TNA ADM 199 795

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CONFIDENTIAL.
405
H.M.S. 'EXCELLENT",
6th June, 1940.
Sir,
I have the honour to forward a report of the operations carried out by the Naval Beach Staff at Bray during the ambar emabarkation of the BritiMsh Expeditionary Force on Thursday and Friday, 30th and 31st May, 1940.
2. Oz: antival sit. Dover with the other Lieutanants selected for service at Dunkilck, the situation was briefly explained by
Commander M.G. Goodenough. He gave us the necressary orders for policing the beaches and expediting the embarkation as much as not to be exposed to danger and that we were to evacuate the possible. A definite stipulation was that Naval personnel were beaches as soon as enemy action made the risk serious.
3. At 2000 we 29 embarked in H.M.S." "ESK" with about 60 ratings have a party of onez Petty Officer, one Leading Seaman, two Able
Each of the twelve officers in charge of embarkation were to
Seaman and a Signalman.
The ship sailed for Dunkirk at 2045
and, attached to the beaches explained our duties in greater detail.
en route, Rear Admiral Wake-Walker and the Commodores and 4. the parties of ratings. Commodore Hallett, who was him in charge at
At 0125, I was landed at Bray with three other officers of the beach as a whole, remained afloat. We never saw towed all,as I believe his boat broke down and he had to be naval
It was obvádus that clear of the danger area.
personnel then waiting on the beach. They were all very were needed for the embarkation of the large number tired of and troops to get off the beach at any cost. Some that had been by waitin for 48 eager hours and all had witnessed the bombing the day best
The system that produced
German aircraft. to organize them into a long queue at thex each were of results was embarkation points at Bray beach. The this queues number the three and were spaced out in groups of ten, The being most could be used for shoving off as to at boat, bar three deep suitable for the types of boat available. loaded which took at to the sea. The Army pontoon construction following group good deal of moving at half tide owing boats proved most suitable handiness. Fortunately the weather and gentle running parallel owing to their draught, double ended was favourable for the operations, breeze assisting in the recovery seems and general the sea remaining calm all of drifting day as craft.
Northerly sky and the presence of our fighter bombing. patrols
An to overcast have deterred the enemy aircraft from
5. The take main charge of the outgoing boats soldiers and bring detailed back to difficulty lay in the insufficiency of them naval ratings to the did not carry out return CANADA for the operation.
to the drifting boats, order, causing a delay blame them as it was clearly made our to this effect and it was that up responsibility.
One can hardly for more ratings and a signal was arrived.
from I asked outlying warships. However, none handicap was the bad communication substitute between ships for and 6. shore Another Lamp. A motor Semaphore cycle was headlamp not easy is a and poors we failed to find the an and W/T Aldis sets that had been promised at Dover.
It was neccessary at one

Lynam. 169.
437
9889
From The Assistant Senior Naval Officer, Dunkirk.
( Carmend
407
To The Senior Naval Officer, Dunkirk.
6th. June 1940.
пето Vedid end ml Vines Dolneq sno JE
Narrative of events at Dunkirk 26th May - 2nd. June 1940
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Sunday 26th. May.
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Left London for Dover at 2025. Captain Tennant was on train
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Arrived Dover 2300. Proceeded to Dover Castle where I found to White bed 9W 8.6 guijatoq
Captain Denny and Commdr. Goodenough who had been sent to reinforce
Dover staff. Captains Dundas and Hollifax subsequently arrived.
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Held conference throughout night, eventually getting to bed at
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Monday 27th. May.
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Captain Tennant arrived at 0900.
asw dosed edd no accord and 10 Joubres sift.8
I proceeded to the Lord Warden and collected 8 Officers and 160
,T9DTO edd to brie emitglosib riens men, plus signal staff. They were divided into groups of 20 men from e.BW sibstogs edit asbitti motveried ThedT.admisIquos VIIB breed each with a Commander or a Lieutenant Commander in charge of each
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group. They were all provisioned for two days, and the Officers,
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most of whom had arrived with nothing were served out with pistols visittinI viriod 38
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and steel helmets. Water bottles were also provided and filled.
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Lieutenant Commander Butler from Chatham Barracks was of the nedd BSW odw, улопо arts 20 volmixorq greatest assistance to me during the whole of these proceedings.
I reported to Dover Castle at Noon that the party was equipped moeted leven Jsdj Dermoint B.6W I IE\0010 JR.e ymhlleda JOSSETO off. It myst Je DJ
and ready to proceed to the destroyer in which they were to sailed embark.
ST Telbeging sdd TOT Jeod E doest of JUC news vásátls had WISST Ismigiro THE ml 1.0000
1345 Embs ked in H.M.S. "WOLFHOUND" at Submarine Base and
Ils J801 I of 6mSA
VM JB 190 mid your OJ 9W adud for Dunkirk. Captain Tennant addressed the men and told them evijoette Jaris Beaneq
Juods VITIST becloof nede nosed To briefly what their mission was.
Is,Veb add as gniwol,Io] of ed 9'13"
of enemy air attacks were delivered on the Commanding way across and noved had SW
by A bombers number but the ship was skilfully handled by her no 3480 to nedd had on 5% of
Officer, and no damage was sustained.
9T9W 03 бептител I
Dunkirk at 1750. Whilst berthing at
Wharf Arrived another at air attack was made by the enemy but the ship was brought alongside.
safely accompanied by Commander Ellwood and myself Officer together of
The S.N.O. and Major McCarthy, and the Commanding town to the with the "WOLFHOUND" the General disembarked and walked through the

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Bastion, the Headquarters of the Amiral Nord.
The town was heavily on fire, the streets being littered with wreckage of all kinds, and every window was smashed. Great palls of smoke from the oil depots and refineries enveloped the docks and town itself., continual bombardment and series of air raids was being directed against Dunkirk, and on our way up to the
Bastion we had to take shelter from two more raids by enemy bombers, the bombs from the last of which fell unpleasantly close. There were a number of British troops in the town, and we passed a good few dead and wounded in the streets, evidently the victims of victims of these air raids.
conference was held at the Bastion with the military authorities and with the B.N.L.O. who were of the opinion that it would not be possible to use the port of Dunkirk itself for evacuating the trooops on account of the fierce air attacks and bombardment. It was pointed out that if the embarkation was carried out from the beaches it would take very much longer, the rate of embarking from & pier or jetty being five or six times asprapid.
The beach parties had, in the meantime, been landed under their officers, and they were ordered to rest and to take what shelter they could.
The S.N.O. ordered the "WOLFHOUND" to sail and anchor in the roads and to act as Wireless link. "WORCESTER" was already anchored in the Roads, and visual communication was established with her from the top of the Bastion.
I proceeded with the S.N.O. and other officers to see the state of affairs on the beaches, and also to see whether the
Eastern arm could not be used for bringing destroyers and other ships alongside
We went down the beaches as far as Bray. The sends were thick with troops, who were clustered together in great groups. They to be thickest at Malo les Bains, small town fire about a appeared mile to the eastward of Dunkirk. Malo itself was on and burning fiercely.

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The S.N.O. addressed several groups of these men, enjoining them to keep calm and to keep as much as possible under cover.
He told them that there were plenty of ships coming and that they would all be able to embark and get back to England safely. His words had a very heartening effect upon them.
A signal was made to Dover asking for alli available craft the S.N.O. decided to make use of the beaches and of the Eastern Arm for embarking troops.
During our walk along the beaches we had noticed some small boats coming in each of which went off with its load of troops. These boats were not, however, coming in sufficient numbers.
We returned to the Bastion, and awaited the dawn.
"WOLFHOUND" and"NORCESTER" had been sailed for England to both full of troops.
10
Tuesday 28th. May.
The S.N.O. went down to the Pier to see what the dawn might and I went down to the beaches to await the dawn there.
bring vessels or small craft put in an appearance, but berthed later on
Very few and other vessels started to arrive and were ered to destroyers the East Pier. The men opposite Malo were or almost inside march into Dunkirk and by Noon the beaches there were clear of troops.
I returned to Dunkink and eported the position to the
S.N.O.
meantime many more destroyers and small craft and I including some Torpedo Boat which had arrived, and On our way to
In the Dutch Scoots had arrived off Bray Beaches, went in her took a Motor of the embarkation down there. opened fire
Bray to take we charge were attacked by three Heinkels, He but plunged we into down there guns and brought one of down. smoke with the sea our leaving machine nothing but a cloud

