at La Panne.cn ordered
In accordance with your instructions Officers, and after
H.M.S."DEVONTA" Friday evening, 31st May. Very few off from
consultation to beach herself non came
La Panne on Friday night.
5. At about 0430, Saturday, left La to Panne embark. for About Bray, 280
where many were off in boats, all
being were
6. At about
imiral ke-Walker, C.B., OBB.E., R.N.,
ADMIRATEY, S.W.1.

Details

5.
402
376
should fuid some 24 signal rolies and an
adequate subsidy of aldis Compa one the beacher:
their may Gour been a mcsundenfandu; are my
bank but May were not mm and a
filt
operation Man need was somely - bore for
along M increase engle of
beach and for consumication wife saring shut
du any care communication whice have been
difficult with so many thousands 9 / on
the Grader and dumar; further molor boak uny
too and the few mi the uniqued untiloy.
ment as smake, 4 than ream on
destrated work.
become La Danna Bray and D underen was
uniquity useded but only - Hunday eveny
was a line mm, between la Paims me Bray
by the any
w/g am was also easay weded,
but 06 had with Gum someon 4 machifthis.
an mi/minized v/s Camels was as
Bray H.Q an Thur day evening. ask : was
too weak 6- a every faster.
4. On the Smoke twom was and ma
É concentrace at Male and Many amount the
day vast Godia of your covered the Grader
and dumn - rami mut washwand. was
mould a heaver unt condition had a People
with incomed dums a memes, -

Details

8.
405
379
from Down Gad been given specific mishiolian
with evenue,
as to their destriction). Lace bassed a
message & admiral and aim
= detail a ship to another east 07 the been
and also sent an officer & Demainque to New
burben. Meanwhile many of Mu
twom set off for 0 unheren when 06 was
howed was available
0. in the late afternoon said a seemed &
G.K.Q * clear us a ponit - the allocation 07 trom
be Gracher and returned to Bray us the evening
24 whit watching the unbarhation at Bray, " was
noted how time after time boats Caden with trom
an reactions the shift were cast admitt without
boat Keetness - a wasve and mork serious position.
Ju the acress of naval a was very
evident Mar then was am ungeret were for source
Goate & collect and how them bach under dinetic
and accordingly decroid & 00 6 ha Dame
that used and probon 6- Rear. admiral wall-
Waller reat. was No. & Garden. J
should best be employed affort working mission
or directed rew wathin the followis day.
22. a unis the evening Gamt Mart the energy
were closings in and that of mijas be expenses that
the Lival wacuation would tabe Hare dumy
- following day (Triday) or Riday mjas at lacost.

Details

9.
406
380
Jt their was so, it- seemed vieritable that very
many trooter would be GFt ashm - My order
being that Grach bartier were not to be facus
business and suice of was auticitiales that the
fuial would & heclic, it would
hour been morally undersivable for acc naval
to embark in Man final rush even
of that was accord misly. Geter
broceeding G ha Dami amounted that
half the usual benause
batter dumis the early hours a Inday and
although interneted returning my of 4-Bray
that evening, as mistinction & cusum
that dumis the fallus amang-ments
would be made to all book 6 be
not am than e took of water weich awaiting
the anival of scripturis opt- the Good
23. also space 6. eu Busadur as Bray KP.
- the weld for ensuming hose fallur, -
to avoid - "usly rush: though must
knowledge of new fusal Man nor 1 yet
bromulsaled their could Girl Ge anticipatory
24. am for ha Pame adment about was wather's sour? and
eventually embarked in Gue
Worcesce about 2100 - 2am advisiral came
off then the short each and - 19 all
transferred is Sx/mm - Mean the 3 $ as/m

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10.
407
381
at La Panne was contenuing to embart hooton-
06 was too late to return to Anay that evening
and the adminal Gamij abtormed my proposal
as a my - sous afroat the following day.
told me he would disembark me off Bray on
his way Hour her coast durning the early hour
15. an anival off Bray above 0300? 20day.
houstener E H.M. Prower Olvina" and Cales G
Scivitar's motor boat which was engand -
busing off- Caren boat, in various destroyan
sloops, scoots etc and 8th Bray.
26. Later when 20ml 10 - 12 moter yaoah
amired from England to ANKH
% and her as my H.Q. for the remarkship of
the day. staff of them ordered K La
Paune, the remainder to work off Bray.
Jesse araft monthly druw 6-7 fast and
therefore could not work clan wishon 4- a
bracher. du addition then was an
and order sower book
and as valuable A.L.C.
Same of the small yourk Good water boat
and was weaken conditions framilas Convence
them. but in new Cor then small free Board
snaluded ram Gun's much ua Cus.
27. Dunn's reu early hours and termoon
then wen amsa scuti tor

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302
2
ESSAGES.
Messages for transmission by W/T were sent either
through the French Station at the Bastion in Anglo-French or
K.D.G. Code, or, for the sake of greater secrecy as well as
of convenience, through destroyers. These were taken by hand
down the pier.
All messages were received through the French
Station.
of
On Thursday 30th, Lieut. Balfour arrived with:-
quipment
2 Telegraphists and 2 Signalmen.
A W/T set. (T.V.5).
A Portable Loud Speaker equipment, which
proved invaluable for passing instructions to troops marching
down the pier and also later for controlling ship traffic
from the per head. A number of these instruments would have
been of great value.
Two Field Telephones, with which it was at last
possible to establish effective communication between the Pier
Master and the H.Q. Signal Station.
One copy of Syko Code.
Two Aldis Lamps.
Reception on the W/T set was established by 2300
Thursday, 30th, but owing to a defective transmitter full
communication was not established with Dover on their set until
daylight Friday 31st, when R/T had to be used. Transmission
broke down altogether on Saturday evening lat June, probably
due to sand in the generator.
On Saturday 1st June, the Royal Corps of Signals
established a W/T Station in a lorry by the Bastion, working
on 1700 k/o, and also a much needed telephone communication
between the Bastion and the H.Q. Signal Station. Owing to
the intense bombing and shelling of Sunday, the line was

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4.
410
I ordered the Dutch Scoots to anchor as close to the shore
as possible and the destroyers to send all their boats to ferry
the troops between the shore and the Scoots. As soon as the Scoots
were full they were told to go alonside the destroyers and to
discharge their trooops, and then to return to their position near
the beach. In this way we were able to get some four thousand men
away during the afternoon and evening. I returned to Dunkirk and
reported to the S.N.O.,after which I went down to the beaches
in the M.T.B. once more, to make sure that operations were to
continue throughout the night. About another 3/4000 men were got
away during the night. The 1ST,B. was sent home as she was running
short of fuel.
Captain Bush arrived this evening and had 3 conference with
the S.N.O.
Wednesday 29th. May.
I took Captain Bush down to Bray by the N.T.B. in which he
had arrived to show him what was being done. A large number of
destroyers and sloops had arrived during the night, number of
which I ordered to proceed to Dunkirk to embark troops.
A northerly wind had got up during the night and had made
a nasty lop on the beach. This made embarkation very difficult
Boats were being swamped and the whole operation badly retarded.
There remained no doubt in my mind that the major effort would
have to be made at the Eastern Arm,and the risk of loss of ships
accepted. I returned to Dunkirk and reported to the S.N.O.
accordingly. Orders were passed for the majority of troops on the beaches
to be marched to Dunkirk, but sufficient were to be left to enable
the beach embarkation to proceed.
number of ships, personnel ships, sloops and
other Any craft were berthed alongside the mole today, and we wealeft
in comparative peace by enemy aircraft until the evening when in
fierce air attacks were made. These resulted
a series of being bombed while embarking troops. It looked to the
H.M.S. "GRENADE" that she might sink and block the entrance and
Harbour, for the but moment & trawler and drifter were sent to assist her,

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5.
411
managed to guide her into a pocket to the westward of the main chan-
nel. She burned fiercely for some hours and eventually blew up
with a loud explosion.
A Traw ler was also bombed and sank in the channel about 100
yards from the east pier, about three cables in from the East light
house.
The transport FENELLA was sunk while loading at the ouside
extremity of the Eastern Arm. She was practically fully loaded, but
the troops were transferred to another ship with very little loss.
The troop transport CRESTED EAGLE was bonbed and rendered
impotent. She drifted down towards Bray ,where she ran aground.
A "J" Class destroyer was bombed off the beaches and was taken
in tow by another destroyer.
Earlier in the day the transport PRINX MONA'S JISSI had
been mined and had sunk about 2 miles Bast of Dunkirk.
The enemy air attacks and bombardment had been particularly
ferocious today, but despite the losses we had sustained the
rate of embarkation of troops had been extremely good.
It was decided by the S.N.O. that on the following day only
one ship at a time should enter Dunkirk and noor alongside the
arm, as four or five ships being alongside at one time offered
too large and tempting target for the Heinkels.
We had hoped that ships would enter by night, but nothing
did so - a matter of some disappointment to us.
We got a hospital ship in after dark today. She was ordered
to Monitor Wharf - & considerable risk, as the wharf was being
unceasingly shelled. I supervised the transport of some 270
walking wounded, and a full load of stretcher cases. Unfortunately set
which had taken place an hour or so before had ship
a an tanker air raid opposite Monitor Wharf on fire and the hospital back
illuminated. This brought the bombers
was and thus two attacks brightly were made on her from the air i the bombs hit the
wharf ship got safely away.
A but number the of Naval Officers arrived this evening to reinforce
the beach
The only parties, vessels to arrive this tonight were two drifters

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4122
6.
and a trawler which were loaded with 500 troops and sailed for
home.
I afterwards visited the burning wreck of H.M.S. "GRENADE"
in the Drifter "LORD CAVAN" in which the S.N.O. was flying his
broad pendant. The vessels was a white hot mass and there could
have been no doubt that the confidential matter had been destroved
Thursday 30th May.
No ships had entered the Port of Dunkirk last night.
The Transport "KING ORRY" which had endeavoured to enter the
port yesterday evening despite signals made to her to keep out,
was attacked by bombers when she was attempting to turn in the
Western basin, and was damaged by & near miss. Although her en-
gines remained undamaged, her steering gear was put out of action
and in her attempt to get alongside the 3 stern Mole ,she ranned
and made a breach in the mole itself, thus rendering 8 great length
of the mole inaccessible to troops Ships had accordingly carried to be
berthed to the landward side of this gap, The KING ORRY herself
but
was making water, and it was decided, although she had managed to
get alongside, that it would be undesirable to embark troops in
her. She was, however, advised to sail, making use of her engines
to clear the harbour and to navigate to England. I SAW her sail
at about 2.30 a.m. and she managed to clear the mouth of the
harbour. She was making water, and sunk about 4 cables outside the
harbour entrance. Her crew or the majority of then were resoued.
We were in urgent need of ships but none came, and at
10000 signal was received from PRINCESS MAUD to sar that she
& fired at by shore butteries 5 ailes to the westward of
had been that in consequence of this she had turned back German to
Dunkirkand Dover. This was proved to be erroneous, as there were no
batteries in this position.
advised ще that he was proceeding to G.H.V. of to
The S.N.O. and instructed ne to carry out the duties decision S.N.O.
Dunkirk, see Lord in Gort, his absence. It will be remembered that the
She we hit 3 times bad 3 Kollow
wounded,

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4144
8.
wereembarked.
The bombardment however became more intense and a great deal more
accurate. The enemy were finding the approaches to the mole, and
also the range of our headquarters. Very heavy air attacks were
delivered during the "Evening Hate" but were again concentrated
on derelict ships in the roads. Dive bombing attacks were carried
out on the ships loading but without success. The embarkation
proceeded smoothly.
I asked the R.A. Dover with his Flag in "KEITH" to send
destroyers to Dunkirk to provide A.A. protection for these attacks
but he replied that none were available. This was unfortunate as
we were running out of ammunition onshore. I was getting a
little uneasy as the bombardment had fired the magazine about
100 yards behind our Headquarters, and the French Officers kindly
informed me that it was liable to explode at any noment.
However, it didnt.
The S.N.O. returned in the evening and we attended & confer
ence between the French General, (dmiral Abrian, General Alexander
G.O.C., British Force,. Brigadier Parminter, Commander Henderson,
the B.N.L.O. Captain Tennant and I were present. The plans of the
British and French Generals were at variance. The British plan for
evacuation was to be carried out in accordance with V. Dover's
Most Secret Memorandum of 30th May. The French however considered
that the evacuation should be spread over a longeryberiod of 4 or
5 days. It was not the opinion of General Mexander that the
port of Dunkirk could be held for that length of time, and he
stated that if his view were correct, that there could only result
a situation where many of his rear guard would be taken prisoner.
The Generals decided to refer the matter to their respective
Governments, and General Alexander telephoned to Mr. inthony Eden.
As a result it WAS decided to stick to the original plan of
immediate withdrawal rather than to accept the French plan of
a prolonged operation.
An incident this evening was that on returning to the Noval
Headquarters with Commander Henderson after the meeting,a shell

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Controller
434 461
Small Vessels Pool.
8th June 1940.
In connection with the recent operations at
Dunkirk, I desire to bring to your notice the excellent
work of the following officers.
S.V.P. found itself forced to act in an operational
capacity in this emergency.
1. Among the many officers and civilians who offered
to
their services to fill the emergency of taking boats over, an
outstanding case was one particular officer Lieut.Col.R.L.
Dover
Hutchins, M.C., Grenadier Guards. This officer had a day off
from a certain Department, and asked my permission to be
allowed to proceed with my Deputy, Captain 3.7. Wharton, to
Ramsgate, where he was given charge of 8 motor boat. On the way
over the boat hit submerged wreckage which rendered one engine
useless. Continuing under one engine, on arrival off Dunkirk
he found a steamer ashore with her boats at the davits. He
went to a destroyer, asked for the loan of four hands, and with
these men he lowered the boats, which he used to evacuate
soldiers from the beach to the destroyer. I understand some
700 men were thus evacuated. He returned to London in time
to go on duty the following morning.
2. Captain E.F. Wharton, R.N. This officer under
Daves
S.N.O., him the detailed organisation of "ferrying" Phillimore,
Ramsgate acted as Pier Master for four days with at the Ramsgate.
Upon boats from Ramsgate devolved. Captain on the
S.N.O., valuable Ramsgate services rendered by this officer, and
smaller made a special report by telephone has been asked very
to report it officially in due course.
Paymaster Lieutenant Commander H. tireless Garrett, work, R.N.V.R.
my Secretary. on the He was own
3. He showed immense capacity for using his
and was practically three in the
responsible initiative evening, himself, and putting throughout for Sheerness; for obtaining them petrol in arranging Admiralty yachtsmen from - garages special cars on from his to and the bring own forms, sending initiative. down which them over he down late 100 In to
boats been Ramsgate various situation, signed to accept responsible from other responsibility which the ways Upper is he deserving Thames offers displayed large was most of of again additional motor a much praiseworthy. grasp boats praise. of organisation the received urgency 418 He His readiness here has methodical of of also in the
accordance those collecting indexing boats of some with requisitioned these Statute 2,500 boats by No. by areas 718 S.V.P. of allowed May officers 10th the 1940. being great majority. in service of
within & few hours.
Director Small Admiral. Vessels Pool.

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444
succession of British shipping as motley in its larger form as
were the motor-boats themselves. Tramps, cargo ships, barges,
drifters, tugs, Dutch schoots, British warships, even river
ferry-boats such as carry one's car across the Thames at
Woolwich and elsewhere.
Of individual acts only a few can be given; every crew,
every man almost, experienced some incident or another. some
adventure that could fill a whole small volume on its own. And
yet what can a writer do when such men report such events in the
tersest of language such as "heavily shelled whilst at work";
A few reminiscenses may be given here in the hope that
some idea of the work may be gathered by anyone who cares to
piece them together. Here are some extracts from a letter
written by Sub. Lt. .Williams, R.N. which serve to illustrate
that merry sangfroid which has been referred to earlier:-
"So I proceeded by compass (error 20°) to the Calais out. -
Gravelines sands and anchored & few hundred yards
while about I 8 quarter of a mile I saw two men silhouetted to
I was walked inland in search of Allied
pulled ashore in the boat, which waited soldiers. for me
After against the glow of a distant blaze. them. I approached
within a few yards of them and say hailed "Lieber Gott!" and they time turned I
I heard and one commenced to shoot at me. By this territory, so had
around to the conclusion that I was in enemy
I come behind a dune and shot back.
Fortunately see me properly, while I could see twice out-
hid it was a very dark night and the their Germans
could not quite well. I shot the one on other the right one screamed
lines and he fired fell without two bullets a sound. at him, The and he dropped By whatever this
when I and then fell and lay discretion still. to be
he was carrying nearby shouts so, deeming back to
the the boat better and my ship was under way at her mots
time I heard part of valour, I ran at top speed full six
within less than five minutes."
the soldiers dusk bombing and shelling. greatly lot
"I proceeded at Ramagate and arrived just There was a
back to Dunkirk as soon as in I had time landed to
of shrapnel by the Tommies and Poilus who the boats. into
catch the falling on the beach and I was waded out
impressed and helped the sailors with anything Nowhere but
did the sea Isee any signs of cracking morale or
cheerfulness. back for the last time the same in evening. the "Swallow" Dunicirk
"I went flaming ruin. I again went with a
and proceeded motor-boat. While in there I shortly
was by now a to the inner harbour in company saw another War
slower power boat which was, Ibelieve, of after- the
Department wards sunk. I had been ordered to take off some
- 4

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484
Appendix "A",
Part I
Report by Commander R.A. Cassidi R.H.
A.L.C., 3,4,5,8,15,16,17, and 18 were embarked,
together with their crews and 1 P.O. 2 seamen and 2 stokers IS
spare hands, on board S.S. Clan Macalister at Southampton on
17/5
Monday 27th May. The ship sailed that afternoon.
in
2.
on Tuesday morning she anchored in the Downs 28/5
and was instructed by the examination vessel to await orders
from Dover, At about 3200 hrs that evening 1 1dg stoker and
1 ord. seaman fell into the bottom of No. 4 hold which had been
left uncovered. Both were seriously injured.
CZ
3.
At 2230 a boat arrived with an officer bringing
orders, the injured men were put aboard this boat.
S.C. Clan liacalister was ordered to proceed forthwith to vicinity
of Old Dunkirk, disembark Lending Craft and then return to the
Downs.
Captain Mackie of S.S. Clan Macalister was extremely relectant
to proceed as he had not been supplied with the necessary charts,
I therefore borrowed a chart from the boarding officer. Hovever
Captain .ackie then stated that he also required the assistance
of a Pilot before proceeding.
In view of his refusal to proceed forthwith, 1 then asked that
my landing craft should be hoisted out immediately expressing
my intention of steaming them across to the Belgian Coast under
their own power, as it was imperative that the should arrive
at the point of embarkation as soon as possible,
At this Captain Mackie decided to sail his own vessel, stating
at the same time that he could not follow the route given in
his orders, as he did not know the positions of the various
lettered bueys mentioned. He proposed therefore to disembark

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510
486
120 selim 01
Appendix "A".
Part II.
A.L.C.3.
A.L.C. 3 was stowed in No. 8 hold in
Clan Macalister, and was hoisted out at approx-
imately noon. She worked the beach near Old
Dunkirk embarking British troops until the evening,
then as there were no vessels left in the vicinity,
set off for Dover with about twenty soldiers aboard,
Shortly after passing Dunkirk she fell in with
A.L.C. 8 and 15, and in company with them arrived
at Dover at dawn, on Thursday May 30th.
2.
On the evening of Thursday, May 30th, the
left Dover in company with A.L.C. 8 and 15, for
Dunkirk beaches arriving there at dawn, Friday,
May 31st.
She evacuated troops, (French and British),
until approximately 2230 hrs, when both engines
gave out due to sand in the cooling systems, A.L.C.S
was then taken in to# by 2 small merchant vessel
who towed her to Ramrgate, where she arrived about
0500 hrs on Saturday June 1st.
Two civilians volunteered to assist in
attending to the engines, and eventually succeeded in
repairing them satisfactorily. Ash.C. 3 then
preceeded to Dover, and arrived there about 1130 hrs
on Saturday 1st June. On reporting at Dover they
were told to hold themselves in readiness to return
to Dunkirk, but later were ordered to proceed in company
with A.L.C. 17 to their base in Hayling Island,
A.L.C. 3 reported at Hayling Island at 1300 hrs on

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88D
513
489
APPENDIX "A" PART II
A.L.C. 15.
A.L.C. 15 was the second boat to be hoisted
out from Clan Macalister, and proceeded directly in shore
embarking British troops from the vicinity of Old Dunkirk.
Fifteen trips were carried out during the day, and at
2000 approximately, as no ships were in the vioinity to
accommodate troops, she set off for Dover, with troops
aboard. Shortly after passing Dunkirk she fall in with
A.L.C. 3 and 8. These three A.L.C. reached Dover at
dawn on Thursday May 30th.
On Thursday evening A.L.C. 15, 8 and 3 laft
3
arriving off Dunkirk at dawn on Friday May s1st.
Dover 15 had engine trouble, but carried on enbarking old
A.L.C. troops from the beach in the vicinity of she
British principally with the aid of Scate which on a
Dunkirk, Eventually she damaged her propellors
@
towed. motor lorry, and being out of control, dirifted a small
trog of
submerged beam on. The crew succeeded in launching off to a
ashore the beach and so making their my after and
of
boat from A.L.C. 8 came alongaide shortly considered put
drifter. 15's angineer ashore. As be apparently 15 be at
A.L.C&B not be possible to salve A.baC. to burden
that it would and shortly after ahe at ssan the to after part
her on fire and the petrol tanks to explode, at
fiercely, of the boat being blown high in the

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525
APPENDIX "A" PART II
501
A.L.C. 17.
b
A.L.C. 17 was the fourth boat to be hoisted out,
and followed A.L.C. 5 up the coast towards Braye. On
approaching the beach she mas promptly boarded by a crowd
of French soldiers, who so overload d the boat that she grounded.
On the falling tide she was soon left high and dry, and
remained stranded for some three hours.
In the meantime the Coxswain of A.L.C. 17 procured the
assistance of some British troops, who with fixed bayonets,
drove off the French when these again attempted to rush the
boat as the tide rose. These British troops, together with
a few French, were taken off to a British destroyer shere the
British only were disembarked. H A.4.C. 17 was ordered to
take the French to a nearby reasel, on the my she ma heavily
bombed and machine gurned from the air.
As a result of this attack, the boat became partially
flooded, so much 30 that the engines stopped. A.L.C. 17
then managed to get alongside a tug, where they baled out
their boat, and got the engines running again. She continued
embarking British troops from the vicinity of La Panne for the
remainder of the day, but towards evening had to casse
operations due to a defect in the port rudder; this 183
eventually rectified alongaide, and with the assistance of,
H.M.S. Shikari.
A.L.C. 17 continued working all night, but finally
her engines were stopped by sand in the circulating mater systems.
On Thursday morning May 30th., ahe was taken in tow : a drifter
and towed to Dover, arriving there about 2200. Engines were
repaired, and on Friday A.L.C. 17 - towed over to Dunicirk by
a tug. A few trips only were carried out, embarking British
troops from the viainity of Old Dubkirk, when sand stopped one

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SECRET13
atd
536
Operation "DYNAMO" and the functioning of the Naval Control
Service, Ramsgate.
From
8/30/72.
Naval Control Service Officer,
Ramsgate, Kent.
Commander-in-Chief,
8th June, 1940.
The Nore,
Sir,
I have the Honour to submit the conduct of operations
as carried out by the Naval Control Service Ramsgate during
the "Dynamo" period of 28th May to 4th June,
2.
At 0900 on 28th May instructions were received from
Dover to send every available small craft to arrive off
Dunkerque by 2200 that evening. Though addressed to Naval
Control Service Officer it was obvious that much work and
organisation was required from Naval Officer=in=Charge; and
personal contact was made with Captain W.R. Phillimore, Royal
Nawy, at the earliest opportunity.
Rough details were planned and it was agreed that the
minimum number of craft to be allocated to the Naval Control
Service communications to the Downs should be: 3 Tugs,
for 3 fast Motor-boats. In point of fact only 2
3 Drifters and then available, but this diminution of thesituation. considered
Drifters necessities were accepted in view of the urgency of and
was been laid on the importance of sufficient an
efficient sea outward W/T and R/T is reduced the
Stress has communications for the reason that during to
Air-raid minimum, in a warning if line indeed of "Red", communications "silence" is not proportionately imposed, - and fortunately the increased. difficulties
(In abortive this -- within an hour of the conference).
long connection, an Air-raid occurred
3. Apart from/

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3
DUPLICATE
SECRE
ration "DINAMO" and the functioning of the Naval Control
vice, Ramsgate.
From
50/72.
Naval Control Service Officer,
Ramsgate, Kent.
mmander-in-Chief,
8th June, 1940.
e Nore,
:
I have the Honour to submit the conduct of operations
carried out by the Naval Control Service Ramsgate during
1e "Dynamo" period of 28th May to 4th June.
At 0900 on 28th May instructions were received from
over to send every available small craft to arrive off
unkerque by 2200 that evening. Though addressed to Naval
ontrol Service Officer it was obvious that much work and
rganisation was required from Naval Officer-in-Charge; and
ersonal contact was made with Captain W.R. Phillimore, Royal
lawy, at the earliest opportunity.
Rough details were planned and it was agreed that the
inimum number of craft to be allocated to the Naval Control
Service for communications to the Downs should be: 3 Tugs,
3 Drifters and 3 fast Motor-boats. In point of fact only 2
Drifters were then available, but this diminution of considered
necessities was accepted in view of the urgency of thesituation.
Stress has been laid on the importance of sufficient and
efficient sea communications for the reason that during an
Air-raid warning "Red", outward W/T and R/T is reduced to the
minimum, if indeed "Silence" is not imposed, and the difficulties
in a long line of communications proportionately increased.
(In this connection, an Air-raid occurred -- fortunately
abortive -- within an hour of the conference).
3. Apart from/

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be 113
&
soldiers, same 370 mostly french were disamberked with
considerable difficulty, We arrived without further
insident at Ramagete next morning.
to 40 assist S.N.T.O. Now Lieutenant Commander Givinner, R.N.
1 returned from Remagate to Margate and continued
On Monday evening at 1900 I sailed in H.H.S.
"Guillemot" for Dunkirit, the had not previously been over
and DD took - on as Invigator. To arrived at the Harbour
entremes at about 2330 after an unsersative trip, except for
stuking 8 floating sine. 9a west alongside the West Mole
and entiarked 400 PrencimenT] without incident.
on our return - NA into fog as the last bucy
Valore the Goodula and proceeded at slow speed with
visibility about a cable. 9a nate the Birth Goodwin and
set course for the albow and Birth Fereland bucys, being
unable to find them 90 suchored 01110he fog lifted, when
We found the North Foreland being a quarter gile on the
Starboard beaus 10 BBS course for Margate plan and were
second ship alemgaide.
the S.N.T.O.'s office E80 closs on Memonder, when I
Paperted first to Remagate as ordered and than to Sheerness
Visally proceeding on leave that evening.
threughout the evacuation 3 Has ingreesed by the
account of sending in boats fully marked to naval ratings
9a Mr breath, OF better 00511 sending in putier boats of
shalleve traught, not necessarily possefully expirati very
for W of of this type of boat WSS being used.
I have the honour to be
Sir
Your shediant unryand. Bonham
(Sign) 9. Barhan.
B/L. 2.3.

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1996
COPY.
To: D.M.O. Admiralty House, Sheerness.
S
From: Lt.Cmir. V.R.T. Clemmts, R.N.R.
:
The Datah motor vessel "TILLY" was taken over
at Tilbury = 26/5/40 by R.N.R.,
Lt. Inc Holman, and 9 naval retings. She was
taken to Sheemess to Load stores and thence to on
encharage in the Down share also arrived at 1035 on 87/5/40.
At 1800 orders 1920 required to proceed to Dulkirk.
It to comertable that to instructions 9070 given regarding
the Deason for sailing to Dunkirk and save that 10 DIE
received 00 board lifebelts and life-rafts sufficient for
about 480 people - bad no Idea shat was required of
188 on accival. It was class, however, that at that
time the operation 153 of a highly secret nature. We
proceeded OR the route given to = at the time of sailing,
issuly by the Weets Hinder, Iyok and Niddelkirk Bank
buys. AS about 2900 having reached 8 position about
8 or 9 niles from Dunkir't = observed tvo Large hospital
ships assurted by in oreat parchant aruteer conting from
the direction of Dunicive. These vessale had overtaken
18 enrlier in the day. A poren signal vas therefore
thereupon reseived from the uned merchant 0 utser to the
following effect :- "Dunkirk has fallon and is in eneage
hands. Keep class. No had ast out in company with
- five other small motor vessels, and at this Mm one on
these in charge of Lt.Berwall, R.B. and Lt.Mutchinsen, H.N.R.
use bout. 1 size distent 00 the starboard bonn and the rest
was further actorn. 9a thereupon altered course towards
Lt.Barwell's veasel and supented to his by nores the signal
received. After consideration 00 to the proper notion
to take in the sircumstances 31 considered that as I visa
whally ignorms of what we required of 29 if 2 sould get
to Duning 10 would be useless to attempt to preceed. I
also observed that the aread merchant evaises and hospital
ships continued on their honoverd course.
Shortly aftermeds shou the Lisuport Buay WAS
near, the ship use pub about to return to the Doins for
further orders. On the passage book = come up with the
"Brondaris" in charge of Commission Bumin, R.H., and
informed his also of the information 100 had received. He
stated be had received the - information and intended
returning to the Down for orders.
On 28/5/40 at 1735 whilet lying at motor off
Deal Pier unders vare received to proseed to Duskirk in
order to evenuate trupo, AS this time, oring to
information received the provious evening from an and
merchant ovelear (see 10 report on тоуадо No. 1) we though
that Dunkirk usa in the hands of the enemy. Ten minutes
later w have WD insher and, followed by some half dozen
other smill motor vessels IN proseeded on our verage.
The poute taken on this occusion was by buare 'U', 151 and
that ' the tom vsa in Classe We writed near the entrance
We arrived off Duskin at about 2500 and observed
for the best part of as hour considering whither to enter
the harbour or to procesd further to the Statemed In -
attempt to take soldiers off the benoh. We then pepaseded

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/179
SECRET.
c/o Admiralty,
Whitehall, S.W.1.
11th June, 1940.
Sir,
I have the honour to submit the following report in accordance
with your verbal instructions. The delay has been occasioned by the
difficulty in collecting the necessary information from the Officers,
some of whom landed at Dover, some at Margate and some at Ramsgate.
During and just after the final attack so much was happening at the
same time that I have described firstly what happened in the vicinity
of the Bridge and what action I took, and, secondly, what happened
aft. As appendices I have attached the report of the adventures of
Mr Crews, Warrant Schoolmaster, after he had left the GRENADE and as
statement of the known damage done by the bombs.
2. During the evening of the 28th May I left Dunkirque with over
900 troops for Dover; these troops were disembarked without incident,
and on the Forenoon of the 29th of May I received orders from
V.A. Dover to proceed with all dispatch to Dunkirque, taking
JAGUAR and GALLANT with me. I was ordered to take route X and to
report if I was subjected to shelling off Gravellines. No shelling
Was experienced but all destroyers were subjected to a dive bombing
attack when close to the coast. GALLANT suffered damage astern
but as she did not appear to require assistance I proceeded along-
side the western side of the pier, berthing JAGUAR outside me.
A certain number of attacks were experienced but no bombs came very
close to either ship. GRENADE could not fire her guns owing to
JAGUAR being on her Starboard Side and the pier on her Port Side.
3. JAGUAR was filled with troops and then proceeded, being
subsequently bombed and hit whilst on passage. About this time some
bombs from a high level attack fell fairly close to GRENADE but
did no damage. No troops were put into GRENADE as the S.N.O. stated
that he wished a destroyer to remain alongside. A transport ahead
of GRENADE left and this position was taken by 6 trawlers. Acting
on the instructions of the S.N.O. I ordered a V - - class destroyer

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Department 37
to /1/89
COPY.
SECRET.
c/o Admiralty,
Whitehall, S.W.1.
11th June, 1940.
Sir,
I have the honour to submit the following report
in acceptions with your medal instructions. The delay
has been consioned by the difficulty in collecting the
necessary information from the Officers, BOXE of whom
landed at Dover, - at Margate and some at Ramagate.
During and just after the final attack 80 much was happening
at the - time that I have described firstly what
happened in the visinity of the Bridge and that nation I
took, and, secondly, what happened are. As appendices
2 have attached the repart of the adventures of Mr. Crews,
Warrant Schoolmator, after to had left the GRENADE and a
statement of the Imoin dissage done by the bombs.
Dunkirque 8. with 0112 900 treeps for Dover; these troops
During the evening of the 28th My = left
used disembarked without insident, and on the Foreneen of
the 29th of May 2 reseived orders from V.A. Dever to proceed
with all disputed to Dunkirque, taking JAGUAR and GALLANT
with - 1 TAB ordered to take route X to report If I
was subjected to shelling off Gravellines. No shelling
use experienced but all destroyers vare subjected to a dive
bonbing attack when close to the const. GALLANT suffered
damage astorn but 18 the did not appear to require assistance
: proceeded alongside the sestem side of the pier, borthing
JAGUAR outside - A certain number of attacks 1970
GRENADE could net fire her guna owing to JANUAR being on
experienced but 30 boobe I very close to either ship.
her starboard side and the pier 00 her port side.
JARIAR was filled with troops and then proceeded,
being 3. subsequently bashed and his whilet on passage. About
alose to CANADA but did no damage. No troops were put
this time 5009 bonbe from 8 high lovel attack fell fairly
destroyer into to remain alongside. A transport should of
GRENAIS as the S.N.O. stated that be wished a
Acting on- the instructions of the S.N.O. I order a V -class
GRENADE Left and this position was taken by 6 travlers.
destroyee whose - 3 have forgotten to proceed alongaide
ahoul of these traviers.
At about 15.00 the first deliberate attack on
GRENADE 4. commend; two bonbo fell about 80 - 25 yards from
the Pursonatle, damaging A-gan and VD ding one rating shoud on the
Starboard Bow, killing use and wouddnet ⑉ rating on
Searchlight the Platform. Some ratings LAGER in on the the trawlers other side
of these and no doubt until
GRENADS and is the CHILD fall
of vare about 80 feet from the water
that they the use released
ink, the
0899 of the boath
AS above. 01.00 18 issue SAN
1
" the
and 0. of the ydar and the coom? delibed commond attack 8 dive -
bombing
GRENATE command.
dropped. 3 have found it
attack and 8 number of
1870 GRENADE WAS htt, but I
disfloult opinion to discover third two bombe 9870 dropped alone to the miltaneously Starboard
Bide between after end of the Fore hitting the ship
se-in the a & 9 guns, making-shole Moss Deak and sinkings
an of the explier redd, No. falling Leiths side, causing
N fire at just the shead of GRENADE; No. the 8 bottom of the ship near
the strawler Biok Bay, penstrating nearly to
before exploding.

Details

Ofform
20197
COPY.
H.M.S. KING ALFRED.
HOVE.
SUSSEX.
Admiral Taylor.
Room 3.7.
Admiralty House,
E.M.S.Wildfire.
Sheerness. Kent.
#
Dear Sir,
= I arrived at H.H.S.Wildfire at 1800 on Wednesday
the 29th May direct from H.M.S.King Alfred. I was appointed
to M.Y. "Jong" (a standard Thornycroft 36' twin seree notor cruiser
central cookoit type) the following morning and put to sea in
company at 1400»
To were secorted to Imagate by H.M.T.Strathellict
rhere 98 arrived at 2200. There TO received out instructions
and proceeded to Dunkisk arriving at about 0930 Friday.
X impdiately want to a spot about 3 miles northeast
X the harbour anchored my boat and 1st he Grift 68 close to the
there as possible. I than floated a life line eshare W - of
* life buoy. Immediately M English soldier 0889 est to -
followed by about a dozen Balgiane. 3 expendenced considerable
lifficulty in getting State SSSS about as there usa about 3 20. of
resboard at the stern of "Jong", Inverer, 99 got every HAIR
hoard and took then to 8 School X then returned to the boach
and this time rigged the falls of one of the diaght devits. Again
sent the life line ashore and when the man 0889 out to 139 I went
verboard and hooked the Lower Mock 00 to the back of their waist
elta and my orer hanled than about quite essily.
I continued this operation during the day and also ran
essages for the Captain of a steam hoppen who wanted the services
Jr. an experienced engineer off another ships
During the afternoon Dir took R boat alongside & supply
ighter that had been drifted schore. There 1920 8 number of
board and these zen 312 took off. Others were
opposite side of the lighter and experienced
aboard it. DIE went 00 to the lighter to ⑉ if
STATE STATE the others to get abound. Just as I arrived
found a young Toung (K.Alfred) in the water
was exhausted and 80 10 got him on to the lighter and X
was overboard to take his place. We continued to get - on to my
9ab until DD more 1020 caning down the beach. During this
peration three bonha fall quite close to the lighter but DO one was
upt. X took this boat load of about thirty five out to the hopper.
they " motor boats which had gone sahore without dropping an suchor
I spent 9200 time during the afternoon trying to Jull
Dd the beach which USE a 100 shore. I also towad various whalers
ships boats out to the transporte.
evening the big ships started sending their own
long lines and as this occurred about every 50 yds.
the which had a supply lighter in too outside the line of big ships.
mobor boate became difficult. I VM hailed by
he could 0000 DO names the beach he nabed as to take
8a alose in as X could. The lighter was almost -
While towing 10 the water circulation of one signa.
3 had to sintinue using the ongine which got Yes OTHE-
with I could safuly tree the Lighter after taking is VIII

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212
Page 6.
3.
During all this period the whole ship's company
behaved in a grand ray. They were tireless in their energies
in whatever direction they were requiredd, either pulling
the shalers to and fro from the beach, or landing on the
jetty at Dunkirk and heartening the passage of the soldiers
with cheerful words or help. I regard this segnificent
spirit to be due to the example shown by my officers and
heads of departments in spite of the fact that 10 suffered
a very severe dive bombing attack on our second trip and
Low level bombing attacks from one plane lasting about 20
minutes this some trip, and by Saturday every can was needing
rest badly.
The spirit of the ship's company WSS shown when,
having cleared lower deck on Saturday evening and explained
the final stages of the operation, there vas literally a
"Tooth-suck" from the ship's company when the sailing
enncellation was piped by the bosun's case later.
4. and mon for the period covered by this letter of proceedings.
Attached is list of recommendations of officers
I have the honour to be,
sir,
your Chedient Servent,
(sd) C.D.Mand.
Lieutenant Commander,
Royal.Havy,
The Vice-Admiral,
Dover.
VIA OF 17JUN ADMIRIE 1940 E RE *
4

Details

SECRET
219
Page 6.
3.
During all this period the whole ship's company
behaved in a grand way. They were tireless in their energies
in whatever direction they were requiered, either pulling
the whalers to and fro from the beach, or landing on the
jetty at Dunkirk and heartening the passage of the soldiers
with cheerful words or help. I regard this magnificent
spirit to be due to the example shown by my officers and
heads of departments in spite of the fact that 10 suffered
a very severe dive bombing attack on our second trip and
low level bombing attacks from one plane lasting about 20
minutes this same trip, and by Saturday every man was needing
rest badly.
The spirit of the ship's company was shown when,
having cleared lower deck on Saturday evening and explained
the final stages of the operation, there was literally a
"Tooth-suck" from the ship's company when the sailing
cancellation was piped D. the bosun's sale later.
4.
Attached is list of recomendations of officers
and men for the period covered by this letter of proceedings.
I have the honour to DO,
Sir,
Your Chediens Servant,
(ed) C.D.Maud.
Lieutenant Commander,
Royal. Havy.
The Vice-Admiral,
Dover.
VI 10 17JUN 1940 ADMIRAL O *
*
DOVE
E

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SECRET
-229
226
70ge &
3.
During all this period the shole ship's company
behaved In 0 grand my. They sero tireless in their energies
in sistever cirection they sere required, either pulling
the shalers to and fro from the beach, 02 landing on the
jetty at Dunkirk of hearten the passage of the coldiere
with cheerful words or help. I regard this negnificant
spirit to be due to the exemple chom by my officers and
heade of departments in spite of the met that (d) suffered
a very severe dive boxbing attrick 12 our record trip and
Iov level hombing attacks from une plane losting about DD
nimites this sexo trip, and by intering every con 500 needing
sent baily.
the ngizts of the obig** coupons vos above when,
having classed losse cook on saturity evening and explained
the fiml stages of the operation, there udd literally a
"Tooth-ouck" from the ship's company usen to soiling
encellation we piped 9. the become are Inter.
4. and neo for the pastod covered by this letter 18 proceedings.
Attached La liot of of officers
X have the bondue to to,
sis,
your conditions Supent,
(sil)
Montensat Communicate
The Vice-Amiral,
Dever's
10E ADMIRAL
17 JUN 1940
3
+
DOV

Details

Department 324
23230
CONFIDENTIAL
LETTER OF PROCEEDINGS OF H.M.S. WHITSHED.
Portsmouth.
5th June, 1940.
Sir,
I have the honour to report that in accordance
with your instructions Ship under my command was
expeditiously repaired, guns being lifted and roller paths
cleaned and adjusted. The Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth
also authorised the removal of the after set of triple
torpedo tubes and the fitting of a twelve pounder H.A. gun
in this place and the conversion of the warhead magazine for
H.A. ammunition stowage. Ship also received a lot of plating
as splinter protection. Boilers were cleaned and repairs
made to engines and hull.
New officers and ratings joined and ship proceeded
at 2000 Friday, 51st May to Spithead. Ship's company were
drilled that evening and the Pollowing forenoon until the
magnetic mines in the entrance had been exploded and the
port re-opened to traffic when ship at once sailed for Dover,
arriving there at 1750.
1/6
there at 0130 and berthing at the outer berth on the western 2/6
Ship sailed at 2240, 1st June for Dunkirk arriving
side of the Eastern arm. On passage an aircraft which
dropped a large object ahead of the ship was fired at.
French destroyers off Dunkirk were frequently firing at
heard aircraft and & signal was sent asking whether these
were friendly or not, as if so it was most desirable that
firing should cease. No reply was received.
The jetty was empty and no troops could be found.
However by using the loud hailer army landing craft from the
beach on the other side of the pier started to bring troops
up the pier until I had collected enough troops English and
to the ship, while I landed and finding a bicycle proceeded
French to fill the ship. The bicycle also provided useful in
berthing two other destroyers and directing troops to board
transport for two wounded men, and I was able to help
them.
proceeded without inoident to Dover arriving at 0530.
I slipped at 0500 as dawn was breaking and
2/6
arriving there I found one airoraftsman had from
Ship at 0050. Just past W. buoy whistling survivor
left Dover at 2135 and proceeded to Dunkirk was
3/6
got Commander heard them and Clouston's eventually and R.A.F. Commander launch. Clouston A messerschmit had refused into to be
They by machine their gunned in the water. The with many
rescued about 1850 consort and had ordered it away conjestion Dunkirk. in
the harbour were made berthing impossible and together
other craft ship lay to outside.
The/

Details

2246
ENCLOSURE I. TO FORD'S NO. 541 of 17th. JUNE, 1940.
REPORT BY STOKER A. BENHAM. STOKER OF
MOTOR BOAT NO.275,
P.M. 29th.
Left Littlehampton and arrived Newhaven same evening,
had 8 spot of bother before we were allowed to enter
harbour and stay the night.
A.M. 30th.
Left Newhaven for Ramagate arriving Palle same day.
Port Stern Gland was leaking badly had to be repacked on
arrival, Refuelled and ready to sail.
A.M. Slst.
Was ordered to leave Ramagate independently for Dunkirk.
C.P.O. Leighton, Cox. A.B. Strand and Stoker Benham,
crew. Left harbour and picked up convoy already leaving
for Dunkirk. After about 81 to 3 hours out we had
trouble again with Port Stern Cland and returned to
harbour and repacked and tightened up both Stern Glands.
A.M. 1st.
Was called again about 4.30 and ordered to sail and
proceed to Dunkirk. Two Sub-Lieutenants R.N.V.R.
volunteered to come with us as their boat was unfit for
the trip, and an extra Able Seaman came aboard with them
for the trip. On the way to Dunkirk was kept busy,
Able Seaman Strand watching for aircraft and myself
tending engines, had no more trouble with Stern Clands,
There was quite a considerable amount of aircraft about
and our destroyers were continually repelling their
attacks. Struck something below water starboard side
which made the boat jump but no damage seemed to be done
as the engine was running smoothly and we were not making
water, so we carried on. On sighting unkirk we saw
two large ships loaded with soldiers steamin down the
coast and all small amot following, Bo we decided to
follow as there was nothing we could do there. After
minutes steaming we saw a crowd of German
six about $Arcraft detached 10 in the themselves, air flying not release and at dived a great their down height. bombs at the until About two
big almost on the ships, register d We sunk
ships. They did hits which they
were ships quite close to each other. 10 of were
both travelling at full speed and picked up the the
which made the boat full. As bombers
were best to leave with all possible speed hour
survivors still very active in the vicinity, we for decided home. it
was about half to three-quarters of an we were
mistaken fire on us at close range. had saw wrecked
After for German Torpedo Boat by our I own trawlers, C.P.O.
who opened leave the boat after a shell dashed forward the to
wheel wheel, 1 got on to the side though and saw it one was going
Leighton house and Able Seaman Strand of the grab
trawlers she was just about a seemed impossible away that I
the bearing down on us as boat's length when to
ran us, into the water, for it have boat around she
would to clear. I was picked up by I one dont know how
jumped miss us. But Strand must swung of the boats
enough swimming around for a while. boat's until long.
I did at Margate, when Able to about the affair.
after not see any one else of Seaman the Strand crew came aboard we
arrived the trawler I was on and spoke me
The only....

