TNA ADM 199 795

382
356
sts in oil and water pushing the its through the breakers.
Their cheerfulness and good our was an encouragement to all.
Many officers,both British and nch remarked to me what an ellent help they had been to the ops.
I have the honour to be Sir,
Your obedient serv nt,
ODORE'S OFFICE

888
Dynam 68. Dink?
MOORGATE GUEST HOUSE
Tunamo
HORRABRIDGE DEVON 5th June 194
TELEPHONE: YELVERTON 313
828
No. 622/A.31/40. II.
art of proceedings - Pier Party
THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, THE
3/4t June 1940.
Forwarded, these 787
members of a beach party under
The party caus isted of charge of Commander M.G. Gooden
Lieul car Lampard RN
2. Full names are:-
Lient Shaw RN
Petty Officer Stanley Arthur
C/J.11F
beint R. Wake Ru
Leading Seaman Alexander Carrd
C/SSX.1
Sub Lieul CW. Robertson DN
Able Seaman James Richard Trem
C/J.999
Able Seaman George Albert Form
I Po ILS + 11 Seamen ratus
C/J.10279
from Has "Sandhurst"
COMMANDER D/1 THIS
I Yowan of Signals, 2 Pos
15 JUN1940
#
STATE THE
Run
+ 2 Signalmen from spare
Min. NONE
destroyer Crews [ South Front
R.N. Barracks, Chatham.
COM
Barracks]
13th June, 1940.
Twee French officers were attached
III.
316. K/40.
silaine de Frégats DU CHAYLA
KUN 1940 WASHINGTON
G OFFICER
COMMANIUM
pilamie de Corvette DE VOGUE
and
BOURCY LOUE

384
MOORGATE HORRABRIDGE GUEST HOUSE page 253
DEVON
TELEPHONE: YELVERTON 313
L partn embarked in Hus. Whither
1830/3rd and arrived of whirket 2220 as ordered.
me difficulty was found in curing along side ouring to a iong tide setting off the jetters abarkation was not in full wind until about 2300.
Embarkation proceeded without terruption until 0300 when last troops + the pier partw
& Denkirk in HMS. "Express"
The main difficulty was the teme tiredness of the troops ich slowed down their progress mg the jetty. Few ships were apletely filled but beept at

385
MOORGATE HORRABRIDGE GUEST HOUSE page
3
359
DEVON
TELEPHONE: YELVERTON 313
D last when a few lundred ops remained on the jetty who were able to reach embarkation points were in off.
the bearing of the French ph ops was excellent and their se they were able to understand cers gave we every assistance at was required. The three mch usual officers attached we valuable assis tance in
Doria the troops on to the idward end of the jetty.
m carried out their duties all of my officers and the energy and I should ticularly like is mention

386
MOORGATE GUEST HOUSE
HORRABRIDGE
4
1
360
DEVON
TELEPHONE: YELVERTON 313
int Cdr Lampard R.N., Sub Lieul
Wake RN. and Sub tient
W. Robertson RN The two it- Linknants had Carried it similar duties on the evious night and volunteered
N further service. of the en Yeoman of Signals
F Ray of Hus. Ajaxaud Pettro ficen Davies of HUS Sandhurst, ere outstanding. all the and ratings from Sandhurst"
ere volunteers and I think eserve special mention on at AMIR actimb. I have no record
-
Includes.
OVER
4
Commander RAN.

Dynamo 219.
8/4/01
124
3517
FROM ****
REAR ADMIRAL (M.L.)
VICE ADMIRAL, Dover.
TO ****
DATE ****
11th June 1940.
No. 351/13.
SUBJECT ****
Report of proceedings by COMMODORE G.O. STEPHENSON
during evacuation of B.E.F. from DUNKIRK.
The attached report from Commodore Stephenson is forwarded.
Commodore Stephenson himself did officers invaluable work and I fully conctur in the recommendation of the ratings whom he mentions in his report.
REAR ADMIRAL (NLL)
VIDE A POMIRAL
JUN 1940
4
OVER

Dynamo 219
388
362
ADMIRALTY, S.W.1.
(Room 59, Bank Block V)
11th June, 1940.
No.MC.1/40.
Sir,
I have the honour to submit the following report on evacuation of B.B.F. from Dunkirk.
Having under your orders, of the Eastern end of received instructions from you that I was to the take at about 22.00 and then to a small motor-launch evacuation charge, area off La Panne, I transferred to drifter control the movements of tows and of ships.
"TERINGNIS", from which I could the more easily
2. A.M. Conferred with Lord Gort and their
Thursday, 30th May, landed to communicate informed his with the Army. that I would hold & motor-yocht at disposal staff to embark the Commander-in-Chief.
G.H.Q. re draft vessels, grass hawsers, also snatch M.N.B. blocks and
3. position at La Panne; asked
Communicated with Admiralty by telephone for more from anchors to piers. Requested Ambarkation planked to shallow haul off tows from beach; General
This run lorries I saw started before leaving pontoons or into sea to act as piers the when beach. over.
4. with Army Embarkation at La Panne.cn ordered
In accordance with your instructions Officers, and after
H.M.S."DEVONTA" Friday evening, 31st May. Very few off from consultation to beach herself non came
La Panne on Friday night.
5. At about 0430, Saturday, left La to Panne embark. for About Bray, 280
where many were off in boats, all being were
6. At about imiral ke-Walker, C.B., OBB.E., R.N.,
ADMIRATEY, S.W.1.

389
363
2.
6. At about 0840, Saturday, as the last men were being embarked, a very severe air-raid developed, and all vessels moved off. "BOUNTY", having her port propeller foul, was taken in tow by motor-yacht "SERIOLA VI" and proceeded to Ramsgate. Both vessels were machine-gunned on the way back.
7. The conduct and behavious of all Officers and men, who came under my observation, was in accordance with
Service tradition. At times they were subject to heavy air-raids. The highest standard was set by the
Commanding Officers, Officers and men of the destroyers, sloops and minesweepers working off La Fanne.
8. I desire to call your attention to the following
Officer and ratings:-
Lieut. R.H.IRVING, R.N.R., Motor Boat "TRIRON".
I I boarded her. Lieutenant Irving set a most excellent observed the efficient work of this boat before example or devotion to duty, although he his was obviously so tired he could hardly keep be eyes facilitated open. the embarkation of hundreds of soldiers.
By his able handling of his boat
A. VERRIS, B.R.A. (1.124). H.M.S."BOURT".
This although on duty day and night and difficulty I/C
rating was alone in & twin diesl engineroom, sick with and, it was with the greatest take a rest, be the rumes, him to leave his post and to help persuaded air, when 1 Sorrowed & Stoker demeanour, him.
and fresh strong sense of duty and cheerful around him.
By he his set an excellent example to those
Lent to no as
W.A.DENNY. Ord.Sig,, TP/X.1790
H.G.HAYES. Sig., C/JX.140933.
Signature:
H.M.S.BOURTY".
S.FENTON, A.3., P/JX.145044 La Pande D. Friday, 31 shelled, May, when I called the
On return to were being heavily bring off beach and piers to take in the whaler forward to and for volunteers These three young men came They all soldiers. the beach again and again. work was on.
were returned invariably to to be found where
I have the honour to be,
Sie,
Your obedient servent
COMMODORE.