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I ordered the Dutch Scoots to anchor as close to the shore as possible and the destroyers to send all their boats to ferry the troops between the shore and the Scoots. As soon as the Scoots were full they were told to go alonside the destroyers and to discharge their trooops, and then to return to their position near the beach. In this way we were able to get some four thousand men away during the afternoon and evening. I returned to Dunkirk and reported to the S.N.O.,after which I went down to the beaches in the M.T.B. once more, to make sure that operations were to continue throughout the night. About another 3/4000 men were got away during the night. The 1ST,B. was sent home as she was running short of fuel.
Captain Bush arrived this evening and had 3 conference with the S.N.O.
Wednesday 29th. May.
I took Captain Bush down to Bray by the N.T.B. in which he had arrived to show him what was being done. A large number of destroyers and sloops had arrived during the night, number of which I ordered to proceed to Dunkirk to embark troops.
A northerly wind had got up during the night and had made a nasty lop on the beach. This made embarkation very difficult
Boats were being swamped and the whole operation badly retarded.
There remained no doubt in my mind that the major effort would have to be made at the Eastern Arm,and the risk of loss of ships accepted. I returned to Dunkirk and reported to the S.N.O.
accordingly. Orders were passed for the majority of troops on the beaches to be marched to Dunkirk, but sufficient were to be left to enable the beach embarkation to proceed.
number of ships, personnel ships, sloops and other Any craft were berthed alongside the mole today, and we wealeft in comparative peace by enemy aircraft until the evening when in fierce air attacks were made. These resulted a series of being bombed while embarking troops. It looked to the
H.M.S. "GRENADE" that she might sink and block the entrance and
Harbour, for the but moment & trawler and drifter were sent to assist her,

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managed to guide her into a pocket to the westward of the main channel. She burned fiercely for some hours and eventually blew up with a loud explosion.
A Traw ler was also bombed and sank in the channel about 100
yards from the east pier, about three cables in from the East light house.
The transport FENELLA was sunk while loading at the ouside extremity of the Eastern Arm. She was practically fully loaded, but the troops were transferred to another ship with very little loss.
The troop transport CRESTED EAGLE was bonbed and rendered impotent. She drifted down towards Bray,where she ran aground.
A "J" Class destroyer was bombed off the beaches and was taken in tow by another destroyer.
Earlier in the day the transport PRINX MONA'S JISSI had been mined and had sunk about 2 miles Bast of Dunkirk.
The enemy air attacks and bombardment had been particularly ferocious today, but despite the losses we had sustained the rate of embarkation of troops had been extremely good.
It was decided by the S.N.O. that on the following day only one ship at a time should enter Dunkirk and noor alongside the arm, as four or five ships being alongside at one time offered too large and tempting target for the Heinkels.
We had hoped that ships would enter by night, but nothing did so - a matter of some disappointment to us.
We got a hospital ship in after dark today. She was ordered to Monitor Wharf - & considerable risk, as the wharf was being unceasingly shelled. I supervised the transport of some 270
walking wounded, and a full load of stretcher cases. Unfortunately set which had taken place an hour or so before had ship a an tanker air raid opposite Monitor Wharf on fire and the hospital back illuminated. This brought the bombers was and thus two attacks brightly were made on her from the air i the bombs hit the wharf ship got safely away.
A but number the of Naval Officers arrived this evening to reinforce the beach
The only parties, vessels to arrive this tonight were two drifters

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and a trawler which were loaded with 500 troops and sailed for home.
I afterwards visited the burning wreck of H.M.S. "GRENADE"
in the Drifter "LORD CAVAN" in which the S.N.O. was flying his broad pendant. The vessels was a white hot mass and there could have been no doubt that the confidential matter had been destroved
Thursday 30th May.
No ships had entered the Port of Dunkirk last night.
The Transport "KING ORRY" which had endeavoured to enter the port yesterday evening despite signals made to her to keep out, was attacked by bombers when she was attempting to turn in the
Western basin, and was damaged by & near miss. Although her engines remained undamaged, her steering gear was put out of action and in her attempt to get alongside the 3 stern Mole,she ranned and made a breach in the mole itself, thus rendering 8 great length of the mole inaccessible to troops Ships had accordingly carried to be berthed to the landward side of this gap, The KING ORRY herself but was making water, and it was decided, although she had managed to get alongside, that it would be undesirable to embark troops in her. She was, however, advised to sail, making use of her engines to clear the harbour and to navigate to England. I SAW her sail at about 2.30 a.m. and she managed to clear the mouth of the harbour. She was making water, and sunk about 4 cables outside the harbour entrance. Her crew or the majority of then were resoued.
We were in urgent need of ships but none came, and at
10000 signal was received from PRINCESS MAUD to sar that she
& fired at by shore butteries 5 ailes to the westward of had been that in consequence of this she had turned back German to
Dunkirkand Dover. This was proved to be erroneous, as there were no batteries in this position.
advised ще that he was proceeding to G.H.V. of to
The S.N.O. and instructed ne to carry out the duties decision S.N.O.
Dunkirk, see Lord in Gort, his absence. It will be remembered that the
She we hit 3 times bad 3 Kollow wounded,

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to admit only one ship at a time was agreed upon, and this routine was scrupulously carried out for the forenoon and early afternooon
Towards the close of the day a great number of ships had arrived and I accordingly decided to accept the risk of further losses and ordered the vessels waiting in the Roads to proceed alongside and to embark troops. Strong air attacks were launched by the enemy, but fortunately they were mostly concentrated against wrecks in the roads. Times and time again they sent waves of bombers and directed their attack not against our ships loading troops but only against these wrecks in the Roads. Te got a great deal of amusement and satisfaction from this, for loading was proceeeding apace with no casualties. It the same time I decided that the rate of embarkation must in some way be speeded up,as the capacity of the ships now alongside was more than adequate for the rate of the flow of troops. This landour vessels open to attack from the air, and consequent further losses. I therefore went down to the Eastern Arm and rigged up & loud speaker and addressed the troops in the following terms "Renember your Pals,
Boys. The quicker you get on board the more of then will be saved".
This worked like 8 miracle. The thousands of troops tired, depressed, and without food and water for days, broke into & more double and kept it up for the whole length of the Eastern Arm for than hours. During that period I estimate that more
15,000 than two troops were embarked. The Army certainly resconded splendid ly.
the ships which had arrived were fully loaded during and
All more the traffic came to & standstill intense sailed, the dark but hours. once The bombardment of the part became more today.
Friday 31st. May.
dawn came more ships who were filled ID in
With the the embarkation proceeded apace. operation We were spared went good time, and this forenoon, and the wh le of troops ahead intensive without bombing much interference. in enormous number

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wereembarked.
The bombardment however became more intense and a great deal more accurate. The enemy were finding the approaches to the mole, and also the range of our headquarters. Very heavy air attacks were delivered during the "Evening Hate" but were again concentrated on derelict ships in the roads. Dive bombing attacks were carried out on the ships loading but without success. The embarkation proceeded smoothly.
I asked the R.A. Dover with his Flag in "KEITH" to send destroyers to Dunkirk to provide A.A. protection for these attacks but he replied that none were available. This was unfortunate as we were running out of ammunition onshore. I was getting a little uneasy as the bombardment had fired the magazine about
100 yards behind our Headquarters, and the French Officers kindly informed me that it was liable to explode at any noment.
However, it didnt.
The S.N.O. returned in the evening and we attended & confer ence between the French General, (dmiral Abrian, General Alexander
G.O.C., British Force,. Brigadier Parminter, Commander Henderson, the B.N.L.O. Captain Tennant and I were present. The plans of the
British and French Generals were at variance. The British plan for evacuation was to be carried out in accordance with V. Dover's
Most Secret Memorandum of 30th May. The French however considered that the evacuation should be spread over a longeryberiod of 4 or
5 days. It was not the opinion of General Mexander that the port of Dunkirk could be held for that length of time, and he stated that if his view were correct, that there could only result a situation where many of his rear guard would be taken prisoner.
The Generals decided to refer the matter to their respective
Governments, and General Alexander telephoned to Mr. inthony Eden.
As a result it WAS decided to stick to the original plan of immediate withdrawal rather than to accept the French plan of a prolonged operation.
An incident this evening was that on returning to the Noval
Headquarters with Commander Henderson after the meeting,a shell