Details

RAS
of
-2-
MAY 26TH. A careful sweep of the Harbour and approaches
carried out during the forenoon and the area was declared
and the Harbour open at 1436. Sweeping operations were
later to ensure that delayed action mines should be destrope
The order to withdraw the B.E.F. from Dunkirk was given and
embarkation of the troops started this evening.
JOFF
A staff organisation known as "DYNAMO" was set up to carry
plan for evacuating the beaches at Dunkirk. Dutch Skoots,
Launches, Life-boats and numerous other small craft began
assemble at Dover and were berthed at Prince of Wales Piers
in Submarine Basin. These vessels were at once supplied
fuel, food and water to enable them to sail for Dunkirk at
earliest possible moment.
MAY 27TH. The tugs "Sun V11" and "Sun X" and "Persia" arriv
and reported for duty with K.H.M. They were detailed for
lighters and boats to Dunkirk.
MAY 28TH. At 0300 the Examination Vessel "Ocean Reward" ⑉
and sunk off Dover by the Hospital Ship "Isle of Thanet" with
loss of all hands. Boats were lowered by "Isle of Thenet
serched the position of the accident to gether with the tug
Brassey" but no survivors were found. The night was fine
calm and clear and both vessels were showing lights. Facts
contributory to the accident may have been the high speed
"Isle of Thanet" and possibly a misunderstanding on the pari
"Ocean Reward" that "Isle of Thanet" would stop off Dover
The tug "Foremost 87" arrived and joined the flotilla of
lighters and boats to Dunkirk. At 0830 the requisitioned
Skoots "Ruja", "Sursum Corda", "Jaba Amazone", "San Antonio"
arrived for duty on the Flanders coast. They required water
"Pacific", "Frendja", "Hebe", "Frisco Wega", "Pascholl" and
fuel and provisions and steps were to provide
During these operations the air raid taken warning at once sounded and
precautions in the Dockyard were taken. No attack develop
immediately after the "All Clear" was sounded these vessels
for Dunkirk.
MAY tow. 29th. The tug "Fairplay 1" with the water lighter "Cla "SM
was Lt. with Sub. the Comdr. detached Commodore Lieuts. Military and the R.G. K.A. for tug stores Wardrop Harwood, duty "Persia" sailed at R.N.R. Dunkirk. with E.S. for of Hill the Dunkirk. Commodore lighters and G. Jones "Sark" R.N.V.R. and
MAY connection numerous by motor of enemy the 30TH. boats Examination holes action. with H.M.S. arrived Superintendent's caused operation The Service "Jaguar" by former bombs "DYNAMO". was and had detached and staff, "Greyhound" thirteen aircraft for dead arrived duty on at board both duty Many
Dunkirk order by tugs and drifters. during the day All and whose were
Several Thames sailing barges orene
sailed during afternoon.
available at the Prince arrived and as will
visions same day. and ammunition. of Two Wales tugs Pier sailed they with them to
whom Many more vessels were now available evacuating the
many thousands were landed at Admiralty for Pier.
MAY 31ST. The Fleet in tow
"Locust". She had been Sweeper struck "Bideford" arrived which had
her depth charges and blown by & bomb aft
was taken in hand for temporary repairs H.M.S. Sanahu
800 troops on board at the time thirty and feetmoff suffered her
At the Prince of Wales Pier in the by the
"Ocean Cook" and "Challenge" towed morning the lighters and
"F.23" loaded with Military stores over to Dunkir&,

Details

2.
- 258
June End. In Ramsgate Harbour doing temporary repairs to
boilor of "Kindred Stare.
"Thrifty" reported to be leaking badly, engines
shalten up and mlloy store destroyed.
June 3rd. Orders were received from N.O.I.C. Ransgato to
return to Portland in company as soon as the
tide permitted. Owing to the repairs not boing
completed until late, 10 were not in time for
that evening's tide.
The Chief Engineer of "Thrifty" got intoxidated
and struck the Skipper of the "Kindred Start and
also his own Skipper. He was placed under arrost
by orders of the N.O.I.C. and handed over to the
Ramogate Police.
June 4th. Left Ransgate 0925.
June 5th. Arrived Portland 1100.
Lieutenant. R.N.V.R.
June 12th 1940.

Details

SECRET.
- $
249
273
21. At 1130/3 June, 1940, ne were ordered alongside to water
and get provisions. The opportunity was taken to fit sandbags on top
of and around the wheelhouse. Dure to the tags large draft 18 could
only remain alongside for about an hour either side of high water.
22.
Commander Le Measurer came onboard at 1600 and four large
motor boats were secured astem. At 1700 four tugs weighed and
proceeded. Two motor boats were slipped at 1850 and came on under
their own power. British fighter patrols were observed during the
evening. At position PIP two German floating nines were sighted.
They were destroyed by minesweepers.
23.
At 2130 one notor/was boat abandoned after the tow ropes had
parted, as its engines were broken down. It was, unfortunately, a
Doat only three days old.
24 By 2330 we were approaching the breakwater when a small
boat filled with French soldiers hailed us. These soldiers were
embarked. They told us that the Cermans were in the town, but that
the French held the coast for about one and a half miles to the restward
of the breakwater. The tug was stopped to the eastward 0200/4 of June, the
periodic breakwater when to the the pier. 25. we jetty. went shelling and H.M.S. inside we This outside remained Malcolm the 18 tugs did. harbour the had hailed in breakwater. thissposition been Between to and try ordered asked 0200 and pick us to and until leave to 0250 up hold more there and her soldiers 10 was stem proceeded One 1940, up from
with At 0230 the motor/steaming under its own power.
The motor was engaged in tow about half an hour later. peaceful
aircraft our one remaining with Lewis gins at 0310, it did not retaliate. The tug
was anchored boat in was Ramsgate taken at 0730 after an extraordinarily
Passage home.
ratings 26. Lieutenant 5th June, 1940. back at
Metcher and myself together Lends with gims nine and naval two
Able Seamen left were the left tug A.M. onboard on until the tug arrived Gravesend.
27. Both the naval ratings, the civilian tug's crew, and the
volunteers behaved splendidly.
I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Commanding Officer,
Your obedient Servant,
H.M.S.Pelican.
(an)
LIBUTENANT, R.N.
II
No. 1950.
VIOE.ADMIRAL
(Copy to :- Commander-in-Chief, The Nore).
Submitted in accordance with Nore General Order 448/40.
(sd) I.
bommander
LIBUTENANT FOR (on leave)
PELICAN. 18 June.,1940

Details

280
286,
1.0's 1700 & 1723. VESSELS TAKING PART IN OPERATION DYNANO.
TILBURY CONTRACTING & DREDGING CO. LTD. STEAM
HOPPER BARGE "LADY SOUTHBOROUGH"
REPORT OF EASTER.
at 3.00 s.m. on May 30th. To loft Portsmouth in company of
I received orders on May 29th to have steam for sailing
at 9.30 Palla I was boarded by a Havel Officer who have TO
other Steam Hoppers and proceeded to Romsgate, arriving there
my route instructions and charts and orders to leave in the
morning at 5.00 s.m. I left Ramsgate on May 31st at 5.40 n.m.
273
.0's 1700. & 1.723. - VESSELS TAKING PART IN OPERATION DYNAMO.
C.R.in C. DEPARTMENT HOPPER BARGE 11.95.
REPORTS OF MASTER AND CODER.
We left Fountain Lake about 1.15 Stalle 30/5/40 and
proceeding through the barrage to Hab End Bucy, set course
passing sexo about 3.45 s.m.
set course for Royal Soverign Light
ship soon after noon, not course for Dungeness,
visibility became worne, passed Royal
we without any incident worth noting, from
by this time, 10 were somewhat troubled with 508,
Dungenched we our had mark to reduce speed, but managed to keep antiaried going and
with as morning reached to the move our our services Ramagate at 10 trip. any stalls moment, were when Nothing about we not 10 6 were užilined, worth Dallas remained ordered noting on a the at perfect although to anchor whole auxo return one, out to being until way were to we Portanouth, Saturday were at expecting Remagnte moving
St. Helens speed, 10.15 Della on Saturday evening, dropping
at full passage home from was leaving practically Ramagate to arriving at Portmouth,
anchor for Roads, the night, at proceeding to harbour on Saturday norning.
(sa.) F.J. Topo,
Master.

Details

310
305
+
Having reported to H.M.S. "LYNK" was ordered to
remain ready at short notice, but received no further
instructions until the evening of Sunday June 2nd, when
under the orders of Captain G. Praser returned in the tug
Sun X to assist disembarking French troops. I was discharged
to Admiralty P.M. Tuesday, 4th June.
A verbal report was given to H.M.S. "LYNX" of proceedings
during the operations Dynamo" and delay in forwarding this
report is regretted but had no immediate access to P.G.O's.
I have the honour,
to be
Sir
Your obsdient Servent,
LISUTENANT, R.N.,
VICE ADMIRAL DOVER.
VICE AD MIRAL
D

Details

Details

RESTRICTED
CHAPTER I
PRELIMINARY EVENTS
10TH-18TH MAY 1940 (See Plan 1)
10TH MAY
Germany Invades Holland and Belgium
On the 10th May, following the invasion of Holland and Belgium, the Franco-
British forces under General Georges, commanding the French Front of the
North East, crossed the Belgian frontier and began their advance to the River
Dyle,¹ according to plan.
11TH MAY
Allies reach River Dyle
During the afternoon and evening of the 11th May the leading infantry
brigades reached the Dyle.
The news from the Belgian Army, of which King Leopold had assumed
command on the outbreak of war, was not good. At Maastricht the Belgians
had been unable to demolish important bridges over the Albert Canal and the
river Meuse, and the enemy had begun to move across them; whilst the
Belgian anti-tank obstacle eastward had been reconnoitred by the French
Cavalry Corps and found to be not only badly sited but unfinished.²
12TH MAY
German thrust on French 9th Army Front
The Allied advance to the Dyle was successfully completed by the 12th May.
The B.E.F. was in position between Wavre and Louvain, with the French 7th
Army (General Giraud) on its left and the French 1st Army (General Blanchard)
on its right. On the right of the French 1st Army was the French 9th Army
(General Corap) of the French Southern Command. Disquieting news was,
however, received from the south, where a German thrust with at least two
armoured divisions¹ was reported as developing on the front of the French
9th Army.
This thrust eventually proved to be the beginning of the German break-
through and their sweep westward, which cut off the Allied northern forces
from the main French forces in the south, led to the capture of Boulogne and
Calais, and culminated in the evacuation of Dunkirk.
General Billotte was in command of the French First Group of Armies,
which included the French 1st Army (with the French Cavalry Corps), and
the French 7th Army. Between these two armies lay the Belgian Army
(under the independent command of their King), and the B.E.F., which,
though under the command of General Georges, was not under that of General
Billotte. On this day, however, it was agreed to co-ordinate the action of the
British, French and Belgian forces, and General Billotte was appointed to
perform this task.³
I Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 18.
2 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 19.
3 Lord Gort's Second Despatch para. 22.
1

Details

CHAPTER II
THE WEEK BEFORE OPERATION "DYNAMO,"
19TH - 25TH MAY, 1940
19TH MAY
Compulsory withdrawal of B.E.F. foreseen
Gort was forced to the conclusion Continent possibility of a compulsory with-
A crisis was now approaching. After that considering the various alternatives, Lord
General Staff, Lieut-General H. the R. War Pownall, telephoned to the Director
drawal of the B.E.F. from the must be faced, and so his Chief of the
Military Operations and Plans at Office and discussed this possibility. of
at Abbeville were still holding, but there was little doubt that enemy armoured
On this 19th day of May communications by road and rail over the Somme
forces in that area would shortly break through to the coast. The force could
then no longer be supplied through in the ports south of the Somme, and the great
be available for maintaining replacements.¹
bulk of the reserves, which were the rearward areas, would shortly cease to
R.A.F. Component begins return to England
The growing failure of communications had now made it impracticable for
the British air organisation to function, and by the evening orders had to be
given for a large proportion of the R.A.F. Component of the B.E.F. (Air Vice-
Marshal C.H.B. Blount) to return to England.
Equally serious was the fact that, by the evening, German troops had arrived
in Amiens. The picture was no longer that of a line bent or temporarily
broken, but of a besieged fortress.²
Vice-Admiral, Dover, represented at War Office conference
Meanwhile, in London, following the receipt of General H. R. Pownall's
message, a meeting had been held at the War Office at which Vice-Admiral
B. H. Ramsay (Vice-Admiral, Dover), was represented.
This meeting discussed the temporary maintenance of the B.E.F.-and the
evacuation other of its personnel through Dunkirk, Calais and Boulogne. Among
questions considered was the possiblity of "the hazardous evacuation of
known very large forces." So little, apparently, was the true military situation then
seven of days later it developed into Operation "Dynamo". "The main decision
in London that this problem was regarded as "unlikely," though only
delegated disposal." to the Vice-Admiral Dover, and available shipping placed at his
this meeting," says Vice-Admiral Ramsay, "was that the control must be
Channel ports the German objective
enemy down the armoured forces appeared to be directed deepened
On the 20th May the breach south of Arras and widened; the
the Channel valley ports. of the Somme on Abbeville, the on other two main doubtless objectives - making one for
2 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 30.
2 I Lord Lord Gort's Second Despatch,
Gort's Second Despatch, para. para, 31. 32.
4

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THE WEEK BEFORE OPERATION "DYNAMO"
CHAP. II
Organisation of the Canal line
On the 21st May, also, steps were taken to defend the south-western flank
of the Allied force by organising the defence of the canal line from the Escaut
to La Bassée, and to continue it to St. Omer and the sea at Gravelines.¹
From this date all arrangements for air co-operation with the B.E.F. were
made by the War Office in conjunction with the Air Ministry, the air liaison
work being carried out in England at Hawkinge.2
Emergency evacuation again considered at the War Office
Meanwhile, in London, a meeting was held at the War Office at which, once
again, the emergency evacuation across the channel of very large forces, now
100ming close ahead, was under consideration.³
22ND MAY
Canal line occupied
By the 22nd May the 85 miles of canal line from Gravelines, through St. Omer
and Aire, to the Escaut (west of St. Amand) had been occupied, so far as was
possible, with the 10,000 men available. This line was divided into sectors,
for each of which a British commander was responsible,¹ but the number of
anti-tank weapons was barely adequate to cover all the crossing places, and no
effective watch could be kept against small parties of infantry crossing the
canal between the bridges.¹
Boulogne cut off, Calais threatened
The ports of Boulogne and Calais were now no longer working and con-
sequently the supply situation had grown worse than ever. It was found too
that, at such short notice, the port of Ostend could not be adapted to military
requirements.4
Boulogne was, in fact, by this time completely cut off, and by the evening
enemy armoured forces were within 9 miles of Calais.⁵ At Merville, the last
remaining advanced landing ground available for the R.A.F. Component was
abandoned.
On the night of 22nd/23rd May, according to plan, the Allied withdrawal
to the Belgian frontier defences was carried out.⁶
" The operation
...
will be known as Dynamo'
Meanwhile, the Admiralty had begun to make definite preparations for an
evacuation from the Continent. There were at this time, lying at Poole and
in the Port of London, some 50 Dutch skoots (schuyts), 200 ton-motor coasters
which had escaped from Holland. On the 22nd May the Admiralty, after
allocating 8 of these vessels to the War Office for use as supply ships, directed
the Commanders-in-Chief Portsmouth and the Nore to take over and man the
remainder, arrange for their organisation and assembly, and report the names
of the vessels as they became ready for service. At the same time it was in-
timated that, when ready, the skoots would be placed at the disposal of V-A.
I Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 34.
2 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 29.
D.R.
4 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 37.
5 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 36.
6 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 39.
7

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THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. II
Dover.¹ It was added that "Dynamo"2 the operation the for first which these ships were
prepared word. would be known as mention of the now famous being
18 lying at Poole were London were commissioned Portsmouth on of these,
As a result of this direction, commissioned 40 skoots by the in all C. were in C. commissioned;
the May, 25th and and 22 lying 27th at May. by the C. in C. Nore between
23RD MAY
Enemy within 20 miles of Dunkirk
May which (see to have changed enemy hands twice bridgeheads at Aire, at St. 23rd
Over in Plan France, 2), and the situation the on established the canal line deteriorated during the
mediately east of St. Omer), and, during the forest of Clairmarais
German seems tanks were reported harbouring during in the the day"3), and near Watten. Omer
vehicles within 3 miles of Hazebrouck; day, hostile armoured (im-
Dunkirk. enemy was then within some 20 miles these of
movements came had been checked,3 the and though by the evening fighting
Calais cut off
gallant was conducted under the orders of the War Office". of
Calais defence was now of Calais finally cut off, and, said Lord Gort, the remainder the
Dunkirk, available though for its water supply was destroyed,⁴ was by this time the
and port small unloading supplies. Even the small supply by air of only
craft arms ammunition now ceased, as it had become impossible rations
(Licut.-General to land. Accordingly, on the advice of the Quarter-Master-General for air-
During completed. day the evacuation of the R.A.F. Component of the B.E.F. rations.⁴ was
the W. G. Laidsell), Lord Gort put the B.E.F. on half
Dunkirk Naval demolition parties were ready at the Nore, and one was landed
XD(E)). during the day to prepare the locks for demolition. (Operation at
Boulogne evacuated
Comdr. Early A. on E. the same day a demolition party (Operation XD under
Buttercup", destroyer Vimy, to Boulogne, together with despatched,
in the P. Welman, D.S.O., D.S.C., R.N., (Retd.), was (G) also Lieut.-
consisted Major of C. F. L. Holford, R.M. was in cover the demolition
party; to restore control of the docks area and a force known as Force
guns and a medical 4 platoons of seamen, 2 Marine platoons command with a of section this force, of machine and it
attacked battery drawn When to had "Force by the been enemy Buttercup" sent tanks party. on the and Two arrived, previous battalions the day. and town the of Irish was under Guards shell and fire an and anti-tank being
orders jetty in readiness infantry, for Army forces were being with-
I during the afternoon that the evacuation, troops were although to stay the and War fight Office it out⁵. sent
2 Appendices F.1 and F.2.
Appendix F.3.
4 5 3 Lord Lord Gort's Gort's Second Despatch,
Admiralty Second Despatch, para. 39.
Message 1422/23, War para. Diary 37. 23.5.40, p. 356.
8

Details

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. II
Defences of Dunkirk
It was would be Dunkirk¹. Its local were under the only port du
now obvious that if the B.E.F. defences was to be evacuated the
available Nord, Admiral Abrial, whose command included the Boulogne, Calais and Dun-
in these areas to General Fagalde.
kirk, but on this day (24th May) he delegated command of military forces
and comprised an inner and an outer sector; inner on
The French defences of Dunkirk extended only the as far as the Belgian frontier,
Mardyck Canal to Spyker, thence to Bergues to the frontier and so to the
the outer on the line of the river Aa to St. Omer, thence by Cassel and Steen- sea
voorde to the frontier.¹
the inundations which formed part of the defence scheme of Dunkirk.²
The French now took over the British posts on the Aa and began to operate
Belgian line penetrated
In the late evening the enemy attacked the Belgian line on the Lys, pene-
trating to a depth of 1] miles on a 13 mile front3 and endangering the security
of the British left flank.
It had become a matter of vital importance to keep open the B.E.F.'s line
of communication to the coast through a corridor of withdrawal which was
hourly narrowing. The penetration of the Belgian line made it certain that
before long the whole area east of the Yser canal would be in the hands of the
enemy, with the serious risk of the Belgian right becoming separated from the
British left at Menin, and of the Belgian Army being forced to fall back in a
northerly, rather than a westerly direction.³
25TH MAY
Enemy pincer attack
On the 25th May enemy activity intensified. He was across the canal at
St. Venant, and was developing the bridgeheads between that place and Aire
and also at St. Omer, while further north the situation on the river Aa remained
obscure.
During the day the Belgians continued to withdraw in a north-westerly
direction under enemy pressure.
General Sir John Dill, who had now succeeded General Sir Edmund Ironside
as C.I.G.S., visited Lord Gort in the morning. He then informed the Prime
Minister and the Secretary of State for War that there could be no disguising
the seriousness of the situation.3
By 1800, says Lord Gort, "I was convinced that the steps I had taken to
secure the north. my left flank would prove insufficient to meet the growing danger in
held; ment the the south-west on Dunkirk had already and being
The from pattern of the enemy pincer attack was becoming clearer. One move-
between counterpart was now developing on the developed, front. was The gap
the British left and the Belgian right which Belgian had been threatening
D.R.
3 Lord Lord Gort's Second Despatch, 41.
Gort's Second Despatch, para. para. 42.
12

Details

THE WEEK BEFORE OPERATION "DYNAMO"
CHAP. II
the whole day, might at any time become impossible to close; were this to
happen, my last hope of reaching the coast would be gone".'
In order to secure the British northern flank Lord Gort decided to issue
orders for the occupation, as quickly as troops could be made available, of the
line of the Ypres - Comines canal and the positions covering Ypres. In the
absence of General Blanchard, who was visiting the Belgian G.Q.G. at Bruges,
Lord Gort communicated this decision that evening to the Headquarters of
the French First Group of Armies.¹
The necessity of evacuation was becoming a matter of paramount immediacy.
British destroyers bombard suburb of Calais
Meanwhile, on the 25th May, the trawler Lord Howe sailed to Calais with a
cargo of ammunition². She entered the port and discharged part of her cargo
in the face of heavy enemy fire from the dunes to the southward. In view of
the risk involved, Commodore W. P. Gandell, R.N. (P.S.T.O., French Ports),
who was on the quay, then ordered the Lord Howe to sail.
Outside Calais the destroyer Greyhound closed the Lord Howe, which was
carrying a request for bombardment support of the town. At the same time,
the Greyhound received a signal from the Vice-Admiral, Dover, ordering the
bombardment of the Calais suburb of St. Pierre. The Greyhound opened fire,
and at 2000, an H.A. battery east of Sangatte registered a hit on her, killing
2 and wounding 3. About this time the destroyer Grafton arrived and also
opened fire. The 2 destroyers returned to Dover as darkness set in.³
Evacuation of Calais countermanded
At 2130 a force of seven trawlers⁴, three yachts⁵ and two drifters⁶, sailed for
Calais road, ready to evacuate troops from Calais, the moment an order was
received to do so. Five of the trawlers towed motor boats. Commander
W. V. H. Harris, R.N. (Commander M/S, Dover), in the Grey Mist, was in
command. The destroyers Windsor and Verity left Dover at 2300, to cover
the withdrawal of this force.
On arrival off Calais, two of the motor boats were ordered into Calais harbour.
At about 0300/26, a signal was received that Calais was to be held at all costs;
furthermore, it was ordered that this signal was to be sent by hand to the
Brigadier commanding on shore. The Conidaw went in to deliver the signal.
All ships were then ordered back to the Downs, but the Botanic and Maretta
remained behind until the two motor boats and the Conidaw returned.⁷
The Botanic and Maretta were damaged by gunfire when returning on the
26th May, and were unable to take part in Operation "Dynamo".
I Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 43.
2 Lieut. L. C. Whittle, R.N.R., in the Lord Howe, says it was the 24th May.
3 Vice-Admiral, Dover's 1907/25/5.
4 The Botanic, Fyldea, Maretta, Arley, Polly Johnson, Brock and Calvi.
6 The Grey Mist, Conidaw and Chico.
5 The Playmates and Willing Boys.
7 Report by Commander M/S, Dover (R.O. II, p. 497).
13

Details

OPERATION "DYNAMO" IS COMMENCED
CHAP. III
you that a great part of the B.E.F. and its equipment will inevitably be lost
even in best circumstances".
Later in the day Lord Gort received a further telegram from the War Office
which said, inter alia,
not
possible for French
to
effect
junction
with Northern Armies no course open to you but to fall back upon the
coast
you are now authorised to operate towards the coast forthwith in con-
junction with French and Belgian Armies".
It will be remembered that on the evening of the 21st May the King of the
Belgians had agreed that, if forced to abandon the Belgian positions on the
Lys, he would withdraw to the Yser, maintaining touch with the left of the
B.E.F. Now, however, late on the morning of the 26th May, a note was
received from General Michiels, the Chief of the Staff of the Belgian Army,
which said, inter alia the Belgian Army is being attacked with extreme
violence
and
the lack of Belgian reserves makes it impossible to extend
our boundaries
we have no longer any forces available to fill the gap in the
direction of Ypres. As regards the withdrawal to the Yser, the idea must be
ruled out since it would destroy our units more quickly than the battle.
The Belgian collapse was impending, if it had not actually taken place, and
the task of defending the Allied line as far as the sea had fallen on the British
and French troops.2
Dunkirk perimeter organised
Faced with this critical situation Lord Gort, on the evening of the 26th May,
put in hand his plans for withdrawing in to the bridgehead at Dunkirk³. Orders
had already been given for the embarkation of certain key personnel, and now
all units not required for battle were being withdrawn. It was possibly at
this juncture that, " owing to a misunderstanding, the personnel of certain
anti-aircraft units had been embarked instead of being retained for the defence
of the port of Dunkirk".⁴ The task of organising a bridgehead at Dunkirk
was delegated to Lieut.-General Sir Ronald Adam, Bt., Commander of the
3rd Corps.⁵
The Admiralty signals, "Operation 'Dynamo' is to Commence"
Meanwhile, in the morning of 26th May, a meeting had been held at the
Admiralty to give further consideration to the provision of small craft, and
the crews for manning both them and the ex-Dutch skoots. The meeting also
examined the number of craft available for the evacuation. The port of
Dunkirk had already been so damaged by air attacks as to be no longer avail-
able for unloading supplies, which would now have to be landed on the beaches
to the eastward.
Long before the operation was ordered, the Admiralty fully realized that
large numbers of small craft would be required for a beach evacuation; but
such was the secrecy of even the possibility of evacuation, that steps could
not yet be taken to collect craft for the purpose.
During the afternoon of the 26th May, under the pressure of the acute
military : situation, the Admiralty informed the Vice-Admiral, Dover, that
it was imperative for 'Dynamo' to be implemented with the greatest vigour,
I Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 44.
2 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 45.
3 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 47.
4 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 55.
5
He handed over command of the 3rd Corps to Maj.-Gen. S. R. Wason.
15

Details

MONDAY, 27TH MAY
CHAP. IV
The "build-up" of small craft commences
Early on the 27th May, the Ministry of Sea Transport had been asked by
the Admiralty to find between 40 and 50 small craft, which were to assemble
at Sheerness for a special requirement". The Director of the Small Vessels
Pool (Vice-Admiral Sir Lionel Preston, K.C.B.) supplied a list of what were
thought to be suitable vessels, but it was soon found that a great number of
these were not in a fit state for service. A meeting was therefore held at the
Admiralty which was attended by a representative of the Director of Sea
Transport, Mr. H. C. Riggs. On Mr. Riggs' suggestion, Admiral Preston agreed
to send some of his officers to the various boat-yards from Teddington to
Burnham and Brightlingsea, to inspect and send to Sheerness all vessels fit for
service¹. Forty motor boats or launches were thus obtained, and arrange-
ments made for them to reach Sheerness by 28th May.2 Very few of these
reached the Dunkirk beaches by the 29th May, but they were the forerunners
of nearly 300 small craft, which were destined to play an important part in the
embarkation from the beaches of some 99,000 troops, by ferrying them to off-
lying ships.
In the evening of the 27th the Naval Officer-in-Charge, Ramsgate, assumed
by arrangement the duty of fuelling and despatching all small power boats with
the attendant pulling boats forming the inshore flotilla.
Some delays occurred in the assembly at Ramsgate or in the Downs of small
craft despatched from other commands, owing to many of them being routed
to Dover in error, instead of to the Downs. Once despatched by the authorities
no communication with these small vessels was possible until they arrived at
their destination; this resulted in delays of up to 24 hours or more before
assembly, because during the night misfortune befell many tows that came
adrift owing to the moderate weather or collisions, and the business of rounding
them up could not be effected until daylight.
"Dynamo Maintenance Officer" appointed
To take charge of these small craft, Rear-Admiral, A. H. Taylor, O.B.E.,
(with the acting rank of Commodore), after getting final instructions from the
Vice-Admiral, Dover, proceeded to Sheerness on the 27th May to act as
Dynamo Maintenance Officer." He was responsible for the preparation of
various vessels, small motor craft, and pulling boats, for service in Operation
'Dynamo his staff comprised Cdr. H. R. Troup, R.N., and Lt. Cdr. D. E.
Holland-Martin, R.N. The type of machinery fitted in many of the vessels
and its defective state presented the Fleet Engineer Officer, Captain T. E.
Docksey, R.N., and Sheerness Dockyard with some difficult problems; but
within a week, under Commodore Taylor's general direction, no less than 100
motor boats, 10 self-propelled lighters, 7 skoots, 1 oil tanker, 6 paddle steamers,
and numerous pulling boats, were prepared for service and sent out from
Sheerness.
S.N.O. Dunkirk assumes duty 1900/27
Meanwhile, at 1315, Captain Tennant left Dover for Dunkirk in the destroyer
Wolfhound, with a naval beach and pier party of 12 officers and 160 ratings.
A communications staff was also taken, as it was intended that the Wolfhound
should relieve the Wolsey at Dunkirk as W/T link. The Wolfhound was
I T.O. 9144/40.
2 Appendix G. 3.
21

Details

CHAP. IV
THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
attacked misses, and, twice arrival by dive-bombers at Dunkirk en at route, 1655, receiving found some damage
was
in progress. on an air attack by 21 from aircraft near
enveloped air raid casualties lying about depots the and The was
investigate in the a vast pall of smoke from the oil area of Naval Headquarterters to
Captain Tennant local proceeded situation. ashore The whole to the Bastion
with was blazing, masses of wreckage. were streets, which were littered town
Parminter ; On arrival at Colonel the Bastion, Whitfeld, Captain Sub-Area Tennant Commandant; held a meeting and with Brigadier
H. P. Henderson, R.N., the B.N.L.O. It to was retain decided that the harbour Commander
as a W/T link.
untenable, and that it was impracticable the Wolfhound at Dunkirk was
At 1900 Captain Tennant assumed the duties of S.N.O. Dunkirk,
ordered the Wolfhound and Wolsey to proceed to the beach east of Dunkirk and
and embark troops, using their own boats. This they proceeded to do, but
did not get away unscathed; the Wolfhound grounded as she left Dunkirk
harbour and received further damage from a bomb which struck the jetty six
feet away. She made no more trips to Dunkirk, but on that evening she and
the Wolsey became the pioneers of beach evacuation.
Beach evacuation begins
Meanwhile, during the afternoon, four personnel vessels and two hospital
carriers had sailed for Dunkirk¹. Of these, the personnel vessels Queen of the
Channel and St. Seiriol left Dover at 1330, by Route Y, and entered Channel Dunkirk
at about 1930, during an air raid. The Queen of the beaches. had At
harbour barely embarked 50 troops when both boats ships were had started diverted ferrying, to the S.N.O. Dun-
kirk to troyers' passed 2230, boats, embark signalled however, which this motor 1,000 order were the boats. before men. Wolfhound manned to the the The The St. St. as Queen to Wolfhound, Seiriol's necessary Seiriol send of a beach by the personnel by then megaphone Channel, naval and with ship then, ratings the using to and Wolsey returning the or her commandeered east towed own off pier, to the by except boats, Dunkirk, Dunkirk the beaches des- em- the her
she harbour, destroyers barked was about unfortunately picked Wolfhound 150 up troops a and further sunk Wolsey, from by 700 aircraft the to troops. embark early She next troops was morning from the first the (May ship, beaches, 28th) shortly though
after leaving Dunkirk.
" tomorrow night is problematical "
S.N.O. local By 1958, Dunkirk, and Captain he sent Tennant this dramatic had arrived signal to at immediately.
Evacuation on 27th May, only an hour after he a the duties of the of
situation, available craft to beaches T.O.Of.1988."kirk
" Evacuation tomorrow transmission, night is was not received until 2055, but in and the
Please send every problematical.
This I The signal, Queen delayed of the Channel, in St. Seiriol, Canterbury, Maid of Orleans, Isle of Thanet
Worthing.
22

Details

MONDAY, 27TH MAY
CHAP. IV
meantime at 2025, the Vice-Admiral, Dover, received another signal sent only
a few minutes later :
" Port continuously bombed all day and on fire. Embarkation possible only
from beaches east of harbour A.B.C.D.¹ Send all ships and passenger ships
there to anchor. Am ordering Wolfhound to load there and sail. T.O.O.2005."
To the Vice-Admiral, Dover, the situation must have appeared critical
when, later that evening, he received a report from two military officers from
G.H.Q., that the plight of the B.E.F. was precarious and that the enemy might,
indeed, succeed in cutting it off from Dunkirk.²
All ships diverted to the beaches
Such was the grim picture presenting itself to the Vice-Admiral, Dover, that
night - the B.E.F. in grave and very real danger of being cut off altogether from
Dunkirk, and possibly only a bare 24 hours available for its evacuation. Admiral
Ramsay reacted to these dire tidings with characteristic drive and energy,
and a period of intense activity ensued. Every effort was concentrated on
sending as many craft as possible to the beaches without delay². Order
followed order in rapid succession. Personnel ships were diverted to the
beach, code letters A, B, C and D (i.e. Malo beach). Four paddle minesweepers³
were sailed from the Downs to La Panne beach. Destroyers were rushed to the
beaches and urged to embark as many British troops as possible, as this was
the last chance of saving them "; the Gallant, and Vivacious, then on patrol,
the Windsor, Vimy, Anthony, Impulsive, Sabre and the cruiser Calcutta, were
all ordered to proceed with the utmost despatch to the beach at Malo-les-Bains
and the beach at Zuydcoote, just east of it; the Grafton and Greyhound, on
patrol between Fairy Bank and Kwint Bank buoys, and the Wakeful, just
arrived at Dover from Plymouth, were hurried to the beach at La Panne.
The wording of some of the signals4 conveying these orders reflects the
desperation felt that night, a desperation which, in spite of the course of sub-
sequent events, was at the time only too well-founded. " Had the situation
appeared less critical," observes Admiral Ramsay, an organised flow of large
and small craft, working in reliefs, would have been arranged."⁵
Yet a further batch of vessels arrived off the beaches that evening; the
17 available flare-burning drifters of the Dover Auxiliary Patrol⁶ had sailed
for Dunkirk during the afternoon, and on arriving were diverted to the beaches
by the Wolfhound, in accordance with a signal from the Vice-Admiral, Dover⁷,
and anchored close inshore. The boats from the Wolfhound and Wolsey, and
I These letters refer to an arrangement, whereby at the commencement of Dynamo'
the Dunkirk beaches were described by a letter code referring to Map G.S.G.S. 4040,
Sheet 29, 1/50,000. The lengths of beach lying in each 1000 metre map square were
lettered, west to east, commencing with "A" at square 2686 in sequence to "0" at
square 3990. (Appx. N. 10). Under this arrangement, A.B.C.D. actually refers to the
beach at Malo-les-Bains.
This arrangement appears to have fallen into disuse on and after 29th May, when the
stretch of beach, one mile east of Dunkirk to one mile east of La Panne, was divided into
3 equal parts, referred to as La Panne, Bray and Malo, from east to west, with a mile gap
between each part. (Appendix O. 11).
2 D.R. page 3, para. 8.
3
The Sandown, Medway Queen, Brighton Belle and Gracie Fields.
4 See Appendices D. 3, D. 4, D. 5, D. 7, and D. 8.
5 D.R., p.3, para. 38.
6 They were the Netsukis, Lord Howard, Lord Howe, Golden Sunbeam, Midas, Golden
Gift, Girl Pamela, Paxton, Boy Roy, Eileen Emma, Girl Gladys, Forecast, Ut Prosim, York-
shire Lass, Young Mun, Shipmates and Torbay II.
7 Appendix D.6.
23

Details

MONDAY, 27TH MAY
CHAP. IV
beach evacuation impossible ; at no time did this happen, but it was not
until the fifth day of the operation (May 30th) that small power boats and beach
craft began to become available in adequate numbers.¹
The reason for this is to be sought mainly in the need for secrecy enjoined
by the British and French Governments, even after the operation had been
ordered. The necessity for avoiding any action that might have given rise to
talk rendered the collection of small craft slow. It was not until 31st May
that the British public learnt from the press that evacuation had begun.
Disembarkation ports designated
In these early days the limiting factors seemed likely to be the scale of enemy
attacks at Dunkirk and on the beaches, and the difficulty of concentrating the
ships and the troops at a common point or points².
Meanwhile, in order to ensure air protection, Blenheims maintained a patrol
by single aircraft over the Dunkirk area during the night.³
At 2330, the Vice-Admiral, Dover, promulgated the names of ports for the
disembarkation of troops in England as follows :-
The Calcutta at Sheerness;
destroyers at Dover ;
drifters, minesweepers,
skoots and coasters
}{
At Margate or Ramsgate as directed
by N.O.I.C. Ramsgate;
personnel vessels at Folkestone.
Throughout the whole course of the operation the despatch of troops from
the points of disembarkation in England was directed by the War Office Move-
ments Control Organisation, and proceeded with great smoothness⁴.
Summary of troops evacuated
The ships which had sailed for Dunkirk on the 26th May brought back
6,183 troops and 646 stretcher cases next day.
During the 27th May only two personnel vessels actually made the round
trip, viz. : the Royal Daffodil, which brought back 840 troops from Dunkirk,
and the St. Helier, which was ordered back before she could embark any troops.
The destroyers Wolsey and Wolfhound, which embarked 206 and 130 troops
respectively from Malo beach on the evening of 27th May, did not sail for
England until shortly after midnight.
Thus, the total number landed in England from the commencement of
Operation "Dynamo" to midnight 27th/28th May was :
26th May - Nil;
27th May - 7,669, all of whom were lifted direct from Dunkirk harbour.
I D.R. covering letter, No. A.14/0/876/40, page 2, paras. 3 and 5.
2 D.R. page 3, para. 11.
3 R.A.F. Narrative, p. 320.
4 D.R. covering letter No. A.14/0/876/40, page 2, para. 6.
25

Details

TUESDAY, 28TH MAY
CHAP V
While a situation that could only mean surrender was now visualised in
England as possibly a stark necessity, General Weygand sent an urgent tele-
gram to Lord Gort appealing to him personally to ensure that the British
Army took a vigorous part in any counter-attack thought necessary; the
situation, said General Weygand, made it essential to hit hard.
Lord Gort, who saw the situation more clearly, observes, when he [General
Weygand] sent this message, he could have had no accurate information of
the real position or of the powers of counter-attack remaining to either the
British or French."
Germans take Ostend
That evening, at 2030, the Admiralty informed the Vice-Admiral, Dover,
that Ostend was reliably reported to be captured. Dunkirk was the only port
left in Allied hands.
Situation at Dunkirk becomes easier
Nor were the prospects at Dunkirk very hopeful. When the Wolfhound and
the Wolsey left Malo beach for Dover just after midnight on the 27th May the
whole of the port appeared to be ablaze¹.
At 0125 the cruiser Calcutta, en route for La Panne, was missed by a torpedo
100 yards astern fired from an E-boat. No further attack took place, and the
Calcutta arrived off La Panne beach an hour later to find that the destroyers
Grafton, Greyhound and Impulsive, and the paddle-minesweepers Sandown and
Gracie Fields, were already there.
Ever since 0030 destroyers making their first trip to the evacuation area
had been arriving off the beaches, and only two - the Gallant and the Wakeful -
went to Dunkirk. The Vivacious and the skoot Hebe II reached Malo beach
at about 0030, and the Sabre at 0120. The Hebe II, unable to find any troops,
entered Dunkirk harbour and embarked 150 from the east pier; the Sabre
embarked troops from two drifters. At 0320 the Vimy arrived off the beach
at Zuydcoote, 3 miles east of Dunkirk, and sent her boats to assist in filling up
the minesweeper Brighton Belle, which was embarking troops with the assist-
ance of the ex-Belgian canal boat Yser and a small pulling boat. The skoot
Lena had been off Zuydcoote since the previous evening and in the early hours
of the 28th May transferred the 120 troops she had embarked to a destroyer ;
the minesweeper Medway Queen, off La Panne since 2300/27, sailed with 600
troops on board.
By 0400 the situation in Dunkirk harbour appears to have eased, and at
0436 S.N.O. Dunkirk was asking for all vessels to go alongside the east pier.
At 0445 the Vimy, leaving her boats with the Brighton Belle, went into Dunkirk
harbour and embarked 613 troops. At 0955 the destroyer Mackay reached
Dunkirk from the Irish Sea, and picked up 600 troops in an hour from the sea-
ward end of Dunkirk east pier, giving up her berth to the destroyer Montrose.
The Sabre, which had in the meantime returned to Dover with a load of 158
troops from Malo beach, berthed outside the Montrose. An hour later, the
destroyers Worcester and Anthony arrived, and berthed ahead of the Montrose.
The pier was crammed with troops and several aircraft, attempting to bomb
it, were driven off by the destroyers' gunfire. Vast columns of smoke were
drifting westwards from the burning oil tanks ashore, and houses on the sea
front were bursting into flames from time to time².
I Report by the Wolfhound.
2 Report by the Montrose.
27

Details

TUESDAY, 28TH MAY
CHAP. V
had all come under fire from the shore guns at Calais and Gravelines. At
0415 on the 28th May the Queen of the Channel, loaded with 904. troops, was
attacked by one aircraft; 3 or 4 bombs were dropped, which straddled the ship
abaft the mainmast and broke her back, the starboard propeller shaft and the
rudder. By good fortune the Dorrien Rose, en route for Dunkirk, was in the
vicinity and rescued the troops : the Queen of the Channel sank about 1/2 hour
later. The St. Seiriol, which left Dunkirk at about 0415 with 494 troops,
reached Folkestone in safety.
Civilian crews feel the strain
Some 45 personnel vessels were used during operation "Dynamo"
Of these eight were sunk, at least six were so damaged by bombing or gunfire
as to render them unfit for further use during the operation, and two were
damaged in collision. Nine of the largest of these personnel vessels had been
engaged prior to "Dynamo" in operations at Dunkirk, Calais and Boulogne,
and their Captains and crews were beginning to feel the strain when Operation
"Dynamo" started.
Thus it was that the Master of the Canterbury, which had already completed
2 round trips to Dunkirk in operation "Dynamo", reported, on the 28th May,
that he was too worn out to make a third trip. The P.S.T.O. went on board
and explained the gravity of the situation to the Master, and the Canterbury
sailed at 0930 the next day. On her return voyage from Dunkirk she was
bombed and damaged, and after landing her 1960 troops went into dock for
repairs. In the 3 trips she made the Canterbury brought back 4,416 troops;
her Master, Captain C. A. Hancock, was awarded the D.S.C.
Personnel vessels not to be employed during full daylight
On the 28th May, however, it had become apparent that development of
the German air threat over the evacuation area, and the increasing artillery
fire from shore batteries covering the sea approaches to Dunkirk, prohibited
the employment of personnel and similar vessels during daylight, until the
position was restored, and that evacuation from Dunkirk by day must for the
moment be confined to warships and small vessels².
It was not, therefore, until later in the day, that the P/V Royal Daffodil
sailed for Dunkirk, and eight other personnel vessels and a hospital carrier³
received their sailing orders during the afternoon and evening.
The northern Route Y was by this time in general use⁴, but ships proceeding
from Dover to Dunkirk were ordered to use the southern and shorter Route Z,
if the passage from Calais Bell buoy to Dunkirk could be made in darkness.
N.O.I.C. Ramsgate responsible for servicing skoots
In these circumstances some 20 skoots reached Dunkirk, or arrived off the
beaches during the day and evening of the 28th May; others were on the way.
Their speed varied, but most of them were very slow. Eight of them went
into Dunkirk harbour⁵, and four to Bray beach⁶. The Abel Tasman, loaded
with ammunition, the Alice and Kaap Falga, loaded with food, and three
I This number includes 3 store ships, 3 motor vessels and a few freighters, coasters and
tramps.
2 D.R. p. 4, para. 13.
3 The Scotia, Malines, Prague, Manxman, Royal Sovereign, Tynwald, Lochgarry, Killarney
and the H.C. Paris.
4 Appendix K.1.
5 The Caribia, Fredanja, Friso, Jutland, Tilly, Patria, Sursum-Corda, and Twente.
6 The Amazone, Doggersbank, Hilda, and Oranje.
29