Dyrama 19. Alh/o/ 138
SECRET364
390
REPORT ON THE FINAL EVACUATION OF THE BEACHES
AT LA PANNE, BELGIUM, SATURDAY 1st JUNE, 1940.
Royal Naval Hospital,
Chatham.
2nd June, 1940.
Sir,
I have the honour to forward the following report on the final evacuation of "A", "3" and "C" beaches, La Panne, during the period 1600/31 to 0300/1 at which time, I was the senior naval officer there.
I regret that this report is written from memory 2. as, during & period of shelling at about 0130/1, I saw fit to bury my notes and signal log, as they contained information which have proved of value to the enemy.
The X rapid changes of Headquarters, to which I
3. attached at La Panne in the period covered by the reportfour was in six hours-has also made it impossible for the to remember with the names or titles of some of the various army officers whom I was associated.
I also beg to report that all the communication out their duty with courage, cheerfulness and 1
4. personnel with me, seven signalmen and two telegraphists, efficiency. carried
I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
Lieutenant Commander
Royal Navy.
The To: Vice Admiral Commanding at Dover,
The Castle,
Dover.
VICE ADMIRAL
4- JUN 1940
*
DOVER
18

391
ht Can gw McClelland
365
SECRET
CHRONOLIGICAL SUMMARY OF THE EVACUATION OF
LA PANNE, 31st MAY - 1st JUNE, 1940.
my 31st May,
I. Fridan
P.M.
On Saturday afternoon, on By return from a visit to
Bray Dunes, I was instructed by Captain Tennant, R.N., to arrange for the evacuation of the Army Cormander-in-Chief and staff, and to take over his duties as S.N.O., La Panne, and to join General Montgomery, lInd Corps.
2.
At that time, an enemy 18 or 25 pounder battery near
Nieuport had been ranged by kite balloons on the beach and embarking ships, which had withdrayn. I accordingly arranged with the remaining unwanted beach officer,
Lieutenant Greatwood, R.N., and the 12th Lancers, to complete the building of a second pier of motor transport, on "A" beach, and for the repair of the eight pulling boats and pontoons still serviceable. Parties were also organised to provide all the buckets and to collect all the cars and boats that could be found. Damaged boats were made watertight as far as naval Lieutenants, who had been wounded in the hand, to embark possible with discarded clothing. I also ordered one of the in a small notor cruiser to run a ferry service off to ships.
3.
The intention at this time was to recomence the embarkation quantities of the essential boats and power boats had from the enemy's battery would be less effective. Further been of troops at 2030 with two ships, when it was hoped that the fire promised and the local situation appeared promising even had if arrived difficult. at La Panne were ordered on to Bray, to reduce the numbers
To make it easier, certain army units which waiting to be embarked.
31 4.
Admiral, 2 miles westward of La Panne at about battery near
At Dover for the evacuation of the Army Commander-in-Chief, 1800, which I
about 1630, arrangements were made direct with Vice considered from a point would be out of gun range of the enemy
Nieuport.
31 5.
At 1800, in the with cars, the had his been staff delayed in by and at change I joined General staff officer returned to say that the
6.
the the ships for boats by at the there. rendeavous, I therefore nor could the and asked flag signal, of but, went before with him these to could be sent, being "Keith", informed flying of the the situation,
R.A. Dover, arrived, and At the on same time another Commander-in- staff officer sent boats the party inshore. with the information La Panne. that The the other of the wounded Chief, joined had naval embarked Lieutenants nearer also to embarked under my orders in this boat.
During the embarkation, of a bomber few bomba squadrons were dropped attacked near motor La Panne. the ies
7.
The boats, transport, enemy and battery and a large some also number damage opened was fire done, on which the two was, piers however of repaired.

392
SECRE
366
11
8.
The two remaining signalmen of my party who had accompanied me to ensure the embarkation of the Commanderin-Chief, I employed to help in handling the boats on shore, and then sent on to Bray Dunes to assist there.
L.
9.
On my return to La Panne, I gave orders for the destruction of all squipment and confidential gear which was not in actual use, and saw this carried cut.
10.
At 2030, two ships arrived and the boats, which had already been filled, put off. As, however, no additional boats had arrived, the rate of evacuation was only about
300 an hour and, as darkness set in this fell to about
150 an hour. With between 5 and 7 thousand men awaiting embarkation before 0400, at which time the beach would become exposed to the fire of, if not actually in the hands of, the enemy, & rate of at least 1,000 an hour was requisite.
11.
Accordingly, urgent representations were made to V.A.
Dover, M.L.O. Bray Dunes, and ships in the vicinity for more boats, but these never arrived.
12.
During the period of darkness, low flying enemy aircraft patrolled continually overhead and all lights shown the were bombed. This made communication with ships difficult promptly but not impossible, although further interruptions caused from time to time by as few, "spy hunting"
disorganised were troops, who suspected the flashing.
13.
By 2200, had been embarked and the few boats to the situation had become serious, as available only about had
600 troops to three, principally owing, I believe, mismanagement who were doing the naval duties of to and dwindled in the darkness by the inexperienced rowing army personnel, the boats. At this time as the telephone set, and Dover turning atill working, I destroyed the wireless despatched was the two operators to Bray.
14.
At about no boats, commenced to pile Panne up in
2300, the situation became critical, as on troops, the for whom there withdrawal, were which would leave La in full beach and the by 0400 the following morning, the enemy was battery no-man' matters more awkward, which swing. To make opened a slow fire on the must beach, have been caused very casualties near Nieuport with almost every shell and nerve racking to the waiting men.
15.
Finally, after at conversation whom I with had now General attached Johnston, myself, any down was at was and commanding La more reached decided after the Panne, ships seaport, he 1Vth question after to had on or march Dunkirk, Division, conferred boats, above I had that the made and and by 6,000 I to with below thought way had a personal odd of the informed the Bray that men, Duty that beaches, Dunes. reconnaisance they who Captain the I remained was would G.O.C. without This closing at not Dover, in to up decision arrive. finding reply embark down and it
I the to therefore # telephone direct informed line as Dover the headquarters about 0050 were now being abandoned. batteries being taken, further enemy on the
16. had come Whilst into this action decision on the was town, and the rate of fire beach was increased.

393
SECRE
111
17.
As it was desired to leave a few men behind to embark at La Panne, and as I had already lost touch with General
Montgomery, commanding llnd Corps, who had left earlier,
I apologised to General Johnston for the non-arrival of the boats, and informed him that I would go down to the piers and assist in the embarkation of those who were not to march.
18.
It being dead low water, it was now about half a mile
2130
to the end of the piers, which were now high and dry, and whilst walking there, I was twice knocked down by H.E. bursts, one splinter smashing the box signalling lantern I was carrying and another slightly injuring my left ankle.
Several houses on the front were now blazing fiercely.
19.
When I reached the embarkation point, I was informed that there had been no boats in for over half an hour, and the naval beach party had apparently left. This was probably in accordance with my orders that they were to go off in the last boat.
20.
There being neither ships nor boats now at the beaches,
I ordered a general retirement westward of all the groups on the beach, without waiting for further orders, with the object of getting them inside the defended perimeter outside these
Bray orders were being carried out, I rounded up all the stragglers
Dunes, which had been arranged for 0400. Whilst
I could find and sent them off after the other bodies of men with officers.
21.
After this was done, I set out to Bray Dunes, and walking
0700
along the edge of the water to avoid the shelling, collected & few other men of all units.
22.
About out three ships at anchor and soon after met to attract a small two or more miles down the beach towards Bray,
I made who informed me that they had endeavoured There being attention by parties ahead whom I could see authorities by should had party, firing shots without success. flashes no boats, that all troops were being withdrawn to close enough Panne, further large and being anxious that the naval from La be informed best to swim off, and managed get line brought
I to thought "Gossamer" it to be picked up by a lifebelt on a to me by one of the ship's company.
informed the captain of the change inform of R.A. plan Dover, and
23.
I then beaches, and asked him to being sent where by the cypher, state of to the avoid the possibility of boats they were not required.
to walk numbness, because I of
24.
my should to state left be THE that more I of a hindrance than a help as its if I felt I returned that I ashore. regret