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burst close to us and threw us off our feet. Henderson was wounded in the neck and the back and after dressing him, sent him onboard a destroyer for passage to England.
I should like to pay my tribute to Commander Henderson who proved himself a loyal and gallant Officer, and who was quite unmoved however black things night look. His cheerfulness and sangfroid was an example to everyone. Coupled with his name I
should like to mention Paymaster Lieutenent Brockett.
A signal was sent to V. Dover informing him that lights would be exhibited on the Piers at Dunkirk in order that ships might make the entrance at night.
Despite this only one ship enetered Dunkirk during the dark hours and that was the destroyer "IVANHOB".
Saturday 1st June.
Ships continued to arrive and embarkation proceeded satisfactorily.
More air attacks were experienced and our losses mounted up. KRITH and IVANHOE were bombed and MOSQUITO on her way to entering the port WAS bombed and sunk. The enemy carried out very severe bombing attacks on vessels which were loaded with troops and which were on their way home.
It was therefore decided not to continue the daylight ear barkation but to carry on the evacuation at night only.
At 2130 I proceeded to the mouth of the harbour in & motor by & Dutch Naval Officer with a Dutch naval crew boat and led commanded ships into harbour and allocated to then their berths, any
2300 all the night had grown pitch dark, and sometimes once as
By were endtering the port of Dunkirk at as 6 or 7 craft leaving at the same time. All were without whilst others were can be too high for the seamenship displar- alonglights, and no praise Sloops, Transports and other craft coming collision.
side ed by Destro ers, the Mole. I did not witness & single Embarkation and leaving French troops had collected at the were sent
Pier A large in the number Western of Harbour and the requisire vessels thither her propellers The Dutch Motor and her speed was reduced to 6 knots. sccordingly to embark them. Boat collected a long length of net I round

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ordered him to return to Dover, taking with him as many troops as he could carryBe left at 0230 on the 2nd. June.
Sunday 2nd. June.
We had arranged for Commander Ellwood and myself to remain with the S.N.O. till the end, but Commander Surteeps and Commander Gotto refused to leave, as they. considered that there was yet work for them to do. The work of these two Officers the former at
Naval Headquarters and the latter controlling the troop movements on to the Eastern Arm, cannot be described by words of mine.
Suffice it to say that they were never for one moment absent from their posts,in the face of heavy bombardment and air attack and that they carried out their duties with a sense of courage and cheerfulness which must have been a fine example taxther not only to the ratings left with them but to the troops.
On returning to the Harbour I discovered that the drifter
"LORD CAVAN" - our Depot Ship had been sunk by shellfire.
Sunday June 2nd.
As it had been decided to cease evacuation of troops by daylight, there remained little to do during the daylight hours today. We were prepared to make 3 naximum effort tonight to get away the remainder of the B.S.F. There were roughly 4,300
of the rearguard troops to be embarked, which had been withdrawn, according to plan, from the front linde positions.
The position was becoming critical. The Germans were at 1000
to have penetrated important positions surrounding whether reported and it waas for see time questionable as to last
Dunkirk, to carry out the evacuation of this we would be able The hours went by and it was established ships were that the force of troops. had checked the enemy's advance. No air
French troops day, and we were subjected to very intense to move admitted attacks and by bombardment, the enemy having been able up his At artillery 2130 I took due up to my our position withdrawal. at the end of the Bestern Mole

Дурошь 380. -
B14/0/
** TRANSPORTS, WESDO, LONDON."
418
15129
ABBEY 7711.
, further communication on this
MINISTRY OF SHIPPING,
448
should be addressed to:- -
Director of Sen Transport,
(address as opposite)
BERKELEY SQUARE HOUSE, me following number quoted: -
BERKELEY SQUARE,
ONFIDENTIALY
LONDON, W.I.
29th June, 1940.
om
Vice Admiral,
Dover.
1
of
The accompanying report from Commander S.R. Lewis, d
D.S.C., R.N. (Retd.) is forwarded for consideration when making your recommendations to the Admiralty as
:-
to the recognition of the services of personnel engaged in the evacuation of the B.E.F.,
A
.
a
VICE ADMIRAL
Rear-Admiral, vic
Naval Assistant to the
Director of Sea Transport.
-2 JUL 1940
*
DOVER

NAME 10JUN1940 ASSISTANT *
Dynam 390.
41 KNIGHTSBRIDGE COURT
419
SLOANE STREET.
419
LONDON.
S.W.I.
*
D. of G.
8th JUNE 1940.
Sir,
With reference to my report dated the 5th June - on page 6 I
refer to three signalmen who were drafted to my staff at Dunkirk from the Royal Naval Barracks Chatham but at the time of making out the report I was unable to give full details as to their names, official numbers etc. I have been in communication with the Drafting Office of that establishment and give hereunder the full information. I would again reimerate my request that these men and particularly the firstnamed should recive e some form of recognition for their services both before the arrival " of the Naval Party under Captain W.O.Tennant R.N.
and also during the period that officer Y&S in charge of operations.
RATING
D.N.
NAME
Richard 7. JONES
Signalman (Active service)
C/JX 144282
Signalman (R.N.V.R)
C/TDX 1412
James S. Duffy
Signalman (R.V.V.R)
C/LDX 4178
Ronald 3. Walters
I have the honour to be,
SIR,
Your obedient servant,
COMMANDER. R.N.

L50
41 KNIGHTSBRIDGE COURT
420
SLOANE STREET.
LONDON. S.W.1
5th JUNE 1940
Sir,
I haveto report as follows on my sativities during the period
20th May until 1st June:-
cavied
After arriving back at Dunkirk from Ostend (having A out the evacuntion of British refugees from that port and also completed a reconnaissance of the docks - which has since been lost) I received telephone instructions from P.S.T.O. French Ports through Commander E.P.
Henderson R.N. the British Naval Liaison Officer that I was to take charge of the port and relieve Lieutenant-Commander W.R.Dunnett R.N.R
who at that time was S.T.O in charge. This message I received about
1630 on 20th May.
I attended & conference at Headquarters at which the newly appointed Area Commander - Colonel Whitfeld - presided; the remaining officers present being the B.N.L.O; the representative of The Director of Docks; representative of Supply and Transport) and various Movement Control officers. At this conference the President intimated that we were to prepare to evacuate between 2000 and 2500 troops
(useless mouths as he called them): to land supplies, petrol and ammunition and to embark about 35qofficers and sen plus about 25
vehicles of the Air Component. After this conference I returned to
S.T,O's office where I started to take over from Lieut-Comdr. Dummett but as there were so many decisions to make and orders to give 1
I he D
May upl report tele

OSA
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ecided to postpone this until the next day. I learned from military ources tant one ship with 300,000 rations (approximately 700 tons)
ould be ready to sail on 21st and another with 200,000 rations on he following day both for Dunkirk although it was not clear from which ort they would sail. In order that I should know the total number of ritish ships in the port I sent Lieutenant J.Swinsco R.N.R. to obtain his information which proved to be:-
1) S.S.Belwyn
2) S.S.Bawtry
3) S.S.Dover Abbey
1) S.S.Rupera (?)
On the following day (Tuesday 21st) I gave orders that *Sawtry*
buld be required for R.A.F personneland vas to sail as soon as they id embarked but owing to the state of the tide and the look gates the rsonnel were embarked in another ship and "Sawtry" vas, 1 think, sunk the harbour by & bomb. "Rupera" apparently sailed without orders but le remaining two vessels I took over in the name of the Minister of ipping and instructed the masters to await orders re sailing from ne d that these would not be given until arrangements had been made to
11 them with troops.
During the afternoon Lisutenant-Commander R.A.3.Villians R.Y
ported for duty but at the same time Lieut-Comdr, Dunnett was wounded aessitating his evacuation home - in the meantine he Tas placed in &
ench hospital. It was during this somewhat exciting period that some mbers of P.S.T.O's staff arrivedviz: Lieutemant Commander V.R.Seymour
N.V.R., Lieutenant W.Blandy R.N.V.R., Paymaster Lieutenant N.L.V.