Details

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. V
and Hilda), two power boats and Kellett a tow and pulling Leda, but boats ; the(Doggersbank
with the Calcutta¹, the Gallant, Wakeful, of Verity, two skoots
was joined by the minesweepers the number there were insufficient
boats and motor launches to cope with of troops on the beach.
Calcutta had already lost one of her two whalers2.
70 wounded (cot cases) ; heavy embarkation difficult and the
Off La Panne, at 2157, the Calcutta, surf assisted made by the skoot Reiger, embarked
By the 28th May beach evacuation had become a vitally essential part
complete lack of small beaching craft, other than ships' boats - aftermath
Operation Dynamo". It was, however, severely restricted by the almost of
the wish, already noticed, to prevent early information of the operation be- of
coming known to the enemy; and an urgent and persistent cry for boats arose
from the ships off the beaches.³
Beach craft are sailed for Dunkirk
Steps had already been taken, however, to begin the provision of small boats.
At 0800 on the 28th May, 8 motor boats were sailed from the Thames for the
South Downs. At noon the tug Sun V with 8 cutters and 2 whalers in tow,
and the tug St. Clears with 11 cutters in tow, left Sheerness for Ramsgate, and
both tugs sailed for Dunkirk late in the evening. Of these two tows, however,
only 7 cutters reached the beaches, the remainder being lost en route.4
At 1500 the tug Java left Ramsgate for Dunkirk, in company with four
drifters⁵ and 5 motor launches⁶. They arrived off Bray at 0100 on 29th May,
and were the first arrivals of small motor craft off the beaches. With them,
at 1500 on the 28th May, 5 drifters of the 1st Mine Recovery Flotilla left Rams-
gate for Dunkirk⁷, and at 1845, 18 motor boats with 17 whalers left Sheerness
for Dover.⁸
Supply of small craft is accelerated
These supplied only a portion of what was required. There was still a lack
of small craft, and at 2002 V.A. Dover asked that every available shallow draft
power boat should be sent to the beaches⁹. The Admiralty's vigorous reaction
to this request became fully evident on the following day, the 29th May, when
the Portsmouth and Nore Commands, the Thames estuary and the Port of
London Authority were combed for motor boats, lighters and barges¹⁰. To
accelerate the journey arrangements were made to route them direct to the
beaches, provided they had charts, food, fuel etc.¹¹, though some difficulty was
experienced in providing the large number of charts required. Indeed, on the
road map" to navigate on.
31st May the Master of the coaster Hythe states that he was given an army
I 2 The Calcutta reported she was off La Panne.
Appendix H.2.
3 Appendices H.1 and H.2.
Five gunfire from Clears' cutters were lost en morning route to Dunkirk a collision with the destroyer the result of enemy
4 The of the Sun St. V's tow was lost early next in Montrose.
up 5 by The the Sp. Gravelines Serv./V. Crested and Nieuport; Eagle. one of the 5 was, next however, day, as subsequently picked
6 The Lord Walker Rodney, I, Lord Keith, Lord Collingwood
7 8 9 The Appendix Lord Cavan, G.6. Walker Fidget, II, Jacketa, New Britannic, Silver Dawn Nayland, and and Fisher and Lord Angler Boy St. Vincent. (Appendix II. G.5).
Appendix G.7.
II 10 Appendices G.13 to G.18.
Appendix G.9.
32

Details

CHAPTER VI
WEDNESDAY, 29TH MAY
FIRST HEAVY ENEMY AIR EFFORT
German bridgehead in Nieuport
Throughout the 29th May, the enemy attempted to cross the canal between
the Frenco-Belgian frontier and Nieuport - and, indeed, succeeded in establish-
ing a bridgehead in the town of Nieuport, although everywhere else he was
driven back. Some of the enemy attempted to cross in rubber boats; others,
disguised as civilians, with the refugees, horses and cattle. The few vital hours
gained made it possible, against all expectation, to embark practically the
whole British force¹.
Two-day traffic block in perimeter
Large numbers of French troops arriving in the perimeter brought a mass of
transport which caused such traffic congestion that for two days the main road
between La Panne and Dunkirk became totally blocked with vehicles three
deep².
French evacuation not yet ordered
Admiral Abrial (whose headquarters were at Bastion No. 32, near Dunkirk
Mole) had apparently received no orders from his Government that the whole
of the British troops were to be embarked, and he professed great surprise when
he heard of Lord Gort's intentions. He imagined that British troops would
stay and defend the perimeter to the last, side by side with the French².
Meanwhile, the French troops were expecting to embark along with their
British comrades, notwithstanding that only two French ships had so far been
provided³; the beaches were becoming crowded with French soldiers, and
difficulties might have occurred at any time.² Later in the day, however,
three French torpedo boats and one minesweeper sailed to Dunkirk harbour
to evacuate troops.4
Dunkirk perimeter established
On the evening of the 29th May the organisation of the perimeter was com-
plete, and General Sir Ronald Adam, his task accomplished, embarked for
England that night.5
Mackay and Montrose out of action
The story of the 29th May is largely one of ships sunk or damaged. Our
losses were very heavy and began very early. At 0005, the destroyer Mackay
(en route to Bray beach with the destroyer Harvester) ran aground at the western
I Lord Gort's Second Despatch para. 53.
2 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 55.
3 So far, the French torpedo boat Cyclone had brought back 460 troops, and the mine-
sweeper Commandant Delage 520 - both on 29th May, from Dunkirk harbour.
4 The torpedo boats Cyclone, Mistral and Sirocco and the minesweeper Commandant
Delage.
5 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 57.
35

Details

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. VI
and machine gun platforms, a bulkhead wrecking was dished, them
was severely shaken, and 13 killed,
wounded; of the passengers, and orders killed and 2 men
the ship's company, 3 officers 2 officers men and were 10 men were and 18
wounded. Then a fire broke out, further dive bomb were given to flood
and burn the signal books. A anchored. attack took
bombs fell wide. The Bideford
and the tug St. Clears The in tow; she was,
The M/S Kellett came endeavoured alongside the to take Bideford, the Bideford and took off about 300 troops,
in tow, but again the tow parted.
ever, fast aground, and the tow parted. dr. Havant then tried to take how-' her
Bideford towed to Dover
embarked in the Bideford. from La Panne dawn, gunboat Locust, carrying 620
During the night of 29th-30th Near May, 350 the French and 50 British troops
and at daylight she less than 21/2 knots course was set for
British and French troops floated - in tow. At beach, passed a tow to the Bideford,
Dover; en route, during the first 3 miles, the tow parted 3 times. Throughout
the 30th May the Locust struggled on with her burden. During the night
French soldier jumped overboard, fully equipped. The tow was stopped, a
buoy was dropped and a boat lowered; but, in spite of good visibility and a
calm sea, the unknown soldier was not recovered although a search was made a
at 1130 on the 31st May and disembarked 436 troops.
for 30 minutes. In spite of the tow again parting, the Bideford reached Dover
The momentous issues at stake in Operation "Dynamo" were not to be
attained without grievous losses, but the Bideford's heroic voyage to safety
marked a momentary respite from the rapidly mounting toll of lives and ships.
Twelve hundred troops wade out to a skoot
At about 2300 on the 29th May the skoot Patria arrived off Bray from Rams-
The Captain of the Patria, who decided to ground his ship, records that "The
gate and, in the glow of the still burning Crested Eagle, saw troops on the beach.
troops, holding hands, waded out and clambered on board by nets, ladders
and ropes' ends. The sight of two solid phalanxes of men, delineated by
phosphorescence in the water and steadily advancing to the ship, will be
memorable them Over 1,000 men were embarked in just over two hours." Among
Crested Eagle and the Fenella.
were naval ratings - casualties with severe burns from the Grenade, the
Dover unaware of losses
filtered heavy Lord Lord to Little Earlier Dover, Gort bombardment Gort through information in and and the and at the day to 3rd 0127 Dover, 3rd of other and Corps the Corps the that important except disastrous Vice-Admiral, destroyers at La that information losses Panne it there was Dover, of known the were had, afternoon informed being that however, hit Dunkirk the and soon come Calcutta early after was through evening 1600. under that
effort the beach was and to be embark made to the concentrate force. of the B.E.F. destroyers were and at La light Panne, craft and at that that end every of
I D.R.
46

Details

CHAP. VII
ferring By 0100 to her Rear-Admiral from single-minded come face to be of spoken incredible
such a THE EVACUATION
gress situation, Captain the water of Bush. and up to of their From the the waists. ghastly him, Esk, Wake Walker Lound sight He had of the the more trans- from as a
seemed then Commodores seen, to embarkation", detect but I in did his not voice". says feel Rear-Admiral that I could accept Wake-Walker to the note of terribly standing in despair I had pro- not
Stephenson
and
Bray. proceeding to take charge off-shore Hallett at were La Panne, transferred and the to drifters, latter off-shore the which former I
groups he had of to work. all He saw the beaches. a dark line of men the
Wake-Walker By dawn the was Hebe able was to off glimpse La Panne, for the and first in the growing light Readmul at
stern completely men blown over off and Off Bray the Bideford was ashore and large
off the beaches Eagle was high and dry on the beach-burnt out. Nearer
Dunkirk the Crested the Locust was trying to take her in tow. with her
were destroyers, sloops, drifters and other craft, while Lying
were making their way off in whalers, motor boats and pontoon craft. There men
was a slight swell which made landing difficult, and many boats were lying
broached-to and stranded by the tide.
As daylight illumined the scene Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker saw that the
beaches were packed with troops, who were orderly and under proper control.
To anyone with an appreciation of the practical difficulties of embarking in
small boats with a long pull to seaward, the sight of that beach black with troops
was indeed almost dismaying. The numbers increased steadily as more men
filed down the sand dunes, and at the back of our minds all the time", says line
Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker, "was the question of how long the defence boats.²
could hold and the weather remain fair." The crux of the matter was
Twice during contact Captain Tennant. With his staff these ships in
the day Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker went to Dunkirk he transferred in un-
successful efforts to to the Windsor and thence to the Worcester, home as in the Hebe
from the Hebe with troops. Captain Bush took passage large numbers were to
turn " to stress filled the up vital necessity for boats and crews if any The Rear-
benches".³
would Admiral come There off arrive was was the great hampered at beaches difficulty by and in lack start exercising of means loading; The control urgency of getting and off of a the beaches. Ships
everything⁴. desirable, At 2000 would on the be 30th May was at La La Panne discussed Panne at
and where 1800 arrangements next he met day, Lord and were Commodore Gort made and for of Stephenson identifying Tennas embarkation fre of the beaches seaward it. was
On
this
evening
a
method
M.017978/41, p.4.
R.A. Dover's report (M.017978/41).
(R.O.III,
p.374).
R.A. R.A. Dover's Report
Dover's Report (M.017978/41).
58

Details

THURSDAY, 30TH MAY
CHAP. VII
established-two lights being shown at La Panne and one at Bray-and Dover
was informed accordingly.
Later that night Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker transferred from the Worcester,
by that time full of troops, to the Express-his fourth transfer in twenty-four
hours.
Captain Howson, N.O.I.C., Beaches
On the beaches the progress was better than appeared at the time. Captain
Howson, Naval-Officer-in-Charge of beaches, making his first acquaintance
with conditions there, says that on the 30th May, off Bray, in the lightening
dawn, a number of destroyers, sloops and skoots were seen to be lying off, and
embarkation was proceeding in such boats as were available. Several boats
were aground, others were holed, and some had no oars
By about 0600, all
destroyers, sloops, etc., had cleared for England and there were no further
ships available
Before leaving Dover he had understood that there would be 24 signal ratings
along the beaches adequately supplied with Aldis lamps, but he never saw any
of them². Communication along so many miles of flat beaches was very
difficult, if not impossible, with so many troops on the shore.
there
was
no
communication until Thursday afternoon [30th May] between La Panne and
Bray³, and never any between Bray and Dunkirk⁴".
At about 0600 Captain Howson went to Corps Headquarters in a house at
Bray, where he met one of his party, Commander Gorton, and also some naval
officers " who had apparently been working on the beaches for some time
before our arrival".
" About 0800", continues Captain Howson, "I proceeded on a motor bicycle
to La Panne where I met Commander J. S. Dove, R.N., who
took me to
see Q.M.G. [Lieut. General Laidsell] with whom I discussed the position.
off La Panne " there were 2 or 3 destroyers and sloops, and embarkation
appeared to be proceeding satisfactorily
On the return to Bray an hour later
the sky was
overcast and a Scotch mist prevailed which was a Godsend,
for throughout the forenoon vast masses of French troops, quite apart from
British troops, were proceeding along the beaches, and had aircraft attacked
the carnage would have been dreadful. No further ships arrived during the
forenoon off Bray or La Panne and a great opportunity was missed for embark-
ing troops undisturbed.
"During the forenoon
on my way to Dunkirk I found the water lighter
Claude5 high and dry, but with ample supplies of water, and on my return
arranged with the military aurhorities for lorries and cans to collect and dis-
tribute this sorely needed requirement".
Meanwhile, during the forenoon also, the sappers and troops of the First
Division had built a long pier of lorries off Bray into the sea⁶ with plank decking.
This was an excellent piece of work, and though not strong enough for use by
I
Report by S/Lt. E. C. Croswell, R.N. (C.W.23187/40).
2 See p. 67.
3 S/Lt. E. C. Croswell, R.N., on shore at La Panne, says, Lt. Cdr. McCullough [?L. Cdr.
J.W. McClelland R.N.] and signal staff arrived at La Panne on the evening of 30th May.
(C.W.23817/40). The Gossamer reports that she embarked a party of signalmen for La
Panne on 30th May, and arrived there at 1930.
4 1st Corps had a H.Q. at Bray.
5 She had been towed over to Dunkirk on 25th May by the tug Fairplay I.
6
This was done at the suggestion of Cdr. H. du P. Richardson R.N., who was in charge of
a section of Bray beach. (R.O.III, p.369).
59

Details

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. VII
and miracle. unpredictable difficulties, as a
such courage, energy and single-mindedness, that it has since and in come the face to be of such incredible
found
the
Hebe
situation, Captain the ferring By water 0100 to Bush. and her up Rear-Admiral to from "of their From the the waists." ghastly him, Esk, Wake-Walker Rear-Admiral Rear-Admiral he sight He took had of over the had the shore, Wake-Walker, Wake-Walker to duties watch black of with the off S.N.O. heard terribly standing in Bray, (Afloat) and, trans- from
gress of embarkation", says I could the which I had pro-
seemed to detect in his voice".¹
then seen, but I did not feel that accept note of despair which not I
proceeding to take charge off-shore at Panne, and the latter off-shore at
Commodores Stephenson and Hallett were La transferred to drifters, the former
Bray.
Wake-Walker was able to glimpse for the first
By dawn the Hebe was off La Panne, and in the growing light Adminal the growing lear Readminl
he had to work. He saw a dark line of men at the water's edge, and large
groups of men all over the beaches. Off Bray the Bideford was ashore with her
stern completely blown off and the Locust was trying to take her in tow. Nearer
Dunkirk the Crested Eagle was high and dry on the beach-burnt out. Lying
off the beaches were destroyers, sloops, drifters and other craft, while men
were making their way off in whalers, motor boats and pontoon craft. There
was a slight swell which made landing difficult, and many boats were lying
broached-to and stranded by the tide.
As daylight illumined the scene Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker saw that the
beaches were packed with troops, who were orderly and under proper control.
To anyone with an appreciation of the practical difficulties of embarking in
small boats with a long pull to seaward, the sight of that beach black with troops
was indeed almost dismaying. The numbers increased steadily as more men
filed down the sand dunes, and "at the back of our minds all the time", says
Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker, "was the question of how long the defence line
could hold and the weather remain fair." The crux of the matter was boats.²
Twice during the day Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker went to Dunkirk in un-
successful efforts to contact Captain Tennant. With his staff he transferred
from the Hebe to the Windsor and thence to the Worcester, as these ships in
turn " filled up with troops. Captain Bush took home in the Hebe
come off the benches".3
to stress the vital necessity for boats and crews if passage any large numbers were to
would Admiral was hampered by lack of means of about quickly". Ships
There was great difficulty in exercising control off the beaches. The Rear-
desirable, everything would be impracticable. The urgency of a the moment governed
arrive at beaches and start loading ; getting and redistribution, though
where At 2000 he on the 30th May Rear-Admiral Panne
and met Lord Gort and Captain Tennant. Wake-Walker landed at La discussed
1800 arrangements next were made for Lord Gort's The situation was Panne at
On this day, and Commodore Stephenson embarkation from of La it.
1 evening a method of identifying was the put beaches in charge from seaward was
2 2 R.A. report
M.A. Dover's p.4.
R.A. Dover's Dover's Report Report (M.017978/41). (M.017978/41). (R.O.III, p.374).
58

Details

THURSDAY, 30TH MAY
CHAP. VII
established-two lights being shown at La Panne and one at Bray-and Dover
was informed accordingly.
Later that night Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker transferred from the Worcester,
by that time full of troops, to the Express-his fourth transfer in twenty-four
hours.
Captain Howson, N.O.I.C., Beaches
On the beaches the progress was better than appeared at the time. Captain
Howson, Naval-Officer-in-Charge of beaches, making his first acquaintance
with conditions there, says that on the 30th May, off Bray, " in the lightening
dawn, a number of destroyers, sloops and skoots were seen to be lying off, and
embarkation was proceeding in such boats as were available. Several boats
were aground, others were holed, and some had no oars.
By about 0600, all
destroyers, sloops, etc., had cleared for England and there were no further
ships available
Before leaving Dover he had understood that there would be 24 signal ratings
along the beaches adequately supplied with Aldis lamps, but he never saw any
of them². " Communication along so many miles of flat beaches was very
difficult, if not impossible, with so many troops on the shore.
there was no
communication until Thursday afternoon [30th May] between La Panne and
Bray³, and never any between Bray and Dunkirk⁴".
At about 0600 Captain Howson went to Corps Headquarters in a house at
Bray, where he met one of his party, Commander Gorton, and also some naval
officers who had apparently been working on the beaches for some time
before our arrival".
" About 0800", continues Captain Howson, " I proceeded on a motor bicycle
to La Panne where I met Commander J. S. Dove, R.N., who
took me to
see Q.M.G. [Lieut. General Laidsell] with whom I discussed the position.
off La Panne " there were 2 or 3 destroyers and sloops, and embarkation
appeared to be proceeding satisfactorily
On the return to Bray an hour later
the sky was
overcast and a Scotch mist prevailed which was a Godsend,
for throughout the forenoon vast masses of French troops, quite apart from
British troops, were proceeding along the beaches, and had aircraft attacked
the carnage would have been dreadful. No further ships arrived during the
forenoon off Bray or La Panne and a great opportunity was missed for embark-
ing troops undisturbed.
"
"During the forenoon
on my way to Dunkirk I found the water lighter
Claudes high and dry, but with ample supplies of water, and on my return
arranged with the military aurhorities for lorries and cans to collect and dis-
tribute this sorely needed requirement".
Meanwhile, during the forenoon also, the sappers and troops of the First
Division had built a long pier of lorries off Bray into the sea⁶ with plank decking.
This was an excellent piece of work, and though not strong enough for use by
I Report by S/Lt. E. C. Croswell, R.N. (C.W.23187/40).
2 See p. 67.
3 S/Lt. E. C. Croswell, R.N., on shore at La Panne, says, Lt. Cdr. McCullough [?L. Cdr.
J.W. McClelland R.N.] and signal staff arrived at La Panne on the evening of 30th May.
(C.W.23817/40). The Gossamer reports that she embarked a party of signalmen for La
Panne on 30th May, and arrived there at 1930.
4 1st Corps had a H.Q. at Bray.
5 She had been towed over to Dunkirk on 25th May by the tug Fairplay I.
6 This was done at the suggestion of Cdr. H. du P. Richardson R.N., who was in charge of
a section of Bray beach. (R.O.III, p.369).
59

Details

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. VII
heavy craft, nor even by small craft similar in a pier lop, was it was invaluable
ing troops into small boats. A was completed and commenced in use on the morning of later for embark-
the 30th May at La Panne, and by the the same day the the same same d the morning day the morning day
(See p. 47).
2 or 3 motor yachts and paddlers to
Bray; none proceeded east of the Bray pier, where the
Captain Howson goes on to say that arrived in the and afternoon anchored one Fortwo skoots and the weskoots and
waited many hours patiently. One tried or two without destroyers or sloops passed from had
the westward to La Panne, and he he success with a lamp to
Admiral Wake-Walker asking him to arrange for this. Captain Howson also
them to anchor off the pier. Eventually managed to get a signal to Rear- tell
sent an officer to Dunkirk to represent learned the urgent need for destroyers off Bray.
It was not until 2 days later that he that all the destroyers, etc., had
been given specific instructions as to which beach they were to anchor off.
Later a certain number of destroyers, sloops and skoots anchored off Bray and
the embarkation proceeded satisfactorily. Unfortunately, time after time,
owing to a lack of naval ratings, he saw a procession of boats going off loaded
with troops, only to be cast adrift and left floating empty out to seaward¹.
Later that evening Captain Howson got in touch with Rear-Admiral Wake-
Walker, then in the Worcester, and obtained permission to embark the following
day in a motor boat off the beaches SO as to prevent a recurrence of this waste
of beaching craft².
In spite of the difficulties and shortcomings emphasised in the above reports
great progress was being made. In fact, beach evacuation reached its peak
on this day; 29,500 troops were lifted from the beaches (as against 24,300
from the harbour) ; and some 50 ships, including destroyers, minesweepers,
skoots, trawlers, drifters, personnel and special service vessels, were engaged
continuously in the arduous work.
The armada grows, but service of ships to Dunkirk is slowed up
Meanwhile the build-up of ships continued, and some 31 additional craft
reached of Dunkirk and the beaches this day. They included two minesweepers
of the 8th M.S.F.³, the Fleet Air Arm training vessel Grive, 4 yachts and a drifter
the Dover M/S Command4, the corvette Kingfisher, (with the ex-Belgian
canal the boat Sambre in tow), the Yarmouth Examination Service yacht Laroc,
and M/V Scottish Co-operator, the S/M tender Dwarf, the drifters Fair Breeze
minesweeper barge Skipjack), the motor coasters Seine and Sheila, (in the coasting
Ocean Breeze, the ex-Belgian canal boats Ambleve and Escaut tow of the
the Viking, the ex-Dutch eel-boat Johanna (in tow Lady of the skoot Jutland),
water, and (R.N.L.I.) lifeboat Prudential (towing barges 7 Sark and with fresh
Ramsgate sailing barge Beatrice Maud, and the dumb Shetland. hopper The
the oyster dredging smacks Seasalter and Vanguard, the steam W.24,
borough, the punt Carama), and the Margate wherries loaded Lord South-
wherries. were The manned by their own crews, but (R.N.L.I.) naval lifeboat manned the
appeared on the scene. and picked up 244 troops. Another A/S patrol, to
Bray beach in error trawler Olvina, which should have been on ratings went
I At long last a dozen of the long awaited important motor contingent boats
R.O.III, p.396.
2 R.O.III, p.397.
4 3 The The Glen Avon and Glen Gower.
and 5 The the danlaying danlaying Constant yachts drifter Gulzar and Sargasso, the echo and Conidaw
Triton, Silver Pauleter Adventuress, and sounding Ma Black Joie. yachts Arrow, Chico Sunshine, Reda,
60

Details

THURSDAY, 30TH MAY
CHAP. VII
reached the beaches, and by retrieving the abandoned and drifting pulling boats
they were able to do much to increase the rate of lifting¹.
Many more were on the way. The destroyers Basilisk and Venomous from
the Western Approaches Command were making for Dover, and the mine
sweepers Niger and Dundalk were coming down from the Humber. The
attempt to maintain an adequate rate of lift with only the older destroyers
soon proved unavailing, and all the modern destroyers of the H, I and J classes
which had been withdrawn on the 29th May were ordered back to Dunkirk
on the 30th².
Small craft were hastening up from Portsmouth, Newhaven and Sheerness;
six tugs were plodding along from Tilbury (towing 23 motor and 46 rowing
lifeboats), and five others had left Gravesend (towing barges). Yachts, drifters
and trawlers; launches, lighters and steam hopper barges; car ferries, coasters
and cockle boats; train ferries, speed boats and picket boats; seaplane
tenders, fishing craft and pleasure craft; steam pinnaces, sailing craft and a
Thames fire float-a host of vessels-were heading in ever-increasing numbers³,
for Dover, the Downs, or Dunkirk direct, while the cry more ships, more
boats", still went up off. the French coast.⁴
Set-backs were inevitable, but this concourse of ships, big and little, fast
and slow, manned by willing and eager crews fired by one purpose of saving
the British Expeditionary Force, continued to grow until it assumed the pro-
portions of an armada.
Late on the previous evening the Bideford had sent a call for large quantities
of rope for towing to be sent, and within a few hours 9 coils (1080 fathoms)
of 4-inch grass hawser were speeding by lorry from Chatham dockyard to
Ramsgate to help the skoots to haul boats off the beaches, thus speeding up
the boat work and compensating for the shortage of boats, 'which would
continue", says Vice-Admiral, Dover for at least another 24 hours "5.
Undoubtedly as a result of the messages and signals received on the 29th
May by V.A. Dover with regard to the harbour at Dunkirk, the number of
ships sent there on the 30th May was curtailed, with a corresponding reduction
in the volume of embarkation. After V.A. Dover's signal to Admiral Abrial
late on the 29th May, asking whether it was possible for transports to berth
alongside, further signals to the same effect were sent to the Vanquisher and
the Codrington and to Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker. Finally, at 1020, the
Wolsey was called upon for a detailed report of conditions alongside the east
pier; and by 1524 V.A. Dover was able to inform destroyers that a good
berth with bollards exists 400 yards from end of east
pier".
In the meantime signals were coming in from Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker
and from the Vivacious stating that the beaches were filling up rapidly and
more ships and boats were urgently required there.⁶ Although it was known
that the destroyers could use Dunkirk, it appeared, says V.A. Dover, that the
best division of transport was to send the great majority of destroyers to the
beaches, where urgent demands could not be ignored, and the personnel vessels
to Dunkirk harbour, only an occasional destroyer being sent to Dunkirk from
the reduced number available.⁷
I D.R. p.15, para. 49.
Javelin. 2 Appendices D.9, D.10. Except the Intrepid and Jaguar (in need of repairs) and the
3 Appendices G.20, G.27, G.28.
4 Appendices H.7 to H.10.
5 D.R. p.13, para. 41.
6 Appendices H.7, H.9 and G.22.
7 D.R. p.13, para. 43.
61

Details

CHAPTER VIII
FRIDAY, 31ST MAY
EVACUATION REACHES ITS ZENITH
Lord Gort hands over his Command to Major-General Alexander
(2nd Corps) to withdraw to the The 50th 5th Divisions
Orders had been issued on the the beaches 30th May and for Dunkirk. the 3rd, 4th and
began to take place on the morning of 31st May.
the British Base staff at Dunkirk, to come the 1st Corps. These moves with
to fall back to the French defences on Belgian under frontier and, together
This meant that the remnant of the B.E.F., on being withdrawn inside the
area of the French defences, came under the orders of Admiral Abrial; the
ance with the instructions he had received.² He selected Major-Generalthe selected Major-Generl the
time had therefore arrived for Lord Gort to hand over
Hon. H. R.L. G. Alexander to remain in France in command of the 1st Corps,
now numbering less than 20,000 men in all; and, on taking over command
of the Ist Corps, Major-General Alexander handed over command of the Ist
Division to Brigadier M. B. Beckwith-Smith.
Lord Gort agreed with Major-General Alexander that a provisional date for
evacuating his force was to be the night of 2nd/3rd June.
On the 31st May therefore, Lord Gort's headquarters closed at 1800, and,
after handing over command to Major-General Alexander, Lord Gort embarked
with his A.D.C. in the Hebe's whaler, which had been towed in by the motor
yacht Lahloo to a point a little west of La Panne beach. He proceeded to the
Lahloo and thence to the Hebe. During the embarkation an enemy attack
was made by about 40 aircraft and considerable shelling was directed on to
La Panne beach itself. With Lord Gort on board, the Hebe proceeded to La
Panne beach and continued to embark troops.
It was not, however, till about midnight, that the motor yacht Bounty with
Cdre. Stephenson on board proceeded to transfer Lord Gort from the Hebe to
the Keith. At about the same time, however, the M.A/S.B.6, having em-
barked Lord Gort's chief staff officer General Leese from the Keith, was sent to
the Hebe with orders from Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker to embark Lord Gort.
On finding that he had left the Hebe, the M.A/S.B.6 returned to the Keith, em-
barked Lord Gort, and sailed at 0304 on the 1st of June for Dover which she
reached at 0547 the same evening.
It had been the intention of the Admiralty that Lord Gort and his staff
should be embarked in M.T.B.'s and at 1522 V.A. Dover had informed Rear-
Admiral Wake-Walker by signal that 4 of these vessels would be available for
this V.A. Dover's did not reach R.A. Dover4,
and other and signal all four back at Dover
by Speaking of the non-receipt uses; of indeed Dover's were signal, Rear-Admiral
Wake-Walker reached says, The signal informing V.A. of this, like many others, never
me At 1543/30 Rear-Admiral me Wake-Walker had asked that he
I 2 Lord Lord Gort's Second Despatch,
a M.T.B's. Gort's Second Despatch, para.57.
R.A. 67, 107, 68 and 102. para. (See 58.
M.017978/41, Dover-Report p.18. of Proceedings (R.O. Appendix III. para. G.30). 19).
66

Details

CHAP. VIII
THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
Headquarters
and
the
various
was venience, French Messages as employment except best done station by they because taken for despatch of transmission could at semaphore. by the the hand riders, with Bastion coding down the to for Beach of or, Dover help the messages the parties, for pier parties distances of the by for sake nor W/T between of were greater too one great party and cars. con- the
lished was a French, laborious Reception a very by and 2300 business slow decoding on on the business. that naval which the day, type W/T first but necessitated of set code owing which (the to sent arrived the Anglo a through the French Statim French) the the Frestroyers Station by destroversion in use message at that estab- This date into was
munication mission broke was down not established with the Dover defective transmitter.ful defective transmitter.ful com-
of sand in the generator. altogether on evening of 1st June, probably on account
On the 1st June the Royal Corps of Signals established a W/T station in
lorry by the Bastion, as well as telephone communication between the Bastion a
and the Headquarters Signal Station. The intense bombing and shelling by
the Germans that day severed the line more than once.
In view of the possibility of the arrival of enemy forces on the 2nd June all
signal forms and records were destroyed on that day.
British Sector to be held till midnight 1st/2nd June
Meanwhile, on taking over command of the 1st Corps, Major General
Alexander proceeded to Dunkirk to interview Admiral Abrial who informed him
that he intended to hold the perimeter till all the troops were embarked. A
French Corps on the right was to hold the sector from Gravelines to Bergues
(though Gravelines had not apparently been in French hands for some days)
and a mixed French and British Corps under command of Major General
Alexander was to hold a line from Bergues to Les Moeres and thence to the sea¹.
that in his view this plan did not take account of the true naval and condition
Major General Alexander at once told the Admiral and General military Fagalde
situation of the was now such that prolonged resistance was out of the the question, night of
which serious and deteriorating rapidly. The fighting
troops was front could not in his opinion be maintained after beach and
and the present furthermore, the line to be held was so close to the by short
to 1st/2nd Dunkirk June ; that the enemy might soon stop all further evacuation
range War, Major and General received Alexander a reply that gave the the British same French force opinion troops should to being the be Secretary withdrawn embarked Abrial of as State in rapidly equal and for
artillery fire¹.
as possible from on a that basis time of British onward. and This he showed to Admiral allotted to him till
numbers midnight General Fagalde, 1st/2nd stating June, and that then he would withdraw hold under the sector cover of darkness, which
they agreed was the only plan feasible¹.
Cyclone damaged
Day and night our by patrols torpedo were maintaining subjected their to E-boat vigil attacks. northward, but the on
this
day
two
French
destroyers
were
I Appendix to Lord Gort's Second Despatch.
68

Details

FRIDAY, 31ST MAY
CHAP. VIII
in the Bray and Malo sectors were being thinned out by movements westward
towards Dunkirk iteslf. This change of plan involved concentrating the special
tows and the minesweepers to which they were to transfer the troops, into the
stretch opposite the beach between Zuydcoote Sanatorium and one mile east
of La Panne¹, and also advancing the commencement of the operation by one
hour².
A risk was involved in this change of plan as the boat tows were not in com-
munication with the Vice-Admiral, and it would therefore be necessary for
minesweepers to see that the escorting M.A./S.B.'s shepherded the tows to the
new positions It had been explained to the Naval officers in each tow that
the minesweepers would be anchored so as to serve as guiding marks³.
" It was always impossible for me to do more than deal with the situation of
the moment", says Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker. "I did not know what ships
were coming or when-except for the pre-arranged plan of the sloops. Nor
was it possible for Dover to give me much information. Ships got back there,
unloaded, and were off again, the stream was constant but irregular and it was
not possible to see any way ahead. My policy was always to keep only sufficient
ships off the beaches and send all the others into Dunkirk, but the situation
changed continually."4
Small craft arrive in hundreds
It was in such circumstances that, at about 1900, Rear-Admiral Wake-
Walker had proceeded to Dunkirk in the Keith to see how the boat situation
was getting on. There he saw for the first time that strange procession of
craft of all kinds the story of which was to become famous-tugs, towing
dinghies, life-boats and all manner of pulling boats5-small motor yachts,
motor launches, drifters, Dutch skoots, Thames barges, fishing boats, pleasure
steamers⁶. This was indeed the first time that the small craft had come over
in hundreds⁷. Since noon Lt. Cdr. C. J. Wynne-Edwards, R.N. (of R.-A.
Dunkirk's staff), embarked in M.T.B.68, had been directing the tows to the
various beaches.
I See Appendix Q.18, observing that D.R. p.20, para. 61 says the beach between Bray
and 1 mile east of La Panne."
2 Appendix Q.19.
3 D.R. p.20, para. 61.
4 M.017978/41, p.17.
5 The following 14 tugs (their tows are shown in brackets) reached Dunkirk that evening:
The Racia (12 life-boats), Sun VIII (12 life-boats), Sun XV (6 life-boats), Vincia (3 life-
boats), Sun IV (9 boats), Tanga (6 boats), Ocean Cock (6 M/B's), Sun VII (seaplane tenders
243, 254, 276, 291 and A.M.C.3), Foremost 87 (two sailing barges), Fairplay I (sailing barge
Barbara Jean), Empire Henchman (sailing barge Aidie), Crested Cock (a lighter), Sun XI (a
lighter), and the Sun XII (sailing barges Tollesbury and Ethel Everard).
In the early hours of 1st June 4 other tugs arrived. The St. Fagan (auxiliary barges
Pudge and Lady Rosebery, and the sailing barge Doris), St. Abbs (auxiliary barge Thyra
and sailing barges H.A.C. and Duchess), Cervia (sailing barge Royalty), and the Persia
(sailing barge Glenway and Lark).
6 M.017978/41, p.19.
7 New arrivals off Dunkirk and the beaches on 31st May included the following The
yachts Amulree, Aronia, Glagla, Caleta, Christobel II and Llanthony, the nine yachts of the
Portsmouth Inner Patrol, viz the Ahola, Ankh, Bounty, Caryandra, Eilla II, Lahloo,
Noneta, Seriola and Thele and from the R.N. Air Station, Ford, the yacht Andora.
The drifters Ben and Lucy (towing 4 boats), Dorienta (towing boats), Monarda, Renas-
cent and the 13 drifters of the Yarmouth Base, viz Alcmaria, Feasible, Genius, Gula,
Jeannie MacIntosh, John and Norah, Lord Barham, Lord Hood, Overfalls, Reed, Rewga,
Swift Wing and Taransay. The drifters Fair Breeze and Ocean Breeze were again over,
the former towing a motor life-boat and 3 life-boats.
The steam hopper barges Foremost 102 (towing the Excellent's 35 ft. fast motor boat and
71

Details

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. VIII
Typical of the urge which characterised sailed from Ramsgate this movement at 0205 of small craft was
escorting the trawler motor Strathelliot, boats, 8 which of which were disabled and in tow of on various the 31st May
the M/B Skylark, disabled, was in tow of Strathelliot. At 0640 the Skylark's vessels
towing bollard tore away and she was taken the in tow stern first. Then the M/B
embarked the Skylark in also the in became Strathelliot. tow-and damaged, later Shortly taken after in tow this stern the first-and M/B Malden crew Annie Lad ber, IV
crew were transferred to the Strathelliot and she and was Mary sunk after Rose was her sunk. Her
Mary Rose, which had been in tow of M/B the Rapid I, was damaged.
had to be taken she arrived
water fast, and dritting on to the was She
Dunkirk beaches with her pumps beach choked, she bilge abandoned. full of rubbish fund making off
useful purpose, however, by being used as a pier.
It is impossible to give the story of every ship, although each ship has its
which went over on the 31st May in company with the lighters X. 217 (S/Lt.
story. Here, for instance, is the unvarnished history of the M/B Marsayru
R.A. W. Pool, R.N.) X. 213 and X. 149. They arrived off Malo beach at about
1600. During an air attack X. 213 and X. 149 were sunk. The Z. 217 was
beached and, assisted by the dinghy, embarked 95 troops which were transferred
to the yacht Llanthony. The X. 217 continued to embark troops using the
Marsayru and a cutter. At about 2100 that evening, with the Marsayru's
skipper and crew and about 200 British and French troops on board, the X. 217
left for home towing the Marsayru and a cutter.
Shortly after sailing the Marsayru broke adrift, and in darkness could not be
found. Next day, the 1st June, however, at 1400, S/Lt. T.E. Godman, R.N.V.R.
in a Naval steam pinnace, off La Panne, sighted the Marsayru drifting with the
tide and unoccupied. She was found to be in working order; the engine was
started up and Sub-Lieut. Godman took an A.B. and a soldier as crew. He
left Petty Officer Morrison in charge of the steam pinnace with orders to lay off
and wait for the return of the Marsayru.
With the dinghy in tow the Marsayru proceeded to the western end of the
beach capacity. and anchored; the dinghy ferried 19 troops to her, which filled her to
In the meantime the crew of the steam pinnace had embarked in the skoot
Doggersbank and had left the steam pinnace anchored near Dunkirk harbour.
Sub-Lieut. Godman decided to leave her there and sailed in the Marsayru for
England; from her. he overtook the Doggersbank on the way and obtained some fuel
and in tow waited for daylight. At 0430 on the 2nd June a trawler a took the Marsayru
At 2330 on the Ist June the Marsayru made fast to conical flashing buoy
embarked. to Ramsgate, which was reached at 0800, and the 19 troops were dis-
the Queen's pleasure launches Enterprise and Wave Queen), the Foremost Southborough,
White Heather,Westeriey,A Lansdowne, hopper barge .26. The M/B's. Marsayru,
and the 101, Lady Minotaur,
The motor coaster Hythe. M/B, the Dolphin's Balquhain, power Tigris boat, I, Rapid the Nelson's I, picket
the motor X lighters launch 95, 149, 209 (towing a boat), 213, Sherfield,
motor launches Grouse, Nanette II the lighter Y.C.63. The and War 217. The motor barge seven 30 knot
eighth, The skoot the Pigeon, Hilda went Haig, over on Kestrel, 1st June. Marlborough, Swallow, Department's Wolfe and Vulture an
Gipsy Three King, more Golden of towed Spray over II the and motor two life-boats. boats Moss Rose, Rose Marie, Lady Haig, Britannic
and
the M.F.H. Pickford & Co. Ltd.'s motor vessels went over, viz the Chamois, Hound
72

Details

FRIDAY, 31ST MAY
CHAP. VIII
Thereupon, at about 0050 on the 1st June Lt. Cdr. McClelland informed
Dover that he was closing down the telephone line as the headquarters were now
being abandoned.
While this decision was being arrived at further batteries had come into
action on the town of La Panne, and by 0100 the rate of fire on the beach was
increased. Lt. Cdr. McClelland says that he had by that time lost touch with
Major-General Montgomery, who had left earlier and subsequently embarked
in the Codrington at Dunkirk at 0525 on the 1st June.
By 0130 it was low water, and about half a mile walk to the end of the piers
which were now high and dry. While walking there with the intention of
assisting in the embarkation of the few men who had not been ordered to march
to Dunkirk, Lt. Cdr. McClelland was twice knocked down by shell bursts a
splinter smashed the box signalling lantern he was carrying, and another
slightly injured his ankle. Several houses on the front were now blazing
fiercely.
On reaching the embarkation point Lt. Cdr. McClelland was told that no
boats had been in for over half an hour, and that the naval beach party had
left-apparently in accordance with his orders that they were to leave in the
last boat.¹ As will be seen later, the beach parties at Bray also embarked early
on the 31st May.
There being neither ships nor boats now at the beaches, Lt. Cdr. McClelland
ordered a general retirement westward of all the groups on the beaches with
the object of getting them inside the defended perimeter outside Bray-Dunes
before 0400.
At 0200, two or three miles down the beach towards Bray, three ships2 at
anchor and some troops had been trying unsuccessfully to attract their attention
by firing their rifles. Further on, as other large groups were waiting for boats,
Lt. Cdr. McClelland decided to swim off and report on the situation. He
managed to get close enough to the Gossamer, which was anchored 4 cables
from the shore, to pick up a lifebelt on a line brought to him by one of the ship's
company.
He was just able to gasp out his message to the Captain of the Gossamer
before collapsing, but he had told of the 4th Division's change of plan and of
the state of the beaches and had asked that Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker and
Vice-Admiral Dover be informed. The former was evidently informed at
0215³, and at 0235, the Gossamer signalled V.A. Dover that 6,000 British were
marching from La Panne through Bray on Dunkirk⁴.
Being very exhausted and no longer able to walk because of the pain from
the wound in his ankle, Lt. Cdr. McClelland remained in the Gossamer.⁵
Sub.-Lieut. E. C. Croswell's report on La Panne confirms that of Lt. Cdr.
McClelland. He says On Friday [31st May] embarkation at La Panne was
slowed up as shelling caused some ships to move westward to Bray-Dunes.
The rest camp in the rear of La Panne beach and a small arms ammunition hut
were hit during bombing attacks which continued throughout Friday, and ships
also suffered shell fire
On Friday evening German gunners found the range
of the beach and were aided by 2 observation balloons which we did not manage
I Lt. Cdr. McClelland's report (R.O.III, p.392).
2 The Codrington, Ivanhoe and Gossamer.
3 M.017978/41, p.21.
4
Appendix H.20.
5
Lt. Cdr. McClelland received a mention in despatches.
77

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FRIDAY, 31ST MAY
CHAP. VIII
from the beach, apparently stragglers. A large rearguard
party probe to Dunkink.of to the the
men the 4th Division) marching along the beach decided
Bray Beach parties return to England
It was on this day that the majority of the beach parties returned to England.
that the enemy were closing in and that it might be expected that the final
Captain Howson records that on the evening of the 30th May he had learnt
evacuation would take place during the following day (31st May) or night at
latest". As he had received orders that beach parties were not to be taken
prisoner², and anticipated that very many troops would be left ashore, he
deemed it undesirable for all naval personnel to embark in the final rush".
Accordingly he arranged that half the naval personnel should embark during
the early hours of Friday (31st May)3.
This arrangement to some extent accounts for V.A. Dover's 1229/31 to Rear-
Admiral Wake-Walker saying that officers and men of beach parties had re-
turned to Dover on instructions from Dunkirk, and that they must be retained
to the last⁴; and his further signals notifying that more beach parties were
being sent out with all despatch in the destroyer Worcester5.
An account of the activities of the beach parties at Bray has been given by
Lieutenants G. W. Vavasour and J. G. Wells, R.N. They were among the 12
officers and 60 ratings, who sailed from Dover in the Esk with Rear-Admiral
Wake-Walker and Commodores Stephenson and Hallett on the 29th May
(Page 49).
On the way over the 12 officers were divided into 3 groups of 4 officers, and
to each of the 12 officers was allocated a party of 1 P.O., 1 Leading Seaman,
2 Able Seamen and a Signalman. Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker told the officers
that on no account were their parties to be captured, and that with this in mind,
they were to re-embark when they thought fit.
On arrival off the various beaches at about 2330 on May 29th the Esk stopped
off each and the 3 beach parties were landed in whalers; one party went to
La Panne where Cdre. Stephenson was to be S.N.O., Afloat, off the beach⁶,
one went west of Bray, and the third went to Bray where Commodore Hallett
was to be S.N.O., Afloat, off the beach. There is no report available of the
activities of the first two parties.
The 4 officers in Cdre. Hallett's section were Lieuts. Vavasour, Wells, Tibbits
and Cameron, R.N., all of H.M.S. Excellent. Cdre. Hallett had previously
explained to these officers that he himself would be afloat approximately in
front of his sections (E, F, G and H) of the beach, and repeated the warning
that the officers were to be the sole judges of when to evacuate the naval parties.
I Capt. Pim's report (R.O. IV, p.52), Italics not in original.
2 Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker says that the V.A. Dover had stressed that Naval ratings
(in beach parties) were not to risk being taken prisoner (M.017978/41, p.3).
3 Capt. Howson's Report (R.O. IV, p.117).
4 Appendix Q.12.
6 5 Appendices Q.13 and Q.14.
Lt. Vavasour's report, R.O.III, p.422. Lt. Vavasour says that Cdre Stephenson was
S.N.O., A.B.C.D. Sections. But the beaches had been lettered A to O, from west to east
and so the La Panne beach was L.M.N.O. It was probably because of the almost invariable
confusion about the lettering of the beaches that this method of designating beaches was
changed by signal at 1906/29 (Appendix 0.11), and the whole length was divided into 3
equal parts, referred to as Malo, Bray and La Panne, from west to east with a mile gap
between each part.
79