Report Captain I. Hugge RN
of Bray the Paime beaches
I reported to Vice Admiral Dover, about 0530
on Wednesday, 29th May. As a result of a report of an
Army officer recently evacuated, it was decided that a party of Naval Officers was required on the beaches between La Panne and Dunkirk. Accordingly, I together with Commanders Gorton and Otway-Ruthven, Lt.Commander brop
Nottle and Jones)embarked in SABRE about 1400, eventually
Cockburn, R.N., Lt.Commander Woodward and Lts. Whalley, sailing for Dunkirk about 1600.
Dunkish
Captain Bush, who had also arrived from Dover in the morning, took passage with my party. On arrival in at
Dunkirk about 1820, the Western side of the town was southward. GRENADE was seen to be heavily on fire and flames and vast volumes of smoke were drifting to the alongside the Eastern pier and a transport sinking sinking in the inner harbour. A trawler was sinking at the outer side of the Eastern pier.
29
We disembarked at once, and proceeded to the inner Dunkirk) staff. Captain Tennant had proceeded at end of the pier where we met Captain Tennant's to G.H.Q. Our arrival coincided with until dusk. heavy in the morning and was expected back of any bombardment had to clear the harbour as soon as possible to time. which went on almost continuously owing
SABRE bombing, and it was therefore impracticable her to the W/T sets she had brought prior to 2100(?) leaving transfer beaches. the Captain Tennant returned time about to seek his my function had been)to act to as and proceeded instructions as to my party's disposal. either as for the to a conference before I had Before double-back leaving Dover, for Captain Tennant or alternatively decision. work on the beaches according to S.N.O's the above shelling and bombing, manoeuvring 3 or 4
transports were to the harbour was a near miss
During sunk or disabled. ordered KING ORRY to proceed and subsequently remaining there until towed making the clear, rammed the Eastern pier alongside by large at in the entrance but before doing go was damaged by making a drifter. hole, and The pier was holed by at bomb outer part useless.
hospital ship about to enter was dark. ordered As to proceed clear A and a considerable return alongside number after of stretcher the only cases three darkness fell, accumulated were despatched other in side of the which ambulances had available readiness' for to the the quay hospital the ship's across return. the Large harbour in of walking cases were transferred harbour numbers by drifter to the same quay.
Captain Bush in the S.N.O. meanwhile afloat proceeded of the beaches, in an
M.T.B. M.T.B. to embark being directed in HEBE as to return to transport me to the beaches the later if necessary.
At about to proceed along the beaches. divided officers passage
2330 (7) S.N.O. returned and said On he wished across my the party Channel, I had tentatively my into/

395
2.
369
into two parties, one to work from Le Panne to Bray and one from Bray to Dunkirk. Commander Gorton proceeded along the beach with his party to work East of Bray and later I with Commander Otway-Ruthven and two other officers also proceeded along the beach to Bray. There were vast numbers of troops on the beaches round Malo le Baine.
Enemy aircraft were heard overhead and they and the guns west of Dunkirk were bombing and shelling Malo and Dunkirk
Fort. The night was very dark, the tide was low and as we proceeded to Bray we met many large bodies of troops making their way westward including a certain number of
French, who asked if they could be sent off.
I informed these that French ships might be expected in due course.
Half way to Bray were sighted some ships at anchor off the beach but heard nothing in reply to our hail.
Later we passed the CRESTED EAGLE high and dry and still burning. A little further another ship was sighted to seaward and a boat just observed. On hailing her, she also, proved to be from MEDWAY QUESN lying off. Later & second boat and a power boat also came in. Te sent off 700 to
750 troops in these boats to MEDWAY QUEEN. As we approached
Bray in the lightening dawn, a number of destroyers, sloops and scoots were seen to be lying off and embarkation was proceeding in such boats as were available. Several boats were aground, others were hold, and some had no cars.
At about 0500 (?) I reached Bray and made contact
If had cleared for England and there were no further ships with Headquarters. By about 0600 all destroyers, sloops, etc., available. At Bray I also met some Naval Officers who and had apparently been working on the beaches for some time had some Naval Lieutenants and Naval ratings who apparently later arrived from EXCELLENT and VERNON. The lamps. latter were leaving Dover I had understood that there be few in number and a a certain amount of signal would with 24 Aldis lamps, but these I never saw, and so was
Before Signal Ratings along the beaches adequately their supplied need certainly felt. In any case, communication along if not many with so many troops on the shore, with passing also miles of flat beaches was very difficult and I
sorely ships anchored off beaches. Similarly between La Panne was impossible felt the need of communication there ship communication or until Thursday afternoon Dunkirk.
and no Bray and never any between Bray and
About 0800 I proceeded on a motor bicyle in to at La very with whom I discussed the position. La Panne and some were
Panne fatigued where and ineffective condition. There to
I met Commander Dover who I felt He was took me see Q.M.G. French troops between Bray and British ships, but very many had been allowed to embark in had been before I move westward to Malo. Off Le embarkation were of these took steps to stop this, the French Panne there ordered three to destroyers and sloops, and Not appeared were to in evidence on the beaches, but to Bray an two or be proceeding satisfactoriny. possibly many British they were inshore the sky was then overcast and a the troops among the dunes. On the return Scotch mist hour later which was a Godsend, for throughout British forenoon vast masses were proceeding along the beaches, and aircraft prevailed of French troops quite apart from had attacked, troops the carnage would have been dreadful.
No/

396
3.
370
/th.38/5
No further ships arrived during the forenoon off Bray or
La Panne and a great opportunity was missed for embarking troops undisturbed. During the forenoon the Sappers in conjunction with the First Division, built a long pier of lorries off Bray into the sea, with plank decking. This was an excellent piece of work and proved invaluable later as a pedestrian pier, but it was insufficiently stable for such craft as paddle steamers to go alongside. Nor was it desirable for smaller pier craft to go alongside in safety especially in a lop. It was, nevertheless, later invaluable for embarking troops into small boats.
During the forenoon I proceeded to Dunkirk and met S.N.O. He informed me that embarkation had proceeded very satisfactorily during the night and estimated that
12,000 to 13,000 troops had been embarked. I told him that I estimated 6,000 to 7,000 troops had embarked during the night from the beaches, and I stressed the urgency for more ships to arrive and more and more boats, but few if any ships arrived during the forenoon.
On my way to Dunkirk, I found the water Lighter
CLAUDE high and dry, but ample supplies of water, and on my return to Bray arranged with the Military Authorities for lorries and/gune to collect and déstribute this sorely needed requirement.
Acting on S.N.O's instructions, I sent officers on board the CRESTED EAGLE to destroy any secret equipment still in her, but fire had already done all that was necessary. In the afternoon (Thursday) one or two scoots and 2 or 3 motor yachts and paddlers arrived and anchored to the westward of Bray, where no doubt they first observed large bodies of troops waiting embarkation. None, unfortunately, proceeded East of the Bray Pier where the
First Division had waited many hours patiently and most orderly. Eventually some of the First Division proceeded to Dunkirk where they hoped embarkation facilities were better. One or two destroyers or sloops passed en route from the westward, to La Panne, and I tried without success with at very ineffective improvised lamp to tell them to anchor off the Pier. Eventually I managed to get at signal to Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker in a passing ship asking him to arrange for this. I sent an officer with a representative of the First Division staff to Dunkirk to represent the urgent need for destroyers to anchor off Bray. (Not until two days later did I learn that all the destroyers, etc., had been given specific instructions as to which beaches they were to anchor off). Later a certain number of destroyers sloops and scoots had anchored off Bray and the embarkation proceeded satisfactorily. Unfortunately however, owing to at lack of Naval Officers, time after time did one see the a projected procession of boats going off loaders with troops, only to be cast adrift empty floating to seaward.
About 1700(?) I paid a further visit to G.H.Q.
to calar up a point about the allocation of troops to the several beaches, and returned to Bray.
About 2000 I decided that I must go and interview
Admiral Wake-Walker who I believed to be embarked in at ship off
Bray. Before leaving I gave instructions that in the falling tide/