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Ruoff R.N.R. with instructions that they were to re-join the Commodore if possible at Wimereux. As this was absolutely out of the question
I co-opted them onto my staffand they remained as my assistants until they left for the United Kingdom on 29 th May. I found Lieutenant
Blandy's knowledge of the port invaluable particularly as My predecessor had been wounded before he had been able to turn over to me and I was working rather in the dark.
The principle I adopted after consultation with Lieutenant-
Colonel Jesper who took over the duties of Director of Docks was to use the Monitor Quay for hospital ships and personnel ships and use those berths in the docks which were the most suitable for our purpose after making the necessary arrangements with the French authorities and I was given to understand that the only commodities with which TO
wouldbe called upon to deal were supplies, ammunition and petrol. Lieut-
Comdrs. Seymour and Williams I placed in charge of Monitor Quay and
Lieuts. Swinsco and Blandy of the other berths in the port. It was
JNC
hoped to embark wounded and personnel during the whole 24 hours whereas the store and other ships would work from 0500 until 2200 < this reduced hours of unloading was due to lack of properly shaded lights and also to the scarcity of skilled stevedores. A number of air raids occurred of during the day but between raids Colonel Jesper and I managed to call upon and make ourselves known to most of the French Port Officials.
Alll these gentlemen were very helpful but made us realise that French supplies for both the military and civilain population were arriving in the port and that we were not in & position to pick and choose our berths without consulting them but that we should have to work vis-a-vis to remanager consult tely out
Port Officials.
ned as my ass)
realise that From ay. I found ainsten were arriving pick and choose our articularly as My

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42353
the French authorities
On my return to my office I found Lieutenant Nettle R.N.R. of
S.T.O's staff with instructions to obtain from me an appreciation of
10 situation; this I give hereunder:-
The situation varies from raid to raid. At the moment nearly normal and there are a few tugs and pilots. The Engineer of the Port's office is open. Police de Navigation is run by the French Naval Authorities the office is in the abri and is functioning fairly normally. Ship due at 1430 has not yet arrived (1520); she is for personnel. Two store ships expected with rations this afternoon, all arrangements made for their discharge etc. Lieut-Comdr. Dummett wounded in air raid yesterday being evacuated in personnel ship to-day. Main water supply in the town appears to be out of action but auxiliary supply in & few hotels (where staff are living) in fair order. Gas is out off in certain parts but electricity functioning. Fetrol tanks still ablaze unfortunately adding
& smoke screen to enemy aircraft. Food shortage acute particularly bread. Town largely evacuated, local dock labour being supplemented for discharging our ships by No.151 Construction Company. Large number of unarmed Belgian soldiers about the town yesterday, majority have disopeared. Reported that 60 stevedores arriving in this afternoon's store ship. Communications poor; civil line phone 1244 working intermittently direct line to Bastion 32 working at the moment; military line out of order."
During the night (22/23rd) repeated air raids or bombardments as
16 French call them took place and I decided that if they continued ctra staff would be required in order that officers night obtain some

ESD
5.
454
424
sleep sometime during the 24 hours.
23/5
We discharged supplies from M.V.Sodality during the day and in her I sent back and urgent message to D.S.T.O Dover that ships must bring with themgear for discharging cargo and that there were still several cranes in action. Unloading continued hampered many times by air raids but considering these inconveniences the amount discharged was very satisfactory. The labour employed was largely men from No.
151 Railway Construction Company under Major Edwards and although an appreciation of their work will doubtless be forwarded from another source I must take this opportunity of expressing my praise at the way they not only carried out this - to them - strange work but also the manner in which they returned to it after every raid.
22/5
About 2115 one destroyer and two hospitals sailed and about 0400
M.V.Sodality sailed having been delayed by the tide. Although communications were extremely poor I managed to get a signal passedto D.S.T.O
Dover regarding the sailing of the four ships with & request that the information should be forwarded to the Ministry of Shipping and Mar
Office (Searail 3).
Difficulty was experienced in obtaining reliable information from the look-out station at the lighthouse 30 I asked that three saval
-81b signal ratings should be sent out and these duly arrived. 1 billetted them with the French in the lighthouse and having given them a list of ship's lettersof those requisitioned ships which were likely to be employed in such shallow wateri instructed them to report to the office the names of ships arriving or leaving. They proved of the greatest assistance to se and when the remainder of the Sea Transport Staff left that there were

ASA
6.
425
455
(see later) I transferred these three ratings over to the naval party where their services were much appreciated. The names of these three men were:- Signalman Jones; Signalman Walters and Ordinary Signalman
Duffey and I would especially recommend the former and senior for his cheerful bearing under most trying circumstances and for his complete disregard of danger in carrying out his duties and I am convinced that his example influenced the remaining two men who carried out their duties equally efficiently..
On the following day an elaborate programme was made out for arrivals and departures but this was entirely upset by enemy action in various ways 0,8, the Tristram lock was damaged and put temporarily out of action; the electric current was cut and no cranes or lights could operate during the greater part of the day and as & large proportion of the crews of the ships had disappeared into various abris ship's derricks could not be worked. The result was that the discharge vas considerably reduced.
During the day the two ships 1 had taken over (*Selwyn* and
"Dover Abbey") sailed on my instructions conveying apart from a full shipload of troops the surplus staff from P.S.T.O's officei.e. 4
marines and 3 writers. At the same time 1 took the opportunity of sending Lieutenant Blandy over to the D.S.P.O.Doverfand also to the
Vice-Admiral to explain to them the situation in Dunkirk and the
To
Jail to difficulties obtaining - particularly those in connection withche
90
of communications both internal and external.
of
AT THIS STAGE MY ROUGH DIARY CRASED AND THE REMAINDER 03 THIS REPORT
IS FROM MEMORYAND IN VIEW OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES IS NOT ENTIRELY RELIABLE
carried

456
7.
426
The "bombardments" continued incessantlyduring the next day nd more hangars and buildings in the dock area were either destroyed
I set on fire, one of the results being thatthe crews of our ships entirely disappeared and more often than not were never seen again
702
resumably evacuating themselves in one personnel ship or another as hese ships were still embarking & certain number of refugees. It was
9615
think on the morning of the 26th that I found the troops who were lischarging a storeship beating a retreat from an abri in which they had aken shelter during a raid and which was almost entirely surrounded by fire. It was the same morning that I found the M.V.Spinnel alongside hangar which was burning furiously - both the contents and the buildng itself. I decided that the vessel must be moved into a safer berth поілтодото further along the same quay but clear of flames. The only member of the rew who could be found was the chief mate (an Irishman)and with the
Assistance of & handful of soldiers and an abandoned R.A.F. lorry we managed to tow her some 200 yards up the jetty and clear of any danger.
It was during the same day that I was informed that the Tristram look ates had been so badly damaged that they would have to be removed and he port would have perforce to become tidal. In view of this added ifficulty the Amiral du Nord (Admiral Abrial) appointed & port commission to onsisting of:-
rench representatives aptain.Etienne Chiou (?) Chief of Staff to Admiral Abrial
Director of Port
..Delattre
Engineer of the Port.
aptain Kernheis
Police de Navigation olonel Memel
Representing the Governor of the Town aptain Ladent
Military authorities.
ritish representatives
BACALIER
Ich
100928

8.
42457
British Representatives.
Lieut Colonel Jesper.
Commander E.R.Lewis
At the first meeting held in the abri of the office of the
Ponts et Chaussees Major-General Lindsell opened the proceedings by appealing to the members that they should give eachother every assistance and work for the mutual benefit of both France and England.
Certain decisions were taken and everything was arranged in armost amicable manner.
Work continued under extremely difficult conditions when Comdr.
Musson R.N.R. arrived with Lieutenants McEwen and Whittle R.N.R. By this time close co-operation with the military authorities and the
Admiral (through the B.N.L.O) was essential 30 I placed Commander
Musson in charge of the S.T.O's office and set up my own in the
Bastion 32 next door to the B.N.L.O.
I attended another conference presided over by Major-General
Lindsell when he informed us the-t the Tax Cabinet had decided to evacuate the B.3.F. through Dunkirk using the beaches as much as possible and the hole alongside which several ships could borth at the same time. Captain W.G.Tennant and at naval staff would arrive as soon as they could be got together to organise therecuation but that meanwhile all available ships should be utilised to embark troops.
I had to report that the dook area had become almost untenable and that it was doubtful if we should be able to discharge any more cargo from ships.