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THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. VIII
she shot down one Heinkel aircraft in flames. in mixed Between 1630 and 1745 our air
encountered many enemy this series of combats formations, we the largest patrols
of about thirty. In lost 5 aircraft being
Rear-Admiral due to always re-appearedisid
to definitely group shoot down destroyed¹. Wake-Walker, the enemy It was observation "at during times this hauled balloon latter down failed period but to that always re-appearedia find a squadron for enemy a
At 1800, when until Lord 1930. Gort was embark, there were a a
which continued
Between 1920 and 1930 our patrols the were engaged with a formation of
At 1920, off Dunkirk, the Whitehall's after group shot down a bomber.
70 H.E.111's and M.E.109's. In encounter, Fighter Command lost about 3
craft and claimed 10 bombers and 6 fighters definitelydestroyed. Some of air-
Hurricane pilots complained on their return that they had been shot at by the the
engaged about thirty M.E.109's, but no bombers were intercepted.
Spitfires¹. At 2010 six Hurricanes trying to locate the observation balloon at Nieuport
Final evacution of B.E.F. expected on night 1st/2nd June
Meanwhile, at 1920, all ships in the Nore and Dover Commands were informed
by the V.A., Dover, that the final evacuation of the B.E.F. was expected on
the night 1st/2nd June, and that the evacuation of the French from Dunkirk
and Malo beach would continue from the 1st June by both British and French
ships². At 2309 General Lloyd informed the D.M.O. of the new plan and stated that
General Alexander had been placed in command of the final phase of the
evacuation, that the composition of his force was not known, and that it was
impossible now to state how long the French evacuation would take but that
the Alexander force would remain till the last³.
Meanwhile, no firm information could be obtained from the French on the
following matters4:-
(i) the number of French troops to be evacuated;
(ii) the nature and extent of French seaborne transport;
(iii) the French military plan for the defence of the perimeter and the final
withdrawal of French troops.
Embarkation reaches its zenith
The main features of the day had been :-
(a) the increased enemy artillery activity on Dunkirk, La Panne beach and
(b) the change in the military plan as regards the locality and time of lifting
the approach channels
(c) the set-back to beach evacuation that occurred during the the choppy after-
the final contingents of the B.E.F.
noon and evening, forenoon, when large numbers were lifted from the
weather of the followed by an excellent recovery in western
22,942 total of were 68,014 lifted proved from to the be beaches the highest daily total of the
The rate of embarkation had, however, and 45,072 up from expectations:,
beaches. come to A total of
I R.A.F. Narrative, p.335.
2 Appendix Q.19.
3 Appendix Q.22.
4 D.R. p.21, para. 63.
84

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CHAPTER x
THE NIGHT OF 1ST - 2ND JUNE AND
FROM DAYLIGHT TO DUSK ON 2ND
Situation ashore on evening of 1st (Plan 3)
During the Ist June heavy enemy attacks developed the
of the line, and our forces had to give some THE a a
the enemy advance had been checked on a
thence due east of the frontier and along the frontier sea.
was to withdraw through this line which the French would continue to hold.
French troops were holding a line in rear of ours, and the British rearguard
Two divisions of French Territorial troops reduced in strength, in addition
to part of the British 1st Corps and rearguard of 4,000 men, still remained to
be evacuated on the evening of the 1st. The War Office, aware that they were
not in a position to judge the local situation, did not set a period to the evacua-
tion but ordered Major-General Alexander to hold on as long as possible in order
that the maximum number of French and British might be embarked. It
left to the General, in close co-operation with Admiral Abrial, to decide was the
moment when evacuation must come to an end.¹
Plan for the night 1st-2nd June (See Plan 4)
Early in the afternoon of the 1st June the only remaining Route x came under
the fire of German guns, and it was judged impossible to carry out any further
evacuation by day. There was hope both at Dover and at the War Office that
it would be possible to complete the evacuation of the B.E.F. during the dark
hours of the night 1st/2nd June, by using both sides of Dunkirk harbour, pier
and eastern beach. The War Office asked General Weygand to urge Admiral
Abrial to co-operate in completing the evacuation of the French this night.
Evacuation was to be confined to the period between 2100 and 0330. It
was estimated that British vessels could lift about 17,000 men, probably in the
proportion 50 per cent British and 50 per cent French, during these hours, as
follows :-(Appendix R8) :-(a) From the beach between Dunkirk and 11 miles
to the eastward between 2100/1 and 0300/2, 9,000 men. (b) At the East Pier
between 2100/1 and 0330/12, 7,000 men. This time might be extended.
(c) On the east side inside the harbour, between 2200/1 and 0300/2, 1,000 men.
It was intended to withdraw all naval personnel this night3.
All minesweepers, both fleet and paddle, and skoots and all small craft
except certain flotillas specially organised, were to lift from the beach stretching
eastward 100 1½ miles from Dunkirk, and it was hoped to employ here also about
French small beach fishing craft and drifters. Personnel ships up to 7 in
2 I The Report of Captain W. Tennant, S.N.O. Dunkirk, Record Office Case 5458 Vol. 3, p.357.
written 0330 or from by hand, and the time has been altered by the exceptionally) either typed from 0300 to read
originator's copy of this signal is (rather instead of being
was intended 0330 to read 0300, though it is not possible typewriter, to with which figure
Admiral to be sent. The time was received at the say certainty at 0330, and Rear
S.N.O. Wake-Walker in his Report, M.017978/41 p.32 Admiralty 0330 intended.
giving details of the plan until 0430/2.
Dunkirk reported, however (Appendix R.24) says that he did was not receive the message
96

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DUSK TO DUSK, 1ST-2ND JUNE
CHAP. X
number and 8 destroyers were to enter Dunkirk harbour and go alongside the
East Pier, where British troops were. Only by using this pier would it be
possible to evacuate large numbers, and there was considerable apprehension
lest the Germans should shell it heavily and damage it or render it impossible
for ships to lie alongside. The pier had already been damaged by the armed
boarding vessel King Orry when she secured alongside at 1730 on 29th May
with her steering gear out of order and all instruments shattered by air attack,
but the gap had been bridged. Drifters and other small craft were to be sent
into the inner harbour at Dunkirk, to lift troops from the Quay Félix Faure,
in the Tidal Harbour, the North Quay, in the shipyard, and the quay in the
new outer harbour.
The French troops assembled on the west side of the harbour, and it was
intended that French vessels, including torpedo boats, should serve the West
Quay in the new outer harbour, whilst private small boats used the Quay Félix
Faure.
Assembly of shipping
Early in the afternoon of the 1st June Vice-Admiral Dover recalled all des-
troyers to harbour and minesweepers of the 1st, 4th, 5th and 6th M/S Flotillas
were warned for duty only ships having degaussing equipment were to sail.
Five vessels, the Sharpshooter, Albury, Kellett, Ross, and Leda were unable to
comply; the compasses of another the Pangbourne, were unreliable, though
her D.G. gear was functioning ; and in the event, she sailed, led by a Dutch
skoot, though she was too late to go to the beaches, and accordingly proceeded
along Route Y as far as T buoy, looking for any ships in need of assistance.
The destroyers designated Force K, were to proceed in pairs at hourly intervals
to berth at the East Pier in Dunkirk harbour, returning to Dover when loaded.
If there was no vacant berth at the pier when a pair of destroyers arrived,
they were to assist at the beach instead. Four pairs were detailed, viz. the
Windsor and Icarus, Codrington and Sabre, Shikari and Esk, Winchelsea and
Whitshed. The Esk, however, which had been running almost continuously
since 27th May, was unable to sail and was given 24 hours stand off.
Preparations to assemble the requisite small craft for working off the beach
commenced early in the forenoon of 1st June, when a number of Senior Officers
were despatched from Dover in fast motor boats to round up all stray motor
boats in the Downs and along the routes, and direct them back in the evening
to the beach 11 miles east of Dunkirk. A flight of 30 motor boats and 34 life-
boats with 3 tugs, the last three large tugs left in London, was sent during the
early hours of 1st June from London to Ramsgate where they were prepared
for beach work, naval crews being placed in the lifeboats that lacked crews and
extra towage provided. Motor boats were also sent from Harwich and Sheer-
ness. A number of flotillas under Commodore A. H. Taylor and Captain the
Hon. G. Frazer were re-organised for the night's effort.
Abandonment of daylight evacuations (Appendix R)
It was decided to abandon daylight evacuation after 1st June, because the
scale of enemy air attack experienced on that day, and the fact that the Germans
could by now command the newly swept central route at its point of junction
with Dunkirk Roads by gunfire from the shore, rendered it too costly.
Vice-Admiral Ramsay, when drawing up the plan for the night, intended
sailings to cease at 0300 or 0330; and Captain Tennant at Dunkirk, who did
not yet know of the plan arranged for the night, independently gave orders,
97

Details

CHAP. x
THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
of by the the French B.E.F. troops would also have on been lifted. night, by which time most
was consequently would be completed the following
in the late afternoon to of sail the during 1st June daylight with and General that Alexander's concurrence
that no ships were to cease at 0300 on 2nd. If the
0700 and, evacuation if necessary was then still possible. Only between June until dark to tine any of tontine any of
the three also from 1730 on the 2nd was to to tine any of
The Admiralty, channels however, during daylight decided hours, that, should evacuation it be possible
light there would be sailings. They intended to be 0700 and 1730
evacuation 2nd was possible no in daylight as late as 0700. the arbiters as to whether on the
Admiral to Ramsay casualties now being caused to all of therne instructions of therne Instructick Vice-
At 2114, an hour informed and a the half Admiralty after the and receipt
had owing ordered withdraw before shipping
followed been this signal to at 2329 by daylight on the
up situation he a knew message to the
detail Y the Z shipping under fire as of German it. All three channels to Dunkirk, some
maining which daylight route into X, action had that to be suspended on account of a new re-
X, and were now had batteries, for traffic on the last
battery Vice-Admiral came evening and was maintaining a enemy heavy
barrage¹. Ramsay's information (not altogether correct)
that a total of 16 transports (personnel vessels invaluable in the work of evacua- was
tion) were now out of action, 8 being lost and 8 disabled, and that two of the
sinkings had been caused by enemy shell fire on Route X. It was now difficult
to compel the crews of the remainder to face the conditions which existed.
This had been a day of very heavy naval sinkings coupled with losses of troops
from drowning. It is obvious that at some point losses incurred in continuing
daylight evacuation would more than counterbalance the gains it seems clear
that Vice-Admiral Ramsay considered that this point had now been reached,
and, in accordance with the Admiralty's own direction sent to him earlier in
the evening, he now informed them that any attempt to continue the evacuation
in daylight was unwise and he asked permission to withdraw all his forces at
0300 until the following night. In this, he told the admiralty, Major General
Alexander concurred.
The Admiralty, however, were unwilling that evacuation should cease alto-
gether at daylight and directed that it was to continue up to 0700, but only by
destroyers unless further experience showed that enemy gunfire was rendering
the channel prohibitively dangerous.
Danger to personnel ships
It is impossible to resist the conclusion that in the difficulty of obtaining
accurate reports of conditions on the routes and estimating the true causes of
the mounting losses of ships the danger from shell fire was magnified
in the minds of those at Dover. By some means enemy the planners had been in-
formed that two personnel ships had already been sunk by shell fire in the
fairway near No. 5 buoy. Not only was this but in point of fact no
ship of any kind was lost from gunfire the incorrect, routes the 1st June the
only sinking by shell fire on that day on during Lord Cavan, depot ship
of other S.N.O. Dunkirk hit as she quitted was the the drifter at Dunkirk, whilst the only
ship to be hit was the personnel vessel pier St. Helier. This ship arrived at
German
I The War guns." Office 1330/1 reported Only remaining channel now coming under fire of
98

Details

CHAP. X
THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
arranged from 801 and 806 Command been
of them (Appendix 0830 until J.7). 1100 Air on protection 2nd June, by and Coastal Fighter Command had
Command three aircraft during of Nos. these 206, hours, 235, to cover Route Squadrons X. operated under patrols Coastal of
Fifth column activities (Appendix H27-32)
such "Dynamo", effective fifth use during the war. type time during Operation
On the Ist June column there came activities to notice, of the for the of first
empty, the to keep a look out and turn such
Sutton in and company, orders were met sent a out from Dover power to the and small the Dunkirk with thing boats return the boats returning boats returning
At 2150 on the 1st the Minesweeper number of Niger, boats en route to
Apparently the severe minesweepers, conditions it was at in and first from enormous believed the S.N.T.O. at wastage Dover on that the small French boats boats and were Belgian to daunted their coasts; duty. by
but a report came about the Ramsgate during the evening that
fifth column skoot was going first beaches at Dunkirk giving false informa- a
tion and orders to return. The example to come to notice was at 1300
the 1st when the skoot Oranje, off Dunkirk Channel, was informed by another on
sufficient ships in Dunkirk Harbour, and that the Oranje's boats were not
skoot that evacuation from the beaches was complete, that there were already
required. The Oranje remained where she was, however, in case the four boats
turned for home about 1515, subsequent to air attack.
she had towed over were needed, and until all ships in her neighbourhood
Although on the night of the 1st-2nd June the services of a number of small
craft were lost to the coast, there actually were a sufficient number off the
beaches to cope with the troops available.
Embarkation from the beaches
The first ships of the night flight to arrive off the beaches were minesweepers,
which began to anchor off Malo about 2000 on 1st. Here there were already
some 3 or 4 Thames barges, besides the paddle minesweeper Medway Queen
which had arrived some four hours earlier and had been engaged in filling up
with troops ever since. The skoot Lena had been there since 1300 on the 1st.
embarking 340 B.E.F. and 6 French troops; she was slightly damaged by air
attack during the day, and sailed at 2145 for Ramsgate. By midnight on the
1st-3nd June there were anchored off the beaches the minesweepers Marmion,
Snaefell, Niger, Glen Avon, Emperor of India, Glen Gower and Lydd, besides the
personnel ship Portsdown and the special service vessel Royal Eagle. Loading
was a slow process, for there were more ships lying off the beaches than could
be loaded by the boats available. Only one ship finished in 3 hours, most of
them taking nearly twice that length of time.
with 213 troops. She left behind her, abandoned the beach, the R.N.L.I.
The Emperor of India was apparently the first ship to sail from Malo, at 0238,
motor lifeboat Mary Scott which had ferried troops on and towed the Emperor of
India's whalers from the shore until she broke down. Queen left
shot at troops boat, 0245, down and and after an some nearly enemy details, Il aircraft hours including at on anchor the 10 beach Spanish during west which refugees of Dunkirk. the The rescued ship Medway claimed from She took an to have open 426
down the crews of two motor boats, the whose engines broke
unrecorded, like SO many small craft which came to grief in the course of render-
after some hours of ferrying troops and one, towing, Aura, and another, with name
100

Details

CHAPTER XI
THE NIGHT 2ND 3RD JUNE
B.E.F. EVACUATED 2330/2
Plan for the night 2nd-3rd June
During the forenoon of the 2nd June considerable doubt existed at Dover
to the numbers remaining to be evacuated from Dunkirk. Captain Tennant
thought as that about 5,000 British and 30,000 French remained, but it was
estimated at Dover, that in addition to the rearguard of 4,000, (who had been
withdrawn according to plan, from the front line), a further 2,000 British
troops might be found in Dunkirk; while the estimated number of French
troops remaining increased during the forenoon from 25,000 quoted on the
previous evening to figures in the region of 50,000 to 60,000. Admiral Nord
himself estimated the French remaining to number 65,000 of which he hoped
that 30,000 might be evacuated on the night 2nd-3rd and the remaining 35,000,
who were holding the bridgeheads, on the following night.
Major-General Alexander intended that all British troops should be
evacuated by 2400 on 2nd, and Captain Tennant asked for the maximum
number of transports to be sent over. During the forenoon of the 2nd a joint
Naval and Military conference was held at Dover, attended by Rear-Admiral
Wake-Walker who came over from Dunkirk in the early hours, and by Com-
mander J. C. Clouston, Pier Master at the East Pier, to devise a plan to accom-
plish this. The French Admiralty wished daylight evacuation to be resumed,
but Vice-Admiral Ramsay refused to countenance it. The suspension of traffic
in daylight hours had the advantage of enabling all transport resources to
accumulate during the day and to be held available for a massed descent"
upon Dunkirk harbour during the night. By making provision for increased
pier and berthing parties and control of traffic in the harbour channels by
motor boats, it was hoped to berth all craft that were available between the
hours of 2100 on 2nd and 0300 on 3rd.
At 1052 Vice-Admiral Dover made a signal to the destroyers and mine-
sweepers, which practically amounted to a call for volunteers for the night's
work (Appendix T.3) :-
"The final evacuation is staged for tonight, and the Nation looks to the Navy to
see this through.
I want every ship to report as soon as possible whether she is fit to meet the call
which has been made on our courage and endurance".
The replies showed that there was no lack of willing spirit. Ships were fit
and ready", ready and anxious to carry out your orders", ship unfit but
...
officers and ship's company are willing to serve in any capacity : so the replies
came in. Only the paddle minesweeper Medway Queen, which had returned
to Ramsgate three hours earlier on her fifth evacuation trip, was unable to sail
owing to the exhaustion of her crew, and was sent on to Dover where additional
officers and crew were lent from the Sandown, which, like the destroyer Javelin,
was not degaussed and was consequently forbidden to sail.
It was hoped to avoid on this night the situation which occurred on the
previous night, when more ships could have used the pier had they been avail-
able, by working out a programme whereby personnel ships, destroyers, fleet
105

Details

CHAP. XI
THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
79, Of these 808 and 211,137 casualties were 1,129. Allied fit numbered 305,078.
At noon on the 3rd June British the fit total and of 13,004 troops casualties. evacuated had reached
Naval losses 2nd June
harbour at from motor boat sunk off Malo, and by enemy action,
The brightest Dunkirk feature had been of the carried night out was without that embarkation disturbance in the
and apart one losses off by enemy act from small craft from
collision or other misadventure, sinkings were confined to
In marked contradistinction attack the from 2nd. the heavy This losses of the 1st June only
ship was sunk from by air Calshot R.A.F. on station, which was the fast motor boat Seaplane one
at 1500 with Commander from J. C. the Clouston, situation R.N., pier master of the mole,
Tender 243, sailed from Dover for Dunkirk
was returning discussing with the staff at Dover, and a who
embarkation that the party; boats should she was be in used company with S.T. 276, the intention naval being
Walker during the night's work. At 1855, about 6 miles from Gravelines, 4
two as runners" for Rear-Admiral Wake-
enemy aircraft attacked S.T. 243, which received severe damage from a
miss and was abandoned in a sinking condition. Commander Clouston ordered near
S.T. 276 to proceed as the enemy aircraft were still continuing to attack, and
she subsequently arrived at Dunkirk though too badly damaged to be of service.
rating from S.T. 243 were picked up and saved.
Commander Clouston was seen later, drowned, and only one officer and one
The transport Royal Daffodil nearing Dunkirk from England was attacked
all movable gear to port and filling boats with water she was listed to bring
by aircraft about an hour after S.T. 243. The ship was holed but by shifting
the damage above water. The engineers, J. W. Coulthard and W. L. Evans
kept the motors running although the water had risen in the engine room, and
the ship returned to Margate under her own steam. Another personnel ship,
the Ben-My-Chree, was in collision on the evening of the 2nd shortly after
leaving Folkestone for Dunkirk, and took no further part in the operation.
Two further ships were sunk by mines on Route Y on the 2nd June, although
it was at first thought they had been torpedoed. At about 1600 the trawlers
Blackburn Rovers and Westella were on patrol near T buoy, when the former
blew up on a mine and sank instantly. As the Westella closed the position,
explosions from the Blackburn Rovers' depth charges lifted the ship out of the
water and put her asdic installation and pumps out of action. About 40
minutes later the Westella was herself blown up by a mine between S and T
buoys, and commenced to sink. Her depth charges were set to 'safe', and the
trawlers Saon and Grimsby Town sank her and picked up her survivors and
those of the Blackburn Rovers, some badly injured. (Appendix J.9, J.10).
Two other trawlers met with misadventure on the 2nd, but neither was sunk.
Details are lacking but it is known that the Spurs and another trawler, probably
either the Kingston Alalite or Kingston Olivine, were both damaged by gunfire.
The Spurs was on the patrol line, and it is not known how she came close
enough to the coast to be damaged by shore gunfire. Gunfire also sank the
Gallant's motor boat off Malo at 0210.
known. These were the Getuigt Vor Christus, the O.L.V. van Vlaandaren,
Three Belgian trawlers were lost on th 2nd June, though no details are
and the Sunny Isle.
Air co-operation, night 2nd-3rd June
The R.A.F. flew a patrol over the approaches to Dunkirk from about 2010
110

Details

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. XIII
the The factors variations recorded in the in the daily following figures paragraphs. are believed to have been influenced by
average waiting time normal. This probably norm, due the number of the
28TH MAY. Beaches. corresponded Although the to rate the estimated of lift was average (1: 1), and
ing boats. Destroyers, 356 were new to the
lifted per trip was below which made 8 was of the 13 trips, to shortage of beach- men
and their lift per trip was only Calcutta's as lift against reduced a destroyer aveage of 504 work
wounded (cot cases) which she
the whole operation. The embarked. was by the large number over of
HARBOUR. Although the average lift was the above normal, the long waiting
The figures of waiting time are not, however, entirely satisfactory only 10
time reduced the men: minutes ratio to estimated norm for the operation.
ships provided data, three of which waited for periods greatly in excess of the
average.
HARBOUR. The increase in average lift without corresponding rise in waiting
time is accounted for by the great increase in the number of personnel ships
employed and the average lifts made by them on this day. The average lift
per personnel ship, which on the 28th May was only 552, rose to 1,520 today.
30TH MAY. Beaches. The increase of 25 per cent in the figure for average lift
without corresponding rise in waiting time, resulting in the highest men
minutes ratio achieved at the beaches during the operation, is believed to have
been due to :-
(a) better organisation consequent upon the arrival of R.A. Dover as
S.N.O. on the French coast and of Captain Howson as N.O.I.C. Beaches,
together with the employment of two Commodores to take charge off
shore at La Panne and Bray; (b) better discipline amongst the troops
on the beaches ; (c) employment as beaching craft of the A.L.Cs. which
began to arrive on the 29th, and the arrival of 12 motor boats for re-
trieving abandoned pulling boats; (d) absence of enemy air attacks.
Harbour. Although the rate of lift deviated little from the average, both lift
and waiting time declined. This was probably the effect of the disastrous air
attacks of the previous day on shipping, which resulted in only one destroyer
at a time being allowed to enter Dunkırk during the forenoon and early after-
noon and perhaps engendered a feeling of insecurity and a wish to get the ships
away as quickly as possible.
31ST MAY. Beaches. A considerable reduction in average waiting time and
a normal. boats slight rise This above was normal due probably in average to the lift fact gave that a rate greater of lift numbers slightly of better beaching than
were available. Although during the forenoon conditions on the beaches
were very bad they improved greatly during the afternoon and evening. On
the beaches, after 1600, the piers of pontoons were largely responsible for the
rapid evacuation of troops.
Harbour. minutes Lift was average, but waiting time high and reduced the men
be rate of lift. No valid reason was discovered, and it should
noted that all the figures agree closely for this with can the be estimated norm.
" 0943 I This The belief moment is based on the final sentence in Situation Report by S.N.O. Dunkirk at 0950 timed
the If single this weather destroyer persists allowed bombing I want to enter starts a ship would all every must remain half shove hour," alongside off "; which and for would only on the half seem signal an to hour. imply that
126

Details

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
APPENDIX J
to return the to effect England. that a was at Dunkirk telling Margate boats to
During the evening skoot of the 1st going June a along report the was beaches recieved from S.N.T.O.
Antje The intended Antje was to hailed get confirmation and told with to from survivors return. her, when A warship the troop was carrier Scoficinity, sarrier Scoticinity, and
skoot Oranje with boats in tow was England and complied.
close to her; so Antje filled up told to return and to returned. is understood sunk that
another skoot was of these details. was hands. It has not occasion been
In view of these informed reports, message that Dunkirk 2335/1 was in sent German out. On an earlier
possible to get confirmation
2332/3
APPENDIX J
SIGNALS RE PATROLS IN THE NORTH SEA SOUTH AND ON THE
ROUTES TO DUNKIRK
Sunday, 26th May
1. ADMIRALTY to C.-IN-C. NORE, (R) V.A. Dover, F.O.I.C. Harwich, F.O.I.C. Humber
All available forces are to be used for covering operation Dynamo tonight Sunday.
1937/26
2. Widgeon to C.-IN-C. NORE
Siroco was torpedoed by 2 M.T.B.'s
0200/31
Saturday, 1st June
3. Malabar to ANY-BRITISH MAN-OF-WAR
explosion 2 miles ? S buoy.
Argyllshire sunk by torpedo. Survivors report submarine submerged before
0310/1
4. Kingston Galena to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER (R) Capt. A.P.
to Dover.
Stella Dorado torpedoed. Picked up 5 survivors, 1 badly injured. Proceeding
0430/1
5. VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER to SHIPS & AUTHORITIES NORE & DOVER COMMAND
Magnetic mines reported to have been laid vicinity of buoy F.G. on route X.
2310/1
Sunday, 2nd June
6. VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER to Epervier (R) Léopard, Savorgnan de Brazza.
N. Goodwin L.V. 8 miles. Caused by shell fire. Vanquisher left Dover 1305 B.S.T.
Three aux. patrol vessels reported out of action at 1214 B.S.T. in position 090°
to investigate and report.
1315/2
7. VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER to Calcutta, (R) C.-in-C. Nore, Admiralty, Savorgnan de Brazza
patrol to that carried out today Sunday is to be carried out tomorrow Monday,
Return to Sheerness and revert to 1 hours notice for steam. An exactly similar
provided patrol line. C.-in-C. Nore can provide a screen. Inform the French vessels on your
1247/2
were was not already sufficient ships in Dunkirk harbour and that was Oranje's complete, tow of 4 boats,
I A skoot informed Oranje that beach evacuation that there
required. About an hour later the Oranje did in fact return to England.
172

Details

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
APPENDIX L
5. VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER to ADMIRALTY
came into action this evening suspending on only remaining daylight Toute,
Channels to Dunkirk now all under traffic fire of German batteries.
namely X, maintaining heavy barrage
2329/1
2nd June
6. Venemous to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER
Dunkirk approach channel is under fire from the shore guns.
2110/2
3rd June
7. VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER to SHIPS & AUTHORITIES NORE & DOVER COMMANDS
close to Southern channel buoys.
Route X. From F.G. buoy steer 172 degrees for No. 3 W buoy and thence keep
1635/3
APPENDIX L
SIGNALS RE REQUESTS FOR FIGHTER COVERS
Monday, 27th May
1. B.N.L.O. DUNKIRK to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER
Pass to War Office from O.C. Dunkirk :
Complete fighter protection over Dunkirk now essential if a serious disaster is to
be avoided.
1655/27
2. AIR LIAISON DUNKIRK to FIGHTER COMMAND (R) Air Ministry
Unless fighter protection is provided continually from dawn tomorrow result will
be very serious. Embarkation on beach east of 892 [?] Dunkirk.
2350/27
Tuesday, 28th May
3. (C.A.S.) AIR MINISTRY to FIGHTER COMMAND, COASTAL COMMAND etc.
Today is likely to be the most critical day ever experienced by the British Army.
The extreme gravity of the situation should be explained to all units. I am con-
fident that all ranks will appreciate that it is the duty of the R.A.F. to make their
greatest effort today to assist their comrades of both the Army and Navy.
0125/28
1 Chief of the Air Staff.
4. B.N.L.O. DUNKIRK to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER
Continuous bombing and machine gunning on beaches. Only maximum air
protection can alleviate situation at dawn.
0225/28
5. VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER to COASTAL COMMAND, FIGHTER COMMAND, (R) 16 Group, 11
Group, Dover Forces, Admiralty, Air Ministry
Request maximum fighter protection throughout today 28th as follows :
line Fighter North Command, Dunkirk and adjacent beaches. to Skuas Nord from and Detling are patrolling
Suggest Coastal Command patrol line Ostend Sandettie Bank.
Goodwin to Nieuport from 0800 to 1300.
0855/28
174

Details

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
APPENDIX R
still remains evacuation will recommence 1700 evening. If so, strong continuous
Last boat in the morning will leave Dunkirk in the before 0700 hours. If part of garrison
patrols should be carried out over area from to 2100 hours, when operations
hours of darkness. Fighter patrols out over area in area during
will terminate night 1st/2nd June. should Night fighters be routed should patrol same
ships are working between N. Foreland and Dunkirk, and on return journey should
fly low on the same routeing to give vessels maximum protection against low flying
bomb and machine gun attack.
1930/1
15. ADMIRALTY to REAR-ADMIRAL, DOVER STRAITS, S.N.O. DUNKIRK (R) V.A. Dover
(A) Should there be a channel which it is possible to use during daylight hours,
from 2130 tonight Saturday until 0700 tomorrow Sunday.
it is intended that evacuation from Dunkirk should proceed continuously
(B) Continuous air protection will be provided from daylight tomorrow Sunday
until 0830 by fighters, and from 0830 until 1100 by Coastal Command.
(C) It will be decided tomorrow Sunday forenoon in the light of the naval and
night. military situation as to whether evacuation is to continue tomorrow Sunday
(D) It may also be necessary to carry out evacuation from 1730 tomorrow Sun-
day until dark, should evacuation in daylight still be possible.
(E) From the above it will be seen that there will be no ships proceeding to Dun-
kirk between 0700 and 1730 tomorrow Sunday.
(F) Request you will inform Admiral Abrial and General Alexander of the above
arrangements.
(G) Should it be impossible to use any of the 3 Channels from Dunkirk owing to
shell (R) shell fire from coast batteries you are to inform Admiralty
....
T.O.D. 2021/1
16. ADMIRALTY to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER
(a) Embarkation of troops from Dunkirk is to proceed continuously from 2130
today Saturday until 0700 tomorrow Sunday.
(b) Strong and continuous fighter protection will be provided from 0430 until
0830 tomorrow Sunday.
(c) Protection by Coastal Command will be provided from 0830 until 1100.
(d) It is hoped that the evacuation may be completed tonight but should this not
be night. possible, you should be prepared for further evacuation tomorrow Sunday
(e) It may be necessary to carry out evacuation from 1730 tomorrow Sunday
in addition to the night evacuation.
(f) Should it be decided that the conditions are such that evacuation cannot be
carried out between 0300 tomorrow Sunday and 0700 tomorrow Sunday,
you will be informed.
T.O.D. 2025/1
T.O.R. 2044/1
17. VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER to S.N.O. DUNKIRK
cease at 0300.
Evacuation tonight Saturday from west end of beach and from harbour only, to
destroyers will enter harbour.
Can embark about 9,000 from beach if weather remains calm. Lighters and
2045/1
184

Details

SIGNALS
APPENDIX R
18. VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER to ADMIRALTY, S.N.O. C.-IN-C. NORTHERN NAVAL FORCES
GENERAL ALEXANDER, DUNKIRK
My 1609/1 [Appx. R.8] and S.N.O. Dunkirk 1754/1 [Appx. R.11] :
Casualties to shipping are now being caused by heavy artillery. All shipping
has been ordered to withdraw before daylight tomorrow Sunday.
2214/1
19. VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER to ADMIRALTY
A.M. 2025/1 [Appx. R.16] paras. (a) to (f), S.N.O. Dunkirk 1754/1 stating
General concurs that evacuation for transports is to cease at 0300 :
Channels to Dunkirk now all under fire of German batteries. New battery came
into action this evening, suspending traffic on only remaining daylight route,
namely X, maintaining heavy barrage, sinking transports Mona's Queen and
Brighton Queen1 and a trawler in the fairway near No. 5 buoy.
French destroyer nearby turned back Royal Daffodil and " Royal Scot' [?Royal
Sovereign]. Eight transports have now been lost and eight disabled. Crews of
others difficult to keep on service.
The above facts coupled with recent naval losses and also military losses by
drowning have convinced me that any attempt to continue evacuation during the
day is unwise. Permission is therefore requested in accordance with A.M. 2021/1
[Appx. R.15] para. (G) to withdraw all forces at 0300 until the following 2329/1 night.
Sunday, 2nd June
20. VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER to S.N.O. DUNKIRK
Admiralty has directed that evacuation by personnel steamers from Dunkirk
pier shall continue until 0700.
0055/2
21. ADMIRALTY to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER (R) R.A. Dover Straits, S.N.O. Dunkirk
Your 2329/1
(a) Evacuation up to 0700 in accordance with Admiralty telegram 2025/1 to
V.A. Dover, and 2021/1 to R.A. Dover Straits and S.N.O. Dunkirk, is to be
carried out using destroyers only.
(b) Destroyers to be ready to open fire on any batteries.
(c) If further experience shows that the channel is prohibitively dangerous due
to gunfire, evacuation by day is to cease and Admiralty informed immediately.
0115/2
22. VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER to FORCE K
Evacuation by destroyers is to continue until 0700 from Dunkirk harbour. Trans-
ports are to leave Dunkirk at 0300. Destroyers inform transports. Fire of shore
batteries should be returned.
0125/2
23. Winchelsea to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER
Your 0055 and your 1729/1 not passed to S.N.O. Dunkirk.
0416/2
24. S.N.O. DUNKIRK to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER (R) Admiralty, War Office
Your 1609/1/6 [Appendix R.8] not received until 0430. Large proportion naval
personnel evacuated. Estimated approximately 20,000 British and French evacu-
ated, greater (proportion ?) being French.
I No transports were sunk by gunfire on 1st June. The Mona's Queen was sunk
by magnetic mine on 29th May the A.B/V Mona's Isle was straddled by shore
guns on 1st June and sustained some damage. The minesweeper Brighton Queen
was sunk by aircraft on 1st June. The minesweeper Sandown came under fire of
Nieuport guns on 31st May.
185

Details

APPENDIX Y
THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
Transport for General will be sent as you asked for.
as pier master with details of plan. Good luck to you all.
Arrange for Lewis to direct ships at entrance again. Clouston' is coming over
1251/2
13. S.N.O. to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER (R) War Office
French still maintain front line except for front east of Bergues where the Germans
have penetrated 2 miles on a 2 mile front. Counter attack being made at 1500. In
port, no movement. Present situation hopeful.
1538/2
and later
14.
Military situation: French counter-attack postponed until 2000. Remainder
of front quiet. Bombers will probably be (playing ?) evening (hymn ?).
1840/2
15. ADMIRAL NORD to ADMIRAL DOVER
Part One. If during night of 2nd/3rd June 30,000 men can be evacuated, I
hope to be able to try on the night of 3rd/4th June to withdraw the 35,000 men who
are defending the bridgehead.
Part Two. In order to embark these troops quickly after retirement, numerous
boats will be required along east pier, Embecquetage, and Quai Felix Faure; also
boats and small craft to embark 6,000 men on the beach between Malo-les-Bains
and Malo Terminus.
Part Three. This evening all British officers will leave Dunkirk but the help of
British naval Officers will be essential during the night of 3rd/4th June to direct
British ships.
Part Four. If this programme could be carried out, the blocking of harbour
could take place at the end of the night of 3rd/4th June.² I will keep you and
Rear-Admiral Dover Straits advised of my intentions.
Part Five. I shall require help of British fast motor boats to assist in the conduct
of aged. operations of evacuation, a great number of French fast motor boats being dam-
1610/1
16. S.N.O. DUNKIRK to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER
Have promised French I will press for shipping for them tomorrow night when
they hope to evacuate 15,000. Reply Admiral Nord.
1735/2
17. WAR OFICE to GENERAL ALEXANDER (R) S.N.O. Dunkirk
Understand from French that another night will be required to complete the
evacuation altogether. If British troops are entirely evacuated tonight, conclude
this is with concurrence of Admiral Nord.
2037/2
Monday, 3rd June
18. REAR-ADMIRAL, DOVER in M.A/S.B.10 to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER
Four ships now alongside east pier but no French troops.
[Here see Appendix Y.22].
0030/3
I Seaplane tender 243, in which Cdr. Clouston was taking passage, was bombed
en 2 route and sunk. Cdr. J. C. Clouston, R.N., was lost.
See Appendix Z.3.
192

Details

3
Armed to the teeth we now both clambered ashore and found the quay
piled high with equipment of every description. Rifles, Bren guns,
petrol, bicycles, ammunition, kitbags, coats, belts, gas masks, in
fact every conceivable variety of gear. Aircraft were flying low over
us and we felt no inclination to delay and examine some of the stuff.
Alongside the same quay & nearer the town was the transport H.M.S.
King Orry, whom we hailed. The O.O.W. was helpful and told us that the
quay was broken in a second place shoreward of him and he believed
there were no officers to be seen there. On the strengthlof that I de-
cided to remain alongside where we were until the first streak of
dawn when one ship would move further up if possible & I would make
another attempt to see Capt. T. The time was now about 2 a.m.
Soon after we returned aboard there was some shouting up the quay and
King Orry who had been badly damaged by near-misses proceeded astern
& disappeared out through the harbour entrance. She was one of the
Isle of Man packets in peace time.
Things now were a little quieter and in preparation for an arduous
day I decided to take a short rest. Hardly had I sat down and put my
feet on the wardroom table, hopefully closing my eyes, when I was awa-
kened - or rather disturbed - by the announcement that people could by
heard calling for help, apparently just off the harbour mouth. Both
ships immediately slipped & sailed in the direction from which the
shouts came, and as they got louded we could faintly discern part of.
the funnel & foremast of King Orry. Both ships launched their boats &
together rescued 14 of her crew including the Captain, who despite his
awful experiences & having been the last man to get aboard the boat,
stepped aboard the Lord Grey with a cheery "Good evening, thanks.
Drenched in oil & shivering with cold the survivors were suffering
from shock, & we dosed them all with rum & changed their clothes for
s/o/
8/10
1156
211
6/4

Details

OF
GROUP
BEAT
-7-
pubs around the harbour in about two minutes, and a seething
crowd gathered round the Naval Office near the entrance but
this proved to be a pure navy job and they were only taking
the minimum number necessary so as to have more room for the
troops, only Naval Officers were chosen and a very small
proportion of those available at that. The correspondent
who had been coming with me, a competent motor boat man
himself, had seen there was little chance of our getting away
on Saturday and jumped another boat which got across that night
so he got his real experience all right, I may say most of the
correspondents down there went across at least once.
By Tuesday morning, 4th June, the real operations were
over and senior officers were turning up from different places
to try and straighten out records, etc., among them the
Commodore from Sheerness who had looked after us thoroughly
there. I was coming along to the exit from the Harbour from
my wretched house boat to lunch on shore and this Commodore
was standing near the entrance talking to a post-Captain whom
I did not know by sight; when I was within 20 yards of them
the Commodore happened to look in my direction, promptly
One nice piece of as shifting was done by
waing the slight breeze, which was stonger than the
tide act against it, to take this hulk across 2/3 rdo
of the harbour with oput her within 2 yards of
where the was to tie up on the other side.
had some anxious moments half through
this evolution, butwas very proud whom it anceeded.
pointed towards me with a very pleasant smile, said loudly
and firmly "Constant Nymph". Considering that he had exchanged
about 20 words with me a week before when busily engaged over
all the possible wants of 20 or 30 motor boats, this officer
must have a memory for faces and names that would leave an
experienced hotel keeper blushing in despair. As my boat
would not move, except by manhandling, and we often had to
shift in this manner for one reason and another, and the show
seemed to be over, I busied myself in trying to obtain a
passage for myself and crew back to Sheerness as & large
number of boats had already gone and quite a lot of drifters
etc. were laid up in the Harbour, while the crews had their
three days Dunkirk leave.
The difference in the town was most marked, naval
uniforms were becoming comparatively rare. Unfortunately
a lot of the senior officers concerned with the motor boat
side seemed to have gone on leave by this time and it was
not until Wednesday evening that I could get any useful
information. I then found that an officer was supposed to
be coming over from Sheerness on Thursday, 6th June, to
take a boat named Cairngorm back to Sheerness and it was
suggested that I might accompany him if the boat could be
found, apparently two officers were looking for her at the
moment as nobody knew where she was.
On returning to my boat I found that Cairngorn was
lying amongst two or three others just astern of me and had
received a nasty bump on the starboard buby which had
smashed gerabohed quite a bit of the planking; it proved later
on examination that two of the ribs had been broken at the top.
On Thursday morning, 6th June, the expected Officer
arrived, and proved to be a very young man just down from
Oxford and waiting to get into the Air Force who had taken
this boat to Dunkirk and had then been back to Sheerness
for some reason.
The compass had been smashed by a bomb splinter on the
other side, but the damage to the hull had apparently been
done in harbour while he was away. As the damage was pretty
well all above water line we got the navy carpenters to patch
it with canvast and battens, obtained a chart, filled up with
petrol and got under way about 14.30. My arew, on being
given the choice of going back to Sheerness by rail or helping
us two to navigate the crock back to Sheerness at once elected
to come by sea, three of them never having been to sea before.
The boat was a beauty, a 45 foot twin screw Therneycroft, and

Details

of the
the 25th
MINUTE SHEET.
Reference T.0.9144/S.T.N.6B.
I attach a schedule showing vessels with which this
Section was concerned, taken up for the "Evacuation of Personnel"
watrins inform were also
from "Dunkirk".
Early on May 27th we were asked to find a number of small
for it)
craft, vessels to be mustered at Sheerness for a special
requirement. D.S.V.P. supplied a list of suitable vessels but
it was soon ascertained that a great number of these were not
fit and ready for service, consequently I attended a meeting at
the Admiralty, when it was agreed that Admiral Preston should
send some of his Officers to the various boatyards covering the
area from Teddington to Burnham and Brightlingsea to inspect
and send all vessels fit to Sheerness immediately and arrange
regarding runner crews, oil fuel etc. The Officers were each
given an authority, signed by Admiral Preston, to order the
vessels away; Mr. Edwards concurred with this. During the
course of the Monday this Section arranged for and got 40 vessels
to Sheerness by Monday evening.
It has been an enormous task, resulting from the
indiscriminate taking up of vessels without formal requisition,
to get the exact picture setting out the present situation.
Innumerable lists, and a deal of correspondence, from every port
and person concerned, boatyards included, were scrutinised, in
order to obtain and collate all the information to enable a
complete and comprehensive list to be drawn up. This entailed
a great deal of checking, cross-checking and investigation, and,
a large amount of correspondence with owners has often been
necessary to clarify the position. A number of vessels were not
shown on any list, but were simply taken, and consequently our
only source of information has been from the owners themselves.
In order to get as much information as possible a list of
"AI ,"
the vessels which were "reported lost" and whose whereabouts
subsequent to Dunkirk were unknown (see copy attached) was
circulated to the C. in C. Nore, C. in C. Portsmouth, and the
(1502) 28899/1063
1,500,000 9/39 JC&SLtd
V.A. Dover. Copies were sent to the various Naval Officers-in-
Gp644'229
(REGIMINT)
CODE 5-34-0
Charge, requesting them to insert any information regarding
[OVER

Details

Watking, minute of inroinet the the
MINUTE SHEET.
Reference. T.0.9144/S.T.N.6B.
I attach a schedule showing vessels with which this
Mr. atkins inror were
Section was concerned, taken up for the "Evacuation of Personnel"
also
from "Dunkirk".
facilities for
Early on May 27th we were asked to find a number of small
craft, vessels to be mustered at Sheerness for a special
requirement. D.S.V.P. supplied a list of suitable vessels but
it was soon ascertained that a great number of these were not
&
fit and ready for service, consequently I attended a meeting at
the Admiralty, when it was agreed that Admiral Preston should
send some of his Officers to the various boatyards covering the
area from Teddington to Burnham and Brightlingsea to inspect
and send all vessels fit to Sheerness immediately and arrange
regarding runner crews, oil fuel etc. The Officers were each
given an authority, signed by Admiral Preston, to order the
DO
vessels away; Mr. Edwards concurred with this. During the
course of the Monday this Section arranged for and got 40 vessels
to Sheerness by Monday evening.
It has been an enormous task, resulting from the
indiscriminate taking up of vessels without formal requisition,
to get the exact picture setting out the present situation.
Innumerable lists, and a deal of correspondence, from every port
OF
and person concerned, boatyards included, were scrutinised. in
order to obtain and collate all the information to enable a
complete and comprehensive list to be drawn up. This entailed
a great deal of checking, cross-checking and investigation, and,
N
R
a large amount of correspondence with owners has often been
necessary to clarify the position. A number of vessels were not
shown on any list, but were simply taken, and consequently our
only source of information has been from the owners themselves.
In order to get as much information as possible a list of
"AI ,"
the vessels which were "reported lost" and whose whereabouts
subsequent to Dunkirk were unknown (see copy attached) was
circulated to the C. in C. Nore, C. in C. Portsmouth, and the
(1502) 28899/1063
1,500,000 9/39 JC&SLtd
V.A. Dover. Copies were sent to the various Naval Officers-in-
Gp644'229
(REGIMINT)
CODE 5-34-0
Charge, requesting them to insert any information regarding
[OVER