397 4.
371
Th-3015
tide, arrangements were to be made to ensure that all craft should be kept afloat in not less than one foot of water pending ships being available to embark troops. I also discussed with the Brigadier, the need for ensuring that troops would be properly fallen in when the final evacuation took place to prevent so far as possible an almost inevitable ugly rush, but nothing definite could be fixed up in this matter pending the promulgation of the final plan not then received.
I learnt that the Brench final evacuation was expected to take place on Friday, completing on Friday night, in view of the closing in of the enemy and as soon as I had specific instructions that my beach parties were not to be taken prisoner and in order, for psycholigical reasons, to avoid the undesirability of the Naval personnel embarking to the possible exclusion of Military personnel (even if they could do so), I left instructions that half of the personnel were to embark between midnight and the early hours of Friday.
At about 2000 I again set off for La Panne intending to return that night as soon as I had seen the Rear-Admiral.
There were many men embarking in the few boats available going off to about 2 or 3 destroyers and sloops lying off
La Panne and I had considerable difficulty in getting a
WORCESTER as his Flagship, but he himself was ashore.
passage off. I eventually found the Rear-Admiral was using I
decided to wait for his return which did not occur until about 2230. Meanwhile, enemy aircraft were active in the vicinity and destroyers were filling up with troops. I
stressed to the Rear-Admiral the urgent need for ships and boats already obvious), and maintained to him the question of covering fire during the evacuation, but my main object was to get his concurrence which he gave me, to my embarking the following day in at motor boat off the beaches to rectify the projected recurrence of emptied boats being cast adrift.
It was too late to return to Bray that night by she sailed for Bray in the early hours, disembarking me land, and after the Rear-Admiral had transferred to EXPRESS
into the trawler OLVENA at about 0400(?) At this time there were a very considerable number of destroyers, paddlers, trawlers, acoots, etc., off Bray and embarkation was proceeding satisfactorily, but at 1010 had already started. From Bray I
of about ten motor yachts which arrived from England.
transferred to SCIMITARY motor boat and later to ANNI, These one
31/5
craft drew 6 to 7 feet and were unable to get across any of the beaches. I used ANRH as my headquarters during the day, and instructed half the yachts to proceed to La Panne and the other half to work off Bray. During the forenoon, considerable firing of empty craft towards the beach was carried out and only about two boats were allwed to get adrift and ultimately aground. with the falling tide, however, till the tide rose in the afternoon. These included the ALC, a quite a number of boats were seen to ground and remained ashore fast motor boat and a lifeboat. Other power boats broke down.
Nevertheless the embarkation, much hindeedd by the lop, proceeded satisfactorily. As destroyérs and sloops arrived, I instructed them to lower their motor boats whalers where this had not already been done. These boats, sepecially destroyers motor boats were quite invaluable. During the morning, at certain
[Contained in Vol 4, p112 amount/

SECRET
GREAT PECKS 398
typed caproo afthis
WICKHAM
report in vol.4, p96
Dynams
28.
372
HANTS
Sw.
3-0 June 1940
J have the honour to submit the following resort on events after left Down in Sabe about 1600 on
Wednesday 29 May 1940 -
2. On anival at Dunkers about 1320, the western and univer bank 0) the from were heavily on form with vast volumes of smoke drifting to Me southward.
Irenade recently was heavily an five and sinteris - a towler was smiking at the niver 484
and a transport had been hit at the outer Lide & e eastern beakwate. "Saln berther wisher of her trawter and my party of officer at over proceded
Capital Burds and t the winer and 0) the beahwater * report *
Castoni Sennant S.NO Dunknew for ander
3. On learnis Daven the intention had been that Captame
Bush should transfer E Jace an since. apleal, that my
Officer shall work on e bracher in the taken airen scale of Bray and that should when double. bank the S.N.O on accomatively work - the Gaden with H.O
at or mar Bray, the whole buins salpier 6- sirio:
wishes an - aniual. s.mo and forma &- have proceeded & La Paune in a maning $ are Love Sent, his staff remainis as Duuknew - dising 6
await his naturn, informated at any manual
4. Our animal conicided with a renewal unal deash 0) -
bankardment and for 2 hours - mm, - areas subjected & continuous heavy air sum Gombardment

399 2.
373
5. SaGri eft the Garbour as son as possible L/6 So k the Gracher and there was us time in the aircumstances to disembash the winden sets which the has Grought.
6. Dumis the shelling and some 3am 4
transports in the violaty of and to the east- of the harbour entrance were sunk a damaged.
"King Bmy manoring in the entrance was the &
can out, ant before benis aber to do so, had her steming sear disabled by a near miss and rammed the beahwater a hostrical ship entiring was and our and t return after dark. The eastem him was hit, & outh and Genis but ouring action.
7. S. N.O returned after durh hat beton could obtain his mistriction of eff asami for a not returning #a about 2300!
8. Captain Bush subsequintly embarhed un a M.TB
to juni HeGe off the beader her M.T.B buing told k receim a unknew Cata t transfer we and my Santy as requisite ammy
9. In the gatheris darkness a number 8, stutche cases wen collected and suit renual & the hospital sais Every in such few ambricances as would
- a Englishey brown, and in addition a very considerable number of wachins cases was transferred by drifter to the same eway.
*
Later nut Candr garton and 3 officer

3.
400
374
waek us the beach to the eastern and of Bray.
0. when S.N.O. eventually returned a decised that he did not want t be double banked: accordingly my party of 3 officer and myself set off alms the shon about 2330 was over head and any 1
guns west of kept Malo and Dunkersus under fire.
Im might was any dark and the tixe low, and though some stutes could be seen sit the brach. us refries and be got $ our hailury
Very large numbers of British -hooth were
Sathered at Male and are continuously met many large Godies making Kim way towards Dankensa
: there miducare some hoom who was the reat some And shin might be expected for them, a prom hom.
aGmt 0100 a boat was harlid and provide <
be from Nadway Emen ancliend off. a Meme bulluri boat x Cate a sown boat am asshand:
trools in the vicerety was harted and - 700 is was eventually sent off by early morning.
Lath are barred Crestine Lase. high and dry and saa benuis after benis bounbed.
a Bray in the Gyatemis dawn
4 a 5 slowm and destroyees, and some scoots wen found off- a shon and mm areas mcanhing in an two Goat of varies description that were available. Several Boats were ashare