428
9.
45
During the forenoon of 29th I received a message from S.T.O's that the building next door had been hit. by an incendary ffice omb and that it was considered desirable to evacuate it and would find alternative accommodation. I spent some time arranging for his and finally settled to share the abri office of the Police de lavigation close to the Tristram lock. The staff was preparing to nove into this office when H.M.S.Wolfhound arrived with the naval party under Captain Tennant/for the final evacuation. After consultation with Captain Tennant, and as the port was entirely out of action for Sea Transport work except personnel and this was being taken ove by the Navy I decided to send my staff home to the United Kingdom.
the orders to the military were to "travel light" and that no kit of any sort should be taken I gave the same orders to the staff and thi order accounts for the fact that on arrival noone had any gear with him. On arrival in England they were instructed to report to the nearest D.S.T.O. for further orders.
In view of the fact that I was au fait with the port generally and knew personnallyall the local French and military authorities
Captain Tennant accepted my offer to remain and assist him to the best of my ability. The naval party finally embarked on the night of
June 1st/2nd and I arrived in Dover during the forenoon of Sunday 2nd
June reporting my arrival to the D.S.T.O of that port.
I have the honour to be,
SIR,
Your obedient servant
COMMANDER.
R.N.

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430 459
Summary of Reports concerning the Evacuation of Troops from the Dunkirk Area - May 27th - June 4th, 1940.
10.
MISCELLANEOUS REPORTS.
Small Vessels Pool. 46/
Foreign Office - Letter of appreciation of services of three
Officers. 465
Narrative Account of Small Motor Boats. 166
List of Men who Signed T.124 Agreement. 274
P.47
H.M.S. VEGA Submarine Search and on Patrol 28th - 31st May, 1940.
Analysis of Troops disembarked. +77
Officers reporting at Sheerness. 502
Use of Landing Craft. 50st
Ramsgate & Margate - Reports from Base Departments. P 53L
Summary of Reports from C.-in.-C. Sheerness. 551
Letter from C.R.G. recommending the B.D.O. 551
Letter from J.W.Wright concerning his son Hugh Wright. 155%
Report from Commander 3. G. de Jukes Hughes, Acting Dover. P.S.T.O.,
558
6.523
A.L.C.16

460
F
431
20 June 1940.
My dear Vaughan.
Im 20 mg To Garlier you with but it seemed the &
afraid adminate Cost q No right vice will be too Desmisk
These shing papers. TO do with lan shem for
The anyway. be yet done GE Gst of stragglas add where ail 80 what a Starres skind come in from varials sources I hope your gersing 20. a Get of rest. you must 7648 need to 40 06 because Ceave
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Dick
(fleadave)

uscual
433
Cartroller
My Dept is offically under altho more supcard side
Ton. wm - lythe peratimal
Consequently I am sending these remarks tym,
2 pat on the back, expecially
Their good work. deserves
"I" Lat of the soldier.
Lionel Seven us.v.?.
8/6/40

Controller
434 461
Small Vessels Pool.
8th June 1940.
In connection with the recent operations at
Dunkirk, I desire to bring to your notice the excellent work of the following officers.
S.V.P. found itself forced to act in an operational capacity in this emergency.
1. Among the many officers and civilians who offered to their services to fill the emergency of taking boats over, an outstanding case was one particular officer Lieut.Col.R.L.
Dover
Hutchins, M.C., Grenadier Guards. This officer had a day off from a certain Department, and asked my permission to be allowed to proceed with my Deputy, Captain 3.7. Wharton, to
Ramsgate, where he was given charge of 8 motor boat. On the way over the boat hit submerged wreckage which rendered one engine useless. Continuing under one engine, on arrival off Dunkirk he found a steamer ashore with her boats at the davits. He went to a destroyer, asked for the loan of four hands, and with these men he lowered the boats, which he used to evacuate soldiers from the beach to the destroyer. I understand some
700 men were thus evacuated. He returned to London in time to go on duty the following morning.
2. Captain E.F. Wharton, R.N. This officer under
Daves
S.N.O., him the detailed organisation of "ferrying" Phillimore,
Ramsgate acted as Pier Master for four days with at the Ramsgate.
Upon boats from Ramsgate devolved. Captain on the
S.N.O., valuable Ramsgate services rendered by this officer, and smaller made a special report by telephone has been asked very to report it officially in due course.
Paymaster Lieutenant Commander H. tireless Garrett, work, R.N.V.R.
my Secretary. on the He was own
3. He showed immense capacity for using his and was practically three in the responsible initiative evening, himself, and putting throughout for Sheerness; for obtaining them petrol in arranging Admiralty yachtsmen from - garages special cars on from his to and the bring own forms, sending initiative. down which them over he down late 100 In to boats been Ramsgate various situation, signed to accept responsible from other responsibility which the ways Upper is he deserving Thames offers displayed large was most of of again additional motor a much praiseworthy. grasp boats praise. of organisation the received urgency 418 He His readiness here has methodical of of also in the accordance those collecting indexing boats of some with requisitioned these Statute 2,500 boats by No. by areas 718 S.V.P. of allowed May officers 10th the 1940. being great majority. in service of within & few hours.
Director Small Admiral. Vessels Pool.

Directa, S.V.P.
435
435
REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS.
At 0300 hours on Friday, 31st May, 1940., I embarked in
SWALLOW (45' Scott Paine Power Boat) in RAMSGATE HARBOUR, and at
0340 proceeded in company with MARLBOROUGH
WOLFE and VULTURE to embark troops from the beaches one mile East to five miles East of Dunkirk, and to convey them to destroyers and other vessels lying off-shore.
On passage to Dunkirk, we struck wreckage of some description which damaged the starboard propellor; the revolution indicator of the considerable vibration from the shaft. This engine it starboard engine immediately showed excessive revolutions subsequently and there was at normal revolutions with only part of the normal throttle;
ran appeared likely that at least one blade was stripped.
arrival at Dunkirk, MARLBOROUGH entered harbour contrary with to plan, from which she took off as many as she could I closed MARLBOROUGH and to and On went alonside a paddle minesweeper, partly accommodate, loaded troops, two boats ahead of me did the same; informed by the
Commander ask why we that were he had damaged one propellor and proposed return the other deviating from the plan and was to direct to Ramsgate.
Observing take about seven THE effort in that the round a refuelling, the boats was would small, I considered embarked and it I & explained waste of this (on to the account Master of of transfer troops wished already to return with the other the water boats was full of
SWALLOW who had sustained and the fact that beaches alone.
damage wreckage already and flotsam) and we proceeded to the
The situation at 0600 hours was as follows:-
was under a pall of smoke from fires There which were appeared There numerous to be wrecks outside of troops the harbour on the shore was strewn as far with as it all was forms possible of of mainly Dunkirk to the South and West of and the along port. the beaches.
were to large to the numbers Eastward, and the the foreshore beach were a very and abandoned. large number There motor THE see THE Along or motor abandoned, damaged, the boats, Dunkirk and motor several Roads Launches were wrecks and but yachts close one vessels out in waiting to embark these troops, ships.
numerous inshore. destroyers boats were and running other between the shore unfortunately and scarcely any a light onshore and caused tide wind, at a which ground 0600 bombardment hours swell was which setting going made the THE The There except was heavy for occasional until late chelling on fairly on shore, hard but to the the bombing beaches which were quiet did not become heavy and afternoon. intermittent On arrival but at appeared the beach her capable I saw off. one of small being This her THE which was passed signalled aground, her for a towline further action. assistance her out assistance and resorted anchor. her alongside as small rudder coasting took out vessel There it of over was which for a Service was use at in on cutter embarking the beaches, lying the whom astern and troops. I in took of my this to At first H.M.S. first, coaster, to three man I or could and four I trips see no British troops borrowed only French 2, troops and later 2 more, hands /my
IMPULSIVE