Details

LETTER SENT
2 0 SEP 1940 H.O.
st. 2161.
POST ROOM
T.0.9144/S.T.N.6B.
4
T.O.9144/S.T.N.6.
Early
19th September, 1940.
to find # a number
Whiteo
Sir,
I have to inform you that it is
Bheerness for a special
to assemble the fullest
possible desired information, regarding the the
of suitable vessels
part evacuation of the B.E.F. from Dunkirk, as
played by small craft in
ber of these were
in permanent record of the gallantry
order that it may be preserved
nded a meeting at
and a devotion which were displayed For the
during the operations.
miral Preston should
purpose to include such original
Trisuch a drecord diti is
boatyards covering
essential as possible and it is various thought
;he
matter the Coxswains of the
rightlingsea to
that lifeboats may have submitted reports
experiences, or which would be of
general accounts of their
less immediately
e
considerable interest.
fuel etc. The
ch
Preston
It would be greatly appreciated
by Admiral
emend with this,
of
Monday
/therefore
on the course
this
Section
to Sheerness Monday evening.
got 40 vessels
vesi
The General Secretary,
The Royal National Lifeboat
Institution,
42, Grosvenor S.W.1. Gardens,
aller
siti
I this prove to pather.
on.
as
rery
sed
he
19/9.
ole a
entai
ation,
n beer
els we
little or these vessels, which may be in their possession.
uently
There information was received and this has been noted. A
themse
were also a number of vessels already
e a li
few service known prior to "Dunkirk" which were utilised on
hereabo
to us are shown separately, and the End. those
hed) va
Briefly then the summary is as follows:-
uth, and
val office
11/

Details

Early on May 27th we were asked to find # a number
small craft vessels to be mustered 1 at Sheerness for special
requirement. D.S.V.P. supplied/a list of suitable vessels
it was
but 1/soon ascertained that a great number of these were
Consequantly
not fit and ready for service, so I attended a meeting at
the Admiralty, when it was agreed that Admiral Preston should
send some of his Officers to the various boatyards covering
the area from Teddington to Burnham and Brightlingsea to
inspect and send all vessels fit to Sheerness immediately
and arrange regarding runner crews, oil fuel etc. The
an
Officers were each given/authority, signed by Admiral
emeume with their,
Preston, to order the vessels away
During the course
of the Monday this Section arranged for and got 40 vessels
to Sheerness by Monday evening.
aller
aque to this preable to
as
19/9.
he
or these vessels, which may be in their possession. A
little information was received and this has been not ed.
There were also a number of vessels already on
service prior to "Dunkirk" which were utilised and those
few known to us are shown separately. at the End.
Briefly then the summary is as follows:- :-

Details

list nasida
T.0.9144/S.T.N.6B.
ward ice k 1021 saw 1943 221 43 08199 ains
588
I attach a schedule showing vessels with which this
asit
d'J`
20
Section was concerned, taken up for the "Evacuation of Personnel"
56
from "Dunkirk".
124 backbook
Early on May 27th we were asked to find a number of small
craft, vessels to be mustered at Sheerness for a special
ng. g these vessels.
requirement. D.S.V.P. supplied a list of suitable vessels but
it was soon ascertained that a great number of these were not
taining the rations V
fit and ready for service, consequently I attended a meeting at
the Admiralty, when it was agreed that Admiral Preston should
State is
V
send some of his Officers to the various boatyards covering the
Ve
588
area from Teddington to Burnham and Brightlingsea to inspect
svat
Ves
and send all vessels fit to Sheerness immediately and arrange
know
regarding runner crews, oil fuel etc. The Officers were each
from
*
given an authority, signed by Admiral Preston, to order the
ere
sent
There
vessels away; Mr. Edwards concurred with this. During the
ases hampton vessels to, to which, the
course of the Monday this Section arranged for and got 40 vessel
to Sheerness by Monday evening.
that
A
list
It has been an enormous task, resulting from the
with
els
is
indiscriminate taking up of vessels without formal requisition,
Qual
ere
to get the exact picture setting out the present situation.
many
of
Innumerable lists, and a deal of correspondence, from every port
assembly
Points
and person concerned, boatyards included, were scrutinised in
and arrived
order to obtain and collate all the information to enable a
vessels were
complete and comprehensive list to be drawn up. This entailed
Littlehampton
a great deal of checking, cross-checking and investigation, and,
to
believe
that
a large amount of correspondence with owners has often been
their vessels
necessary to clarify the position. A number of vessels were not
A few have,
how
shown on any list, but were simply taken, and consequently our
enquired for c
only source of information has been from the owners themselves
information fro
In order to get as much information as possible a list of
in this connection
the vessels which were "reported lost" and whose whereabouts
subsequent to Dunkirk were unknown (see copy attached) was
a
circulated to the C. in C. Nore, C. in C. Portsmouth, and
V.A. Dover. Copies were sent to the various Naval Officer
ins
nformati

Details

The
T.0.9144/S.T.N.6B.
588
I attach a schedule showing vessels with which this
DEDRE
Section was concerned, taken up for the "Evacuation of Personnel"
from "Dunkirk".
Early on May 27th we were asked to find a number of small
pls.
craft, vessels to be mustered at Sheerness for a special
us
requirement. D.S.V.P. supplied a list of suitable vessels but
One
it was soon ascertained that a great number of these were not
fit and ready for service, consequently I attended a meeting at
V
V
the Admiralty, when it was agreed that Admiral Preston should
V
send some of his Officers to the various boatyards covering the
*
Ve
(
area from Teddington to Burnham and Brightlingsea to inspect
Ves
and send all vessels fit to Sheerness immediately and arrange
regarding runner crews, oil fuel etc. The Officers were each
x
We
given an authority, signed by Admiral Preston, to order the
There
vessels away; Mr. Edwards concurred with this. During the
which,
course of the Monday this Section arranged for and got 40 vessel
to
the
to Sheerness by Monday evening.
A
list
It has been an enormous task, resulting from the
with
is
indiscriminate taking up of vessels without formal requisition,
Qual
to get the exact picture setting out the present situation.
many of the
Innumerable lists, and a deal of correspondence, from every port
assembly
p
and person concerned, boatyards included, were scrutinised in
and arrived
order to obtain and collate all the information to enable a
vessels
were
complete and comprehensive list to be drawn up. This entailed
Littlehampto
a great deal of checking, cross-checking and investigation, and,
to believe
a large amount of correspondence with owners has often been
their vessels
necessary to clarify the position. A number of vessels were not
shown on any list, but were simply taken, and consequently our
only source of information has been from the owners themselves
ngton to Burnh
vessels fit to
In order to get as much information as possible a list of
inner crews, oil fu
the vessels which were "reported lost" and whose whereabouts
chority, signed by
subsequent to Dunkirk were unknown (see copy attached) was
a
ay; Mr. Edwards con
circulated to the C. in C. Nore, C. in C. Portsmouth, and
the Monday this mati
V.A. Dover. Copies were sent to the various Naval Officer
ness by Monday
ina
nformati
has Tal Offi

Details

Officer in
could be
oney ha
nt that
ed go
11th June, 19
In accordance with last nights instruction I am sending a report
e
the
fishing fleet from the Eastern District sent for the evacuation of th
tish
Expeditionary Force.
ed
on
On 30th May, shortly before 1700, I received your telephone messa
so,
of
ould
all boats capable of crossing the English Channel should be ordered to
at once. I at once got in touch with suitable persons, usually the Cd
wer
Hannam
g
thirty
of statistics, at different points round the coast and explained to th
extreme urgency of the situation. Contact with the different stations
established as under:-
Wells.
1700.
Yarmouth.
1915.
Leigh-on-Sea.
1710.
Maldon.
1935.
Harwich.
1730.
Burnham.
1940.
Deben Estuary.
1740.
West Mersea.
1945,
Sheringham.
1800.
Orford.
2010.
Brightlingsea.
1805.
At some stations it was evident that the Naval Authorities were also II
in the same matter and yachts were also being detailed. Early in the day
Lieut. Cator, R.N.V.R., from the Small Vessels Pool had visited Lowestoft a
Yarmouth to select yachts and I remained in touch with him during his visit.
the evening I visited Kessingland and found that the boats, mostly with car
a
engines and no reverse gear, were unsuitable for the service. This also ap
to Aldeburgh. At 2110 Mr. Hannah notified that the two large Sheringham Whll
boats had sailed. There was no discussion of terms or conditions. The
sed
fishermen simply knew they were urgently wanted and they had a pretty good id
why. Some left for Lowestoft immediately they came ashore from the fishing
grounds. Early on the morning of June 1st I reported on the situation to N.O
Lowestoft as the little ships had to be routed, supplied with fuel and etc. by
all
him. He asked me to take full charge of the operations. This simplified th
work and by noon 16 vessels from stations to the North of and including Lowes
were ready for the first stage of their journey complete with petrol, paraffi
water and 4 days provision. These sailed at 1420. Others were standing b
as
under orders but were eventually not required. The vessels from stations
of Lowestoft came for the most part under direct orders from local naval
authorities. Lists of all vessels advised by our various representatives
in the attached schedules.
La
Volunteers for crews were not lacking and it is of passing interest tha
youngest volunteer was 141, a Coastguard' S son Peter Haines, a sea scout, and
the eldest man was 73 (Mr. C.A. Pegg). The latter has now returned to his crab
fishing and the Coastguard's son has been appointed messenger to the 1st. Lieut,
Naval Base, here. In view of the difficulty likely to be experienced by the
fishermen when dealing with the Naval Authority at Harwich and Ramsgate it was
B
agreed that Mr. Graham should accompany the party. This proved a most
Later
satisfactory arrangement and his handling of the variety of problems which arose
200
called the highest praise from the fishermen. The following is his report:-
9th J
1030
"We left Lowestoft for Harwich at 1420 on 1st June in a group of sixteen
Rose
boats. T. Nielsen of Wells was Chief Skipper. The subsequent movements of these
Q. &
sixteen vessels are known up to the time they reached home ports again. It will
10th 1820. June
be some time before the movements of vessels from other stations are fully known
and reported by local fishery officers. One vessel, the "Boy Fred" HH.15, was in
Minist
company with my party for operations from 5th - 7th June.
1300.
The following narrative of the movements of the sixteen and the "Boy Fred" is
All V
constructed from my log and from records in the Fishery Office.
rts, exc
1st June.
T.O. Har
Tony L.N.40 (Leader), Malvina L.N.15, Bessie LN.16, 8. and JJ. LN.88.
1420 Left Lowestoft.
Rose LN.76.
Little Admiral LN.85, all of Wells.
Ace, IN.27.
Aunty Guss IN.29,
Jane Hannah IN.98, of Blakeney.
Rose LN.19, Seagull LN.203, Amity LN.47, of Brancaster.
Edna YH.119, Liberty II YH.104, of Sheringham.
Narcissa IT.38, Winston LY.142, of Lowe toft. ich.
2000 Spoke to Examination Vessel of
2150 Moored in Harwich

Details

Sanders Navments and od thenight could money hat that so
- 2
2nd June.
Several vessels were found to have developed serious engine defects, nd
.ed
OZ
ng to the long passages, for which some of the engines were unsuitable. Also,
bulden
consultation with Naval Authorities at Harwich it was decided that some of
Han
the craft were not likely to be useful, owing to age, small size, or lack of power
the
Fine vessels were selected to continue the voyage to Ramsgate and after standing
for orders these nine vessels proceeded.
1255. Left Harwich harbour.
Ace (Leader) Q. and J.J., Rose (LN.76), Bessie, Malvina,
Jane Hannah, Amity,
Narcissa,
Winston.
2010. Entered Ramsgate.
3rd June.
On request four vessels and crews volunteered for service in Commander Le
Mesurier's opration; but finally were not required. Warton, engineer of
Narcissa, tool part in Vice-Admiral Taylor's operation.
4th June.
0930. Eght vessels and "Boy Fred" HH.15 took part in landing French soldiers
from troopshis at anchor outside in the fog.
1100. Fllowing vessels selected for operations under Captain Selby:-
Ace, Bessie Rose, Q. & J.J., Malvina, Narcissa, Winston, Boy Fred.
The folloing men volunteered to go in the vessels:-
Bessie
T.lielsen.
Rose
R.
Pegg
Ace C. Warton
W.1. Cox
J. Bishop
M. Graham
W. Long
J. Barnes
Narcissa Albrow.
T.E. Scotte:and J.T. Greengrass not required.
Later on le Jane Hannah was also taken and G. Long was anxious to go in her,
bu was not ruired.
General sisfaction was expressed with the work of the volunteers and there
wer no casualies.
5t₂ June.
Aperationn progress. Malvina and Winston were discarded in Dover,
Q. & J.J. in msgate and Jane Hannah was brought in so that six vessels were used:-
Jane Hanna Bessie, Rose, Boy Fred,
Narcissa,
Ace.
6th June.
Operation ompleted.
7th June.
Heard "JanHannah" had been lost. Reported loss of "Jane Hannah" and
damage to all her vessels to S.T.
1530. Le: Dover.
Narcissa (lader).
Bessie towig Ace.
of
Rose towingMalvina.
Boy Fred toing Winston.
Later Narcissa ad to take both Boy Fred and Winston in tow.
2200. Arrved Ramsgate.
8th June.
1045.
Left Ramsgate.
a
Narcissa (lealer). Q. & J.J.
Rose and Malvina towing Winston.
Bessie towing Ace.
Amity.
Later Narcissa helped tow Winston.
2000. Arrivel Harwich.
9th June.
don
1030. Left Harwich.
Rose (leader) with Narcissa, Bessie, Ace, Malvina, Winston all in tow and
Q. & J.J., Amity, Aunty Guss.
1820. Arrived Lowestoft.
10th June.
Ministry of Shipping surveyors visited vessels and noted the damage.
1300. Vessels proceeded to home ports.
All vessels named in this report have been reported as having reached their home
rts, except the Boy Fred. This boat was left in Ramsgate on 8th June and
T.o. Harwich was notified that evening. He promised to inform her owner.
M. GRAHAM.
/Before

Details

-7-
pubs around the harbour in about two minutes, and a seething
crowd gathered round the Naval Office near the entrance but
this proved to be a pure navy job and they were only taking
the minimum number necessary, so as to have more room for the
STATE
and
troops, only Naval Officers were chosen and a very small
proportion of those available at that. The correspondent
who had been coming with me, a competent motor boat man
himself, had seen there was little chance of our getting away
on Saturday and jumped another boat which got across that night
so he got his real experience all right, I may say most of the
correspondents down there went across at least once.
42
By Tuesday morning, 4th June, the real operations were
over and senior officers were turning up from different places
to try and straighten out records, etc., among them the
Commodore from Sheerness who had looked after us thoroughly
there. I was coming along to the exit from the Harbour from
my wretched house-boat to lunch on shore and this Commodore
was standing near the entrance talking to a post-Captain whom
I did not know by sight; when I was within 20 yards of them
One nice price boat shifting was dones by
using the dight brage, which was stronger than the
tide act against'st, to take this hulk across 2/3 do
the Commodore happened to look in my direction, promptly
the harbour width rhut her within 2 you of
and firmly "Constant Nymph". Considering that he had exchanged
where she was to tie up on the for side.
Ihad some assisions moments half way
through this wolution, but was very proud when it succeeded
pointed towards me with a very pleasant smile, said loudly
about 20 words with me a week before when busily engaged over
all the possible wants of 20 or 30 motor boats, this officer
must have a memory for faces and names that would leave an
experienced hotel keeper blushing in despair. As my boat
would not move, except by manhandling, and we often had to
shift in this manner for one reason and another, and the show
seemed to be over, I busied myself in trying to obtain a
passage for myself and crew back to Sheerness as a large
number of boats had already gone and quite as lot of drifters
etc. were laid up in the Harbour, while the crews had their
three days Dunkirk leave.
The difference in the town was most marked, naval
uniforms were becoming comparatively rare. Unfortunately
a lot of the senior officers concerned with the motor boat
side seemed to have gone on leave by this time and it was
not until Wednesday evening that I could get any useful
information. I then found that an officer was supposed to
be coming over from Sheerness on Thursday, 6th June, to
take a boat named Cairngorn back to Sheerness and it was
suggested that I might accompany him if the boat could be
found, apparently two officers were looking for her at the
moment as nobody knew where she was.
On returning to my boat I found that Cairngorn was
lying amongst two or three others just astern of me and had
received a nasty bump on the starboard busy which had
smashed seratched quite a bit of the planking; it proved later
on examination that two of the ribs had been broken at the top.
On Thursday morning, 6th June, the expected Officer
arrived, and proved to be a very young man just down from
Oxford and waiting to get into the Air Force who had taken
this boat to Dunkirk and had then been back to Sheerness
for some reason.
The compass had been smashed by a bomb splinter on the
other side, but the damage to the hull had apparently been
done in harbour while he was away. As the damage was pretty
well all above water line we got the navy carpenters to patch
it with canvast and battens, obtained a chart, filled up with
petrol and got under way about 14.30. My crew, on being
given the choice of going back to Sheerness by rail or helping
us two to navigate the crock back to Sheerness at once elected
to come by sea, three of them never having been to sea before.
The boat was a beauty, a 45 foot twin screw Thorneycroft, and

Details

VINITAL
H.O.
FALCON II
tn.2161.
righton Municipal Hospital,
Elm Grove,
9144/STN6B.
29th October, 1940.
Brighton, 7.
47
46
Sir,
19th September, 1940.
I have to acknowledge receipt of
your letter dated 24th October, 1940
enclosing report on the Dunkirk
Operations insofar as your vessel
"COUNT DRACULA" took part in these
'ALCON 11'.
operations and to thank you for the
information which you have been good
sels were required for the
enough to supply. It is anticipated
t Dunkirk, I offered my vessel,
that this report will be of value in
y 31st arranged with a crew of
compiling the final report which will
ssel to be taken to Dover or
be drawn up on these operations.
ssage was received in the evening
essels were to proceed, but on
I am, Sir,
t) orders were received at
Your obedient Servant, d to proceed, and as there was
no
time
again
he crew, she sailed under a crew
detailed by the Chichester Yacht Co. She was proceeding
to Dover but, probably to the crew being unaccustomed
to the particular some trouble was experienced and
she put into Shoreham.
Director of Sea
Transport.
The
she was taken from Shoreham to
Newhaven and the channel to St. Valerie. From
accounts
grim time, and four bombs exploded
K. Greiner, Esq. the tunately, only resulted in a burst
2, Blondin Avenue, allons of Diesel oil. This narrow
Northfields, later quite independently, by a
Ealing, W.5. of who, prior to the war, had a
W the 'Falcon 11'.
erie to Newhaven the vessel was
taken over by the naval authorities, and is now doing routine
coastal patrol duties.
The vessel can be regarded as an 'old-timer' as she
did useful service in the last war (not under her present
name), and having come safely through that, it is hoped that
she may have the same good fortune in her second period of
service.
Rekin
I am, Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
The Director of Sea Transport,
Ministry of Shipping,
Berkeley Square,
LONDON, W.1.
Director of Sea Transport.
ng
me
em,

Details

FALCON II
2/3/19
Brighton Municipal Hospital,
Elm Grove,
RECEIVED
Brighton, 7.
47
RY
OF 18 18
19th September, 1940.
Sir,
Re: 'FALCON 11'.
At the time small vessels were required for the
evacuation of the B.E.F. at Dunkirk, I offered my vessel,
Friday
the above-named, and on May 31st arranged with a crew of
local yachtsmen for the vessel to be taken to Dover or
across the channel. A message was received in the evening
of this day that no more vessels were to proceed, but on
Satus Saturday day
the following day (June 1st) orders were received at
Chichester that vessels had to proceed, and as there was
no time again to collect the crew, she sailed under a crew
detailed by the Chichester Yacht Co. She was proceeding
to Dover but, probably owing to the crew being unaccustomed
to the particular vessel, some trouble was experienced and
she put into Shoreham.
The following Sunday she was taken from Shoreham to
Newhaven and went across the channel to St. Valerie. From
accounts they had a pretty grim time, and four bombs exploded
near the vessel which, fortunately, only resulted in a burst
fuel tank containing 260 gallons of Diesel oil. This narrow
escape was later confirmed, quite independently, by a
Lieutenant of the R.N.V.R. who, prior to the war, had a
yacht at Chichester and knew the 'Falcon 11'.
Returning from St. Valerie to Newhaven the vessel was
taken over by the naval authorities, and is now doing routine
coastal patrol duties.
The vessel can be regarded as an 'old-timer' as she
did useful service in the last war (not under her present
name), and having come safely through that, it is hoped that
she may have the same good fortune in her second period of
service.
Rikd
I am, Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
The Director of Sea Transport,
Ministry of Shipping,
Berkeley Square,
LONDON, W.1.
Directorol Sea Transport.
ng
me
em,

Details

KINTAIL
PAPERS
INSERTION IN
SENT
HO. 8, Leicester Hove 3. Villas,
TOAD.
STANLEY ROWDEN,
STEAM TRAWLER OWNER AND
FISH SALESMAN.
Telephone 595.
31, Military Road,
Royal Harbour,
Ramsgate.
64
Copy of Statement from Skipper of S.T. "Tankerton Towers"
Re Dunkirk.
During the afternoon of May 3Ist, after taking aboard
some boat loads of soldiers, we decided to steam in shore to
pick up some more, when we came across a motor-yacht disabled.
This we took in tow. After about an hour her tow rope fouled
our propeller, which we could not free. I knew would should be
seen by a Patrol ship at some time or other so, we went on
with our work, getting as many soldiers aboard, which at this
time proved a mixed lot, British and French.
Every available space aboard was taken up by a soldier,
cabin, fish hold, wheelhouse, decks, even in the engine room.
Sometime in the evening, I cannot give the correct time, a
Patrol ship, did arrive, an d took us in tow.
It has since occurred to me, that no one thought
of the predicament we were in, and the only concern of everyone
was to get the troops aboard. In between times we were kept
amused by the way our men, of the Navy, were shooting down the
divebombers, just like rooks.
(Signed) Jack Hannaford.
Skipper.
October I940

Details

KINTAIL
OF INSERTION IN
LETTER SENT
HO.
8, Leicester Villas,
Hove 3.
EXTN. 2161.
8NOV1940
PO8T ROOM
25th September, 1940.
9144 N6B.
8.
8th November, 1940.
P.M.
Sir,
66
21
67
I. have to acknowledge receipt of
enclosing report on the Dunkirk Operations of September 1940, I
your letter dated 4th November, 1940,
insofar as your vessels "KESTREL",
m craft "Kintail" during
"TANKERTON TOWERS" and "PROVIDER" took
three volunteers, L.J.
part in these operations, and to thank
ns Hove: Clifford Wright,
you for the most interesting information George Pettit, 4 Seal View
which you have been good enough to
supply. It is anticipated that this
report will be of value in compiling the 0th, under instructions
final report which will be drawn up on Lcer at Shoreham, Commander
these operations.
H. M. S. Lynx on the evening
onwards we were placed under
I am, Sir,
ed with the De-Gaussing Squad
Your obedient Servant,
also used for trans-shipping
occasions. I left my vessel
had been requisitioned.
(Sgd.) A. P. MEREDITH
to give you fuller details
Director of Sea Transport.
ny one incident from another
ith no more than two hours
Stanley Rowden, Esq.,
31 Military Road,
Royal Harbour,
RAMSGATE.
4g

Details

Details

Details

MERMAIDEN
93
97
am also toed
wr name "Matilda" / kis, by
h.
the way, was also her ham
40.
when Shen was, before conversion,
/STN. 6B,
culars of the
WHO RNLI. survice) was
evacuation of
fferent vessel
popular with Som of the
tools, who called her
made four
, carrying
she is leaking
-
that her
with machine-
/ doin know whether
y further in-
since.
Usen fragmenting details
to
an of any wn to you, or
rvant,
2
Whether 16th an in time.
Han you In received
Entered in Day Book
1
w
co
am information on 162
is R.N.
subject yours voral ? It so,
1 should undersally h grand STReeT
for
it -
I am, Sir
hom Bunz vidical (C.G.BURGE)
DE
wh
pl
ac
30t
fav
mizzen set, and narbour motor. about Outside 3.0.p.m. on May
setting the with heavy a fresh Mainsail wind, and so Jib the Naval for & good Ratings run got down. busy we in were assisting
We were making to quite a good headway by the
was overhead, preparing so keep ship going all night, when evening we heard of 30th planes and I
still favoured we stopped the Motor and relied on our many wj
close us. But many times that night planes Sails, while quit
range. As daylight broke we could see where came in
with occasionally Sails gunfire was heard, and planes above us. we were So and
motive, lowered when it seemed just for the purpose the wind failed si
to near Dover, and to get quickly by there seemed we to cont b
and Sails. The Motor was our only chance now in this strong us,
contrary wind.
So with the assistance of the Seamen, I tried starting, but fou
she was cold, and that the cold paraffin had given me a wet plug.
had to re-start on petrol and change a plug. I had taken some time
to localise our difficulty and to remedy it, that I felt very relieved
when she started, as without power, we might very well have been blown
P.T.O

Details

Details

MERMAIDE
97
to to Chelsea.
95
Apart from usis, (
11",
rmouth.
now working. l would,
er, 1940.
myself, very much
9144/STN. 6B,
the
like to know. So way
I ask you to note
of n a
my name & address
at she made four
ying off, carrying
and G So good as to
result she is leaking
mbs and that her
gir me un information
riddled with machine-
required shones nor
e you any further in-
hear her since.
discovn is.
The rosal was requiritions
from her wornings will our
dient Servant,
inference to in - So ( did
In filed
not even han ur chance
of going contacter.
Commander, R.N.
i
yours C.G. Burge
Berkeley Square W.L.
I
Berkeley Square, LONDONS
T
h
(
g
te
wh
pl
ac
30t
fav
mizzen set, and motor. Outside we were
narbour about 3.0.p.m. on May
setting heavy Mainsail and Jib for & good run down.
the with a fresh wind, so the Naval Ratings got busy in assisting
We were making quite a good headway by the evening of 30th and I
was preparing to keep ship going all night, when we heard many planes
overhead, so we stopped the Motor and relied on our Sails, while wj
still favoured us. But many times that night planes came in quit
close range. As daylight broke we could see where we were and
occasionally gunfire was heard, and planes above us. So we contr
with Sails to near Dover, and to get quickly by there seemed to b
motive, when it seemed just for the purpose the wind failed us, SA
lowered Sails. The Motor was our only chance now in this strong
and contrary wind.
So with the assistance of the Seamen, I tried starting, but fou
she was cold, and that the cold paraffin had given me a wet plug.
had to re-start on petrol and change a plug. I had taken some time
to localise our difficulty and to remedy it, that I felt very relieved
when she started, as without power, we might very well have been blown
P.T.O

Details

MERMAIDEN
Sir,
Dunkirk operation.
97
inc sion in records.
96
iful",
ae,
Esq.,
ws, S.W.1. 1.
Your obedient Servant,
I am, sir,
Your report is being retained with the others received, for
information regarding the part your vessel took in the
21st February 1942, and to thank you for the interesting
XXXXXXXXXX3X
(armouth.
I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated
T. O. 9144/STN6B
ber, 1940.
M.V. V. "MATILDA"
COPY FOR INSERTION IN REGISTERED PAPERS
0.9144/STN.6B,
N particulars of the
in the evacuation of
of a different vessel
at she made four
ying off, carrying
result she is leaking
mbs and that her
riddled with machine-
Director of Sea Transport.
(Sgd) H. C. RIGGS
27 27 February, 1942
a you any further in-
LETTER SENT
near her since.
27 FEB1942 8
dient Servant,
Commander, R.N.
Ministry Berkeley Square House,
I
Berkeley Square, LONDONS. W.1.
h
(
go
te
wh
pl
ac
30t
setting fav the heavy a fresh Mainsail wind, and so Jib the for Naval & good Ratings run got down. busy we in were assisting
mizzen set, and motor. Outside
narbour about 3.0.p.m. on May
was preparing keep ship going all night, when we heard planes and I
We were making to quite a good headway by the evening of 30th
close favoured us. But many times that night planes in quit
still overhead, so we stopped the Motor and relied on our Sails, many while wj
occasionally gunfire was heard, and planes above us. were So we cont
range. As daylight broke we could see where we came and
with Sails to near Dover, and to get quickly by there seemed to bi
motive, when it seemed just for the purpose the wind failed us, S4
and contrary wind.
lowered Sails. The Motor was our only chance now in this strong
So with the assistance of the Seamen, I tried starting, but fou
she was cold, and that the cold paraffin had given me a wet plug.
had to re-start on petrol and change a plug. I had taken some time
to localise our difficulty and to remedy it, that I felt very relieved
when she started, as without power, we might very well have been blown
P.T.O

Details

STATE
MERMAIDEN
97
OF
H.M.S. "Watchful",
Great Yarmouth.
26th September, 1940.
Sir,
In reply to your letter T.O. 9144/STN. 6B,
I regret that I can give you very few particulars of the
part played by my yacht "MERMAIDEN" in the evacuation of
Dunkirk as I was, myself, in charge of a different vessel
working from the beaches.
I have heard, however, that she made four
trips from the harbour to vessels lying off, carrying
two hundred men each time, and as a result she is leaking
rather badly from near misses of bombs and that her
decks and wheelhouse have been well riddled with machine-
gun bullets.
I am sorry I cannot give you any further in-
formation, as I have been nowhere near her since.
I am, Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
Lieut. Commander, R.N.
The Director of Sea Transport,
Ministry of Shipping,
I
Berkeley Square House,
T
Berkeley Square, LONDONS W.1.
h
(
g
te
wh
pl
ac
30t
fav
on a fresh wind, mizzen so set, the and narbour motor. about Outside 3.0.p.m. on May
with occasionally close still was overhead, setting preparing We range. favoured were the so making heavy gunfire we to As us. stopped keep daylight Mainsail quite was But ship the heard, many a broke going good and Motor times Jib and headway we all and for Naval could that night, relied & by night good Ratings see the when on where run planes evening our we got down. we Sails, heard busy came were of we many 30th in in while were and assisting quit planes and wj I
motive, Sails when to it near seemed Dover, and to get planes quickly above by there us. seemed So we cont
and contrary wind. Motor was our only chance now in this strong us,
lowered Sails. The just for the purpose the wind failed to SA b
had she was to cold, and that the cold paraffin had given starting, me a wet but
So with the assistance of the Seamen, I tried fou
to re-start on petrol and change a plug. I had taken plug.
localise our difficulty and to remedy it, that I felt very some relieved time
when she started, as without power, we might very well have been blown
P.T.O

Details

Ho
MINNE DOS
st. 2161.
98
Road
99
f.09144/s.T.N.6B
2nd October 1940.
I.W.
9ᵗʰ 1940
Sir,
I letter dated 26th September 1940,
have to acknowledge receipt of
rk.
your enclosing report on the Dunkirk
Operations insofar as your vessel
"MERMAIDEN" took part in these
and to you for the
operations, information which you
REGIST 17 6 RECEIVED OCT 11/16/18 x
enough this report will be of will
to supply. It value in
that compiling the final report which
be drawn up on these operations.
of B.E.F.
big
to submit the
I am, Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
uthampton on
May
June
by S. Riding
lias ciscumotances
Director of Sea Transport.
U separate sheet
Lieut. Cdr. P.M. Felleul, R.N.,
sotion to duty
b
H.M.S. "Watchful",
a
Great Yarmouth.
into considerations
c
an
go
Of
7 White
ear
par
The
for owners of Minnedosa
him
(the
Med 6. 7 White & ( poethumour) Ao. Ridina
goin
tem
what
place
accon
in
ratings to
Ho
we
got
out
favoured 30th with with foresail fresh and mizzen of Portsmouth set, and Harbour motor. about 3.0.p.m. on
setting the heavy a Mainsail wind, and so Jib the for Naval & good Ratings run Outside got down. busy we in were assisting May
was overhead, so we keep ship going all night, when evening we heard of 30th planes and I
preparing We were making to quite a good headway by the
close range. As But many times that night planes Sails, while quit
still favoured us. stopped the Motor and relied on our many wj
with Sails gunfire was heard, and planes above we were and
occasionally daylight broke we could see where came in
motive, lowered when it seemed just for the purpose the wind failed seemed to b
to near Dover, and to get quickly by there us. So we cont
and Sails. The Motor was our only chance now in this strong us, SU
contrary wind.
So with the assistance of the Seamen, I tried starting, but fou
she was cold, and that the cold paraffin had given me a wet plug.
had to re-start on petrol and change a plug. I had taken some time
to localise our difficulty and to remedy it, that I felt very relieved
when she started, as without power, we might very well have been blown
P.T.O

Details

MINNE DOS
/. Milton Road
99
ate
Cours. I.W.
Director of Sea Transport
Oct. 9ᵗʰ 1940
Ministry of Shipping, (H.O.)
Berkeley Square House,
Berkeley Square,
London, W.I.
T.O. 9144/STN. 6B.
Dear Sirs,
REGIST 17 RECEIVED OCT Hilliams A
M.S.B" Minnedosa - Evacuation of B.E.F.
MF Riding and myself beg to submit the
enclosed details of the voyage from Southampton S. on
the Mate Engineer aged 19 under peculiar
May 29 the to Nortsmouth June made by incumotances Riding
which I submit for your approbation on separate to sheet
&
under such incumstances, might be taken considerations,
hoping that the boys initiative and devotion into duty
o
Having the honour to be,
ai
your humble servant,
50
E. F White
Of
ea
pa:
The
for ownere of Minnedosa
hin
Meso 6. 7 White & Ab. poethumour (Riding
(th
goi
tem
wha
plac
acco
111
ratings to
favoured 30th L. with foresail we got and out mizzen of Portsmouth set, and Harbour motor. about 3.0.p.m. on May
setting the with a fresh wind, so the Naval Ratings Outside got busy we in were assisting
heavy Mainsail and Jib for & good run down.
We were making quite a good headway by the evening of 30th
was overhead, preparing to keep ship going all night, when we heard planes and I
close favoured us. But many times that night planes came in quij
still so we stopped the Motor and relied on our Sails, many while wj
range. As daylight broke we could see where we were and
occasionally gunfire was heard, and planes above us. So we cont
with Sails to near Dover, and to get quickly by there seemed to b
motive, when it seemed just for the purpose the wind failed us, SU
and contrary wind.
lowered Sails. The Motor was our only chance now in this strong
So with the assistance of the Seamen, I tried starting, but fou
she was cold, and that the cold paraffin had given me a wet plug.
had to re-start on petrol and change a plug. I had taken some time
to localise our difficulty and to remedy it, that I felt very relieved
when she started, as without power, we might very well have been blown
P.T.O

Details

Cericumstances attending the use of Munnidosa May 1940 June 6
Minnedosa was discharging scrap ison at meas Pollock &
Brown's Whatf at nostham, Southampton on May 29 the
100
The Master, W. Riding, was under the doctor and had lift the
vessel the previous day in charge of his son, Sidney Riding aged 19
to proceed with unloading, while he (W. Riding had to go the to
semoval of discased bone roulling from an accident to hand rk.
East Cowes Hoopital for some days as an in patient for the
some weeks before
The mate, G. absook was also involved in a serious
with the winch, was a hospital case at Ryde for some Ak was
accident on may 2nd previously while getting out cargo weeks at Rewpost with
contucions of the head of body and a nd broken ankle the away
from It two was usual under these duties uicumstances from May 2 that to the Sept. Mastes, Y Riding made
the latter was the only one ow boards to it accept the order, & himself consequently
artangements for his son Sudney Riding to selieve humself 9 mate, and
go with the ship on May 29
W. Riding lost his mother on or about July 1st and his father
B
3 weeks later very suddenly
Both Mastis and Malb were very cotty at not being able to go
1
1
with this ship on this occasion due to the above causes. that & but
were pleased to know that she did so well such and Riding to
was able to take charge in imergency at ah early ago,
b
a1
help the Havy carry out their work.
ca
as owners, on behalf of my lato partnes MF a I Rading
and his family, I would thank you for giving the above above all facts
an
got
Off
difficulties your we founds surselve in, to be of use is Havy for
kind consideration in that we were pleased the
ear
par
these purposes. yours faithfully
The
him
for Quinere Minnedosa," White & Riding)
(tho
For Macter of Crew
E. 7. White
goin
tem
hs. Riding
extra hand
what
place
accom
G Alrooh mate
s. Riding
ratings to
H
30th favoured with with foresail we got and out mizzen of Portsmouth set, and Harbour motor. about Outside 3.0.p.m. on May
setting the heavy a fresh Mainsail wind, and so Jib the Naval for & good Ratings run got down. busy we in were assisting
was overhead, preparing to keep ship going all night, when we heard 30th planes and I
We were making quite a good headway by the evening of
still favoured so we stopped the Motor and relied on our Sails, many while wj
close us. But many times that night planes in qui
occasionally gunfire was heard, and planes above us. So cont
range. As daylight broke we could see where we came were and
with Sails to near Dover, and to get quickly by there seemed we to b
motive, when it seemed just for the purpose the wind failed us, S
and contrary wind.
lowered Sails. The Motor was our only chance now in this strong
So with the assistance of the Seamen, I tried starting, but fou
she was cold, and that the cold paraffin had given me a wet plug.
had to re-start on petrol and change a plug. I had taken some time
to localise our difficulty and to remedy it, that I felt very relieved
when she started, as without power, we might very well have been blown
P.T.O

Details

101
"Minnedosa" Voyage to Dunkirk May - June, 1940.
The following is a brief account of what happened in the Voyage of
M.S.B. Minnedosa from Southampton down the Channel to Ramsgate from
which we were used for the disembarkation of our troops from Dunkirk.
(Slender details from the Mate-Engineer aged 19 who was the only
member of our crew able to sail with her on account of Skipper W.
Riding being in hospital with crushed finger, and Mate G. Abrook
attending doctor with broken ankle).
Taken in collaboration with S. Riding, the Mate Engineer.
Our vessel the M.S.B. "Minnedosa" is a Thames Sailing Barge,
fitted with a Kelvin Ricardo Motor as auxiliary power, giving her a
speed of 5 knots approx., and our usual trading runs are between the
Isle of Wight and the Mainland with coal, coke or scrap iron freights.
My father had left me in charge of unloading one of these freights
(scrap iron) at a Southampton Quay on May 29th, to go to hospital for
the removal of some injured bone in a crushed finger he had got some
weeks before.
Accordingly, when some Officials arrived with orders that Ship
was wanted on urgent Government work, I stated the case, they asked
me would I go. I rang up to my home and told Mother I was going,
hoping to be back soon, trusting to luck.
I had some experience of being on my own in small sailing craft,
but nothing like this before. Stating the case to the Officer, he
arranged for some Dockyard men from Portsmouth to assist me to unload
cargo, and get vessel to Portsmouth by the next morning (30th).
I ran the Motor and took the wheel, they assisted in the ropes
and getting up sails, and mooring up at the Dockyard on arrival. We
got on well together and it is surprising what these men can do. The
Officer got 6 Naval Ratings aboard with their kits. Morning and
early afternoon were taken up by them bundling in provisions, stores,
paraffin, petrol, lubricating oil, - it looked to be for a long voyage.
The Officer was making sure of everything, for a few questions from
him soon put him at ease, but I felt a little worse off for not knowing
(though I might have surmised) where we were going to, or what we were
going to do. I felt I might be in for a hot time, and my job as pro
tem for the Skipper (Father) and Mate to be quite a "swizzle", and
what did it mean with the disciplined seamen on board, seemingly in
place of them. (The Officer chose some 6 good Naval ratings to
accompany him).
However, we got out of Portsmouth Harbour about 3.0.p.m. on May
30th with foresail and mizzen set, and motor. Outside we were
favoured with a fresh wind, so the Naval Ratings got busy in assisting
setting the heavy Mainsail and Jib for & good run down.
We were making quite a good headway by the evening of 30th and I
was preparing to keep ship going all night, when we heard many planes
overhead, so we stopped the Motor and relied on our Sails, while wj
still favoured us. But many times that night planes came in quit
close range. As daylight broke we could see where we were and
occasionally gunfire was heard, and planes above us. So we cont
with Sails to near Dover, and to get quickly by there seemed to b
motive, when it seemed just for the purpose the wind failed us, S
lowered Sails. The Motor was our only chance now in this strong
and contrary wind.
So with the assistance of the Seamen, I tried starting, but fou
she was cold, and that the cold paraffin had given me a wet plug.
had to re-start on petrol and change a plug. I had taken some time
to localise our difficulty and to remedy it, that I felt very relieved
when she started, as without power, we might very well have been blown
P.T.O

Details

139
On the evening of May 30th I arrived home at 6 p.m. being
met as usual by the dog to collect the evening paper. Having
finished my meal and whilst reading the evening paper a ring
came from the front door. My wife answered and found two
Naval Officers armed with their revolvers waiting. The Officers
asked for, and my wife called, me.
Although surprised to see the callers I was not astonished,
for I had, after reading the news from France, some suspicion of
what might be on foot by the Royal Navy.
After identifying myself and giving the assurance that I
was the owner of the M.V. "Quest", the Officers asked if I had
a photograph of the vessel. The expression "Just the type of
boat for the job" was made after seeing a small snapshot. I
was hereupon handed a paper and requested to consider both
myself and "Quest" at the disposal of the Naval Authorities.
I was given, in confidence, a brief outline of the situation and
the intentions of the Authorities with the usual Naval advice
to "Keep it under your hat".
I was requested to get under way as early as possible with
the instruction that if necessary I was to commandeer crew,
food and fuel. Any refusal to be met by the showing of the
paper to the nearest Police Officer. I mentioned the business
on hand to my chum Ted Avery who immediately volunteered to
come along with me.
After donning our boating kit and sweaters we went along
to the Hurlingham Yacht Club, got "Quest" off her moorings,
and brought her alongside the landing stage, where, with the
assistance of women members of the Club we unloaded all masts,
sails and anything movable, which, as mentioned by the Naval
Officers, would impede numbers of troops scrambling aboard and
packing themselves as tightly as cabin space would permit.
Life jackets and Life Buoys were left on board.
While the unloading was in progress I was hailed by a
Naval Pinnace from the river and asked to hurry my departure
as things were getting rather desperate. A further Naval
Officer appeared at the Club Jetty again emphasising the
necessity for all speed.
After saying Au Revoir to our women folk and others at the
Club we got under way at approx. 8.50 p.m. The tide being
against us our speed was not too good, normal speed being only
approx. 7 knots. Just below Wandsworth Bridge the Naval
Pinnace came up with us and asked if we were making our maximum
speed. We replied this was so but of course we were receiving
no help from the tide. The Officer in command thereupon
suggested he take us in tow as far as Tower Bridge, by which
time we should have the tide under us. As a conversion "Quest"
was never intended to travel at a speed of 12 knots which we
did in tow of the Pinnace.
over with them to Dunkirk. He returned on Tuesday and "
to C.O. Davies who informed us that as the weather had deteriorated
no more small boats would be used and he had no further use for our
services. We obtained our clearance paper and, with a borrowed
chart and compass started for London.
Here began one of the worst experiences of the whole job for a
heavy sea was running and our little boat was tossed about like a
cork but we made it and at 10 p.m. Tuesday night we anchored in the
Swale. An early start was made on Wednesday morning and, after
being/

Details

10 Silver Road
THE
Burnham on Crouch
bren
157
friday 27 nel sept 40
On Wednesday may 29 40. returning from a days
Oynler daedging with the ayalir dredy ing
smach "Sea9alten" me were hailed by the
Oynlir dredg my venel "Vanquard" and informed
that a naval Commander weshed to nee the
Secraller
a
introduced to Commander Bowler R.N., who
We immediately went as hare and were
l
told us the Searallir was required to attempt
l
A
the heach at Dunkish I volunteered to like
his help having back some of the Soldiers off
,
cle
the Seasaller & ashed for a crew, Dech book
tie
the engineer & Bill Bridge one of the hands
id
also voluntiered.
The Commander a and there would he live
as
ha
the and Mar-Toie, We were required la leave
other M.Y. boals, the oyslir dredg ing vessel Vanguard
his
are were laken & the e emander whiched
following marning at Our farticul-
L
ag
dou
as luch, We fent the rest of the evening
were
taking about liares water d refueling,
We ded not have a bool on deck as the
acr
Commander had and it would be in the
we
Wear
way, hot alloyeather liking the sound of
La
ranna WILLON we could quit one begin W. Bouy
Owing to the engines failing we had to leave with only a few troops
WE and proceeded back to Dunkirk W here we took five more loads off
the shore which we were now able to do owing to the rising tide.
Whilst these operations were being carried out we were being

Details

Runs Line
SUNSHINE
STATE
ECEIVED
File
JUL 5 REGISTRY 1940 RECEIVED
180
)
SEP P.M.
7 alliance Road
21
Sir RE, "Sunohis DE
15/16/21
Ramsgate
STABLISHED
1820.
July 4th 40
In reference to the above craft she was liakm
183
rey.
by the admnaliy on Thursday may 29th to help
in the evacuation of the B.E.F near Dunkerque
This boat was used on the shore wich 7 others
small boats on Thursday evening bringing hoops
off the shore and putting chem on board of
the Life boat and transferrig chem to various
N.
crafis lying off. the was working continuouly
ine.
as she was the best boat and the largert, some
y that
of the other boals were slove in and severely dam-
y craft
aged on Friday that it was with greatly
myself
tions to
difficulty to keep them afloat, and some got
over by
m the shore and warhed up and (3104) left no
by one
only with 3 out of the eight. Friday there was
hey had
er the
a narly swell on the a and we put
claimed
too good
live of our crew in the "sunshme" and dropped
he large
send and
the Sunshine" in m the shore with 90
fachons of veering line and pulled chem
nt
and
ch rifle
off to che life boot till we loaded, them cook
Thames.
the soldiers
touch
will go
With une
on record.
Yours Eshanias faithfully,
La Ranns which is about nine miles further round the coast
Owing to the engines failing we had to leave with only a few
and WE proceeded back to Dunkirk W here we took five more load
the shore which we were now able to do owing to the rising
Whilst these operations were being carried out we were bein

Details

DUNKIRK CLAIMS COMMITTEE.
MEMORANDUM for the Ministry of Shipping
re the unsuccessful attempt of the Owner
of M.C. "Wolsey" to assist at the Dunkirk
204
evacuation.
"Wolsey" had been out of commission about seven
months and was lying covered with a tarpaulin at
Burgoines Boat Yard, Hampton Wick, on Tuesday the 28th
May 1940, with about 30 gallons of pool petrol in her
tanks.
On the evening of that day I received,
about 7 o'c. a telephone message from J. Offer who was
in London, to the effect that Lieut. Laycock of the
Admiralty wished my craft to be delivered at Sheerness
as soon as possible after daybreak on the following
day.
Mr. Offer at the outbreak of war had served as one
of the crew of "Wolsey" when I was Section Officer at
Lambeth Pier in the River Emergency Service, and he
agreed to help to deliver the boat to Sheerness. He
arrived at Hampton Wick about 11. o'clock and in the
meantime I had got the engine in running order and the
water tank filled, but had no time to clean out the
filters and carburetters or to attend to other details
which would have been seen to in ordinary circumstances.
We left Teddington Lock about midnight and arrived
at Greenwich Pier about 2 a.m. when the tide turned and
we endeavoured to sleep for about an hour, and then con-
tinued our journey. At Tilbury we received instructions
from the Naval Officer in charge of "Eternal Wave" to
deliver the vessel at Southend Pier, where we proceeded
after taking on Petrol at Gravesend.
About 10.30 a.m., we arrived at Southend Pier and 29/5
Wednutay
were asked to take the vessel to Dunkirk as there were
not sufficient Naval Ratings available. Provisions for
three days and more petrol were taken aboard, and we were
-1-

Details

57
I swung the ship and berthed on the store jetty at the root of
the East Pier and soon the troops started to board carrying badly
wounded men on stretchers.
Shell fire continued; shells falling on either side of the
Pier, one damaging the handrail on the east side abreast of the
ship, the pier is about six feet wide at this point.
Bombs fell at intervals from aircraft flying in the pall of
smoke over the town and fires were observed to start in many places.
At 1001 having on board 650 Officers and men 18 wounded, 4
French and 2 Belgian Officers, the Naval Embarkation Officer decided
to sail me as the shell fire was getting more and more accurate
I could probably have taken 20 or 30 more. The holds were full hut
there was a little space on the forecastle head.
On leaving the Pier a number of shells fell on each side of
the ship, one bursting under the starboard quarter. No damage was
suffered to the ship or troops. The vessel lying ahead appeared
to be damaged by this salvo (Malines).
The voyage back to Dover was uneventful except for a distant
air attack on vessels arriving and a few shells falling over apparently
from our unfriendly battery.
Dover was reached at 1640 after making a detour of some miles
to avoid mines laid the previous evening.
During the passage my hands tended the wounded and provided
tea etc., to the tired but wonderfully cheerful troops, until water
ran out.
I would like to emphasise that the conduct of the whole crew
was splendid throughout under most trying conditions. The engine
room staff kept a constant head of steam and the many difficult
manoeuvres were executed promptly. The Chief Engineer Mr. J.Bamforth
shewed leadership of his men by his example.
The Deck Officers and men embarked the troops rapidly and filled
the ship to capacity and carried stretchers from the quay. The
helmsman Able Seaman S. Walker obeyed every order I gave him and
shewed skill and coolness when entering and leaving the port, when
the rest of the crew had to take shelter. We remained at Dover
under immediate steam for four days but were apparently not again
required.
I am, Sir,
Yours obediently.
(Signed) R.W. Morford.
Master.
When off the No. 3 beach in addition to many other craft sunk
and aground our S.S. "LORINA" was observed, broken backed and aground.
R.W.M.