401 4.
375
holed on without oars.
all destroyer shoots at proceded to sea about 0600.00 30. Near.
2. as about 0600? made contact will
Corts HQ in a home at Bray and also met
Camer Sorton 2 my sants, and some naval officers who Gas absomily been working -
the beacher for same time before our anival.
Late special on a moter heycle alway the bench to make contact with 9. H.Q at ha
Pame Two sloots - destroyers was off
La Pame and ambarbation asspeased k G
forwarderis slowly but salisfactority. Then wen many French twom - but not being embarked mean for small musber Mm was not great winder of Brilish troofer in corrence.
after discussing the sutuation are ONE
cd had aim met Camdin. J.S.D ove 2x. who save me as unitersion of buris a line and inspective person). returned $ Bray making contact in rente with naval Licutinance and their santier who had assumily came from Excelemt of Vemon almo Gamt of Ream General
Wahe. Walher: presence - a sCult lynng of are signalled to him 1 yes ungent wed for navel
3, Before Gaving Down, had understood Mat an

5.
402
376
should fuid some 24 signal rolies and an adequate subsidy of aldis Compa one the beacher:
their may Gour been a mcsundenfandu; are my bank but May were not mm and a filt operation Man need was somely - bore for along M increase engle of beach and for consumication wife saring shut du any care communication whice have been difficult with so many thousands 9 / on the Grader and dumar; further molor boak uny too and the few mi the uniqued untiloy.
ment as smake, 4 than ream on destrated work.
become La Danna Bray and D underen was uniquity useded but only - Hunday eveny was a line mm, between la Paims me Bray by the any w/g am was also easay weded, but 06 had with Gum someon 4 machifthis.
an mi/minized v/s Camels was as
Bray H.Q an Thur day evening. ask: was too weak 6- a every faster.
4. On the Smoke twom was and ma
É concentrace at Male and Many amount the day vast Godia of your covered the Grader and dumn - rami mut washwand. was mould a heaver unt condition had a People with incomed dums a memes, -

6.
403
377
the havoc have would have resulted from eveny an action in dreadful to
5. Thursday moments was evverent and mon and
British practically mon, troom continued to anior, but ram was no states for Minu & unbark in and only a few boats and borton craft and a course of power Goats. an A.L.C. operating off ha Danne
4 as micaluable.
had horns from what was told an Down that Locust and and same 30 small craft from Ramengat would have amine 57%
the beacher but they was not seen that day.
16. Soon after my return to Bray, am by motor cycle for Dunkergue to much S.N.O and ascertain program Have. En min forms the water canier Coauds " high and day 3
wast of Bray wath was a make unigent need for the twom and on my nature
5 Among later, informed the militians authoriter with a new & and can hum's and
& college and discribute - water.
S.N.O. in Yamed we a submer had evacuaGed same 12-13000 the Anneur myan - massing and extimative the Gearder had and and 6-7000.
Bui SHIPS and BOAES was unsurer wanced and estremally small sown Goats.
Then was at hair the want number of

7.
404
378
Brilish two bs at and just east or Dunheran and many henoh troubs as X was MaGo.
7. On my notume to Bray. arranged in accordance with mishination from S NO, for
" Crestid Ease & a virited any reent equipment & be destruyed. the fire. had in tact dons all that was necessary
3. Dumis the day the RE: amisha by rediorm had conshind a las soon of Comes * Manhs
5H Bray - the shamed have grown about 10 her of walk at high wall and was misa Guable lace as a Additions him * the small enaft G lazy alamyside but 06 was insufficiently stable the lamps to secure fif and will & daman small craft by holu's themselves expecially - a
9. asamt from a Scoot one the no no shirts amind the the Grander dumy 1 forman but smill sawden and a yours or his amired fin the wastward dumis a afternom and and were of
Bray when easy no dougs fink absorved Rudiu of waiters trustn
Later two or 3 destroyen and slown same easiward k La Paum and Great without success to sugual them & another & a eart of the Aven when are /or Division have Been wallens - can' for sculn and Goat. (ddid not am ace Same days each that all seesh

8.
405
379
from Down Gad been given specific mishiolian with evenue, as to their destriction). Lace bassed a message & admiral and aim
= detail a ship to another east 07 the been and also sent an officer & Demainque to New burben. Meanwhile many of Mu twom set off for 0 unheren when 06 was howed was available
0. in the late afternoon said a seemed &
G.K.Q * clear us a ponit - the allocation 07 trom be Gracher and returned to Bray us the evening
24 whit watching the unbarhation at Bray, " was noted how time after time boats Caden with trom an reactions the shift were cast admitt without boat Keetness - a wasve and mork serious position.
Ju the acress of naval a was very evident Mar then was am ungeret were for source
Goate & collect and how them bach under dinetic and accordingly decroid & 00 6 ha Dame that used and probon 6- Rear. admiral wall-
Waller reat. was No. & Garden. J
should best be employed affort working mission or directed rew wathin the followis day.
22. a unis the evening Gamt Mart the energy were closings in and that of mijas be expenses that the Lival wacuation would tabe Hare dumy
- following day (Triday) or Riday mjas at lacost.

9.
406
380
Jt their was so, it- seemed vieritable that very many trooter would be GFt ashm - My order being that Grach bartier were not to be facus business and suice of was auticitiales that the fuial would & heclic, it would hour been morally undersivable for acc naval to embark in Man final rush even of that was accord misly. Geter broceeding G ha Dami amounted that half the usual benause batter dumis the early hours a Inday and although interneted returning my of 4-Bray that evening, as mistinction & cusum that dumis the fallus amang-ments would be made to all book 6 be not am than e took of water weich awaiting the anival of scripturis opt- the Good
23. also space 6. eu Busadur as Bray KP.
- the weld for ensuming hose fallur, -
to avoid - "usly rush: though must knowledge of new fusal Man nor 1 yet bromulsaled their could Girl Ge anticipatory
24. am for ha Pame adment about was wather's sour? and eventually embarked in Gue
Worcesce about 2100 - 2am advisiral came off then the short each and - 19 all transferred is Sx/mm - Mean the 3 $ as/m

10.
407
381
at La Panne was contenuing to embart hooton-
06 was too late to return to Anay that evening and the adminal Gamij abtormed my proposal as a my - sous afroat the following day.
told me he would disembark me off Bray on his way Hour her coast durning the early hour
15. an anival off Bray above 0300? 20day.
houstener E H.M. Prower Olvina" and Cales G
Scivitar's motor boat which was engand -
busing off- Caren boat, in various destroyan sloops, scoots etc and 8th Bray.
26. Later when 20ml 10 - 12 moter yaoah amired from England to ANKH
% and her as my H.Q. for the remarkship of the day. staff of them ordered K La
Paune, the remainder to work off Bray.
Jesse araft monthly druw 6-7 fast and therefore could not work clan wishon 4- a bracher. du addition then was an and order sower book and as valuable A.L.C.
Same of the small yourk Good water boat and was weaken conditions framilas Convence them. but in new Cor then small free Board snaluded ram Gun's much ua Cus.
27. Dunn's reu early hours and termoon then wen amsa scuti tor

11.
408
382
but the amid had treshened causer's a cop which added seriously to defficulties and delays in selling heavy laden book 07/-
28. wore the falluis tode a conviderable unine of boath grounded and remained asion Cice the afferioon. micluding her ALC X a lifeboat and a speed boat Janes tourns boar beach wishin after miloading, few booth were eath t drift.
as destroyees arrived ram 4
hower there motor boat and whales when
Mary had not a Grady done no. Jan boals from destriyers did service and estrocially their shallow draught moter Goat.
Conditions at Bray them form am a great uniforment m the Arwous say -
the matth of available transport - as ha
Dame however then asseas
&
Gam Gene.
grat shartage of boats * suitable Sower Good
29. Ten los subvided about your on Inday and conditions for embachation a number of energy acieraft astreased subdically and bombed the dunh, bracher and off shon, and enemy suns milana Them fin am saifn t sea wand, which delayed embartation and sand various small craff
No. 9' moter your the was malury