Page 2.
3,436
my cutter. I later borrowed a whaler and 2 hands from IMPULSIVE.
For the rest of the day until my last trip I carried only British troops.
Owing to the ground swell and the fact that SWALLOW's propellors were unguarded and below the hull, we considered it unsafe to go into less water than five feet, and it was necessary, therefore, to run inshore at some speed, check the boat's way and allow the cutter to shoot in towards the beach, and when it was nearing the end of its tow
(50 fathoms of grassline bent on to 30 fathoms of 3" rope), the cutter's bows were turned to seaward and the boat was backed into shore.
Crowds of French soldiers immediately rushed into the water and clambered over the stern and quarters of the cutter. I instructed them by megaphone how to distribute their weight, and when I thought enough had been embarked, I went ahead so as to take the cutter out of reach of the remainder; subsequently stopping while hangers-on were pulled inboard.
With the British troops the loading was easier, but in all cases the men were very weak and very helpless; for instance, on one occasion when the tow parted, both the cutter and the whaler, which were fully loaded, were blown in broadside on to the beach, and in the case of the cutter, the combined efforts of the four Naval ratings and the soldiers were unable to refloat her, so that I was obliged to send a line in to them, using SWALLOW's dinghy. The tow parted again and it was only with great difficulty that we re-established it and hoisted in the dinghy.
Each time after loading, I proceeded alongside IMPULSIVE, which had a jumping ladder rigged. In order to avoid waste of time in shortening in my eighty-fathom towline, I passed the end of it to
IMPULSIVE and requested her to haul the boats alongside, which was done by part of the ship's company doubling along her deck. After the first number of trips from shore to ship towing both boats. There were but at trip, I borrowed IMPULSIVE's whaler and two more hands, and made &
this time few boats working between the shore and the ships, there very boats full of troops broached to on the beach and and unable 8
to were some One motor boat belonging to & destroyer, one whaler miles of small get motor off. yacht were the only boats working on two aircraft or three by beach, and in view of the target presented to enemy I
destroyers and transmit & signal from me to Admiralty, repeated embarkation. Dover, other ships waiting to embark troops, requested requesting more shelling on the beaches, and a good deal of intervals. from
IMPULSIVE to Cautters and power boats to speed up the A/A fire
There the ships was as some German aircraft appeared overhead at frequent
IMPULSIVE hoisted two black shapes, some wreckage and when
At about midday, she reported that she had struck while she was
I and next came alongside propellor (this happened, aircraft). I think, taking damaged avoiding her port action during an attack by
As IMPULSIVE borrowed had ratings to who had manned IMPULSIVE my cutter, had taken proceeded some proceed for docking, I returned and her whaler and the Up to this time obtained from
400 to work soldiers, with WINCHELSEA. nearly all British. Before she left, I her
50 gallons of fuel for my boat.
Captain, I the possible should First like Lieutenant was to done mention to and assist here many the long me others the both ready tow C.H.M.S. by line, co-operation the and handling IMPULSIVE; by providing of of the the ship everything to provide a whaler lee, by and hauling hands to help in working during my the outter short and petrol, also by providing lending a food for me and my boat's crew periods when we were alongside.
received much assistance and co-operation for my cutter from and H.M.S. gave
WINCHELSEA I who later lent me a signalman and ratings me all her available petrol.

Page 3.
4394
In the early afternoon, the wind lightened and conditions became easier. Observing that there were boats at the davits of a wreck close inshore, I borrowed some hands from WINCHELSEA to lower and man them and ordered a R.A.F. launch which was lying astern of a neighbouring vessel to take over these boats ex- the wreck and embark troops.
Soon after this, on the suggestion of the Captain of WINCHELSEA, I
boarded KEITH to discuss with Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker the possibility of making all remaining troops march to Dunkirk for embarkation.
By 1730 hours, there were few troops waiting to embark at this part of the beach and the remainder were making their way along the this beach should to be the last trip; I concurred. In the last trip only about 30
Dunkirk, and at this time WINCHELSEA signalled proposing that soldiers embarked in the cutter, and I transferred them to the launch. cabin and room of my boat, handing over the cutter to the R.A.F. made on
WINCHELSEA further to the Eastward was hit about this time, and enemy presumably air
During which appeared to be straddled by the first engine this last half-hour, several dive-bombing attacks salvo. were A
transport activity was intense. SWALLOW was hit by a few small splinters, of anti-aircraft shell, but was undamaged.
last trip inshore I proceeded direct to boat Ramsgate, had been and
After the about 2150 hours. The engines of the the port, and a arrived there since 0315, at and when outside Ramsgate the first port engine was restarted.
minute running would Johnson, cutter untiring like later, single-handed The of in to crew his the bring the Patrol efforts of starboard to the for your Service SWALLOW and some before showed notice engine of at worked the Lowestoft; she great the failed; earlier left extremely work initiative and of trips this obtained an well Able man to and throughout the was Seaman, his resource: beach working name Peter and and as in I was I I the put wished him to on draw board attention IMPULSIVE to his very good work.
total number of troops embarked 600 and from 800. the beaches and transferred I estimate to H.M.Ships the by SWALLOW as between
Rohn Hutchis
Lieutenant-Colonel,
(A.L.O.,Admirality).
To be attached to my upnt, bleak himet Prescom
Dort 13.6.

CENTRAL
429
In any further communication
8 JUN 1940
on this subject, please quote
REGISTRY
No. K 9032/7083/217.
and address not to any person by name
FOREIGN OFFICE. S.W.1
but to-
18550
6th June, 1940.
"The Under-Secretary of State,"
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.I.
1940
Sir,
I am directed by Viscount Halifax to state, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty. that in the course of his report on the closure of the British Vicetribute to the Sea Transport Officer, Lieutenant Commander Dunnet
Consulate at Dunkirk on May 21st, Mr. Pro-Consul Wild pays
R.N.R., who extremely useful in providing transport for the
Mr. Wild mentions that he understands that this officer was later large number was of refugees leaving Dunkirk for the United Kingdom.
very seriously wounded by a bomb.
R.N., Officer attached to Aniral Nord, was the Pro-
2. The Pro-Consul further states that Commander H. Henderson also
Dunkirk. request point Mr. Wild had heard that some He
Consul's in for transport as Boulogne, Calais, fifteen Ostend invaluable Naval Liaison supplying Destroyers and other craft at and hundred Commander British Henderson of this, and a vessel was made at
At one subjects were stranded in Ostend. available informed
Ostend by dawn on the following day.
who was attached to extremely the helpful. This attitude officer considerably
3.Mr. Wild adds Vice-Consulate as Assistant remained calm that Paymaster Sub-Lieutenant H. Naval Penn R.N.R., Control under Officer, was bad also conditions and his cheerful alleviated very the despondency of the refugees.
I am,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
18 Secretary or the Admiralty.

440
APPENDIX 5.
RAMSGATE & MARGATE: DYNAMO OPERATION.
Narrative account prepared by Temp. Lieut. A. Dann,
R.N.V.R. by arrangement with Rear Admiral A. H. Taylor.
US HAS UNIT particu.

441
To present a comprehensive view of the whole of the naval operations at Dunkirk between May 27th and June 5th is as task for the historian. No man who took an active part can hope to describe anything beyond the activities of his own particular unit or section, and only with the passing of time will the expert be able to piece together the various reports of all who took part.
This is the story of the small motor-boats and the part they played, but even here a connected narrative is difficult, if not impossible. Each boat with its own tiny crew was thrown more or less upon its own resources; and upon the fortunes of war and the initiative of each boat's captain depends the story each may subsequently tell.
From all around the compass they came. Prom up the river, along the coast, from the yachting harbours, the pleasure beaches, Naval porta and fishing towns - anything that would float, move under its am power, and collect a dozen men or 80
from the beaches where they waited.
The Meat assembly to gather at Sheerness was typical of the she tlyuermads. A dozen or so of motor yachts esquipped and amartly erund a cluster of cheap itin supueur craftamen who had sng tound a ship's lifeboat a that cruiser of sorts as 1 cruioze up-river reaches.
anotell.

442
Half a dozen Thames river launches resembling nothing so much as the upper decks of elongated motor-buses with their rows of slatted seats, but given 8 tang of the waterside by rows of white-painted lifebuoys slung around the upper rails.
The very names of these latter craft are redolent of the quiet of Richmond, Teddington and Hampton Court: "Skylark",
"Elizabeth" and "Queen Boadicea". A strange flotilla indeed to be taking an active part in what has been described as "the greatest naval epic in history".
The crews and their officers too were as miscellaneous an assembly as the craft they manned. First arrived a trickle of R.N.V.R. Sub-Lieutenants direct from training school, taken from their class-rooms often in the midst of as lecture on the
"practical pilotage" they were soon to put to such good account.
Many of these were entering a naval dock-yard for the first time in their lives, yet they clambered over the little ships, bawled for their requirements in food, fuel and water and set to work to prepare for the task in hand, as if to the manner born.
Next came another thin trickle - this time junior Royal
Navy officers who but a short time before were midshipmen on war vessels of various types; little more than schoolboys, yet each possessed of that indescribable sangfroid and cheerful discipline which is the hall-mark of the British naval officer whatever his age or rank.
Lastly - and only at matter of minutes before the time of departure - came the crews; Royal Fleet Reserve men this first batch - tough, stout-hearted and disciplined. No time to pick or choose; stoker ratings first, to man the little engines -
one man to each boat; then the seamen - "Swarm over those boats men and wherever you find an officer aboard ask him if he needs a crew! Three men to the larger boats and two each to the smaller".
2