Details

19
The latter were made as comfortable as possible in the Restaurant and
Saloons. The discipline of the troops was exemplary.
Subjected as usual to attacks from bombing planes but no hits
registered. Returned to Dover on the morning of May 31st.
Proceeded again to Duhkirk at 0030 on June lst. arriving just before
daybreak and berthing at the end berth of the East Mole. Low water and
wrecks made berthing more difficult.
Requested by S.T.O. to remain alongside and permit destroyers to
embark troops over our decks, as our gangways to Jetty were more efficient.
Remained in berth about six hours enabling two destroyers to load.
We then took on board 1856 troops (including about 400 French troops)
By this time it was daylight and the enemy bombers became more active, both
when the ship was alongside and after leaving for Dover at which port we
arrived during the morning.
On the evening of the same day orders were received to proceed to
Dunkirk. Left at 2030.
While leaving Dover Harbour, H.M.S. Worcester collided with us,
holing shell plating and causing damage too serious to permit us to go
to sea.
We returned and anchored in Dover Harbour.
Total numbers carried from Dunkerque duringthis period - 5469.
(Sgd.) G.D. Walker
Master.

Details

105
phone :
BURCOTE BROOK.
Hampden 77
ABINGDON.
97
so
Dear Mr ellamy, 31/8.
Many thanks for the copy of the notes.
I am grateful to you for so kindly looking after
me, and for making my task so easy.
Will you please thank Mr Edwards from me, and apolo-
gize to him for my not staying for the cup of tea he generously
promised ? The work took less time than I had expected, and I
went on to work elsewhere when I had ended.
With many thanks for all your help,
Tours sincerely
John Marepied.
W.J.P1
T
se
Manager,
his
Heinkels
left,
in
the
between
Germans
disembarked blew it to dived pieces. on to However, the berth we which got the back we had Pier just Needs, vacated and practically
in the Downs our for troops. a little On rest 24th. May we were to ordered Dover safely to to and
set day congested. off at noon as per we We got were orders at anchor and a as route in Dover the for Downs harbour on Saturday was so getting go evening. rather anchorage Next
but to a certain buoy. instructions. On nearing Our the route took Dunkirk, us about 4 we miles accordingly off Calais
instructions nearing the buoy I saw it was not the it
certain. saw a On buoy a little further inshore position and steamed I could towards not see the to buoy, make
loose and ordered the helm hard aport. Immediately buoy on the let
on our ship. We were shelled from the shore by single hell guns was and
1.

Details

Steam SQUARE 104
103
Monthorn
necessary
F. H. Keenlyside, Esq.,
was
Ministry of Shipping,
6th September, 1940. 49
Berkeley Square House,
Berkeley Square, W.1.
Sir,
98
Dear Sir,
tter of the 17th ultimo, I
by the Chief Engineer of
Thank you very much for your
th the evacuation of the
letter of the 3rd September, with
1 will see that this vessel
which you were good enough to
enclose particulars of the work done
99
by the "ROYAL EAGLE" in the
roops
evacuation of the B.E.F. from
Dunkirk. As you know, we are anxious
troops including
to have as full details as possible
of this operation and we are very
grateful to you for helping us.
tloads of wounded.
Yours faithfully,
aithfully,
COMPANY LIMITED.
F.H. KEENLYSIDE
This ussed is not away
Une we sent compatulatory
off shore all night.
letter tourt. presumably
few dents in ship but no
because
she
mostly French troops.
ounded arrived some very
commin
ssimed
service
ШК
b/a
nd arrived Sneerness 6 p.m.
p.m. as Evacuation was
.J.Philpott, Esq.
Mn Hypand
of
The General Manager,
The Isle of Man Steam Packet Co., Ltd.,
General Manager's Office,
DOUGLAS.
Yours
IV
the
Germans
in
fact
Heinkels dived on to the berth which we had just vacated and practically
blew it to pieces. However, we got back to Dover safely and
disembarked our troops. On 24th. May we were ordered to go to anchorage
in the Downs for a little rest as Dover harbour was getting rather
25/5
congested. We were at anchor in the Downs on Saturday evening. Next
day at noon we got orders and a route for Dunkirk, so we accordingly
set off as per instructions. Our route took us about 4 miles off Calais
to a certain buoy. On nearing the position I could not see the buoy,
but saw a buoy a little further inshore and steamed towards it to make
certain. On nearing the buoy I saw it was not the buoy on the
instructions and ordered the helm hard aport. Immediately hell was let
loose on our ship. We were shelled from the shore by single guns and
1.
P.T.O

Details

General Steam Navigation Co., Ltd.,
103
n°0
" for Telegrams:
15, TRINITY SQUARE,
ONIC TELEX,"
DNDON.
LONDON, E.C.3.
F. H. Keenlyside, Esq.,
Telephone:
Ministry of Shipping,
ROYAL 3200-7
(23 LINES).
3rd Sept. 19 40
Berkeley Square House,
:ference WIP/LK
Berkeley Square, W.1.
now
OF
one
Dear Sir,
Further to my letter of the 23th ultimo, I
YOU
now enclose copy of a report made by the Chief Engineer of
GALOGE
the "ROYAL EAGLE" in connection with the evacuation of the
B.E.F. from Dunkirk, from which you will see that this vessel
OF
made three trips in all :
99
First Trip - landed 800 to 900 troops
and
Second trip - landed 1800 to 1900 troops including
40 wounded.
Third trip - Picked up three boatloads of wounded.
Yours faithfully,
for THE GENERAL STEAM NAVIGATION COMPANY LIMITED.
up Dunkirk ship. arrived Proceeded at dusk waited off shore all night.
Shelling heavy all night and a few dents in ship but no
one hurt.
French drifter brought off mostly French troops.
Last hour three boat loads of wounded arrived some very
bad cases, Left at daylight and arrived Sneerness 6 p.m.
3rd June but were recalled at 8 p.m. as Evacuation was
finished.
on day.
of
service
The General Manager,
The Isle of Man Steam Packet Co., Ltd.,
General Manager's Office,
DOUGLAS.
aniss
left,
in
Heinkels dived on to the berth which we had just vacated and practically
blew it to pieces. However, we got back to Dover safely and
disembarked our troops. On 24th. May we were ordered to go to anchorage
congested. We were at anchor in the Downs on Saturday evening. Next 25/5
in the Downs for a little rest as Dover harbour was getting rather
day at noon we got orders and a route for Dunkirk, so we accordingly
set off as per instructions. Our route took us about 4 miles off Calais
to a certain buoy. On nearing the position I could not see the buoy,
but saw a buoy a little further inshore and steamed towards it to make
certain. On nearing the buoy I saw it was not the buoy on the
instructions and ordered the helm hard aport. Immediately hell was let
loose on our ship. We were shelled from the shore by single guns and
1.

Details

102
H.M.S. "ROYAL EAGLE"
Statement of Lieut. R. Helyer. Chief Engineer.
100
Dunkirk Evacuation.
Strai ts of Dover May 28th.
Left early May 29th and arrived Le Panne about 9a.m.
Ships A.A. Guns in action all day, heavy bombing during the
day but not hit. Left at dusk and arrived at Margate
Pier at Daylight 30th May. Landed between 800 - 900
troops.
Left Margate 30th and arrived about 1 p.m. Before
arriving Le Panne shelled by Shore Gun Batteries from upper
end of beach, but no damage. Again ships A.A. guns in
Action. bombed during day but not hit. Left at Dusk and
arrived 7.30 a.m. 31st May Sheerness. Machine gunned at
night coming back by Plane but think it was only guide for
M.T. Boat as French Destroyer 3 miles Astern went up.
All troops were taken from beach and landed between
1800 to 1900 about 40 wounded. 011, watered and cleaned
up ship. Proceeded to Ramsgate left on 1st June for
Dunkirk arrived at dusk waited off shore all night.
Shelling heavy all night and a few dents in ship but no
one hurt.
French drifter brought off mostly French troops.
Last hour three boat loads of wounded arrived some very
bad cases, Left at daylight and arrived Sneerness 6 p.m.
3rd June but were recalled at 8 p.m. as Evacuation was
finished.
on that day.
The
General Manager,
The Isle of Man Steam Packet Co., Ltd.,
General Manager's Office,
DOUGLAS.
Yours
anis
the
left, in
blew it to pieces. However, we got back to Dover safely and
Heinkels dived on to the berth which we had just vacated and practically
disembarked our troops. On 24th. May we were ordered to go to anchorage
in the Downs for a little rest as Dover harbour was getting rather
congested. We were at anchor in the Downs on Saturday evening. Next 25/5
day at noon we got orders and a route for Dunkirk, so we accordingly
set off as per instructions. Our route took us about 4 miles off Calais
to a certain buoy. On nearing the position I could not see the buoy,
but saw a buoy a little further inshore and steamed towards it to make
certain. On nearing the buoy I saw it was not the buoy on the
instructions and ordered the helm hard aport. Immediately hell was let
loose on our ship. We were shelled from the shore by single guns and
1.

Details

B
101
The Isle of Man Steam Packet Cor_Limited
101
General Managers Office.
T. M. 6213/40/s. T.A.6.
Douglas
A/DE.
F.N.6213/40/S.T.A.6,
1940.
1st September, 1940.
The Director of Transport,
Ministry of Shipping,
Berke Sir, House,
Berkeley Square,
LO I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter
Dear Sir,
A/DE of the 28th ultimo and to thank you for the reports
of the Masters of your Company's ships which took part
I have received your relating to the
from which the evacuation of the B.E.F. from Dunkirk.
evacuation is required.
I am, Sir,
The reports from the Masters of the
"FENELLA" deal chiefly with the Your obedient The Servant,
Master these of the "LADY OF MANN" includes some details of Pullice.
ships being lost in that operation.
evacuation have had of the the B.E.F. copied from Le in sgd.) B.E Bellamy herewith.
-
of You the "MONA'S QUEEN", one from joined left her
will obser for Director of Sea Transport. who
the the work ship on the 28th. May, and of Captain
on that day.
The
General Manager, material which I forward of service
The Isle of Man Steam Packet Co., Ltd.,
General Manager's Office,
DOUGLAS.
Yours faithfully.
administ
lobert
I
only left, in fact between the Pier Germans
as
the
Heinkels blew dived on to the berth which we had just vacated and practically
it to pieces. However, we got back to Dover safely and
disembarked our troops. On 24th. May we were ordered to go to anchorage
in the Downs for a little rest as Dover harbour was getting rather
congested. We were at anchor in the Downs on Saturday evening. Next 25/5
day at noon we got orders and a route for Dunkirk, so we accordingly
set off as per instructions. Our route took us about 4 miles off Calais
to a certain buoy. On nearing the position I could not see the buoy,
but saw a buoy a little further inshore and steamed towards it to make
certain. On nearing the buoy I saw it was not the buoy on the
instructions and ordered the helm hard aport. Immediately hell was let
loose on our ship. We were shelled from the shore by single guns and
1.
Master.

Details

ALL TRAFFIC CARRIED SUBJECT TO THE CONDITIONS OF CARRIAGE OF THE COMPANY AS EXHIBITED IN THEIR OFFICES AND ON BOARDTHEIR STEAMERS.
B
The Isle ofMan Steam Packet Co Limited.
(INCORPORATED IN THE ISLE OF MAN.)
102
TELEGRAMS
"STEAMERS, DOUGLAS"
TELEPHONE N?
DOUGLAS 1101 (5 LINES)
R.W. CANNELL,
General Manager's Office.
GENERAL MANAGER,
OUR REFERENCE
YOUR REFERENCE
A/DE.
T.M.6213/40/S.T.A.6.
Douglas 28th. August, 1940.
The Director of Sea Transport,
Ministry of Shipping,
Berkeley Square House,
Berkeley Square,
LONDON, W.1.
Jiglio, 11/18/19 30 16 AUGISHD RECEIVED A 11121.
Dear Sir,
I have received your letter of the 22nd. instant,
from which I note that the material relating only to the Dunkirk
evacuation is required.
The reports from the Masters of the "MONA'S QUEEN" and
"FENELLA" deal chiefly with the evacuation from Dunkirk, both
these ships being lost in that operation. The report from the
Master of the "LADY OF MANN" includes some details of the
evacuation of the B.E.F. from Le Havre, Brest and La Pallice.
I have had the reports copied in extenso and enclose same herewith.
You will observe that there are two reports regarding
the work of the "MONA'S QUEEN", one from Captain Duggan, who left
the ship on the 28th. May, and of Captain Holkham, who joined her
on that day.
I trust the material which I forward will be of service
to the Department.
Yours faithfully,
Robannett
please Is
aniss Dans
General Manager.
in
the
Germans
disembarked blew Heinkels it to dived pieces. on to However, the berth we which got the back we had to just Dover vacated and practically
congested. a little rest as Dover harbour was go
in the Downs our for troops. On 24th. May we were ordered safely to to and anchorage
day at We were at anchor in the Downs on Saturday getting rather Next
to per instructions. Our route took us about 4 miles accordingly Calais
set off noon as we got orders and a route for Dunkirk, so we evening.
but a certain buoy. On nearing the position I could not see the off
certain. On nearing the buoy I saw it was not the buoy on the
saw a buoy a little further inshore and steamed towards it to buoy, make
instructions and ordered the helm hard aport. Immediately hell was let
loose on our ship. We were shelled from the shore by single guns and
1.

Details

COPY.
steamer "RUSHEN CASTLE".
2nd. July, 1940.
R. W. Cannell, Esq.,
103
General Manager.
Sir,
In reference to your letter of the 28th. June requesting a
report from me as Master of H.M. Transport "MONA'S QUEEN" when on
her last voyage from Dover to Dunkirk.
I joined the "MONA'S QUEEN" on the 28th. of May. On the
evening of that date, I received orders to leave Dover in the early
morning of the 29th. to carry fresh water to Dunkirk and return with
troops. Everything was uneventful until we reached to within about
half a mile off Dunkirk, when the ship was mined and sank within two
minutes, the survivors being rescued by the destroyer "VANQUISHER".
With reference to the request for names of Officers and personnel
who should be recommended, I can only say that the conduct of all
survivors was exemplary.
not An outstanding example of bravery was witnessed by some of the
survivors. It appears that H. Craine, Chief Cook, showed the
greatest courage and disregard for his own safety when noticing that
Mr. Morgan, the Chief Steward, was unable to get away from the ship
through injuries, he went back and rescued him knowing that the ship
was rapidly sinking; further particulars can be obtained from Mr.
Morgan,
Chief
Steward.
Owing to the
port Another meritotious act was that of 955244, Gunner J. Osborne,
of the 253/64th. Field Regiment R.A., who rescued Mr. R. Gallagher,
the Purser, and swam with him to the warship which was taking
survivors to England. Unfortunately Gunner Osborne's self
sacrificing heroism was unavailing as Mr. Gallagher died on board
the warship before arrival at an English port.
took home, of
Duke I trust that this report will meet your requirements.
Canadian troops and
all day that was off. Then Yours obediently,
of ammunition and embarked the Irish
of E's for Boulogne, It (signed) A. KHAM
cranes
to
load
the
ammunition,
but
willing soldiers we had the landed in Master.
embarked BE many troops as we
British,
RE the Germans
only left, in fact
Heinkels dived on to the berth which we had just vacated and practically
blew it to pieces. However, we got back to Dover safely and
disembarked our troops. On 24th. May we were ordered to go to anchorage
in the Downs for a little rest as Dover harbour was getting rather
congested. We were at anchor in the Downs on Saturday evening. Next
day at noon we got orders and a route for Dunkirk, so we accordingly
set off as per instructions. Our route took us about 4 miles off Calais
to a certain buoy. On nearing the position I could not see the buoy,
but saw a buoy a little further inshore and steamed towards it to make
certain. On nearing the buoy I saw it was not the buoy on the
instructions and ordered the helm hard aport. Immediately hell was let
loose on our ship. We were shelled from the shore by single guns and
1.

Details

1640.
COPY.
H.M.T. "BEN-MY-CHREE",
c/o G.P.O., LONDON.
3608M Istema
Mr. R. W. Cannell,
3rd. July, 1940.
General Manager.
104
Dear Sir,
In
Taby
JIOGY
In answer to your letter, herewith are details of the part
played by the "MONA'S QUEEN" in the recent operations off the Dutch,
I
SEAL
Belgian and French coasts. The facts and circumstances are very plainly
remembered by me, although I may not be quite certain as to the exact
dates, I think I won't be very far off the mark.
TOTAL
Firstly, our experiences started when we left Dover for
List
Rotterdam on the 14th. May intending to evacuate Dutch troops etc.
Unfortunately we did not succeed in that because when we arrived at the
mouth of the River Maas, the place was a raging inferno, even the river
was afire with oil from destroyed tanks. We did our best but were
beaten back. German bombers were overhead and tried to get us, but did
not succeed as we HERE were very often enveloped in dense and choking
smoke. Finally we were ordered to return to Dover and arrived there on
the evening of the 15th. May. We left Dover again that night for Ostend
and arrived off Ostend following morning, the authorities there would
not let us in and we had to anchor. Whilst laying at anchoré we were
attacked twice with bombers, but with our Lewis guns and the guns of a
small Dutch vessel we beat them off. We entered Ostend about noon in
spite of the fact that magnetic mines had been dropped in the harbour.
They had swept up some of them, not all. In Ostend we embarked
British, Dutch, French and Belgian refugees, men, women and children.
We left Ostend about 5-30 p.m. (16th) and arrived Folkestone at 10 p.m.
Owing to the trouble with passports etc. we did not get away from that
port until noon (17th.) when we were ordered to Southampton. When we
arrived at Netley Anchorage, we got orders to fill up with fuel and water
and return to Ostend and to call at Dover for stores, arriving in Dover
on the 18th. The Ostend trip was cancelled as the Germans had already
got there. Then on the 19th. we went to Boulogne and as far as I can
remember that was the night that G.H.Q. at Boulogne was bombed and we
took home, amongst others, the Duke of Gloucester and his staff. The
Duke was wounded. Arrived back at Dover on the 20th. We then loaded
Canadian troops and stores for Dunkirk, but after they had been aboard
all day that sail was off. Then we loaded about 400 tons of all kinds
of ammunition and embarked the Irish and Welsh Guards, also a demolition
squad of R.E's for Boulogne. It took fourteen hours at Dover, with
cranes to load the ammunition, but with the work of my crew and a few
willing soldiers we had the stuff landed in three hours. Then we
embarked as many troops as we could carry (amongst them there were many
wounded). Units from all Allies, British, French, etc., also women and
children and we left Boulogne just as the Germans were coming in. We
had only left, in fact were between the Pier Heads, when a squadron of
Heinkels dived on to the berth which we had just vacated and practically
blew it to pieces. However, we got back to Dover safely and
disembarked our troops. On 24th. May we were ordered to go to anchorage
in the Downs for a little rest as Dover harbour was getting rather
congested. We were at anchor in the Downs on Saturday evening. Next
day at noon we got orders and a route for Dunkirk, so we accordingly
set off as per instructions. Our route took us about 4 miles off Calais
to a certain buoy. On nearing the position I could not see the buoy,
but saw a buoy a little further inshore and steamed towards it to make
certain. On nearing the buoy I saw it was not the buoy on the
instructions and ordered the helm hard aport. Immediately hell was let
loose on our ship. We were shelled from the shore by single guns and
1.

Details

RE
to
OF SOX THE OTHER to do
COPY.
9, Berkeley Street,
DOUGLAS.
108
Date 1991 need to ed Idsaso FIO D.S.D
R. W. Cannell, Esq.,
General Manager,
I.O.M.S.P.Co.Ltd.
Dear Sir,
The enclosed letter is a short account of our
experiences in the "LADY OF MANN".
xemseds my gind on bas as
to
I have only put in when we were actually attacked,
without any of the side shows, but there are two incidents I have
omitted. The first was on the 31st. May at Dunkirk. Our gunner
v.sal
got the credit for shooting down a German plane and was
congratulated by French Officers on the spot.
uso
20
second was when we were attacked off La Pallice.
The The were machine gunning us, when suddenly killed him. one stopped.
I am planes sure that we disabled the gunner, or
the Pier the
were dropping the other Yours truly,
Shells were dropping
the starboard bow (signed) Thos. C. WOODS.
marching holed by down flying Master. lifeboats
over five hours shell fire. All the time from of us on the
wharf from the were killed thirty yards Several ahead soldiers
disembarking about 5 p.a. for we Folkestone, were under berthing best and shell attack. entering We Dunkirk aniled
arriving about all 5 the at widnight and
where the were disembarked. for Dover,
Saturday, 1st. June.
destroyers arrived off the port Left about Dover 11 p.m. Saturday and got evening orders for Dunkirk,
wraing Left to for whit orders and as no orders came by from 3 e.m. two Sunday
Mairalty. Dever obeying strict instructions from the
2nd. June.
11-45 instructed by la charge to whit
Left Dover 8-30 P.O., off Dunkirs Pier
as by off
2
that came OII in boats.
the harvour, we only had Dover, a few
Monday, 3rd. June. the coast. The Poles
Left Dover 6-30 p.m. of arrived at Dunkirk 10
10-15 p.m. went inside the Piers. Could not get a berth or anyone p.m.
to take ropes, kept manoeuvring inside the Harbour until 12-30 a.m.
4th. June, when we got made fast. Embarked about 2000 troops and
had to leave at 1-45 a.m. as water was ebbing. I was afraid ship
would ground. Had intermittent dense fog in the passage back
arriving at Dover about 6 a.m. and disembarked troops. 8 p.m. left
Dover for Plymouth arriving in Plymouth on the 5th. June. Left
Plymouth Friday June. evening 7th. June, arrived Southampton 8th. June.
1.
P.T.O

Details

E.R.O. 6986
COPY.
9, Berkeley Street,
eJI
DOUGLAS: ISLE OF MAN.
R. W. Cannell, Esq.
June
for
Havre.
Arrived
a
Cape
General Manager, pood
I.O. M. Steam Packet Co.Ltd.
10.1
DOUGLAS.
they
them.
12-30
bomber
,Tis
Dear Sir, four French
they hit they
one
You asked me to write a short account of our experiences
in the "LADY OF MANN" of the evacuation of the various ports.
the of the
Friday, 31st. May.
by
world
We arrived at Dunkirk about 11-30 a.m. and had
to wait outside the pier heads for orders to enter which we got
to
303
about 1-30 p.m. All the time we were waiting there were continuous
COM
waves of German planes coming over 40 at a time. The anti-aircraft
barrage from all the ships about and our fighter planes going up
and intercepting them, kept them from being able to drop any bombs
close to the shipping. About 1-30 p.m. we got a berth at the pier
and commenced embarking French casualties from the French hospital.
We took 1500 casualties on board, of which 300 were strethher cases,
also 500 other French troops and 1000 British. All the time we
were at the Pier the German planes were coming over, their bombs
were dropping the other side of the Pier about 40 yards from us.
Shells were dropping alongside us, and we had seven holes made in
the starboard bow close to the water line, also three lifeboats
holed by flying shrapnel from the shells. Several soldiers
marching down were killed about thirty yards ahead of us on the
wharf from the shell fire. All the time from entering Dunkirk for
over five hours we were under bomb and shell attack. We sailed
about 5 p.m. for Folkestone, berthing there at midnight and
disembarking all the troops, leaving at 4-30 a.m. for Dover,
arriving about 6 a.m. where the casualties were disembarked.
they
came
Several
Saturday, 1st. June. to move the
the Left Dover Saturday evening for Dunkirk,
arrived off the port about 11 m. and got orders from two
destroyers to wait orders and as no orders came by 3 a.m. Sunday
morning left for Dover obeying strict instructions from the
Admiralty.
Sunday, 2nd. June. PALLICE.
Left Dover 8-30 p.m., arrived off Dunkirk Pier
heads at 11-45 p.m., instructed by Admiral in charge to wait off
Pier heads, as there was no room inside, stood by within hailing
distance until 2 a.m. when Admiral ordered me to leave for Dover,
as time would not allow to go inside the Harbour, we only had a few
French soldiers that came off in boats.
Monday, 3rd. June.
Left Dover 6-30 p.m. arrived at Dunkirk 10 p.m.
10-15 p.m. went inside the Piers. Could not get a berth or anyone
to take ropes, kept manoeuvring inside the Harbour until 12-30 a.m.
4th. June, when we got made fast. Embarked about 2000 troops and
had to leave at 1-45 a.m. as water was ebbing. I was afraid ship
would ground. Had intermittent dense fog in the passage back
arriving at Dover about 6 a.m. and disembarked troops. 8 p.m. left
Dover for Plymouth arriving in Plymouth on the 5th. June. Left
Plymouth Friday evening 7th. June, arrived Southampton 8th. June.
1.
P.T.O

Details

E.R.O. 6986
- 2 -
HAVRE.
110
Left Southampton 4-30 p.m. 8th. June for Havre. Arrived off
Cape "La Havre" about 10 p.m. and anchored, nothing unusual happened
*XIS
until 11 a.m. 9th. June. We were now about fifteen ships at anchor,
when three German dive bomber planes came over, they attacked two
AIM
French ships and just missed them. 12-30 p.m. six dive bomber
9dd
planes came and attacked us and four other ships. Three French
ni
which they hit and set on fire and an English ship which they also
hit, the bomb just missed us by 20 ft. We were now called inside
the boom defence at 2 p.m. Six more planes came over and attacked
tism Juods
a. French battleship and us, a salvo of bombs fell between the
battleship add the "VIKING", missing them by about fifty feet and
29VSW
another missed us by about 20 feet. 3-30 p.m. another attack was
TIBD
made on us, by the bombs missing us by about 20 ft. Bombers came
over several times afterwards but did not attack us. At midnight
bas
I was ordered into the port, a drizzling rain at the time,
2/3
visibility poor, no pilot or light buoys, but we got in without any
mishap. When getting to the Pier there was another air raid and I
had to stand off till it was over as everyone had taken shelter, no
one left to take our ropes. 1-45 a.m. Monday 3rd. June, we made
fast at the pier, troops came dribbling on board till 6 a.m. We
had about 2000 British troops on board. We sailed for Cherbourg
arriving about 10 a.m. and disembarked the troops and waited orders.
Later got orders to embark the same troops and we sailed with them
at 6 p.m. for Southampton, arriving inside the boom defence about
11 p.m.
BREST.
Saturday, 8th. June.
4 a.m. Left Southampton for Brest, arriving
about 4 p.m. Went into Dock at 6 p.m. and commenced embarking troops
as they came along. Several air raids during the evening. At
midnight was told not to move the ship under any consideration as
the Harbour and Channels outside had been mined.
Sunday. All day troops kept coming on board. We sailed at
5 p.m. Sunday with not less than about 4000 soldiers and arrived at
Plymouth about 4 a.m. Monday 10th. June and disembarked.
LA PALLICE.
Midnight, Monday 10th. June.
Left Plymouth for La Pallice, arrived and
anchored off La Pallice about 7 p.m. on Tuesday 11th. June, awaiting
orders. 3 p.m. Thursday 13th. June, destroyer "МАСКАҮ" came along-
side and put a few refugees on board us and told us to standby to go
into Port as he had heard rumours there were some Russians Poles
making their way to the coast. The "MACKAY" left us at 4-15 p.m.
4-30 p.m. two German bombers came out of a dense smoke bank at us and
opened fire with their machine guns. One passed on each side of us,
dropping bombs which burst not more than 15 ft. from the ship. The
vibration was terrific. One man was hit by shrapnel and put in
hospital on arrival at Plymouth. We were now ordered to heave up
anchor and proceed to Plymouth. After getting under way, we found
our compasses to have about 14°E deviation on Westerly courses and
14° W deviation on Easterly courses and very irregular. We were
escorted by the destroyer to Plymouth where we arrived about 6 p.m.
on Friday 14th. June.
(signed) Thos. C. Woods.
Master.
1.
P.T.O

Details

67
Extracts from letter from the Managing Director of the
NEW MEDWAY STEAM PACKET CO. LTD.
151
14th August, 1940
The "QUEEN OF THANET" which was stationed at Grantnam in
the Firtn-of-Forth and Flotilla Leader of Minesw eepers received
instructions on Thursday, during the evacuation to proceed to
Dunkirk. On arrival there, this vessel with many others pro-
ceeded to take in Troops off the beach under terrific bombing
and shell-fire from the Germans; in spite of this she took in
several hundreds of Troops and proceeded to Margate Jetty where
they were disembarked. Arrangements were then made for her
to take in oil fuel and proceed again to Dunkirk, as soon as
possible; she arrived over the following evening, and again took
on board several hundred more Troops and many wounded, and again
proceeded to Margate Jetty, disembarked the Troops, and after tak-
ing in Stores and water proceeded again for Dunkirk. When more
than halfway across the Channel they noticed a Steamer which
had evidently been bombed and loaded with 3,000 Troops was in
difficulties and seriously damaged; on arriving close to the
vessel she proved to bettieLondon North Eastern Mail Steamer,
"PRAGUE".
A destroyer was alongside transferring Troops from dis-
abled vessel, numbering 500. A wireless message was then
received by the "QUEEN OF THANET" asking him to call alongside
also, and take off the Troops. When within hamling distance,
the Commanding Officer of the "QUEEN OF THANET", Lieutenant
Commander Hallivell, R.N.V.R., asked 'How many Troops were left
on board' and the reply came, '2000. Commander Hallivell re-
plied, "I will take the lot". These were all safely embarked
including the few wounded, and again the vessel left for Margate
Jetty; this was on Sunday, May.
In the meantime the "PRAGUE" having been lighted was able
I
with precaution to proceed under her own steam to Dover on Sunday
I
night. "QUEEN OF THANET" again proceeded to Dunkirk, and
o
early Monday morning cleaned up the beach and brought over a
t
few Troops including 47 wounded. The total number of Troops
W
brought over by the "QUEEN OF THANET" was 4,000 plus wounded.
d
Lieutenant Commander Hallivell has since been promoted Commander
o
"MEDWAY QUEEN" This vessel I understand made three or four
trips to Dunkirk and each time brought over her full complement
pl
of about 800 passengers. I am endeavouring to get in touch
with the Commanding Officer of the "MEDWAY QUEEN", but each
al
occasion she was lying so far from the pier that I was unable to
De
jo
of
th
I see immediately we were hove up our anchor and kept the
he
twisting as I could and turning to likely clear to get run down whilst the Tug underweigh
were rowing as could see our crew of the barge and the in towards the
a bit, I the bombs. I paddled destroyers shore were
and crew of barge off in their boat towards us. I picked soldier stevedores
e
t
next wave of bombers "DUCHESS" were overhead. that had anchored in the Roads, them up, and also then boat the
(Continued)

Details

67
Extracts from letter from the Managing Director of the
NEW MEDWAY STEAM PACKET CO. LTD.
151
14th August, 1940
The "QUEEN OF THANET" which was stationed at Grantnam in
the Firth-of-Forth and Flotilla Leader of Minesw eepers received
instructions on Thursday, during the evacuation to proceed to
Dunkirk. On arrival there, this vessel with many others pro-
ceeded to take in Troops off the beach under terrific bombing
and shell-fire from the Germans; in spite of this she took in
several hundreds of Troops and proceeded to Margate Jetty Where
they were disembarked. Arrangements were then made for her
to take in oil fuel and proceed again to Dunkirk, as soon as
possible; she arrived over the following evening, and again took
on board several hundred more Troops and many wounded, and again
proceeded to Margate Jetty, disembarked the Troops, and after tak-
ing in Stores and water proceeded again for Dunkirk. When more
than halfway across the Channel they noticed a Steamer which
had evidently been bombed and loaded with 3,000 Troops was in
difficulties and seriously damaged; on arriving close to the
vessel "PRAGUE". she proved to be the London North Eastern Mail Steamer,
A destroyer was alongside transferring Troops from dis-
abled vessel, numbering 500. A wireless message was then
received by the "QUEEN OF THANET" asking him to call alongside
also, and take off the Troops. When within hamling distance,
the Commanding Officer of the "QUEEN OF THANET", Lieutenant
Commander Hallivell, R.N.V.R., asked 'How many Troops were left
on board' and the reply came, '2000. Commander Hallivell re-
plied, "I will take the lot". These were all safely embarked
including the few wounded, and again the vessel left for Margate
Jetty; this was on Sunday, May.
In In the meantime the "PRAGUE" having been lighted was able
I
with precaution to proceed under her own steam to Dover on Sunday
I
night. "QUEEN OF THANET" again proceeded to Dunkirk, and
o
early Monday morning cleaned up the beach and brought over a
t
few Troops including 47 wounded. The total number of Troops
W
brought over by the "QUEEN OF THANET" was 4,000 plus wounded.
a
Lieutenant Commander Hallivell has since been promoted Commander
o
"MEDWAY QUEEN" This vessel I understand made three or four
trips to Dunkirk and each time brought over her full complement
pl
of about 800 passengers. I am endeavouring to get in touch
with the Commanding Officer of the "MEDWAY QUEEN", but each
al
occasion she was lying so far from the pier that I was unable to
De
jo
of
th
I
as
I
see immediately we were likely hove up to our anchor and kept the Tug
he
could
a twisting bit, and I turning to clear the get bombs. run down I whilst the destroyers underweigh were
were and rowing as off could in see their our boat crew towards of the barge and paddled the soldier in towards stevedores the shore
rt
e
next crew wave of of barge bombers "DUCHESS" were overhead. that had anchored us. I picked in the Roads, them up,also and then boat the
t
(Continued)

Details

58
M.V. "SCOTTISH CO-OPERATOR".
EVACUATION OF B.E.F. FROM DUNKIRK.
165
Regarding the part taken by the above vessel in the
evacuation of Dunkirk, there is very little to tell.
When these operations were begun we were loading
ammunition in Newhaven, Sussex and this was completed on the
evening of Tuesday 28th May. Orders were then received that
this ship was required for other duties and the cargo just
loaded was to be discharged. Work to this end was begun on
the morning of Wednesday 29th May and completed the same day,
after which we shifted and bunkered to full capacity.
On Thursday 30th May at 5 a.m., we sailed from Newhaven
with instructions to proceed to Dover for orders. On arrival at
Dover, about noon, I spoke to Examination Vessel and was informed
that we were going to Dunkirk to embark troops and that we were to
anchor and await further orders. At about 5 p.m. we were ordered
into South Downs where we were to close the Examination Vessel
which would provide us with sailing orders and routing instructions.
On receiving these routing instructions I asked the
Examination Officer where the troops were to be embarked, and
whether I had to enter the port of Dunkirk and I was told that
I would receive further instructions from British Naval Craft
when I arrived off Dunkirk. At about 8 p.m. we sailed from
the Downs and at about 11 p.m. arrived off Dunkirk Piers where
several vessels were patrolling but none of these was able to
give me any information as they all appeared to be in the same
position as ourselves. One of them informed me, however, that
there were sunken craft in the entrance and therefore it would
not be safe to attempt entering during the hours of darkness so
I decided to keep on the move, at slow speed, until daylight.
There were several enemy aircraft over during the night which
were engaged by our own or Allied Fighters, and driven off.
By 5.30 a.m. on Friday 31st, it was daylight and I
decided to proceed into harbour and we moored alongside break-
water at 6.30 a.m. The Germans, who were about five miles to
the westward of Dunkirk, had the range of the breakwater and were
keeping it under almost continuous shell fire, but fortunately
neither the ship nor any member of the crew was hit, although
overhead. shells were falling all around and occasional shrapnel bursting
The embarkation began immediately on arrival and after
we had embarked 50 stretcher cases, 150 walking wounded and about
350 able men, we were about to sail when just then an hospital
ship came alongside and it was decided to transfer all stretcher
cases and walking wounded from our ship to the Hospital ship.
This was completed in about forty minutes and I then had to wait
and fill up again with able men. At 10.30 a.m. we sailed
with 550 men on board, including seven stretcher cases.
I had orders to discharge these men at Ramsgate but on
arrival there I found there was not sufficient water at the pier
for my ship and I had to go to Margate where we arrived at 4 p.m.
After discharging troops we were about to leave again for Dunkirk
but discovered that our degaussing cable was cut and owing to
this I was ordered to anchor and await orders, which I did.
After the evacuation was completed I was sent to Sheerness to
have degaussing wire repaired, after which I was ordered back
to Newhaven where we arrived on Saturday 8th June, 1940.
(Signed) T. S. ROBERTSON, Master.
o0o

Details

or
FROM STATES STATES
COPY.
50
ORES 10
GREAT WESTERN RAILWAY.
T10 bothe TUO is DAS
in
Chief Docks Manager's Dept.
of Marine Section,
and FISHGUARD HARBOUR.
Dist
14th June, 1940.
Harbour entrance,
became
CDM.C/30077/S.
B.25/272.
About
to
Dear Sir,
Harbour, S.S. "ST. ANDREW".
EVACUATION OF TROOPS FROM FLANDERS.
Harbour
It is reported to me that on Monday, the 20 May, at
3.0a.m. the S.S. ANDREW" left Netley for Boulogne, which
was reached without incident at 11.0a.m.; and almost as soon
as the ship was moored the first air raid warnings were sounded,
and continued at intervals throughout the day. Although During
the early raids no enemy planes actually reached the docks, the
crew were kept in readiness to deal with outbreaks of fire, etc.,
as required by A.R.P. Regulations; also to shift ship as
required by the S.T.O.
to
At 10.0p.m. the first of the night raids commenced
incendiary and explosive bombs were dropped on the town,quays,
and harbour, while much shrapnel was falling from the anti-
aircraft fire.
on Tuesday, the 21st May, at 6.0a.m. wounded from the
Base Hospitals were embarked, and at 8.0a.m. the vessel left
for Southampton, which was reached, without incident, at 4.30p.m.
The wounded were absonce disembarked, and the Ship
se
ciled, stored and watered and placed by the S.T.O. on one hour's
g
notice. At 6.0p.m. orders were received to sail at 8.0p.m.
for Cherbourg.
on Wednesday, the 22 May, shortly after daybbeak
Cherbourg was reached, but owing to lack of quay space the vessel
was put to anchor until about 4.p.m. at which time she
proceeded to berth at the Quay Francais.
In the early evening patients were embarked, this
being completed about 10.0p.m. when orders were received to
sail about 5.0a.m. on the 23rd.
On Thursday, the 23 May, at 3.0a.m. air raid warnings
were sounded, and the S.T.O. appeared, saying that the quay would
n-
be the centre of objective, and that the ship was to leave as soon
wed
as possible. All was in readiness, and at 3.30a.m. this order
g the
was executed - the vessel sailing for Southampton.
id
1 of
This Port was reached about noon, patients were at
scort
once disembarked, and the ship oiled and watered, and then placed
the
on one hour's notice. At 6.0p.m. orders were received to sail
raft
at 7.0p.m., and report to the Vice Admiral, Dover.
On Friday, the 24 May, the vessel arrived off Dover,
and was ordered by the Examination Vessel to proceed to the Downs
and anchor until daylight.
These were reached, and at 3.0a.m. enemy planes
passed over, dropping bombs so close to the ship that we felt the

Details

STATE UNITED
G.W.R.
- 4 -
180
O.W.Mly Docks Manager's
that it would have been impossible to load even had the occupants
of the ambulances been alive. Again the ves el shifted to another
.0. 908,
part of the Harbour. This also was done during 8. heavy raid.
CIM.C/3077/3.
In the new borth, impromptu gangways were rigged by the
crew from planks, or any handy material which could be produced
BOOKS
from ship or store.
B.23/272.
2800
There again all hands assisted in carrying the stretchers,
gas
and carry was a. long one, and made more difficult by the large
091
number of Troops that were passing along to embark on other vessels;
and by bombs and shrapnel which were still falling.
Dear Sir, While this was in progress the tide was falling and the
daylight going. This was important, as the ship would have been in
danger of grounding or hitting submerged wreckage close under her
stern when leaving. On these grounds the S.T.O. decided it would be
better for the ANDREW" to leave, and instructed the "STDAVID",
by morse, where to berth, in order that she may embark the remainder
of the wounded and sailvat daylight. By this time the enemy was on
the outskirts of the town and was bombarding the quay with shore
batteries, but owing to large fires, clouds of dense smoke, and the
confusion of shipping on the Pier Heads, it was impossible to say if
the message was properly received.
On her way out, when passing along the Grawe-
lines sho Navigat on the homeward passage was both difficult,
and dangerous, as there were no aids to navigation, and the risk of
over-running the hundreds of small craft, heavily laden with Troops,
and which carried ordights, was very great. out of the Channel
to avoid gan fure. Later on, air craft (apparently French)
escorted During these fourteen days, very little rest was had by
any of the crew - double look-outs were kept, work as stated was done
in the French Ports, and while atusea it yas too dangerous to allow
the men to use the forecastles; but all carried on with 8. good
will.
The next morning she proceeded to the Downs, and the
day after It is evident from the foregoing that the fficers and
men of sour ST. ANDREW" were exposed to great danger, and it was only
g
due to their untiring devotion to duty that thousands of wounded
were hurriedly evacuated from France, who otherwise would have been
left on the piers to die. sok or the usual aids to navigation and
the fact that many vessels had been sunk in the fair-ways since
her last leaving that Port. At 8.00/0100k that evening she
entered Dünkirk, where Yours faithfully, morning.
Duting the whole (SGD.) J.D. REED. town, quays, etc.
were subjected to terrific bombardment by air and Land, and It
became necessary, owing to the laok of for the
reamen, Fireman, Stewards etc. to load the wounded themselves.
I hope to be able to report on the Item DAVID" in the course on
of ca few daysing the wounded and placing they in the nots etc.
to
wed
This work was exceedingly difficult, as the whole area
1g the
was in a bad condition, and there was not even any gangways available
nd
for passing the stretcher cases on board, However, the Ingineers
n of
whole time of the embarkation.
constructed & wide and useful gangway, which was used during the
scor
the
W.J. THOMAS, ESQ.,
craft
CARDIFF.