12.
409
383
water and told an to brach Cerself 17
necessary.
30. The Rear. admiral procuding in between La Paune and D Dunhurzu arrived off Bray and cloud Gimi an necessary
31. with Mr risus tide after has waca conditions much unterned, more boats were Hoaled - send in, and Morquite arrived and anchme olone in + Away him
Embarhation was accelinating when am enemy gum buyond ha Dame street an accurate ten on "Marquit" and other scuth and craft wishon then to the wastward - a ment disablomities situation an new mement aloud you then arriving from
D which and informed lum of Miss position and by his cristruction was donny deslargen to Gu ram not to should to for wesh, when the sunfin again street us: meanwhite the with a slocts procuded towand,
La Ansumably to draw a fine.
acout recei time a yacht toming 6 imace bower boats animal and the rem &
snowed rishan G Guis off hoom a will on so 6- the west of Bray when was aho sucuduis. learne as New manuf that

13.
410
384
the AL.C. was our of action. but in
Lno of a s Gamer.
32. as we cloud the beacher, some 30 energy bumber escancial by many traccas absorved overlead. - went an to bomb Dunhir healthy other bounded "Morgurt" destroyen
8/00/m and small wath Many Geneles fell we the receives one Genis a my man mis
<
my yachl.
also
33. She stand maling water ford and, Meno the stem slands and notial an univially melialle send as from Mu A Gradule.
In the was a electric bumb was resalid defealine.
was of the Jania the would by unlited stand us G further rongh and ather due commideration regulations decided 4
recurn to Darn, ordering the your tees com/sarly Se wen ram some
2-3 with É seaward mi new fallurs Gigar and was made G pan a menate & the
Isla II & Canyandra:- yacat.
Hasslup in my closed use - The one the was short of full and as a fuel dritter had use animal 4th her 6
return a who ) and mistencled wishore her 4. 421
cean of the Gao ful.
the rear

14.
411 385
she was short of oil, had a each.
and had scriptude sen astem seam, and consequently my etement in constitury & Dave
Then form was a reduction in available small craft.
34. Looking Sash as 06, reasure saw should have ben beller advised 4. howe undersor lod and 4. Gan as amulme'
smound weekm. In M encures - at Me time diaded sa was a we Income
35. an 06 General and, the haven was made without the walk Gunis have down by Baling, and it u: ace the mm & be (4) when 1004
on new wainty of Mu gull, in the dark. "Anuelme" was num dam by "Veruge, fortunately for of ex.
36. on animal at Down. reserved +
the Via. adminals office and request &
return 4 the beaches.
was havever administes He' are falisued condition and Gas completely Can my was accordures by dineled 6
MIRAL
ml and ence my met m'Hadium the
.
OUN o 1940 REF
further duty.
OF
have reu Gorner to be Sw, itc. admiral your absolvent servaux
Doven
Ca Man

Dynams 63.
412
386
FROM
THE OFFICER IN CHARGE, NO. 3. PARTY.
R.N.BARRACKS, CHATHAM.
DATE **** 6th June, 1940.
TO
THE VICE ADMIRAL, DOVER,
I have the honour to report that this party left R.N.Barracks, Chatham at 0415, 29th May 1940 for
Dover, where it arrived at 0630.
2.
The party consisted of "C" Company of Nore
First Battalion and 120 Stoker ratings from the N.T.B.
3.
On arrival at Dover I reported to the Commodore, who was the principal S.T.O. of the Division, and was informed that the party would be required in small groups to augment the crews of the merchant ships being used in the transport of troops from Dunkirk, or as armed guards in the event of any disturbances taking place in these ships.
4.
I then contacted Lieutenant Commander lykin,
R.N. First Lieutenant of H.M.S. "Lynx" who afforded =
great assistance by arranging accomodation for the party during our stay in Dover. The first night the party was accomodated in the Citadel, but vas subsequently transferred to the Transit Camp near the harbour as this was more convenient for getting emergency parties away quickly. A small party was kept on duty outside the P.S.T.Os offices for emergencies.
men and 5. Stokers were reported to have had a very heart-
The parties sent to merchant ships, both Seaening effect on the crews of these vessels. They helped work the ship and formed the nucleus of boat crews working from Dunkirk beaches.
6.
SPECIAL REPORTS.
Dutch boat "Ngaroma" The Captain of this Yeasel reported that his engineers were unwilling to sail in the ship, and I was asked to provide Engine-room ratings who could work a Deisel-engine, Stoker Petty Officer
Jenner and Leading Stoker Linden volunteered for this
Duty. I also sent an armed party of six hands and Petty
Officer Burge to augment the crew. On their arrival on board the Captain obeyed orders to sail immediately and the crew, heartened by our party, all did their jobs.
Owing to the delay in sailing, the ship did not arrive at Dunkirk until daylight and was consequently subjected to constant fire from ahore batteries during the time she was there. Lateness of arrival was also caused by two engine failures on the way over. The ship was carrying provisions and water, but the shelling prevented her from getting alongaide. Two attempts were made but proved impracticable. It is regretted that casualties incurred were, four killed and three injured. A list of
Naval casualties is attached.
Petty Officer Burge. This rating rendered valuable assistance to the wounded.

413
LETTER OF 6TH JUNE 1940 FROM THE OFFICER IN CHARGE NO.3.
387
PARTY N.BARRACKS, CHATHAM, to VICE ADMIRAL, DOVER.
II.
7. 3.8. "Seiriol. It was reported that the Captain of this ship had refused duty. As there were no spare
Crews for Merchant ships in the port, Lieutenant Mc.Ewen,
R.N.R. was ordered to take command of the ship. Petty
Officer Harding and six armed ratings, with one Stoker
Petty Officer and six Stokers joined the ship at 1000 on
29th May, 1940. The Captain was put under open arrest and the ship proceeded. The Naval ratings manned the
Lewis Guns and Bren Guns in the ship and on arrival at
Dunkirk were standing by to take lines ashore had it been possible to get alongside. This was not possible so they manned the only two boats left in the ship. The only ships ratings who assisted were one Officer and as Steward.
They embarked survivors from S.S. "Crested Ragle* which was on fire, and H.M.S. "Grenade" which had been sunk alongside. They also embarked soldiers from the beach.
About two hundred men were brought on board, half of whom were badly wounded. As there was no medical party on board the ship left before being fully loaded on account of the latter.
the crew 8. of this ship were very tired and shaken and re-
Hospital Ship "St.Julien". It was reported that quired assistance in working the ship. à party of twentytwo hands under Sub. Lieutenant Radeliffe, R.N.V.R. was sent for this purpose, half of whom were to assist in the engine-room. The crew were very willing and the Naval party lent practical and moral support. The ship proceeded to Dunkirk on May 31st, where she arrived at 0850 and went alongside the pier. She remained there until 1015
and was under heavy fire during the whole of this time. All the Naval ratings except the Stokers on watch were ashore bringing off stretcher cases. No casualties were sustained. Sub. Lieutenant Radcliffe was himself ashore carrying stretchers and was the last man on board having seen all his men had returned.
9. FOLKESTONE.
At 0500 on Sunday 2nd June, 1940, it was reported that three ships 9.3. *Malines* 5.9. "Ben-my-Chree" S.S.
"Tynewald" - were giving trouble. An armed party under
Petty Officer Hollingsworth was sent over to take guard duties on these ships. The Petty Officer had instructions that no-one was to leave these ships under any circumstances.
Shortly after the arrival of this party the ships were sent out to anchorage. Nothing untoward occurred before 1400
when at relief party under Leading Stoker Booth took over duties.
At 1850 S.S. "Ben-my-Chree" came alongside the jetty. Three sentries - A.B.Clithero, 0.8m. Tomlinson,
Cook Blackman - were placed on the gangway, the remainder being posted at intervals along the ship. As the ship was being berthed the crew were demonstrating and shouting that they were going to leave the ship, and on the brow.
being run out they attempted to do so with their kits.