443
Ten minutes more and the first convoy is ready for the sea - manned, victualled and fuelled - equipped in fact with all but arms. Only later, when the full peril of their task was realised and returning troops had filled the depots with sandfouled small arms, were weapons available for the crews'
protection. The first convoys sailed gaily into the inferno of Dunkirk beaches without SO much as & pistol between them.
Still the boats arrived and still the officers and men flowed into the port; "T.124's" now for the most part. Sturdy fishermen, lightermen and merchant seamen. Now, too, came in increasing numbers the civilian volunteers who played so fine a part in the operation.
In the very first flotilla to leave was one black motor launch, the "Advance", manned entirely by three bearded civilian yachtsmen. This boat and its crew stayed with the writer in convoy through the whole of the first journey across, and after the first murderous machine gun attack from the air three cheerful bearded grinning faces appeared above the fore cabin roof and three pairs of hands were clasped and shaken overhead as a signal that allwas well; only the "Jolly Roger" was lacking to complete that picture.
These men wore no uniform, were born on no ship's books but took the graver risks which attend civilians engaged in military operations as undisturbed as they would take a choppy sea on a week-end cruise.
The journey across, perhaps, afforded the individual his opportunity of assessing the magnitude of the operation best which he was playing his part. Beautiful yachting weather in the small craft could never have made the crossing otherwise), (half hardly a chop on the water; the whole vista bathed endless in summer sunshine; and, across the expanse of sea, an
From horizon ahead to horizon of laden ships.
stream spanning the whole scene from coast to coast, unloading endless astern, their human freight and hastily returning for more; an
3

444
succession of British shipping as motley in its larger form as were the motor-boats themselves. Tramps, cargo ships, barges, drifters, tugs, Dutch schoots, British warships, even river ferry-boats such as carry one's car across the Thames at
Woolwich and elsewhere.
Of individual acts only a few can be given; every crew, every man almost, experienced some incident or another. some adventure that could fill a whole small volume on its own. And yet what can a writer do when such men report such events in the tersest of language such as "heavily shelled whilst at work";
A few reminiscenses may be given here in the hope that some idea of the work may be gathered by anyone who cares to piece them together. Here are some extracts from a letter written by Sub. Lt..Williams, R.N. which serve to illustrate that merry sangfroid which has been referred to earlier:-
"So I proceeded by compass (error 20°) to the Calais out. -
Gravelines sands and anchored & few hundred yards while about I 8 quarter of a mile I saw two men silhouetted to
I was walked inland in search of Allied pulled ashore in the boat, which waited soldiers. for me
After against the glow of a distant blaze. them. I approached within a few yards of them and say hailed "Lieber Gott!" and they time turned I
I heard and one commenced to shoot at me. By this territory, so had around to the conclusion that I was in enemy
I come behind a dune and shot back.
Fortunately see me properly, while I could see twice outhid it was a very dark night and the their Germans could not quite well. I shot the one on other the right one screamed lines and he fired fell without two bullets a sound. at him, The and he dropped By whatever this when I and then fell and lay discretion still. to be he was carrying nearby shouts so, deeming back to the the boat better and my ship was under way at her mots time I heard part of valour, I ran at top speed full six within less than five minutes."
the soldiers dusk bombing and shelling. greatly lot
"I proceeded at Ramagate and arrived just There was a back to Dunkirk as soon as in I had time landed to of shrapnel by the Tommies and Poilus who the boats. into catch the falling on the beach and I was waded out impressed and helped the sailors with anything Nowhere but did the sea Isee any signs of cracking morale or cheerfulness. back for the last time the same in evening. the "Swallow" Dunicirk
"I went flaming ruin. I again went with a and proceeded motor-boat. While in there I shortly was by now a to the inner harbour in company saw another War slower power boat which was, Ibelieve, of after- the
Department wards sunk. I had been ordered to take off some
- 4

445
French Staff, but I could not find any so I filled up with Poilus and a few Tommies. The furthest end of the inner harbour was already in German hands but their shooting was extremely wild and we got away unscathed."
He finishes up his letter with this characteristic remark - -
"That is all I did at Dunkirk (1). I went over five times in all!
For brevity and preciseness in describing real achievement in the face of danger, the following from Lieut. C.W. Read,
R.N.R. is characteristic:-
"Made 7 complete return trips to Dunkirk Beaches; average number soldiers carried 60 - approx. 420 soldiers. Made
10 trips from Mole at Dunkirk to transports lying off, under shrapnel = 600 soldiers.
Rescued Chief Steward and 39 soldiers from water ex S/S
Scotia and bombed whilst doing SO.
On last return journey was caught in parachute flares, bombed and then machine-gunned, but escaped without damage owing to speed and quickness on helm of "Bonnie
Heather". Service finished at 5.0 D.M. on 4th June.
Estimated number of soldiers handled in launch:-
Dunkirk Beaches to Ramsgate
420/450
Dunkirk Mole to Transports lying off
600/650
Rescued from S/S Scotia
40.
With compasses of doubtful accuracy and no other navigating instrument but a lead pencil, the difficulties of navigation once a boat lost contact with the main convoy were imense.
Some of the small craft had not even 8 compass; yet all who left the other side in safety managed to reach the English coast to re-fuel and set off again to repeat the advanture.
One officer even tells how, after wandering all through the night with a compass he could not trust, he put into
Calais! Only after twenty minutes heavy shelling did he escape with his craft intact.
The narrowness of such escapes could be repeated again and again. The writer himself, whilst leading at column of six small white painted yachts was subjected to dive machinegunning from three successive flights of three enemy aircraft.
With no arms whatever with which to offer resistance, the column was almost a sitting target and the airplanes could approach till they almost touched the cabin roofs. Yet,
- 5 -

446
unbelievable though it may seem, of all these six boats in close formation not one lost so much as a chip of paint.
Amongst the commoner difficulties encountered were submerged lorries in whichtroops had apparently driven right down to the water's edge at low tide. Another source of much trouble close inshore was the large amount of floating grass rope which various craft had used and lost in their rescue work and numerous articles of military equipment, such as greatcoats. Quite a few small motor boats were put temporarily out of action by the ropes and garments fouling the boats'
screws and many times the crews (stripped or not as occasion permitted) were obliged to go over the side and free these obstructions before they could carry on.
As those boats which made the earlier crossings returned with their stories of the difficulties to be overcome, other crews profited by their experience. to add to - or in some cases to subtract from - the equipment carried. Arms were principally in demand and the depot was raided time and again by officers and crews in search of anything with which they could hit back. As one manexpressed it "Even a record of the
1812 overture would be better than nothing".
By this time too, volunteers of all sorts, military as well as civilians, were besieging those boats which were ordered out, and many were the last minute "pier head jumps"
on to already moving craft by those who were determined not to be left out.
One story relates how two army cadets disappeared from as machine-gun nest on the harbour wall complete with gun. They were next heard of bringing down an enemy plane off Dunkirk from the deck of & small motor boat!
The principal work accomplished by these small craft consisted of what may best be called "ferrying". The shore off the beaches to the east of Dunkirk shallows very gradually;
at times there is no more than two or three feet of water for
- 6 -

447
over a hundred yards out to sea. A long rolling surf flows inshore most of the time and even the shallow draught motorboats could not approach closely with any degree of safety.
Open boats of all kinds from naval cutters and whalers to seaside dinghies were towed over from England by the motorboats themselves and by other craft. Some of these pulling boats were manned by odd naval ratings, others by the soldiers themselves.
One of the principal difficulties was to avoid fouling the motor-boats' screws with painters and odd lines attached to these pulling boats. It is amazing how much sea-room a soldier can take up with a couple of fathoms of rope! Carley floats and inflated motor inner tubes also played their part in carrying men from the beach to the motor boats, which in turn took aboard those on these more precarious perches and towed the loaded pulling boats to larger craft lying off in waiting, picking up their own or any other empty boats and towing them back inshore for further loads.
As petrol ran short each motor boat would pick up such men as it could carry and set off back to England for more petrol, then out again for further service.
During Wednesday, May 29th, the Mole at Dunkink was apparently rendered temporarily useless so that most, if not all of the troops had to be taken from the beaches. During this day, too, and for at least a part of the following day, air attack continued almost unabatedly from dawn to dusk:
dive-bombing for the larger ships and machine-guming for the smaller.
Later in the week, although the R.A.F. were present in greater numbers to relieve the pressure from the air, shelling added to the difficulties and men were being hit in the pulling boats as they carried on their work.
By the week-end evacuation from Dunkirk harbour was in full swing again and the beaches were often almost deserted.