Details

ons
at
G.W.R.
49
20113
STATE
When G.W.Rly Docks Manager's Dep
to Newhaven via Dover Marine Section,
Fishguard Harbour.
SEAL
were
CDM.C/3077/S.
was 20th 181
June
1940.
On the B.25/272.
that was from
Dris
sts. 'St. David".
loss of
EVACUATION OF TROOPS FROM FLANDERS.
Dear Sir, and in
the
It has been reported to me that the "st. David"
under the command of Captain Joy on the 24th May was ordered
to Dunkirk, via Dover, to evacuate wounded from thatarea.
She arrived at that Port on the morning of the
25th and lay alongside receiving wounded until that evening,
During the whole of the time the town and quays were being
subjected to severe bombing.
On her way out, when passing along the Grave-
lines shore, she came under heavy gun fire, and one large calibre
shell fell within less than the Ship's length ahead of her.
at
The vessel was then manoeuvred out of the Channel
to avoid gun fure. Later on, air craft (apparently French)
escorted her until she was clear of danger.
About midnight she arrived at Newhaven, where all here
wounded were landed.
to
The next morning she proceeded to the Downs, and the
day after, the 28th May, received orders to proceed to Dunkirk
once again to evacuate more wounded.
difficult owing to the lack of the usual aids to navigation and
The weather was very misty, and navigation made very
the fact that many vessels had been sunk in the fair-ways since
her last leaving that Port. At 8.00'clock that evening she
entered Dünkirk, where she remaired until the next morning.
were subjected to terrific bombardment by air and land, and it
During the whole of the night, the town, quays, etc.
became necessary, owing to the lack of R.A.M.C. ashore, for the
board receiving the wounded and placing them in the cots etc.
carrying them down the quay as required, with the Medical Staff on
geamen, Firemen, Stewards etc. to load the wounded themselves,
we
This work was exceedingly difficult, as the whole
1g
was for in a bad condition, and there was not even any gangways available area
nd
constructed passing the stretcher cases on board, However, the Engineers
n e
whole a wide and useful gangway, which was used during the
SC
time of the embarkation.
et

Details

47
13th August, 1940.
Extract from letter dated 31st May from Station Master,
Kingswear.
185
Gentlements
S.S. "The Mew".
regeipt
Further to your telephone conversation last evening, I
beg to submit the following fuller details.
At about 6.45 p.m. I received a personal telephone call
from the N.O.i/c Dartmouth, Capt. L. Cunliffe, stating that
the Admiralty wished "The Mew" to proceed to Dover. As the
works would be of hazardous nature, it would be necessary for
the crew to volunteer for the job. I immediately got in touch
with the Master and we interviewed the various members of the
crew available and we only had one refusal. We then visited
the N.O.i/c and informed him that we had a volunteer crew and
he thereupon asked for the vessel to sail at Midnight as it
was wanted at Dover by Midnight Friday. On consulting the Chief
Engineer it was found that Coal would have to be bunkered and
Oil obtained so that a sailing at 4.0.a.m. could be arranged,
but that he estimated it would take 38/40 hours to reach Dover
owing to having to clean fires enroute. I informed Capt. Cunliffe
that I did not anticipate the boat could arrive there before 8.0.pm.
Saturday and he accpeted this and instructed me to send the boat
and as we had no coal in our bin, he arranged with the Dartmouth
Coaling Co. to supply 10 tons of coal for bunkers, as the quantity
on board was only sufficient to take the boat to Dover. In order
that a sufficient supply of oil could be taken I obtained from the
River Dart Steamboat Co. 20 gallons of lubricating oil and 5
gallons of paraffin. I obtained provisions considered necessary
and to provide freshwater, I put a Traffic Department rotary pump
se
aboard. This met with the approval of the Crew.
g
The crew who volunteered and have gone with the boat are:-
T.J. Palmer.
Master.
Deckhand.
G.G.Challicomb
as Mate.
W.L.Pink.
Chief Engineer.
Fireman.
F.Coombes.
as Engineer
R.Gill.
Fireman
Nighwatchman
S.R.Legg
as Fireman
Supny
S.G.Vercoe
as Deckhand.
These men readily volunteered for the task and they
greatly apprefiated your kind message. They were in good heart
and said they would do their best. The vessel left at 6.0.am.
wed
today in company with a Motor boat belonging to the River Dart
g the
Steamboat Co. The necessary instructions and route were obtained
and
from the N.O.i/c and the Master has to report to the N.O.i/c Dover
an of
on arrival for instructions".
escort
ff the
rcraft

Details

early
at beachearricades always we Bray appeared part to know of to the when have as of day, far tanks, this no out.townrds.evening fighter patrevening there the enemy were seemed times when
sh
tide which and it was came La plank Panne. pier of venthes, footway Wi as lorries, the handrail so water etc., R.E. mark were did
westward. As the afternoon wore a the abandoned the enemy's hit and saw "VI bu
and "CLAN
the to - get or outer twor-boats that men alongside. At could out walk ong out the to
brunt boats many the late ships boats his on grass staff in embarked a get to
of the evening a number of wind powe cl
in most like closely to thele THE in these or three - would states In bar this have of
the evening. the C. tide England MA/SB.
Friday, to 1,200 May men. 31. was in the region of 5-6 time hours to water load - line power that 18, for except 1,000 from the
Saturday
June 1 under very was as
There
with During the bet
encourage high the enough boats and sea dry the broached for twelve to at northerly high water work breeze most and a heavy
and the La Dunkirk. were good general
that west towards there the direction of numbers of enem
in holding Dunkink therolding Dunkirk as it the tonly real hoperds the the hours. We all that and were Many left of
be by The off from not them. The more rate than and getting the a fraction a beaches was & The beaches was & beache armies evacuation on Dunkirk, so from slow
to of and close in was possible lay to
At TOTAL offing, on Ke
<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<< THE
when patrols little there trouble were sky entirely was during clear, adequate the but earlier despite part this of the the enemy aircraft could
part staff much of his transferred own were way again and to many some bombs gaps until were during the which late the day. afternoon Our and fighter evening, gave
87's though was skipjack Keith All an
It close
of The this bad weather and other H.M.S. days in "KEITH" small off craft dropped. Bray. up and He At enemy spent 0645, had a R.A. large things and
attack on on hit
the on most the beaches of the almost small craft and onshore near wind, coupled with down the stranding coast.
these time after At the 0805 second a further or third The strong ship salvo imme was diatelya moving at boiler a hi fre qu
off day, the and it became tovident that toyal evident that there been was slowed the no hope greater down the of the part work of
THE sar
Bray. shelled About We from proceeded noon the "HEBE" eastwards at La and Panne were reported originally that they planned. were bringing
side, then. M.T.B.
noon trouble. to try An to locate up the to shore La Panne in forced "KEITH" to withdraw towards being
eastward spotting work. of La enemy Panne A observation and may have balloon battery been was which up was a early few causing in the the
after-
<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<< <<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<< with w s
1430 down off by aircraft La Panne but signal 1t was was still made there asking able for to this do some miles useful to
the
<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<< 10-15 attack
number and at of the same time we a came tremendous under fire aerial from in a the hidden evering. shore to be At shot about
executed. frequent escorting STATE THE on broke while overhead. they engaged Our a the
fighters battle in which battery, large
type the most her the hit went off <<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<< the to from atta B
"KEITH" was bombed ships at 1500, and beaches without through. were success. mostly The ill
and
-3-
- 2 -

Details

early
part
of
we
the
appeared
to
day,
but
towards
beaches always Barricades to know when have of tanks, this no fighter was the patrols, case. evening and there the enemy were seemed times when
the 4
westward. a
at Bray and and La out plank Panne. as far as At lorries, the Bray low the water etc., R.E. mark S were did thrown the
causing the brunt wre
the tide which it came that
boat
top approach in connection, most of high water. a was like closcly to thew the to isloping, - in get or these twotor-boats beach operations. or end. three men At alongside. of a distinct - would states The In this have to of
man
ri
Friday, to the 1,200 beaches men. was in the region of 5-6 time hours to load - power the that testroyer that destroyer boats to 1,000 from the bar
May 31.
as the thenelding Dunkirk therolding Dunkirk encourage high the enough it boats and There sea dry the broached was inshore for a twelve fresh the to to to only at make northerly move hours. high real boat westwards water work We breeze did about most and all this 0830, difficult. that morning, and was were possible and Many left a of heavy
be The off from not them. The more rate than of and a flow fraction getting at the as of beaches many the men evacuation was off so from slow
by to the end, hope of a complete close in on Dunkirk, lay to
when patrols little there wers tirely trouble sky was during clear, the but earlier despite part this of the enemy aircraft armies could
part staff much transferred his again and to many adequate some bombs gaps until were during the which late the the day. afternoon Our and fighter evening, gave
of The bad other H.M.S. days in "KEITH" small off craft dropped. Bray. He At enemy spent 0645, had a R.A. things and
off the on most the day, beaches of the weather small craft and onshore near wind, coupled up and with down the the stranding coast. large
noon Bray. trouble. shelled the About to An noon to locate the La La and Panne Panne had were been reported forced in originally was to that slowed the withdraw no they down were the work
eastward of enemy "KEITH" early in towards being after-
executed. number frequent. escorting and fighters spotting at off the aircraft La were work. <<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<< aircraft same Panne La Panne time but A we it bombed was was ships made at 1500, and beaches broke able in was which for the to up they engaged the were was this evering. do a few some causing mostly to miles be useful the a battery, At shot the large to about the
without
ill
success.
- 2 -
ate the
ny observ
Panne and

Details

bombed
(
t
b
however no single After and bomb and sunk a which bomberch the tug time. and levelys were
the to ap: in be be cc t. Dunkirk. Night of embarked Saturday but. At - Sunday in Dunkirk June T.B. we dayli were above it and 102 was unrortunate again and decided her sailed dropped losses up. that was
the were The
Fri, to and to to 1½' scheme a legion of R.A. an MA/SB 10 to and 1-2. at
bombed
WORK
this sunk, that
ship she and At another had to return.
and
enou
the
high
at southward attack 0300 East without shes and evening was the very 0330. from the men
on the with washerioated but
encol it
to
there in
by COL
behind itrn very Sometimes the Among vivid to week, ony one the of the vivid of us drift with the of breezes smoke over from air end the
attacked he tide at tur tr
up.
be bro
031
the
Monday
little
patrols
into other ending tired stream run, in silhouette upon picture during this
Night of
staff
much hi, th
t1 the they were Weary to brunt backed of men just The ionary men who ploddea Seavards, onlindly
at tr
part of
blue
on of most The
and There was thembarked and made next all night. two on to some of them
arrived
however,
the
Bray. off the the the day, be ri
did the the on deal of shelling this a famous
shellAbout
noon We
thousands in <<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<< ships on the evacuation possible.
harbour forges
and off the air try La wo of
Night end. of the The of B.E.F. Sunday was ships away. at and and many to hit, pier the not tens a though tonight think miracle of
like
it
these
the
Monday, June 2-3.
allbut
very
or
a
THE sunk al angsived come in, MA/SB We General had 10 at 2030. on handful had the been way
we
enequented. fighters number of bomb wer end ai S
in remaining one of during boat these the boats and evacuation, blue sent 2115 were on in a board fresh theginning the
rifter
attack on
boat sent arrived, Berthing great but on should the she not was stop too lost. badly to pick damaged When him returning to but carry push water for badly as out on he pier-master tinsisted night's Dunkirk. across Commander at that operation
put him on
and the with early the northerly night, wind her blowing Job and and urgent off was This the the
need
-4-
was/

Details

3 July,
RIC ADDRESS:
HOTAL THAMES VACID CLUB
E.KNIGHTS,LONDON.
60, KNIGHTSBRIDGE,
ELEPHONE:
S.W.1.
JANE 2121.
in her. Dure,
264
/ han how friends is
the Дипкик docket, which on
duly returned to Mr. Wilson Can
evening.
the papers were with
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Details

From Lieut: WykehamN Martin.
Dynam.
223.
A14/0/1352
1352
1st Lieut: of "Alice', D.B.2.
15
Date
7th June 1940.
TO V.A. Dover.
Report on Dynamo Operation.
15
Alice left Southampton at 2030/26/5/40
and at Dover was directed to beach herself at
La Panne, to fac litate unloading of cargo of
250 tons of provisions.
This operation was carried out at
0800/28 by Alice and Kaap Falga, the former
having rescued Pilot Sergeant T.BOYD, 516716
of 213 Fighter Squadron, who had descended
by parachute.
Two hours later he was transfered
to Able Tasman, also beached at La Panne as
it was thought that she would be the first
to return, Alice and Kaap Falga having received
orders to refloat as soon as possible and beach
themselves again after dark at Bray Beaches,
there to land some provisions and evacuate soldiers
before daylight.
Lieut: Slater (C.O. Alice ) and Lieut
Beale (C.O. Kaap Falga) landed to make definità
arrangements with G.H.Q. for the evening's
operation.
Whilst they were ashore four bomb
and Machine gun attacks were carried out against the
three ships beached and the Military ashore
About 1400/29 Major P.De Havilland, of
at
unea
G.H.Q. four soldiers, himself being wounded, with instructions
(D.A.Q.M.G.) arrived on board Alice with
29
for to try and get in touch with a destroyer cut
28
22,
immediately, me as his communications had been the
and he wished to report to the War Office
seriousness of the situation.
stated that Germans would be occuppying evening
Dunkirk and He advancing along the coast that
due to the capitulation of Belgian Troops for
told him of the intentions he had the
evening evacuation Beaches, where the provisions were
I and he told me that troops
falling just come back from on Bray La Panne, and that
were no longer He also required mentioned there. that Zudycote the beach Channel. at Bray
was under fire as was the he said
Two naval leg. and one
had taken been to hit Military one hospital I came to the
From his Lieut: Slater Falga)
description (Alice)
who conclusion was KIlled that and it Lieut: was Beale wrong; (Kaap since on June6th he
who me I spoke that was wounded. Lieut to Lieut Beale Slater were was I was made also over to unharmed. the refloat and phone, splinters Alice, and from assured
but aircraft due Efforts lubrication system
of the engine,

Details

Adminalty Pier
I arrived at Dover at 16.00 and disembarked the prisoners alongside
After obtaining fuel I remained at Dover until ordered
23
H.M.S.Kaap Falga to Poole, leaving Doms at 09.20 on Tuesday 4th. June 1940
cort
23
"RUJA"
B
H.M.S. RUJA sailed for Dunkirk from Dover and on first attempt broke down in the
Downs. The ship was towed back to Dover and repaired by Sandhurst and then I reported
to N.O.I.C. Ramsgate and sailed for Dunkirk and remained there for 24 hours in order
to collect about 300 soldiers off the Beach East of Dunkirk and later on in the
evening off the barracades east of La. Panne. On the way back to Poole the ship
broke down again and was successfully towed by H.H.S. Pascholl.
Signed H.R.Webber (Lieut R.N.)
"FRISO"
A
This vessel under the command of Licut. G.O. Symonds R.N. and subsequently under
Sun. Lieut. G.V.Ward R.N.V.R. made two successful trips to Dunkirk beach and was able
to evacuate 1008 officers and men. Although under continual fire from shore
batteries and dive bombers the operation was carried out without mishap to vessel
or crew.
Signed. G.V.Ward (Sub. Lieut. R.N.V.R.)
"DESPATCH II"
B.
May 29th & 30th.
To West of La Pain. Arrived La Pain 20.00 29th. and embarked 267 French with
ships boats only until 04.00
At 04.00/30 discovered 2 ft or water in E.R. no air bottles and belt to air
compressor broken. Managed to get under way 10.00/30th and returned to Ransgate
19.00 30th.
May 31st. June 1st.
Arrived Dunkirk 18.00/51 Air compressor not working and insufficient air in bottles
to restart motors if they stopped. Embarked 160 mostly Middlesex Regiment with
ships boats only until midnight.
Ships company were then exhausted with boat work and all Middlesex Regiment embarked
ship sailed for Ramsgate arriving 07.30/1.
Ships Company acted very well. Besides my Lst. Lieut. Lt. Miller I wish to mention
L.S. A.J.M. Upton P/SSX 13505
A.B. W. H. Dibben P/JX 148504
A.B. H.B.Ketchley PJ109346
O.S. S.A.Greenwood P/JX 130093
Signed J.E. Whitwell, Lt. Comdr.
"PASCHOLL"
B.
This ship was only taken over by me on Sunday June 2nd., the previous Captain
having returned to his proper duties at Ramagate. I proceeded to Ramagate
arriving there 23.00 Instructions received ashore at 23.30 were to remain at anchor
until further orders. At 15.00 Monday 3rd. June we sailed with Commander Hammond flying
his flag in the ship in Command of 5 skoots. We arrived Dunkirk Harbour Jetty at
23.00 and embarked ap roximately 300 troops and after some delay left at 00.30 Tuesday
June 4th, arriving Ramsgate approximately 08:30 On instructions sailed at 05.30
Wednesday 5th. June for Poole. arrived Newhaven at 21.00 having taken
N.M.S.Ruja in tow at approximately 10.00 Sailed from Newhaven at 18.00 Thursday
6th. June Ruja still in tow arriving Studland Bay approximately 21.00.7th. June
entered Poole Harbour.
Signed J.N.Wise Lieut. R.N.V.R.
"ZEUS"
I have the honour to Report the following of my vessels activity in operation
Dynamo in diary form.
25th. May Joined at Poole. P.M. Vessel wiped 5.0 p.m. approx cast off and
proceeded to anchor off Portsmouth. 9.0 p.m. ordered to anchor off Yarmouth.
26th. May, 5.10 a.m. ordered to remain at anchor until further orders. Hands cleaning ship
3.0 p.m. Ordered to proceed Portsmouth.
6.0 Arrived Portsmo th. Recive fuel water and stores and ordered to proceed broken
Spithead p.m. to swing for deviation. Dischar ed Dutch engineer. Note compass
and steering compass damaged. Results of swinging give very unreliable deviation card
10.30 27th. May Proceed Dawn in arrived company off for Newhaven Newhaven. and anchored. Note. Ship very and short overhauling of dec gear stores
rope etc. Hands employed rope etc. Hands employed cleaning ship
9.0 p.m. approx. Dawn arrived off Dover 9.30 approx berthed alongside "Ruja" at so West bad Quay, as
Proceeded in company for Dover.
Enemy render air independance p.m. of navigation impossible we follow rest ahead. gunfire
28th. May raid 1.0 approx. Proceed in company for Dunking. Compass Considerable to
etc. all night.

Details

I arrived at Dover at 16.00 and disembarked the prisoners alongside
Adminalty Pier
23
After obtaining fuel I remained at Dover until ordered
to
escort
H.M.S.Kaap Falga to Poole, leaving Downs at 09.20 on Tuesday 4th. June 1940
23
"RUJA"
B
H.M.S. RUJA sailed for Dunkirl from Dover and on first attempt broke down in the
Downs. The ship was towel back to Dover and repaired by Sandhurst and then I reported
to N.O.I.C. Ramsgate and sailed for Dunkirk and remained there for 24 hours in order
to collect about 300 soldiers off the Beach East of Dunkirk and later on in the
evening off the barracades east of La. Panne. On the way back to Poole the ship
broke down again and was successfully towed by H.M.S. Pascholl.
Signed Webber (Lieut R.N.)
"FRISO"
A
This vessel under the command of Licut. G.O. Symonds R.N. and subsequently under
Sun. Lieut. R.N.V.R. made two Although successful under trips continual to Dunkirk fire beach from and shore was able
batteries to evacuate and 1008 dive bombers the operation was carried out without mishap to vessel
officers
and
men.
or crew.
Signed. G.V.Ward (Sub. Licut. R.N.V.R.)
"DESPATCH II"
May 29th & 30th.
To West of La Pain. Arrived La Pain 20.00 29th. and embarked 267 French with
At 04.00/30 discovered 2 ft oz water in E.R. no air bottles and belt to air
ships boats only until 04.00
compressor broken. Managed to get under way 10.00/30th and returned to Ramsgate
19.00 30th.
May Arrived Dunkirk 18.00/51 Air compressor not working and insufficient air in bottles with
31st. June 1st.
to restart motors if they stopped. Embarked 160 mostly Middlesex Regiment
Ships ships company were then exhausted with boat work and all Middlesex Regiment embarked
boats only until midnight.
Ships ship Company acted very well. Besides my Lst. Lieut. Lt. Miller I wish to mention
sailed for Ramsgate arriving 07.30/1.
L.S. A.J.M. Upton P/SSX 13505
A.B. W. H. Dibben P/JX 148504
A.B. .B.Ketchley PJ109346
O.S. Greenwood P/JX 130093
Signed J.E. Whitwell, Lt. Comdr.
This "PASCHOLL" ship was only B. taken over by me on Sunday June 2nd., the previous Captain
having 23.00 Instructions received ashore at 23.30 were to remain Hammond at anchor
returned to his proper duties at Ramsgate. I proceeded to Ramsgate
arriving further there orders. At 15.00 Monday 3rd. June we sailed with Commander Jetty at flying
his flag embarked roximately 300 troops and after some delay left at at 05.30 Tuesday
until in the ship in Command of 5 skoots. We arrived Dunkirk Harbour 00.30
June 23.00 4th, and arriving Ramsgate approximately 08-30 On instructions taken sailed
Wednesday in tow at approximately 10.00 Sailed from Newhaven at 18.00 21.00.7th. Thursday June
5th. June for Poole. arrived Newhaven at 21.00 having
H.M.S.Ruja 6th. June Ruja still in tow arriving Studland Bay approximately
entered Poole Harbour.
Signed Wise Lieut. R.N.V.R.
"ZEUS" I have the honour to Report the following of my vessels activity in operation
Dynamo in diary Joined form. at Poole. P.M. Vessel wiped 5.0 Palla approx cast Yarmouth. off and
25th. May 9.0 p.m. ordered to anchor off Hands
26th. proceeded May. to 5.10 anchor a.m. off ordered Portsmouth. to remain at anchor until further orders. cleaning shij
3.0 p.m. Ordered to proceed Portsmouth. Recived fuel water and stores and ordered to broken proceed
6.0 p.m. Arrived Portsmo for deviation. th. Discharged Dutch engineer. unreliable Note compass deviation
Spithead and steering to swing compass damaged. Results of swinging give very card
10.30 Proceed in company for Newhaven. and enchored. Note. Ship very and short overhauling of dec. gear stores
27th. rope etc. May Hands Dawn arrived employed off rope Newhaven etc. Mands employed Dover. cleaning ship
9.0 Enemy 28th. p.m. May air approx. Dawn raid arrived 1.0 Proceeded p.m. off navigation approx. Dover in company Proceed 9.30 impossible approx for in company WG berthed follow for alongside rest unicint. "Ruja" Compass Considerable at so West bad Quay. as gunfire to
render
independance
of
etc. all night.
msianole

Details

1
48
47
In the afternoon of the 3rd June orders were received to
be prepared to proceed to Dunkirk but these were later
cancelled.
In the evening of the 4th June orders were received to
proceed to Tilbury. At Tilbury on the 5th June orders were
given to destore at Royal Victoria Yard, Deptford, and to
proceed to Surrey Commercial Docks.
The dock was entered
at 1530 and the ship handed over to the Port of London
Authorities.
I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
Donald H.,Sife.
Lieutenant. R.N.
VICE AUMTRAL TRAL
11 JUN 1940
.
*
DOVER BR E
for

Details

289.
-
83
NARRATIVE OF DUTCH BOAT "JAVA"
26th May - 4th June, 1940.
0645, 27th May, the crew of D.B.22 under the command of
Lieut-Commander Drake, BUE left Chatham Barracks and travelled via
Portsmouth to Southampton, joining "Java" that evening. The
vessel was then under repair, with orders on completion to load
ammunition in the River.
On the afternoon of 29th May those orders were cancelled
and we were instructed to fuel and proceed light to Dover.
Accordingly about 1700 with Main and Auxilliary machinery
persuaded to function by Diesel experts from the shore "Java" left
ible.
SECRET
,914/0
irted. Our final air
??
22/1148
left with the handicap of
IS the belt driving our
ally our Auxilliary
LIEUT.F.T.RENNY.R.N.R. - REPORT
83
Lght and air with the
ON OPERATIONS OFF FRENCH COAST.
er our E.R.A. collapsed
(Letter dated June, 1940.)
as already out of action
è morning of 31st May
By this time our
II.
in
No:477.cc/40.
egards the other and
FLAG OFFICER COMMANDING, DOVER.
it was pointed out that
Lete and we were under
h starting on them.
-Commander Drake was
Forwarded.
=
proceed to Dunkirk to
2. The full names of the
945, steaming 10 knots
Officer and rating concerned are:-
working. My confidence
as being too slack it
Lieut. Frederick Thomas
ack of air and consequent
Renny, R.N.R.
ahead or astern, might
Petty Officer James Potts,
, 16 miles off Dunkirk,
D/J.92816.
, shedding bolts from
eventually held in place
5 knots making an 0200
at to put about, but a
Engine cooling, some
rpoceeded another 5 miles
The Nore.
ADMIRAL
ngine failed and it was
9th June, 1940.
hat it could be kept
ogress unwise I cruised
VICE ADMIRAL
then made the best of my
2nd June. Here repairs
11 JUN 1940
y,4th June I was towed
lowing day by "Bornrif"
*
to Surrey Commercial Docks
DOVER
ΓyHaTo
Davie
It. P.N.V.R.
14 Ju.
DOVER

Details

289.
-
83
NARRATIVE OF DUTCH BOAT "JAVA"
26th May - 4th June, 1940.
0645, 27th May, the crew of D.B.22 under the command of
Lieut-Commander Drake, RND left Chatham Barracks and travelled via
Portsmouth to Southampton, joining "Java" that evening. The
vessel was then under repair, with orders on completion to load
ammunition in the River.
On the afternoon of 29th May those orders were cancelled
and we were instructed to fuel and proceed light to Dover.
Accordingly about 1700 with Main and Auxilliary machinery
persuaded to function by Diesel experts from the shore "Java" left
dock and proceeded down the Solent to Hamble.
At 0400 on 30th May our troubles started. Our final air
pressure started the Main Engine and we left with the handicap of
being able neither to stop or go astern as the belt driving our
Auxilliarys parted immediately. Eventually our Auxilliary
Diesel was started and ran all day for light and air with the
result that shortly before arrival at Dover our E.R.A. collapsed
owing to fumes. As our Windlass gear was already out of action
the ship was allowed alongside and on the morning of 31st May
"Sandhurst" was notified of our defects. By this time our
Auxilliary engine also had ceased running.
The Main belt was renewed, but as regards the other and
major defects, notably our Ballast Pump, it was pointed out that
as they would take several hours to complete and we were under
1 hours' notice for sea, it was not worth starting on them.
On Saturday morning, 1st June Lieut-Commander Drake was
taken ill and detained sick in "Sandhurst".
I received orders that afternoon to proceed to Dunkirk to
arrive at 0200 on 2nd June and left at 1945, steaming 10 knots
with neither Auxilliary nor Anchor gear working. My confidence
in our new belt was apparently misplaced as being too slack it
failed to drive the Compressor. This lack of air and consequent
inability, if stopped, to restart, either ahead or astern, might
have led to complications if, at midnight, 16 miles off Dunkirk,
No.3 Cylinder had not commenced to seize, shedding bolts from
the Crankcase which my Engineroom staff eventually held in place
with wedges. But our speed was down to 5 knots making an 0200
arrival impossible and I had no choice but to put about, but a
for
minuteslater however presumably with the Engine cooling, some
higher revolutions were obtained, and I receeded another 5 miles
towards the shore. Again however the Engine failed and it was
only at slow speed and with great care that it could be kept
moving at all. Considering further progress unwise I cruised
in the neighbourhood until daylight and then made the best of my
way home, berthing in Dover about 1015, 2nd June. Here repairs
were considered impossible and on Tuesday, 4th June I was towed
by "Gorecht" to Sheerness and on the following day by "Bornrif"
to Tilbury, thence the following morning to Surrey Commercial Docks
ADNIRAL
Havri
DOVER 14JUN 1940
ft. R.N.V.R.

Details

Dyrams 314
Blale
m. Lieut.Commdr.K.M.Drake,R.N.R., c/o W.Simons & Co., Renfrew.
1325
e. 13th.June 1940
-
85
Vice Admiral, Dover. copy to 0.in O., Nore.
mitted in accordance with Nore General Order 448/40 relative to
ration "Dynamo".
On the morning of 27th.May I proceeded from Chatham to Portsmouth
:h draft, to take over Dutch ship "TINY". On arrival at Portsmouth I
3 informed that "TINY" had already been taken over by the C.O. and ships
mpany of "JAVA" which had broken down and was then undergoing repair,
1 I was instructed to proceed to Southampton and take command of the
tter ship;this I accordingly did on the evening of the same day.
Repair work proceeded as arranged in accordance with F.O.1/c.
uthampton's instructions and main engine trials were held during the
renoon of 29th. May; these appeared to be satisfactory.
ring the afternoon of the same day I received instructions to proceed
Dover at the earliest possible moment, the urgency of these instructions
king it impossible to carry out the full tests of auxiliary machinery
originally planned with a further 24 hours at my disposal.
I left Inner Dock, Southampton at approx.1840/29th.and,after
justment of compasses and fuelling at Hamble Jetty, finally sailed for
ver at 0400/30th. arriving off that port at 1730 on the same day.
On passage the following defects had appeared:-
Driving belt from main engines to auxiliary machinery broken.
Auxiliary diesel refused to start.
Leaks from air bottles had resulted in starting air supply being
reduced to only sufficient air for one certain restart.
Mooring and windlass diesel refused to statt.
Ballast pump out of order.
On arrival off Dover a report was made through the Examination
essel to the effect that engineroom repairs were required and I was later
nstructed to berth alongside in Submarine Basin. This was done at
approx. 2230/30th.
Repair work was started the following day but at 2000 was stopped
is all ships were at immediate notice and remaining repairs would require
at least 24 hours. At that time the only repairs which had been completed
were the renewal of the driving belt and the restarting of the auxiliary
Omant

Details

127
-2-
This method was found successful and two trips were
carried out in same manner. For the third endeavour,
"VANQUISHER" and"FITZROY" having left for England, and no other
larger craft being in the vicinity, my intentions were to
close again, fill to capacity and proceed towards La Panne, to
transfer troops if requested, or return to England.
It is regretted that this effort failed in that
"SURSUM"CORDA" was beached too securely and no efforts ot my part
were successful in re-floating.
Thiswwas due to an error in judgement on my part in
allowing too many men on board at the time and my incorrect
appreciation of the time of the tide turning, no tide tables being
carried.
H.M.S. "HEBE" came to my assistance, but unfortunately
though a tow was passed, her lack of power and manoeuvreability
were strong handicaps, and she herself grounded two cables to
Eastward.
At 0800/30 it was realised there was no chance of the
ship moving until the following High Water.
During the period of waiting until High Water that
evening, I assisted where possible on the Beach in the vicinity
of the Ship, and during periods where there were no small craft
operating, took aboard soldiers for shelter and distributed
what food remained aboard "SURSUM-CORDA".
All members of my crew worked magnificently under
somewhat strained conditions, and with no consideration for
themselves.
Further endeavours to re-float were made between 1800
and 2030 using kedge anchor with soldiers onboard assisting.
At 1840 a shell from an enemy shore battery burst & few yards ahead
of the ship and four soldiers were hit by splinters. I ordered
these and one officer hit whilst on the beach to be placed below
and with the assistance of a stretcher bearer my First
Lieutenant, Lieutenant Brooks rendered first aid and made them as
comfortable as conditions allowed.
I then cleared the ship of soldiers and continued my
efforts to re-float, but with no success, delay being caused by
an influx of soldiers somewhat naturally seeking shelter after
the shell fire, whom Lordered to stand by to board "HEBE" who
I could see appeared to shew hopeful signs of clearing the
beach. The majority of them carried out these orders and
"HEBE" was re-floated at approximately 1945. On receiving
report of my engines being temporarily out of action and on
point of "seizing-up") decided further efforts were fruitless,
and retaining only wounded and completely exhausted men onboard
for shelter, until small craft or ambulances could be commandeered
to take them off, decided to land and assist on beach where
possible.
(continued

Details

129
-4-
Having reported to H.M.S. "LYNX" was ordered to
remain ready at short notice, but received no further
instructions until the evening of Sunday June 2nd, when
under the orders of Captain G. Fraser returned in the tug
Sun X' to assist disembarking French troops. I was discharged
to Admiralty P.M. Tuesday, 4th June.
A verbal report was given to H.M.S. "LYNX" of proceedings
during the operations "Dynamo" and delay in forwarding this
report is regretted but had no immediate access to P.G.O's.
I have the honour,
to be
Sir
Your obedient Servant,
LIEUTENANT, R.N.,
Vice Admiral Dover.
VICE ADMIRAL
25 JUN 1940
COVER

Details

st.of Officers and other ranks brought from Dunkirk by H.M.Y.
"Christobel II" June 1st 1940.
180
Varney. R.A.S.C.
I
3449762.
1/5 Battallion Lancs Fus.
-
laworth. it. Fus.
168
3450550.
"
"
Fus.
If
"
If
airhurst Fus.
3451380.
If
If
If
"
"
3445062.
"
If
If
If
Walkden. Fus.
If
6018271.
2nd Essex regiment.
Taylor. Green. Fus.
3450323. 1st 5th. Lancashire Fus.
3446761.
1st 5th.
If
If
kelly. Fus.
G. Butler Fus.
3449109.
"
If
If
IF
7339992.
R.A.S.C.
CPL. N.H. Colson.
B.Mc. Ewan.
T92456.
2nd Corps Amm Park. R.A.S.C.
T58067.
If
If
"
"
If
CPL E. Betts.
3449949.
Dawson. Fus.
1st 5th. Battallion Lancs Fus.
3445064.
"
If
=
If
If
If
singleton Fumpton.
3448391.
If
If
If
If
If
If
3450278.
If
If
"
If
If
"
Evans Fus.
3446130.
"
If
If
"
"
If
France. Fus.
3449797.
"
If
If
"
"
If
Chadwick. Fus.
3445292.
"
11
"
If
11
If
S. Mc Carthy.
Renshaw.
3444120.
"
If
If
If
If
If
3449829.
If
If
"
If
"
If
Q.M.S. John Armstrong.
ohn Oddie. Fus.
3449958.
If
If
"
If
11
If
4073997.
If
"
If
If
"
If
George Blagg.
S.M. John Henry Brown.
1714972.
2nd Corps Amm Park. R.A.S.C.
harles Belshaw. Pte.
807755.
5th Bit Northants Regt.
ack Trailing. Pte.
6141581.
1st 6th Btn East Surrey Regt.
amuel Penman. Fus.
3452270.
1st 5th Btn Lancs Fusiliers.
rederick Charles Clarke.
34471191.
"
"
"
#
If
"
3448936.
"
If
"
"
If
If
ames Henry Herbert Wood.
A.A. Warren.
6018483.
2nd Essex Regt.
Fielding. Fus.
3448122.
1st 5th Regt Lancs Fus.
3450197.
"
"
If
If
If
Sherrington. Fus.
Dunn.
3452185.
Hurricanes have in sight and we saw no more of the Messerschmits
- **** 1000 range. a paw. areas HALLS - now OF was a
after that.
Another day we were bombed by a large formation of
Heinkels flying miles up. At least I think it was our little
ship they were after, unless it was one on the horison, in
which case they missed by miles.
During the course of these operations we took off
from the beaches upwards of 400 French soldiers. To our bitter
disappointment we could find no British, others were luckier.
We also mislaid out ship for a few hours - she was on tow -
having one propeller completely tied up with bits of line and
the other engine knooking hard. The tow rope broke and we
could not find her though we cast about for a time. However
back at Sheerness yesterday evening having babled from Ramsgate
she turned up again next day - faithful thing. We arrived
5'
at 1200. An eventful trip. We borught back 2 "prises" - a nice
18ft

Details

Dynamo 185.
182
MOTOR YACHT "MARSAYRO"
170
6th.June 1960
B14/0/1513
II.
Leading Seaman BROWN.
No.R.E.2/014.
Vice Admiral,
Dover.
169
(Copy to Commander-in-Chief,
that I took over dommand
The Nore.)
esday 29th.May 1940.
rt I tried to sort things
on, regarding any particular
Forwarded.
stremely hasty. I therefore
nga will suffice.
2. Reports and recommendations
Friday 31st.May 1940 at
concerning the above named vessels
with X217 and 2 other
were forwarded by my Nos. I.1/14/015 utenant
POOL,R.N.
We
and R.E. 2/014. of 8th and 9th
out 3 p.m. we name in sight
June, 1940.
moke and explosions as far
later we contacted the
3.
Of the vessels mentioned in the French soldiers from the
above reports only the "Royal Eagle", to the beach; it was
"Golden Eagle" and "Crested Eagle"
imen and capsised at once.
are specifically named in Appendix 1, it himself from being more
thdrew my ship to review
4.
In addition to the vessels
" stuff that looked like
named in Minute 1 above, the Yachts
ID devil as I know that
"Christobel II" "Caleta"; "Glala"
our propellers in the way
"Amulree" and the tug "St Clears"
happen as soon as I had
were mentioned in my reports, and
each we managed to pick
are presumed to be included in the
captured and used a little
note to Appendix 1.
troops appeared to be a
>-loads for some 5 hours,
'Jaba" and so on. On this
ADMIRAL 1940
am Queen" (about 2000 tons
- she had put her nose.
*
30th JULINE,
;ines of "Marsayru" and
COMMODORE-IN-CHARGE,
ce
ghout this day and the
Dover
HEERNESS.
all a complete jumble in
tant fire of various kinds,
the ship was not hit by
more
lune I think - we were
tion to -done, nearest ship being
te 1 above, by 4 brave Messershimits who dived and
"
"Caleta th much vigour but exceedingly poor aim
the tug our. No had a Bren and 2 rifles but did
in my German pilots seemed disinolined to come
reports 0 and I had given orders to hold our fire
on Eagle" casA pity. After half an hour of this 3
above arcifically aght and we saw no more of the Messerschmits
2/014. of my 8th in addition of we were bombed by a large formation of
arded by Nos.
40.
in Minute 1 all. At least I think it was our little
stobel II" "saless it was one on the horison, in
eports only the me mentioned solddimurse of these operations we took off
the vessels ree" and opamony miles.
Eagle" and "C presumed tax, ocumnof 400 French soldiers. To our bitter
cifically named to Appell
ad tind no British, others ware luckier.
Christrisor a few hours - she was on tow -
"Amulre" stely tied up with bits of line and
n addition to vive MI
were men tisard. The tow rope broke and we
n Minute 1 a had a
are presfroit cast about for a time. However
obel II" "( pilots Be
e" and the I had give
note to rises - faithruk thing. No arrived
ntioned in ty. After
ts, evening having called from Ramsgate
sumed to be and we saw
Appendix 1.
ICEADM in We borught back 2 "prises" - a nice
IRA

Details

Dynomo 185
182
MOTOR YACHT "MARSAYRU"
170
6th.June 1960
SKIPPER.
G.D.OLIVIER.
SIGINEER
C.COGGINS.
CREW
Messrs.FORBES, HUMPHRIES and Leading Seaman BROWN.
I have the honour to report that I took over dommand
of the Motor Yacht "Marsayru" on Wednesday 29th.May 1940.
Before commencing this report I tried to sort things
out a bit but find that my recollection, regarding any particular
date on which incidents occurred, is extremely hazy. I therefore
hope that a general report on our doings will suffice.
We sailed from Sheerness on Friday 31st.May 1940 at
4 A.M., bound for Dunkirk, in company with X217 and 2 other
drifters under the comand of ib.Lieutenant POOL,R.N. We
steamed at 5 knots approximately. About 3 p.m. we name in sight
of the coast, a long line of fires, smoke and explosions as far
as the eye could see. About one hour later we contacted the
Naval forces engaged in evacuating the French soldiers from the
beaches. I had a whaler and sent it to the beach; it was
immediately stormed by about 50 Frenchmen and capsised at once.
My rating, Brown, had a job to prevent himself from being more
or less forcibly drowned. I then withdrew my ship to review
the position. Warps were everywhere, stuff that looked like
42", also smaller ropes which were the devil as I know that
sooner or later we were bound to get our propellers in the way
of one of them. However this did not happen as soon as I had
feared. In our retreat p from the beach we managed to pick
up a very nice naval cutter which we captured and used a little
futther down channel where the French troops appeared to be a
little calmer. We took off many boat-loads for some 5 hours,
loading X217, S.S. "Foam Queen", S.S. "Jaba" and so on. On this
first day we also managed to pull "Foam Queen" (about 2000 tons
I should say) off the mud, into which she had put her nose.
I thought this spoke well for the engines of "Marsayru" and
Mr. Coggins who attended them. Throughout this day and the
days and nights that followed (it's all a complete jumble in
my mind) we were of course under constant fire of various kinds,
but I have the honour to report that the ship was not hit by
anything. On one day - Sunday 2nd.June I think - we were
singled out for attention (we were alone, nearest ship being
about 2½ miles away) by 4 brave Messershimits who dived and
machine-gunned us with much vigour but exceedingly poor aim
for about half an hour. We had a Bren and 2 rifles but did
not use them as the German pilots seemed disinolined to come
nearer than 2000 feet and I had given orders to hold our fire
to 1000 feet range. A pity. After half an hour of this 3
Hurricanes have in sight and we saw no more of the Messerschmits
after that.
Another day we were bombed by a large formation of
Heinkels flying miles up. At least I think it was our little
ship they were after, unless it was one on the horison, in
which case they missed by miles.
During the course of these operations we took off
from the beaches upwards of 400 French soldiers. To our bitter
disappointment we could find no British, others were luckier.
He also mislaid owe ship for a few hours - she was on tow -
having one propeller completely tied up with bits of line and
could not find her though we cast about for a time. However
the other engine knocking hard. The tow rope broke and we
back at Sheerness up yesterday evening having called from Ramsgate
she turned again next day - faithful thing. No arrived
at 1200. An eventful trip. We borught back 2 "prises" - a nice
18ft

Details

Dyrams 61.
DOVER.
à
179
5
4th June, 1940
TO: COMMANDING OFFICER,
H.M.S."LYNX".
189
.
-2-
177
lighter to see if I could help them and found a young Tommy
(K. Alfred) in the water vigorously assisting the others to get
aboard.
Just as I arrived he said he was exhausted and so
we got him on to the lighter and I went overboard to take his
place.
We continued to get men on to my boat until no more
were coming down the beach.
During this operation three bombs
fell quite close to the lighter but no one was hurt. I took
this boat load of about thirty five out to the hopper.
I spent some time during the afternoon trying to
pull other motor boats which had gone ashore without dropping an
anchor off the beach which was a lee shore. I also towed
various whalers and ships boats out to the transports.
Towards evening the big ships started sending their
own boats ashore on long lines and as this occurred about every
50 yds the manoeuvring of motor boats became difficult. I was
hailed by a tug which had a supply lighter in tow outside the line
of big ships.
Saying that he could come no nearer the beach
he asked me to take this lighter as close in as I could. The
lighter was almost unmanageable.
While towing it the water
circulation of one engine gave out but I had to continue using
the engine which got very overheated until I could safely drop
the lighter after taking it through the line of big ships
to the shore.
This caused the engine to seise up. Shortly
afterwards the other engine began to give trouble and could only
be used at slow speeds.
I later discovered that this was due
to a choked jet in the carburettor. Just as dark came I passed
a rope to a drifter and asked permission to hang on until morning
when I could see to try to repair my engines. This drifter had
not got its complement of men on board and during the night he
moved about slowly from one spot to another trying to get a load.
During this period a bomb fell very close to us. The fourth
time he moved he headed to a point south of the harbour and then
very slowly made his way down channel.
About a mile from the harbour I realised he was
heading for home and being then too far from the seat of operations
Ramsgate. and being practically engineless I let him tow me right back to
We entered the harbour at noon (Saturday).
I reported for duty again at 0800 on Sunday morning
and though I was given command of another boat and got her all
ready I was not again ordered to sea.
I brought both my boats back to H.M.S. Wildfire on
Thursday p.m. the 6th June.
yours obediently
Ian F. Smith
SubL RNVR

Details

ENCLOSURE I. TO FORD'S NO. 541 of 17th. JUNE, 1940.
198
REPORT BY STOKER A. BENHAM, STOKER OF
MOTOR BOAT, NO.275
P.M. 29th.
Left Littlehampton and arrived Newhaven same evening,
had a spot of bother before we were allowed to enter
harbour and stay the night.
A.M. 30th.
Left Newhaven for Ramsgate arriving P.M. same day.
Port Stern Gland was leaking badly had to be repacked on
arrival, Refuelled and ready to sail.
A.M. 31st.
Was ordered to leave Ramsgate independently for Dunkirk.
C.P.O. Leighton, Cox, A.B. Strand and Stoker Benham,
crew. Left harbour and picked up convoy already leaving
for Dunkirk. After about 2/2 to 3 hours out we had
trouble again with Port Stern Gland and returned to
harbour and repacked and tightened up both Stern Glands.
A.M. lst.
Was called again about 4.30 and ordered to sail and
proceed to Dunkirk. Two Sub-Lientenants R.N.V.R.
volunteered to come with us as their boat was unfit for
the trip, and an extra Able Seaman came aboard with them
for the trip. On the way to Dunkirk was kept busy,
Able Seaman Strand watching for aircraft and myself
tending engines, had no more trouble with Stern Glands,
There was quite a considerable amount of aircraft about
and our destroyers were continually repelling their
attacks. Struck something below water starboard side
which made the boat jump but no damage seemed to be done
as the engine was running smoothly and we were not making
water, so we carried oh. On sighting Dunkirk we saw
two large ships loaded with soldiers steamin down the
coast and all small craft following, so we decided to
follow as there was nothing we could do there. After
about 10 minutes steaming we saw a crowd of German
áircraft in the air flying at a great height. About
six detached themselves, and dived down at the two
big ships. They did not release their bombs until they
were almost on the ships, registered hits which sunk
both ships quite close to each other. We were
travelling at full speed and picked up 10 of the
survivors which made the boat full. As the bombers
were still very active in the vicinity, we decided it
was best to leave with all possible speed for home.
After about half to three-quarters of an hour we were
mistaken for German Torpedo Boat by our own trawlera,
who opened fire on us at close range. I saw C.P.O.
Leighton leave the boat after a shell had wrecked the
wheel house and Able Seaman Strand dashed forward to grab
the wheel, I got on to the side and saw one of the
trawlers bearing down on us as though it was going to
ram us, she was just about a boat's length away when I
jumped into the water, for it seemed impossible that she
would miss us. But Strand must have swung boat around
enough to clear. I was picked up by one of the boats
after swimming around for a while. I dont know how long.
I did not see any one else of the boat's crew until we
arrived at Margate, when Able Seaman Strand came aboard
the trawler I was on and spoke to me about the affair.
The only....