388
LETTER OF 6TH JUNE, 1940 FROM THE OFFICER IN CHARGE, NO.3.
PARTY:.BARRACKS, CHATHAM, to VICE ADMIRAL, DOVER.
III.
Leading Stoker Booth ordered his men to come on guard and advance up the brow. The crew thereupon returned on board at once, where they remained until the relief crew arrived.
S.S. "Tynewald" came alongside at 1910. The crew did not attempt to leave the ship, but contented themselves.th shouting abuse at the sentries. Relief crews for these two ships arrived at 1950, and the old crews were then allowed to leave. Complete lists of their names and addresses were taken and given to the.0.Folkestone.
These ships subsequently sailed as ordered.
S.S. "Malines" had left the harbour with no instructions at about 1600, and was subsequently found to have proceeded to Southampton.
10. The Chief Gunner's Mate of the Company - Chief
Petty Officer Ward rendered the most invaluable service in the Transit Camp, not only by regulating our own party and sending out guards and Stoker parties with the utmost despatch, but also by keeping a complete record of all Naval ratings passing through the Camp. These included survivors,
Lewis Gun parties, Parties etc.
11. The following ratings were also outstanding -
Petty Officer Harding, Petty Officer Burge, Petty Officer
Willock, Leading Stoker Booth - The whole party remained in good spirits throughout and were always cheerful and eager for any duties, that were to be performed.
12. The party had proceeded to Dover in buses from
Maidstone andDistrict 'Bus Company. Two of these were retained in Dover and I would like strongly to commend the
Drivers, who were only too willing to turn out at any hour of the day or night to transport our various parties, so saving valuable time, and also turned to themselves in shifting gear and stowing in the buses for transport when necessary. A report to this effect has been sent to the
Proprietors.
COPIES TO.
Lieutenant With Commander, R.N.
Commodore. P.S.T.O.
OFFICER IN CHARGE NO.3.
PARTY.
Commodore. R.N.Barracks.
Chatham.
Captain (G). R.N.Barracks.
Chatham.
Battalion Commander.
Company Commander.

415
389
APPENDIX 1. TO LETTER OF 6TH JUNE 1940 FROM OFFICER IN
CHARGE NO. 3.PARTY, R.N.BARRACKS, CHATHAM TO VICE
ADMIRAL, DOVER.
I regret to announce the following casualties sustained by No.3. Detached Party which left R.N.
Barracks at 0415 on 29th May, 1940.
KILLED.
E. H. Jenner * Stoker Petty Officer.
C/K.64610.
Able Seaman. R.N.R.
D.226.
C. Garside.
WOUNDED.
off. No. N.K.
J. H. Drake. Ordinary Seaman.
All were on board S.S. "Ngaroma" which was shelled from shore battery on entering harbour.
NOTE.
C/JX.178712.
R. Armstrong. Ordinary Seaman.
was result removed of the to intense shelling and bombing and sight hospital in a demented condition the as at of the casualties.
* This rating was not a member of the Naval Brigade.

416
390
APPENDIX 11. TO LETTER OF 6TH JUNE 1940, FROM THE OFFICER
IN CHARGE NO.3.PARTY: R.N.BARRACKS CHATHAM to VICE
ADMIRAL: dover.
Armed Guards had to be placed on the following ships at various times during the operation.
S.S. "St. Helier"
S.S. "Manxman"
S.S. "Seiriol"
S.S. "Ben-my-Chree"
S.S. "Tynewald"
S.S. "Malines"
2.
A guard was sent to the Dutch boat *Ngaroma*
but she sailed on their arrival.
Parties to supplement ships' crews were also lent 3. to the following ships, besides those mentioned above.
S.S. "Canterbury"
S.S. "Lady of Mann*
S.S. *Princess Maud"
h.s. "St.Julien"
and various Drifters and Motor-boats.

V.A.Dover.
Dynamo 81.
391
2 2nthil hereinth by nal report form
Dunknik. As I have alread mentioned an my report Can Ellwood to Balfun perfirmed wat' valuarle there tel layd 15th Carchesin Thank
Report by COMMANDER ELLWOOD on Communications.
Wennant
Narrative.
7 Aml
On arrival at Dover at about 1000, Monday 27th May,
I was placed in charge of communications.
CODE.
A private code, known as the K.D.G. Code, consisting of a simple letter transposition was arranged between the Flag
Lieutenant to V.A. Dover and myself for communication with
Dover should other means fail.
ENT.
The Flag Lieutenant gave me to understand that one military portable wireless set would go over to Dunkirk in the "WOLFHOUND" and that two or possibly three Naval Sets and personnel would follow almost immediately. It was unfortunate that none of these sets materialised until Thursday 30th, when one Naval set arrived.
STAFF.
One
Yeoman of Signalse and 24 Signalmen were attached to the landing party. These were told off 80 that one
Yeoman and 8 hands should be available for Headquarters, leaving
2 signalmen for each of the various embarkation parties. They were provided with hand flage but the total equipment other than these consisted of one Aldia Lamp, which was taken over from the British Naval Liaison Officer and made to function with the help of a battery acquired from a French Motor Car.
STATION.
A H.Q. Signal Station was established at the shore end of the péer for communication with ships arriving, but for some days no means of communication existed between Headquarters and the various parties, nor between one party and the othery except by Despatch Riders, distances being too great for the affective use of Samaphore,
Beach parties improvised signalling arrangements as best they could with the help of lamps of commandeered motor cars.

302
2
ESSAGES.
Messages for transmission by W/T were sent either through the French Station at the Bastion in Anglo-French or
K.D.G. Code, or, for the sake of greater secrecy as well as of convenience, through destroyers. These were taken by hand down the pier.
All messages were received through the French
Station.
of
On Thursday 30th, Lieut. Balfour arrived with:-
quipment
2 Telegraphists and 2 Signalmen.
A W/T set. (T.V.5).
A Portable Loud Speaker equipment, which proved invaluable for passing instructions to troops marching down the pier and also later for controlling ship traffic from the per head. A number of these instruments would have been of great value.
Two Field Telephones, with which it was at last possible to establish effective communication between the Pier
Master and the H.Q. Signal Station.
One copy of Syko Code.
Two Aldis Lamps.
Reception on the W/T set was established by 2300
Thursday, 30th, but owing to a defective transmitter full communication was not established with Dover on their set until daylight Friday 31st, when R/T had to be used. Transmission broke down altogether on Saturday evening lat June, probably due to sand in the generator.
On Saturday 1st June, the Royal Corps of Signals established a W/T Station in a lorry by the Bastion, working on 1700 k/o, and also a much needed telephone communication between the Bastion and the H.Q. Signal Station. Owing to the intense bombing and shelling of Sunday, the line was