448
The slower motor boats still removed stragglers and odd parties as they were encountered whilst the faster types co-operated with larger ships inside the harbour, even when the enemy had reached the inner part of the harbour itself.
Those who lost their little commands returned to England as best they could, some aboard other small motor craft, others aboard larger ships lending a hand with the wounded or snatching a few hours sleep aboard before reporting for further duty.
Many officers spent sixty hours or more at a stretch before gaining a much needed sleep.
The total number of such small motor craft engaged in the operation cannot at present be assessed. It is doubtful if the exact figure can ever be computed since many who took a part did so with their own boats manned by their own relatives or friends; did their best, shared the dangers and discomforts and, when no further work remained to be done, stole quietly away unrecognised and unrewarded.
The numbers, too, of soldiers taken off the beaches by these motor boats can never be more than estimated. Lieut.
Read's report of 600 men ferried to transports and 420 brought direct to England in one 35' motor launch gives some idea of the usefulness of this miniature armada".
8

Their ins
Drynows 18% 44947
LIST OF MEN ENGAGED IN THE DUNKIRK EVACUATION HO SIGNED ON
T,124 AGREEMENT.
CAPACITY ENGAGED
NAME
HAND
ALLEN F.F
CHARGE HAND
AMBLER H.
ENGINEER
ADAMSON J.S.
ENGINEMAN
BELLCHAMBER W.
COOK DECK HAND
BROWN N.
ENGINEMAN
BROWN R.
CHARGE HAND
BURNS S.F.J.
ENGINEMAN
BARNES S.
SKIPPER
BARNARD
COOK
CROUCH A.
COOK DECK HAND
CLARKE W.E
ENGINEMAN
COGGINS C
ENGINEMAN
CALLEN A.A
DECK MAN
COX A.T
MATE
CROCK J.M
MATS
CHARGE HAND
CURTIS G
MATE
DICK N
DECK HAND
DAVIES A.W
SKIPPER
FORBES
ENGINEMAN
FAULKNER R.W.A
HAND
GARRETT R
ENGINEMAN
GAYDON H.C
CHARGE HAND
HEMPEL J
ENGINEER
HASTINGS H.G
CODE DECK HAND
HASTINGS WAS
ENGINEER
HUNPHRIES D.
SHARGE HAND
HOBBS P.L
BEGINEMAN
HISCOTT C.H
CHARGE HAND
HODGESON N
DECK HAND
HALL G.V
ENGINEMAN
HORNE G
ENGINEMAN
HETH RINGTON 1.7
SKIPPER
HOPE-LAWSON
CHARGE HAND
HACKFORTH-JONES
DECK HAND
HALL A.W
COOK DECK HAND
HILLS A.W
MASTER
JOHNSON R
MATE
JEFFREY E.R
2nd HAND
JEFFREY V.S
SKIPPER
JAMESON J.W
MASTER
KIMBER G
MATE
KEARNS N
COOK HAND
LIGHTROLLER J.T
COOK DECK HAND
LIGHTROLLER C.H
ENGINEMAN
MCGRUPPIE K.C.
CHARGE HAND
MARKING A
SKIPPER
MONTY H.W.
ENGINEMAN
MOSS S.G
MASTER
MEDD T.W
ENGINEMAN
MASON T.W
MESSENGER
A.B.
MARDLING J.J
SKIPPER
MEDSON L.C.
MUDD M
DECK HAND
NICHOLSON R.A
CHARGE HAND
NUMMERY R.H
ENGINEMAN
ENG INSMAN
PIERCY OLIVER HAMILTON 3
MATE
PENRICK R.G.
POLLARD D
MATE CHARGE HAND
PECK B.W
ENGINEER
PORTER F.G
PORTER F.

Dynoms 18%
449
LIST OF MEN ENGAGED IN THE DUNKIRK EVACUATION HO SIGNED ON
T.124 AGREEMENT.
CAPACITY ENGAGED
NAME
HAND
ALLEN F.F
CHARGE HAND
AMBLER H.
ENGINEER
ADAMSON J.S.
ENGINEMAN
BELLCHAMBER W.
COOK DECK HAND
BROWN N.
ENGINEMAN
BROWN R.
CHARGE HAND
BURNS S.F.J.
ENGINEMAN
BARNES S.
SKIPPER
BARNARD
COOK
CROUCH A.
COOK DECK HAND
CLARKE W.E
ENGINEMAN
COGGINS C
ENGINEMAN
CALLEN A.A
DECK MAN
COX A.T
MATE
CROCK J.M
MATE
CURTIS G
CHARGE HAND
DICK N
MATE
DAVIES A.W
DECK HAND
SKIPPER
FORBES
FAULKNER R.W.A
ENGINEMAN
GARRETT R
HAND
ENGINEMAN
GAYDON H.C
CHARGE HAND
HEMPEL J
ENGINEER
HASTINGS H.G
COOK DECK HAND
HASTINGS WAR
HUNPHRIES D
SNGINEER
HOBBS P.L
SHARGE HAND
HISCOTT C.H
SEGINEMAN
HODGESON N
CHARGE HAND
HALL G.V
DECK HAND
ENGINEMAN
HORNE G
HETH RINGTON A.P
ENGINEMAN
SKIPPER
HOPE-LAWSON
HACKFORTH-JONES
CHARGE HAND
DECK HAND
HALL A.W
COOK DECK HAND
HILLS A.W
MASTER
JOHNSON R
MATE
JEFFREY E.R
2nd HAND
JENURRY V.S
SKIPPER
JAMESON J.W
MASTER
KIMBER G
MATE
KEARNS N
COOK HAND
LIGHTROLLER J.T
COOK DECK HAND
LIGHTROLLER C.H
ENGINEMAN
MCGRUPPIE K.C.
CHARGE HAND
MARKING A
SKIPPER
MONTY H.W.
ENGINEMAN
MOSS S.G
MASTER
MEDD T.W
ENGINEMAN
MASON T.W
MESSENGER
A.B.
MARDLING J.J
SKIPPER
MEDSON L.C.
MUDD M
DECK HAND
NICHOLSON R.A
CHARGE HAND
NUMMERY R.H
ENGINEMAN
PIERCY OLIVER HAMILTON E
KNO INSMAN
MATE
PENRICK R.G.
MATE
POLLARD D
CHARGE HAND
PECK B.W
ENGINEER
PORTER F.G
PORTER F.

- 454
EVACUATION OF B.E.F. INCLUDING ALLIED TROOPS
ANALYSIS OF TROOPS DISEMBARKED AT DOVER.
Date.
Total Officers & O.R.'s
28.5.40.
10.856
29.5.40
22,916.
31741
30.5.40
40,615
31.5.40
24,470
1.6.40.
13,519
2.6.40.
12,431
3.6.40.
14,053.
4.6.40.
172435

456°c
EVACUATION OF B.E.F. INCLUDING ALLIED TROOPS.
AMAT VOTO on AM
455
MARGATE.
EVACUATION OF B.S.F. (INCLUDING ALLIED TROOPS)
ANALYSIS OF TROOPS DESPATCHED FROM MARGATE STATION.
Total of Officers and 0.R's.
Date.
280.
28th May, 1940.
6386.
29th May, 1940.
5785.
30th May, 1940.
7471.
31st May, 1940.
2823.
1st June, 1940.
8055.
2nd June, 1940.
3520.
3rd June, 1940.
3841.
4th June, 1940.

2901.
TOUU
23
12 30th. 5480
196
1540
12
31th. 5735
183
1828
MEMORANDUM
305.
457
FROM:- NAVAL OFFICER IN CHARGE, RAMSGATE.
DATE:- 15.6.40.
TO:- Captain 0. E. Hallifax DSO., R.N.,
DYNAMO ARRIVALS - RAMSGATE & MARGATE
SUBJECT
Further to my telephone conversation this morning, as near as could be established from signals etc. during the attached lists give arrivals at Margate and Ramegate the operation.
Marelation Secretary to
Naval Officer in Charge,
Ramsgate
Naval Captain. Officer in Charge
Ramagate.