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Page 3.
267
256
day (continued)
congestion in the harbour
2331
Just cleared Harbour entrance when Kingfisher
"M" and"F" Degaussing circuits were cut. The two ships
Bow, 20 feet from the stem opened up to the water-line Port
rammed by French Trawler 'Edmond Rene', and her was
swung alongside one another after the collision and
troops transhipped to the trawler who was undamaged
esday 4th June.
0005
Received orders to return to Margate.
Kingfisher was making a little water in the Asdic
Compartment.
0010
Proceeded. Speed 7 Knots.
Ordered to proceed to Sheerness.
0505
In company with H.M.S.Lida who had been in collision
and requested Kingfisher to stand by.
0540
Sighted French Destroyer with damaged bows at anchor
near N. Goodwin Lt. Vessel, who had been in collision
0545
French Destroyer got under way and proceeded to the
South.
0615
Observed heavy explosion in position 51° 23' N,
1° 31' E., and unknown ship sink. Several of H.M.Ships
including H.M.S. Aulbury and H.M.S. Kellet near the pos-
ition picked up survivors.
0714
H.M.S. Lida and Kingfisher arrived off Margate.
Decided to anchor attempt repairs to D.G. Circuits
before proceeding
0745
Thick Fog. Requistoned steamer King GeorgeV, hit
Kingfisher on the Starboard Bow when entering
Margate Road but caused practically no damage
1200
D.G. Circuits temporarily repaired. Received orders
to proceed to Lowestoft at daylight on Wednesday.
During the evening M.A.S.B. No.1. came alongside
and reported one engine out of action and requested
a tow up the swept channel to abreast Harwich.
lednesday 5th June.
0400
Proceeded with M.A.S.B. No.1. in tow.
0926
North Knock Deep Buoy. Slipped M.A.S.B. No.1. who
proceeded to Harwich.
1620
Berthed in Lowestoft Harbour.

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-3-
264
276
have off a the few boats. At this time I got a signal
I at this part of doing essential work and that there were
I was beaches were to proceed to Dunkirk but that as
many men signal, and the coast to be evacuated I decided to
ignore the other transports proceed with the evacuation. There were at
most inadequate and the other only about 3 power boats of doubtful efficiency were
and/cross arrived. The embarkation arrangements were
first no channel boa on the beach but later a paddle minesweeper
boats and Royal Engineers Ferry Boats do with very few seamen ratings
present boats consisted of a few service boats mercantile
between the loto It was only due to the magnificent work of the
Army units at this part of the beach who were admirably led by their
Officers. that embarkation was able to proceed at any sort of
speed, although the work of the naval officers 10 were present in
few power boats available was beyond praise. There appeared to be
no centralised control either of boats or beach. During the
afternoon and evening there was a certain amount of enemy air
activity but enemy planes always moved away when A/A fire was brought
to bear on them, and there were frequent visitations by British
Fighters which appeared to have an excellent deterrant effect. No
bombs were dropped in my vicinity.
At about 2000 a short but heavy artillery fire was brought to
bear on the part of the beach near to Dunkirk and many men started
to swim out to the ships or come out in very inadequate boats.
I weighed anchor in the "Royal Eagle" - as the tide was approaching
high tide and proceeded as close in shore as possible to pick up these
men. At about 2200 when no further men were coming to the ship
and "Royal Eagle" was packed to nearly full capacity - i.e. every
covered in part of ship full and men also on the upper deck forward
and aft, I decided to weigh and proceed to Sheerness rather than
Margate on account of the ships requirements in oil and water which
at Margate would have taken too long to complete. I consider now
that on this day I committed a serious error or judgement as in
view of the poor embarkation facilities I should have ordered "Royal
Eagle" to ground herself in shore at low water and fill up my boats
running between the ship and shore on a line and then have floated
off and proceeded as the tide rose, or alternatively I might have
grounded /Royal Eagle" to form a pier to facilitate embarkation
by other ships when they arrived. I consider now on looking back
that the provision of some sort of pier should have been a matter
of primary importance.
In view of the shelling of the beaches from the Westward I
decided to proceed back by route "y" particularly as this was the
only route known by experience. Shortly after leaving a report was
received of M.T.B.'s off Bray but I then considered that it was too
late to turn back. After passing Middelkerke Buoy the ship was
attacked by an aircraft firing machine gun but I gave orders that
no firing was to take place so that thereshould be less chance of
giving away to ships position to M.T.B. The ship was not hito
During the night I passed three small dark vessels which I believed
were French Torpedo Boats. I did not challenge but kept guns trained
on them. About 0230 on 31st May there were signs of firing about
10 miles astern and about five minutes later a tremendous column of
flame rose from the water. I consider now that I was to blame in
using route "Y" and that I unduly hazarded the ship by 80 doing.
On arrival at Sheerness at 0600 I found that in response to my
request every possible arrangement had been made for the reception
of the troops and the cleaningofuelling, and provisioning of the
ship. The ships company had had practically no sleep for about 48
hours and had been working under conditions of high tension and
extreme discomfort and the fact that such excellent arrangements had
been made by Sheprness was very much appreciated. I cannot speak
too highly of the spirit and sense of duty shown by the officers and
ships company. On both nights the whole of the ships ...commodation

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SECRET
mánoeuvring.ne near the slightly wall fairly heavy shelling progress58 .
284
outside round the bearing the port paddle had arriving
the harbour was I found wounded by a splinter. was On in
hemp the entrance - so as soon as I was just many clear fathoms of
wreck at on with knives to to the port, I stopped and got a of the of
hands and I was able to clear it. The bearing was practically number
cleared light proceed though only at half speed. In
the increasing of the ship was shelled from a gun position
coast I picked up a Service motor launch and also a lifeboat and
to the west Dunkirk, but was not hit. Soon after leaving the
towed them back to the North Goodwin.
H.M.S. "CRESTED EAGLE" I have not yet seen the report from
the Commanding Officer of H.M.S. "Crested Eagle" but from the
evidence of a survivor it appears that, after I had ordered her
to Dunkirk on May 29th, she proceeded alongside the eastern side
of the East Mole at Dunkirk and embarked troops and casualties
including many from H.M.S. "Grafton" and a transport which
had both been sunk alongside by bombs. Heavy bombing and shell
fire was experienced but "Crested Eagle" was unhit until the
evening when she had just left the Mole to proceed home with her
load of troops and casualties and was hit by a bomb in the engine
room. A fire was started and it appeared that as the engines were
still working slowly the Commanding Officer decided to beach the
ship. Before or after she was beached it is believed she was hit
again by two bombs. It is thought that only a small proportion of
the ship's company were casualties but that many of the stretcher
cases who were accommodated in the wardroom and after part of the
ship were lost in the fire.
H.M.S. "GOLDEN" EAGLE". 1 I would like to add the following remarks
in respect of th report of proceedings forwarded by Lieutenants
Newman and Lucas. Although technically Lieut. Lucas is second in
command of the ship (as an R.N.R. Officer - Lieut Newman being an
R.N.V.R. Officer), Lieut. Newman has carried out the duties of
First Lieutenant and there is no doubt that the initiative and
good work done by the ship during the absence of her Commanding
Officer was due almost entirely to Lieutenant Newman who took
upon himself the command and was loyally supported by the two
R.N.R. Officers-Lieutenants Lucas and Dent, who did excellent work
once Lieutenant Newman had decided what was to be done. Lieut. J.
C. Newman is 54 years of age and quite inexperienced in Naval
matters - but I consider that the part he played in these operations
is worthy of the highest commendation and I am convinced that had it
not been for his leadership and initiative "Golden Eagle" would not
have taken any active part in the proceedings.
I would like also to mention the goods work done by Lieut.
Lucas R.N.R. who handled the ship with great skill, and on the
occasion on which the ship was in Dunkirk harbour at night. I
consider that the fact that she got out safetly was in a great
measure due to his personal efforts on the springs, etc, as well
as his handling of the ship.
To the list of men recommended I would like to add Fredk.
J. Shirley, Acting Leading Telegraphist R.N.V.R. C/WRX84, whose
assistance of to me as Senior Officer of the flotilla and also that
efficiency and extreme devotion to duty has been of the utmost
rely Able Seaman Scott S.T. TD/X1406, who was the only man I could
the upon to take the wheel with degree of competency during
given to C.P.O. Seaman and Utton, I thoroughly Seaman R.N.R.
night visit to Dunkirk. any endorse the recommendations

Details

REPORT OF 'BOUNTY' (Contd).
of Petty throughout operations.
I should Officer like to T.Jones draw special attention to the magnificent work 295
2
The following officers, Lieut.D.A.Dawson, Sub.Lieuts. Godman
and Potter-Irwin ships accompanied and me and reported to Ramsgate,
volunteering services on the following day if required.
Our names were accordingly entered on the Volunteer's List.
June 2. Having reported to Ramsgate, we were informed
that only fast and shallow draft vessels were required. During
course of day, found M.T.B.101. lying idle and requested use
of same, but were informed that the vessel was R.A.F. property
and we were unable to obtain permission to use her.
Received instructions to stand by and later to return
to own Base.
Throughout twenty seven hours spent at Dunkirk and
adjacent beaches, were under continuous bombardment from the
air and shelling from the land.
308
REPORT OF INNER PATROL YACHT "SERIOLA"
COmmanding Officer, Lieut. D.A.Dawson, R.N.V.R.
- 287
29. 1800. Left Hamble in formation for Dover, my division
consisting of "SERIOLA", "EILA II", "AHOLA" & "NONETA".
30. 0930. Arrived Dover, and seet into submarine basin, S.O.I.P
and myself went to report to S.N.O. Dover and received
final orders for our departure.
2200. Left Dover.
31 0500. Arrived off Bray, leading my division, when we received
signal to commence embarking troops from beach to
destroyers lying farther out. This lasted until about 1000,
when I received a signal from a destroyer to proceed to
La Panne and carry on with the same routine there.
1200. Suggestion made to run a grass rope from "SERIOLA" to
the shore, which would enable the troops to pull themselves
out by the aid of this warp in boats etc. Sub.Lt.Godman,
r.n.v.r left "SERIOLA" in a whaler with a Lt., R.N.V.R. off
H.M.S. "Hebe2 to operate the shore end. Unfortunately, a
lorry was driven into the sea and turned over, fouling the
line, so this idea had to be abandoned. With great difficulty
we were able to get Sub. Lt. Godman aboard again as the whaler
which took him off, left the shore without him, with a full
load of troops. A severe bombardment was going on at the
time and, consequently, most small craft had withdrawn to
seawards but in spite of a big sea running at the time, we
managed to lower our dinghy and got him aboard in an
exhausted condition. We then prodeeded to continue disembarking
troops.
1500. Received signals from H.M.S.Keith to go and collect
two whalers and crews foroperations off La Panne during the
1530. evening. Received signal from C.O. "NONETA" to say that she had
a dead man on board and her P.O. badly wounded. Closed her
and the C.O. suggested that he should take Sub.Lt. Godman
with him. This I agreed to and advised him to return to
Ramsgate as the "NONETA" was holed above the water line.
1630. Collected two whalers and crews and set off for La
Panne. Beached the whalers and their respective crews.
1800. Received signal from "BOUNTY" which was flying the
flag of Commodore Stephenson WMMXXXXX ordering us to close.
The Commodore told me and my crew that the houes 2100 on that
day to 0400 the following morning were to be considered the
"Zero Hour" and eh hoped we would do our utmost to get as
many men off as possible. We then returned to La Panne and
continued transporting troops throughout the night.
(Continued).

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345
be 322
June 2nd. In Ramsgate Harbour doing temporary repairs to
boilor of "Kindred Star".
"Thrifty" reported to be leaking badly, engines
shaken up and galley stove destroyed.
June 3rd. Orders were received from N.O.I.C. Ramsgate to
return to Portland in company as soon as the
tide permitted. Owing to the repairs not being
completed until late, we were not in time for
that evening's tide.
The Chief Engineer of "Thrifty" got intoxicated
and struck the Skipper of the "Kindred Star" and
also his own Skipper. He was placed under arrest
by orders of the N.O.I.C. and handed over to the
Ramsgate Police.
June
4th. Left Ramsgate 0925.
June 5th. Arrived Portland 1100.
June 12th 1940
Lieutenant. R.N.V.R.
And
ded hereto
the

Details

36,
PRINCIPAL SEA TRANSPORT OFFICE
FRENCH PORTS,
2
MINISTRY OF SHIPPING,
338
ROOM 8009
BERKELEY SQUARE HOUSE,
FP/YX/4.
SHEERNESS
BERKELEY SQUARE,
LONDON. W.1.
20th June, 1940.
The Director of Sea Transport.
Sir,
I have the honour to bring to your notice Licutenant
C.V. Brammell R.N.R. of H.M.S. "GULZAR".
2. On the evening of 26/27th May, 1940, I was informed by
Vice Admiral, Dover, that H.M.S. "GULZAR" was placed at my
disposal to go to Calais to take water and stretchers, and to
bring back wounded.
3. Lieutenant Brammell brought his ship into Calais, it
being a very dark night, turned round, and secured with slip
lines alongside the steps of the Gare Maritime. All this was
done without noise, which enabled the officers landing to get
ashore unnoticed. On entering the channel, the complete absence
of any firing raised suspicions that the enemy might already have
taken the town, suspicions which were confirmed when the landing
party got ashore and had to return hurriedly to the yacht.
4. Lieutenant Brammell slipped his lines very quickly and
got away just in time, as a heavy fire from rifles and machine
guns was opened on the yacht from the neighbourhood of the
steps as she proceeded down the entrance.
5. It was due to the quiet discipline in his ship that the
landing party got ashore unnoticed, and due to his seamanship
and smartness that we got quickly away; any delay might have
entailed severe casualties.
/6.

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Dynamo 143
372
H.M.D. "RENASCENT"
-
349
6th June, 1940.
Sirs,
I have the honour to put before you a report of our
action in getting troops off in the Evacuation of Dunkirk.
We sailed on orders on Thursday evening May 30th at
8.45 p.m. and proceeded to Ramsgate. Arrived at Ramsgate in
the early morning 5.0 a.m. and received orders to go to Dunkirk
and take off soldiers.
We arrived at Dunkink and hailed a destroyer, asking
him where they were getting the troops from. He asked us what
and T replied about 11 feet. He then told
2.
About 1,000 men stood to attention 4 deep about
half way along the pier, the General and his staff
about 30 feet away and after having faced the troops;
whose faces were indescernable in the dawn light, the
flames behind them showing up their steel helmets,
the Officers clicked their heels, saluted and then
turned about and came down to the boat with me and
we left at 0320.
"Go stranger, tell the Spartans that here
we lie, having been obedient to their
commands!".
Commander, R.N.

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Dynams 143.
TLE
-
H.M.D. "RENASCENT"
349
6th June, 1940.
Sirs,
I have the honour to put before you a report of our
action in getting troops off in the Evacuation of Dunkirk.
We sailed on orders on Thursday evening May 30th at
8.45 p.m. and proceeded to Remsgate. Arrived at Ramsgate in
the early morning 5.0 a.m. and received orders to go to Dunkirk
and take off soldiers.
We arrived at Dunkirk and hailed a destroyer, asking
him where they were getting the troops from. He asked us what
water we were drawing and I replied about 11 feet. He then told
us to proceed 8 miles to the Eastward and get troops off the beach.
We proceeded on our way and as soon as we got there, hailed
some small boats and told them to bring us some men.
raid.
Dynamo 143.
bombs
348A
'S from
to the
From:
Captain M/S, Sheerness.
roraft
During all
Date:
6th June, 1940.
Eagle
To:
Commodore in Charge, Sheerness.
. When we
to smother
did. We
80 I ran
he boat
In forwarding the attached, I have
hen we
$ at
nothing but praise for the Skipper and Crew of
"Renascent". Thelis officer carried out his very
coming
in
unusual duties in a prompt and seamanlike and
them
courageous manner.
hing to
He had no Unit Officer on board to assist
ving a
and the
1 Della and
him.
The
hanging
e put the
PBHartful CAPTAIN M/S
bit to
kirk harbour
SHEERNESS.
would
UNMODORE-IN-CHARGE -7 JUN 1940
day June
ashore
return
*
CHEERNESS

Details

Dynams 143
372
H.M.D. "RENASCENT"
349
6th June, 1940.
Sirs,
I have the honour to put before you a report of our
action in getting troops off in the Evacuation of Dunkirk.
We sailed on orders on Thursday evening May 30th at
8.45 p.m. and proceeded to Ramsgate. Arrived at Ramsgate in
the early morning 5.0 a.m. and received orders to go to Dunkirk
and take off soldiers.
We arrived at Dunkirk and hailed a destroyer, asking
him where they were getting the troops from. He asked us what
water we were drawing and I replied about 11 feet. He then told
us to proceed 8 miles to the Eastward and get troops off the beach.
We proceeded on our way and as soon as we got there, hailed
some small boats and told them to bring us some men.
We were waiting for them when we had an air raid.
There were about 80 planes over and they were dropping bombs
for about three quarters of an hour. We then had orders from
a destroyer to go back to the Westward. We then went to the
Westward as ordered, with wave after wave of enemy aircraft
continually coming over and trying to get some of us. During all
this they started shelling from ashore.
While on our way back, we were hailed by an Eagle
paddle steamer and told to put our troops on board him. When we
did that, we were told to take the Commodore from him to snother
paddle boat - about a mile back to the East - which we did. We
then came to the West again and it was a rising tide, so I ran
my ship up on the beach and started to get troops in the boat
by any means I could. We had one hundred and eighty when we
were floating again, so I came away with them - leaving at
approximately 8. 30.
We were subjected to one more air raid while coming
out. It lasted for about twenty minutes. We arrived in
Ramsgate 8 A.M. Saturday 1st June with first load, put them
ashore and laid off at anchor.
Set sail for Dunkirk 5.40 Saturday palla Nothing to
yacht disappeared - he had been mined. The time WAS The Dalla and
large steam yacht when there was a terrible explosion 11 and the
report until we got into Dunkirk Roads. We were following a
visibility was very poor and the smoke from ashore was hanging
I ordered full speed and the boat's crew to stand by.
on the water, but we got as near as we could.
hear men shouting in the water, 30 70 put bit to the
boat I and could picked up four survivors. I waited could for not. a
see if away we could get any more of them, but we
I then board eighty British. The French Sunday
proceeded on my way and went into men Dunkirk would harbour
where we took on started back for Ramsgate at 2 a.m. them ashore June
not come, so I in Ramsgate about 7 a.m. I put to return
2nd. and went We arrived off and laid at anchor until we had orders
back to Sheerness.
I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your obedient servant,
(Signed) R.E. HANNAPORD
Skipper R.N.R.

Details

SECRET
- 3 -
1
Binlo/2 408
38671
of and and get 21. around provisions. the wheelhouse. for opportunity about Dure to was the taken tugs to large fit draft sandbags water we on could top
At 1130/3 June, The 1940, we were ordered alongside to
only remain alongside an hour either side of high water.
broceeded. Two motor boats were slipped at 1830 and came on under
motor boats were At 1700 four tugs weighed and
22 Commander secured Le Measurer astern. came onboard at 1600 and four large
their own power. British fighter patrols were observed during the
evening. At position "W" two German floating mines were sighted.
They were destroyed by minesweepers.
boat Santasy)
parted, as its engines were broken down. It was, unfortunately, a
23. At 2130 one motor was abandoned after the tow ropes had 3/6
boat only three days old.
24 By 2330 we were approaching the breakwater when a small
boat filled with French soldiers hailed us. These soldiers were
embarked. They told us that the Germans were in the town, but that
the French held the coast for about one and a half miles to the westward
of the breakwater. The tug was stopped to the eastward of the
breakwater and we remained in this position until 0200/4 June, 1940,
when we went inside the harbour to try and pick up more soldiers from
the pier. H.M.S. Malcolm hailed and asked us to hold her stem up
to the jetty. This we did. Between 0200 and 0230 there was
periodic shelling outside the breakwater.
25. At 0230 the tugs had, been ordered to leave and we proceeded
with our one remaining motor steaming under its own power. One
aircraft was engaged with Lewis guns at 0310, it did not retaliate.
The motor boat was taken in tow about half an hour later. The tug
was anchored in Ramsgate at 0730 after an extraordharily peaceful
passage home.
26. Lieutenant Fletcher and myself together with nine naval
ratings left the tug A.M. on 5th June, 1940. Lewis guns and two
Able Seamen were left onboard until the tug arrived back at Gravesend.
27. Both the naval ratings, the civilian tug's crew, and the
volunteers behaved splendidly.
I have the honour to be,
Commanding Officer,
Sir,
H.M.S.Pelican.
Your obedient Servant,
JEL hartin
LIEUTENANT, R.N.
II.
No. 195D.
VICE ADMIRAL
20 JUN 1940
*
DOVERADMERAL, VICE
*
DOVER
(Copy to :- Commander-in-Chief, The Nore).
no
Submitted in accordance with Nore General Order 448/40.
PELICAN.
LIEUTENANT Jenhnaitin FOR
18th June, 1940.
COMMANDER (on leavel

Details

NAVAL
21 JUNISTANT
PRINCIPAL SEA TRANSPORT OFFICE, 481
#
7-
FRENCH PORTS,
*
MINISTRY OF SHIPPING,
ROOM 8009
*
BERKELEY SQUARE HOUSE,
7
FP/YX/4.
of S.T
BERKELEY SQUARE,
LONDON. W.1.
20th June, 1940.
The Director of Sea Transport.
Sir,
I have the honour to bring to your notice Licutenant
C.V. Brammell, R.N.R. of H.M.S. "GULZAR".
2. On the evening of 26/27th May, 1940, I was informed by
Vice Admiral, Dover, that H.M.S. "GULZAR" was placed at my
disposal to go to Calais to take water and stretchers, and to
bring back wounded.
3. Lieutenant Brammell brought his ship into Calais, it
being a very dark night, turned round, and secured with slip
lines alongside the steps of the Gare Maritime. All this was
done without noise, which enabled the officers landing to get
ashore unnoticed. On entering the channel, the complete absence
of any firing raised suspicions that the enemy might already have
taken the town, suspicions which were confirmed when the landing
party got ashore and had to return hurriedly to the yacht.
4. Lieutenant Brammell slipped his lines very quickly and
got away just in time, as a heavy fire from rifles and machine
guns was opened on the yacht from the neighbourhood of the
steps as she proceeded down the entrance.
5. It was due to the quiet discipline in his ship that the
landing party got ashore unnoticed, and due to his seamanship
and smartness that we got quickly away; any delay might have
entailed severe casualties.
/6.
be were dropped, but they were
Commanding Officer,
Ams. hulzar,
"Canterbury," "Calvi", "Polly
e men received shrapnel wounds
90 W.P. Oi,
London
the raiders were driven off.
think one by "Jaguar", "Jaguar"
hips attended to their wounded.
18 "Canterbury" and not the
from "Grenade" for the more

Details

here
M.T.B.
which
said
all
craft
were
being
to be well clear before dawn, so we had ordered to turn to back.
to Dunkirk The because next wrecks day, Monday, and I was ordered to
hours borrowed without the harbour was help. from Navigation only and a about wooden the transports 200 on ship, the yards, way and might while across consequently not a was a not THE to m
On arrival at Dunkirk local squall 1
to getting stand in by. and I out requested of harbour quickly I duly under reported. their own The tran
was refused permission to enter harbour power
the operation as was it might have and impeded the transports. to
on Tuesday morning, ending the 4th was then ordered back to I th I
the same evening June, to Captain Wharton Ramsg
I was ordered to report back to H.M.S. and "KI Co
(rd) T Lawine
Proby. Temp. Sub. Lieut,

Details

REPORT
539
522
ON THE OPPERATIONS OF THE MOTOR LAUNCHES "YSER" AND
"MALBOROUGH DURING THE EVAQUATION OF THE BRITISH &
509
FRENCH FORCES.
Yug Vincia
The Hopper no.95, which I had been ordered to take
round to Ramsgate, anchored early last Wednesday evening,
and Commander Duffet gave me the Belgian ferry boat "Yser".
We started in a convoy of eighteen other small
motor craft at about 0100 on Thursday. Shortly after daylight
the escorting drifter had to turn back with two of the small
512
boats, and with our much greater speed we soon left the
remainder of the launches well astern.
VI940
Owing to the fact that the "Yser" was not fitted
with a compass we deviated from our course, making & landfall
8 few miles to the westward of the town. We arrived off the
beaches at about 0900, and ran aground in our attempts to
approach close enough to the sands for the men to wade out to
us. There was no anchor in the boat, but we salvaged two of
the plowshare type from other abandoned boats, and laid them
out at low tide in order to kedge her off.
During the afternoon and dog-watches we were able to
be of some use by acting as a liason link between the boats
and the officers of the embarking troops. The Frenchmen were
very reluctant to wade in deeper than their waists, and
Petty Officer Clarke (Chatham Division) spent approximately
five hours, with water up to his neck, helping the soldiers
ief
into the small boats.
agret
I should like to take this oppotunity to recommend
Petty Officer Clarke for his cheerfulness, vigour, and valuable
advice offered on this occasion and later in the WD boat
"Malborough". I understand that Captain Lord Louis Mount-
batten mentioned Petty Officer Glarke in his despatches
following the torpedoing and bombing of HMS "Kelly".
Our efforts to refloat the "yser" were without
success, and having waited for high tide we took passage home
A. Gabbett- Mulhallen.
Sub.Lieutenant Royal Navy.
The Captain's Secretary.
H.M.S. FERVENT.
RAMSGATE.

Details

Statement from S.Y Vincea: (Re, Dankish
522
C. B.O.
Sir,
6x Imday the 31" M May, are the Jug Vincia
left Ramagah in taw of three skelfs for Durkich at
2.45pm.
at 4Pm see were off the Sandethe Bany, who
548
eport by Lieut. V.A. de Mauny, R.N. (contd).
- 518
1500
From 1500 onwards we were subject to almost
continuous attack by enemy aircraft and had the
satisfaction of seeing 7 bombers brought down by
destroyers' and shore batteries' anti-sireraft
fire. Two enemy pilots escaped by parachute.
Majority of troops embarked at this point were
French.
1700
On hearing that there were a number of British
troops on the beach near La Panne proceeded
there with Sub. Lt. Cornish and his motor boat
and succeeded in embarking a number of British.
Total number embarked was not recorded by no
but was approximately 150 altogether.
2030
Having valuable cargo aboard and observing that
there were a number of schoots and other craft
who, owing to the absence of small power driven
craft, were unable to get any troops. I decided
to return to Base with my load and turned over
my whaler to Sub. Lt. Cornish and asked him to
report to the Schoot "Atlantic", the Commanding
Officer of which told me that he had been there
all day without being able to get a single man
on board for reasons explained above.
Proceeded by route X in company with other drifters,
troop ships, tugs, etc. and were attacked by
enemy aircraft until past No 6 W Buoy, when they
were driven off by anti-aircraft fire from
British destroyers.
1st June.
1430
Arrived N. Goodwin L/V and anchored owing to
insufficient water in Ramagate.
1600
Weighed and proceeded in to Ramagate and discharged
That troops. evening was ordered to return to Dunkirk in
"Ocean Breeze" but order was cancelled as we
could not reach destination by 2130.
2nd June.
Ordered to proceed in Power Boat "Haig" with Lt. in
McMullan R.N.R. and Sub. Lt. Hollingshead
Proceeded with Marlborough in company with
company with Marlborough, Kestrel and Swallow. Cmdr.
2100
Troop R.N. in command of "Haig" and with one
lifeboat in tow.
3rd June.
0030
Approached Dunkirk; obliged to out lifeboat adrift
she became full of water and was hampering bollard.
Entered speed Dunkirk Harbour and proceeded alongside
as of "Haig" and damaging towing

Details

558
4
528
for order.
On 28/5/40 at 1735 whilstlying
at anchor off Deal fier order
were received to proceed to Dunkit
in order to evacuate troops. at
this time, owing to information
received the previous evening from
an armed merchant cruiser (see my
report on varyage ho 1) we thought that
Dunkirk was in the hands of the
every Ten minutes later we have
up ancher and proceeded to Dunkink
followed by some half dozen other
small motor vessels! We proceeded
via broys u "V" and W and
arrived off Dunkisk at about 2300
-and observed the town was in flames.
Downs to Dunkisk with 5 other
I did all the Piloting from
(ht- line close astern, including "Patria"
schoolo following in single
Cundr Pisani R.N.) the "Lwenti"
and the Rian w l waited
near the entrance, about 1/4 mile
3ra Juny.
tow. harbour. Ordered
staff and French but troops. Furthest end now
inner could find none; loaded of with harbour snggion
in German hands.
Returned Ramsgate.
Completed 5 journeys in all.

Details

PLAGE OFFICER IN CHARGE
17JUN1940
*
HARWIOH
H.M.S. "Vatchful"
547
Great Termouth.
8th June, 1940.
Sir,
I have the honour to submit the report of proceedings of the
"M" Drifters attached to Tarmouth Base (H.M.S. "Watchful") whilst
employed on Operation "Dynamo",
30.5.40. 2345. Flotilla sailed Tarmouth for Ramagate,
Good
46
567
From:- Sub. Lt. W.R. Williams, R.N.
Mm
537
Date:- 5th June, 1940.
To:-
Naval Officer in Charge, Ramagate.
30th May. Arrived Ramsgate from Portsmouth with lighter. X.209
Ordered to sands between Gravelines and Calais.
Compass error 20°. Fixed green Bight buoy
appeared to be missing.
Anchored off sands; landed in boat and searched
inland. Encountered enemy, engaged two and believe
I shot both; returned to my ship.
31st May. Followed tug to East beach at dawn. Took aboard
500 men from my boats. One boat destroyed by
bomb, two struck submerged lorries.
Left for Ramagate.
1715
Landed soldiers at Ramagate and returned Dunicipe.
led
2150
Arrived Dunkirk at dusk, heavy bombing and shelling.
Soldiers very steady and cheerful.
1st June. Landed soldiers at Ramagate at noon. Ship had been
n
in collision off Dunkirk; left her in Ramagate
us
inner harbour. Took command of a tug whose
Master refused to go to Dunkirk again and left
of
for Dunkirk. Arrived evening: very few soldiers
on beaches. Went alongside small pier at back or
harbour. Went ashore to look for troops; found
no English so loaded up with French.
2nd
June.
Arrived Ramsgate 0730. Obtained Captain Duka's
Mann,
permission to arm and command Power Boat "Swallow". xi
Arrived Dunkirk in "Swallow" at dusk. Entered
inner harbour; took off 15 men and towed & full
cutter in addition.
3rd
June.
Arrived Ramsgate in morning with loaded cutter in
tow. Left for Dunkink in afternoon; entered
inner harbour. Ordered to embark some French
staff but could find none; loaded with English
and French troops. Purthest end of harbour now
in German hands.
Returned Ramsgate.
Completed 5 journeys in all.

Details

582
552
Report of Operation "DYNAMO" from 30th May to 5th Tune 1940.
Subject :
Dynama 374 581
it
EVACUATION OF B.E.F. - NARRATIVE OF EVENTS.
551
From
THE COMMANDING WEYMOUTH. OFFICER, CONTRABAND CONTROL BASE, sex
Date
17th June, 1940.
No. 40/23.
a
To
THE FLAG OFFICER-IN-CHARGE, PORTLAND.
pose
G
With reference to your No.2912 of 6th instant, the
following reports in connection with the evacuation of
troops from Dunkirk are submitted :-
Temp. Lieutenant R.Nimmo, R.N.R.
Petty officer F.J.Norton, Pensioner.
pas.
Petty officer G. Senior, Pensioner.
Petty officer G.B.Thomas, R.N.R.
&
Leading Stoker W.A.S.Horne, R.F.R.
2. - Other officers who took part in Operation
Dynamo, have been reappointed and instructed to hand in
reports to their Commanding Officers.
UCER-IN-CHARGE 310H 310
injury
ed
JUN 1940
2
CAPTAIN.
*
RTLAND
/II.
early
on the 1st June and the engine was overhauled that day and made 115
Ior rurther service. " ᵉ left again for Dunkirk in the early evening
and on arrival OIT Dunkirk troops were again ferried for HOME time.
unfortunately in manceuvering close to the anor the crait either stuck
a submerged object or grounded and in the subsequent movements 01
engines and nelm the rudder W.S.S. LOSG. 1 eventually managed to reach
up alongside a tug, transferred the troops 1. had on Doara and unen
proceeded to 118 a jury rudder; consisting or a ladder Aashed so &
rail stantion art and with & locker door lashed at the Dottom; the
flag start acting 8.8 a tiller. This proved rairly effective and No
earried on Terrying troops until the the nad surficient and we left
in tow or the EUG. when about 15 miles off Hamagate the GOW rope parted
and we completed this latter part of the voyage under our own power

Details

582
552
Report of Operation "DYNAMO" from 30th May to 5th June 1940.
30.5.1940. 2pm. Left Sheerness in charge of Motor Hoat "Forty Two"
and a convoy of nine craft bound for Ramsgate for orders. After about
2* nours steaming the leader of the second convoy, Lt.ges1 on Dogra
"white Heather" requested me to take charge or nis convoy or nine
craft as White Heather" had broken down and was under GOW. Thereafter
proceeded with the full convoy of 18 craft and arrived OII Hamsgate
about midnight. Proceeded ashore for orders and received same, which
"were to carry on as soon as possible to Dunkirk beaches for the purpose
of ferrying troops to the larger ships at anohor. AT 9am on the 51st
May left Ramsgate escorted by d.M.Trawler towing those craft wnion
were unable to proceed under their own power. After about 2 nours
steaming the trawler requested me to carry on with the convoy as the
craft ne nad in tow were causing him some trouble with their tow ropes.
I earried on with 14 crait and arrived or the Dunkirk beach as about
9am. Throughout the day British and French troops were forried to
the various large vessels at anchor. Sometime during the night the
engines on "Forty Two" were giving trouble and as 1 nad the opportunity
of a tow back to Ramsgate where 1 might expect repairs to De executed
and as few ships seemed to be left in our immediate vicinty for the
transferrence or troops I decided to return. Arrived off hamagate early
on the 1st June and the engine was overhauled that day and made 115
IOr further service. ne left again for Dunkirk in the early evening
and on arrival OIT Dunkirk troops were again Ferried for some time.
unfortunately in manoeuvering close to the anor the craft either STROK
a supmerged object or grounded and in the subsequent movements 01
engines and nelm the rudder was lost. 1 eventually managed to reach
up alongside a tug, transferred the troops 1 had on Doara and onen
proceeded to 115 a jury rudder; consisting or at ladder Assaed to &
rail stantion art and with a locker door lashed at une oottom; the
flag stari acting as a tiller. This proved rairly effective and we
carried on ferrying troops until the tug nad surficient ind we left
in tow or the tug. when about 15 miles off Ramagate the GOW rope parted
and we completed this latter part or the voyage under our own power

Details

582
552
Report of Operation "DYNAMO" from 30th May to 5th June 1940.
30.5.1940. 2pm. Left Sheerness in charge of Motor Host "Forty Two"
and a convoy of nine craft bound for Mamsgate for orders. After about
2* nours steaming the leader of the second convoy, Lt.3eal on Dogra
"white Heather" requested me to take charge or nis convoy or nine
craft as White Heather" nad broken down and was under GOW. Thereafter
proceeded with the full convoy of 18 craft and arrived orr Mamagate
about midnight. Proceeded ashore for orders and received same, which
were to carry on as soon as possible to Dunkirk Deaches for the purpose
of ferrying troops to the larger ships at anchor. AT 9am on the plat
May left Ramsgate escorted by H.M.Trawler towing those craft wnion
were unable to proceed under their own power. After about 2 nours
E.
steaming the trawler requested me to carry on with the convoy as the
craft ne nau in tow were causing him some trouble with their tow ropes.
I earried on with 14 crait and arrived or the Dunkirk Deach at about
9am. Throughout the day British and French troops were ferrisa to
the various large vessels at anchor. Sometime during the night the
engines on "Forty Two" were giving trouble and as 1 nad the opportunity
of a tow back to Ramsgate where 1 might expect repairs so De executed
and as few ships seemed to be left in our immediate vicinty for the
transferrence OI troops I decided to return. Arrived off hamagate early
on the 1st June and the engine Was overhauled that day and made 115
Ior further service. ne left again for Dunkirk in the early evening
and on arrival OIT Dunkirk troops were again ferried for some time.
unfortunately in manoeuvering close to the anor the crait either Stuck
a submerged object or grounded and in the subsequent movements 01
engines and nelm the rudder was lost. 1 eventually managed to reach
up alongside of tug, transferred the troops 1 had on Doard and onen
proceeded to 118 a jury rudder; consisting or a ladder hasned to &
rail stantion art and with of locker door lashed at the Dottom; the
flag starf acting as & tiller. This proved rairly effective and we
carried on ferrying troops until the tug nad sufficient and 40 left
in tow or the tug. when about 15 miles off Ramagate the GOW rope parted
and we completed this latter part or the voyage under our own power

Details

583
r
contd.
and steering and was with tola jury the rmudder. craft would Berthed in Ramsgate nardou
morning be repaired 8.8 soon
I again left that in the evening with a War Dept Motor Boat arriv
Dunkirk late evening and troops were again transfer
the larger ships. When this operation was completed at sho
2am a return was made to Ramsgate. On Tuesday the 4th June
ordered to return to sheerness, out a few minutes before
the Petty Officer on the' Mermaiden" advised me he was nel
having an officer to navigate the vessel back to weymouth
myseli to Commander ----- R.N. for this Job and was told
we left at 8pm that night and arrived and perthed at weym
the next day wednesday 5th June 1940.
Leck

Details

or
83
contd.
morning and steering and was with tola jury the rmudder. craft would Berthed in Ramsgate hardour
left that evening with be repaired 8.B soon as
I Dunkirk again late in the evening and a War Dept Motor Boat arrivi
When this troops were again transfer
the larger ships. operation was completed at sho
2am a return was made to Ramsgate. On Tuesday the 4th June
ordered to return to Sheerness, out a few minutes before 0
the Petty Officer on the" Mermaiden" advised me he was neld
having an officer to navigate the vessel back to weymouth,
myself to Commander ----- R.N. for this Job and was told 1
we left at 8pm that night and arrived and berthed at weym
the next day wednesday 5th June 1940.
LeaR

Details

$ 10
5
83
contd.
and steering and was with told jury the rmudder. craft would Berthed in Ramsgate harbo
morning left that be repaired .8.8 soon
I again late in the evening with a War Dept Motor Boat arri
Dunkirk when evening and troops were again transfer
the larger ships. this operation was completed at si
2am 8. return was made to Ramsgate. On Tuesday the 4th Jur
ordered to return to Sheerness, out a few minutes before
the Petty Officer on the" "Mermaiden" advised me he was ne
having an officer to navigate the vessel back to weymout
myseli to Commander ----- R.N. for this Job and was told
we left at 8pm that night and arrived and perthed at wey
the next day wednesday 5th June 1940.
List

Details

$ 16
contd.
morning and steering and was with told jury the rmudder. craft Berthed in Ramsgate
I again left that evening with would be repaired .a.s nardour soon
Dunkirk late in the evening a War Dept Motor Boat 3.8 %
the larger ships. and troops were again transferre arrivina
2am a return was made When this operation was completed at
ordered to to Ramsgate. On Tuesday the 4th June shortly
the return to Sheerness, out a few minutes before due
Petty Officer on the Mermaiden" advised me he was neld
having an officer to navigate the vessel back to weymouth. up 1
myseli to Commander ----- R.N. for this Job and was told to
we left at 8pm that night and arrived and perthed at weymouth
the next day wednesday 5th June 1940.

Details

W.A.S. HORNE LDG. So
R.F.R. B.1672
M.L. MERMAIDE
JUNE 13th 1940.
c/o HOTER E.)
WEYMOUT
DUTY PERFORMED 34 M.L. MERMAIDEN DORS
AT EVACUATION OF DUNKIRK.
Lept Heyminth of procession to .) we
& / 2 Maid RNR
Wed 29/5/40, went to Sharmes, There 30/5/40, of was put 555
am
its Ldg Sho Williams of Devenport RNB. (Chrishian name 098- to
kswain of a small open moha boat named Two Revers:
all
to (Chrissian name & off be not known) and molored
known) to drive the mober, and Sea horris RNRof Lowshoff
Lobs b Dunkish to help evacuak she Goldiers from she
to
ch, sharted arriving at Dunkirk early hours of frid morning
beach to bring of Proofs b HMS.Winchelsea See eng on
prove
camships m work the under surf East of the which Dunkirk be was of piers presty her as a heavy 4 Heamship gave of some logh f decided to shelter one of
P
falls which were hanging from her davits
In
heligged has as a boat rope made first to the s/s sterm
get our boat out clean of he Gurf, bout
/
chelsea in she morning when going in from the
we out which I think was lowing to the shock of
for load of Folders our engine
k
coge explosion of the bombs which in is were the dropping
9
a
around, we carried on beach of
raded up with Goldiers hauled out our boat be per
4 boat cope regged to the Oftern of the steamship who
gnabed to motor lannch which gave us her sofe
d howed us to the Winchelsea and continued lo low
when
going alonglide of Winchelsea with the last load
to and fro, all the daywill lake in the evening
6
eart ordered us she Crew of the: Two Rivers abound
nk
ach h Dover and then went on to Pharmeses ready
Gless and could only drift about we were brought
with the molor broke down and baking we were
and
ady to take another boat acrosses if needed

Details

$ 10
5
83
contd.
morning and steering and was with tola jury the rmudder. Berthed in Ramsgate
I again left that craft would be repaired ,8.8 na
Dunkirk late in the evening with a War Dept Motor Boat BOOK
the larger evening and troops were again tran a
2am ships. when this operation was completed at
8. return was made to Ramsgate. On Tuesday the 4th :
ordered to return to Sheerness, but a few minutes before
the Petty Officer on the Mermaiden" advised me he was I
having an officer to navigate the vessel back to weymou
myself
to
587
W.o.d
TO
we lei
the ne
The crew behaved extrements well in
duty carrying on all the while and
continual air bombardment T machis
fire from shore bathery firing across
to the finish and being web through 4
noh stopping or having anything to eat
all she croldiers had to be dragged a
had to wode out in the our up
at times to get to our boar. and with their
equipment on were helpless in she was
G.B Phomas Sea P.O.R.N.

Details

601
2
566
led for Hun kish at 0 300 on heay 31ˢᵗ
8
anse of speeds.
th borough", their T slower to process independently "Lady to me
pany with Q "No. meen's 101" Channel & ordered Hoppers
jallions Reach and Queenischamel assued at the
each to the East of Hem kisk Newbour at about osio
may 31ˢᵗ.
Lnd
Their to the effing like we could only take
gallions Reach eventually managed to get about
few tooops mising the forenoon and early efternom.
official attached to the army.
one Belgian soldies and me French potal
123 French and British troops, including
at The Hoppers sailed independently from Huntrite
discretion various times rusing the evening at the
Hun of the Skippers tsailed from
time kirk 3,st in " fallion's Reach at 2230 m
of
twas set considerably H my coutse in takin
Ouring to enemy air attack during the night
avoiding action and tid not asswe at
Ramsjalie until about 700 on time in
whence troops. twas ordered to margate to disembath
1 & I : 1
clear general of the suit, throw a propert line to the pulling boats
and then tow them out to the ships. One boat, heavily
laden with men in full equipment capsised just as it
we managed to recover one who revived after
was reaching us. most of the men sank like stones treatment. but
While doing this our screws became foul of some
obstacle and rendered useless. In spite
sunken of the anchor and vain efferts by other boats, the strong
suit and ebbing tide soon drove us aground.