419
393
22
more than once severed.
ction of Records.
In view of the possibility of the arrival of enemy forces on Sunday 2nd, all signal forms and records were destroyed.
REMARKS, to
During the week under review, the French Wireless Staff had ceased decoding messages in the Code Franco-Brittanique, and
)
had turned this over to Paymaster Lieutenant Brockett, who worked untiringly and with great efficiency, helped only from time to time by the 8.N.L.O. or myself.
The K.D.G. Code was used almost entirely for outward messages. This was because the only copy of the Code Franco-
Brittanique possessed by the French was the French version.
Consequently to transmit & message by this code it was first necessary to translate it into French. This meant that the message when de-coded at Dover by the English version might differ in some detail from the original message. The de-coding of messages in was fairly straightforward as an English De-Code was kept by the French.
The main objection to the Anglo-French Code was the time taken in decyphering. To give one example, at long message from Dover timed 0900 was received by me at 1300 and the text t
was finally obtained at 14.30. With events moving at the speed they were, quite often the purport of these messages had been anticipated some hours before.
Officer and Signalling Equipment. The arrival of Lieut. Balfour of was a relief. afficient communication in an undertaking this great kind is of such paramount importance that a Signal Officer, fully up-to-date and technically conversant with all the most modern equipment would seem to be a first assential of the organization.

304
Adequate means of establishing daylight and night signalling, taxe
TO
To telephone communication wherever possible, independent W/T communiabross
Drte
Longin cation, and loud-speaker communication would greatly have eased the situation and saved much valuable time in getting important messages to their destination.
Lieut. Balfour carried out his work with coolness and precision and was of the highest value.
donsts welver Tobru
COMPARISON OF RECORDS.
Tw
Since all records were destroyed it is not possible to make a complete comparison. Speaking from memory, however, it would seem that all messages in and out duly reached their
202
vissitns destination, even though in some cases the delay in transmitting
9500
one
To and decoding caused them to be of somewhat doubtful value.
istev dones" end
High praise is due to the Signal Staff in general. They
BEW
ti ebos were kept constantly on the look out with short spells and undertook tedd truism and a large volume of visual signalling.
In particular I would bring to notice the work of:-
tm noismov
Yeoman of Signals Piper.
Signalman Waters.
=
Jones.
=
Mulheran.
of
=
Simmonds.
WASHINGTON
VIOE ADMIRAL T 1940
Commender
TO
DOV 77
to

A
396
Dynam. 88.
422
prideridates to GREEN
efdicsed reveriem
Account of mentenant G.W. Vavasour and his section
VIJUSTY
as part of the Naval Beach party smittey nt 6823 oldertisv down
2330 Wednesday 29° May - 0100 Friday 31ˢᵗ
fitte Amount and two belates worked
Disposition of Officers.
euloy Jesmin 20
We were split up into three groups of form bentenants.
421
CONFIDENTIAL 88 914/01
hisis).
395
accords EO
Subject. REPORT OF EVACUATION VAVASOUR. OF B.E.F. FROM DUNKIRK BY LIBUTENANT
Jon at at heyendeeb 635W abroses In
From
The CAPTAIN, H.M.S. EXCELLENT. Portsmouth.
VIORIST most
Date
7th June 1940.
No. 781/4.
ensest v.Eub the et essesses
To
THE VICE ADMIRAL, DOVER.
veleb 80000 nt deriverion 20 ad of mode
The attached report by Lieutenant 0.W. Vavasour,
Royal Navy, of part of the work of evacuating the British mt This Dangra odt of with al
Expeditionary Force from the Dunkirk region, is forwarded in accordance with instructions received by him from Commander M.O.
trode rid ber two tool add no
Inmity ent oction of bfoow
Goodenough, Royal Navy, of your SylBind staff.
elemple to
CAPTAIN.
VICE ADMIRAL
hat
B- JUN 1940
*
91 the DOVER data whe hea Dig & the nurseten are correct
E
she is it dat a pasa 3 should 4 29°
en which duit Heal no a seeming Commender stars in any pase thing 8 amplise,
YAKASOUR hard 12AM healt situation when with he mis us him a promotion alout the state of he 9 DONCIRE -Mgh that mg not
-
THE
a
Her affected 25t the has sctuation. a the Beach suggest B.

A
396
Dynam 86.
422
To mass of auges
Account of mentenant G.W. Vavasour and his section as part of the Naval Beach party.
risum
2330 Wednesday 29" May - 0100 Friday 31ˢᵗ
Disposition of Officers.
10
We were split up into three groups of form bentenants.
ABCD sections were the ha Famme end of the beach
EFGH sections were in the middle of the beach (Bray)
IJKL sections were the Dunkink end of the beach.
Commodore Stephenson was S.N.O. ABCD sections.
Commodore Hallett was SNO EFGH sections.
On landing - as for as 9 know. - no Commodare was responsible for IJKL sections.
I was in G section under Commodar Hallett
Other officers under Commadore stallett were mentenants
Wells, Tibbits, Cameron
Before landing, Rear- Admiral Wake-Wallen told us of our dispositions. He said that the information available was extremely small and that we should have to meet situations as they arose.
We were told that on no account were our parties to be captured and that we were to leave when we thought fit
Rear. Adminal Wake- Walker explained that he would stay afloat and that whatever dup he was in would hoist the Red Ensign at the main as a distinguishing signal, and that the Blue Peter' to would be the signal for the naval party leave in an emergency.

397
Account of 'G' section
Commodore Hallett explained the following organisal
3015
his officers before landing
The soldiers were on the whole easy to control we had been prepared to find a very bad situation
He was to be afloat approximately in that with French and English fighting among Themselves section of the beach Signals were decided
There was nothing like that at all.
as to how he would call us up and has
Any organisation for forming groups for the next communicate with him.
boat was constantly ruined by streams of
He informed us that we were to be the straggless coming down to the waters edge.
judges of when to evacuate the nowal part
At that time only junior army officers were present that if one party beach had to leave to community
They had little or no control over the men along the whole, so all would have the
Our orders and the orders given by the naval ratings about boats were ip alryed implicitly;
The section heirtenants decided that as the orders about forming groups and quars for the
2.
boats were very much more difficult to enforce were so very small, that all four section
- duefly due g think - that stragglus were remain close together in case there shall continually arriving and forming batches out of trouble with the soldiers over boats or their turn.
the food and water bottles of the sailous
May
30
The morale of the soldiers was very good. They two
3.
We landed at approximately 2330 in had experienced bitter disappointments in that
The Admiral and the Commodore decided to some of them had been waiting as long as two
29/5
until daylight in the destroyer from which days to be evacuated, and there had aty been only a few boat loads at very long intervals disembarked.
Considerable discontent was felt against the French sections (each covering a frontage of approximal
On landing we took up our positions
- not only as to their fighting ability which the British addiess described most fluently - but form hundred yards.
as they were mingling with our soldiers walting of
When we landed there were no signs within for evacuation
4.
A few wholesome lies to the French soldiers as to boats ashore or of any solders the position of their own ships soon cleared minutes of landing, approximately 5,000 and the area. They formed to the Eastward of left their cover in the sand dunes our sections but between ABCD sections and approached the boats ourselves. We discovered that a headquarters was established there

of
B
398
0/5
in one of the houses along the front, but we not to contact with them until daylight.
30/5
were considerably string out, away from the waters
There was no acute distress for food and edge, and to settle down in the sands he managed by 0600 to collect a considerable although extremely weary were not exhausted number of collapsible boats from the RE:
feeling was one of depression for evacuating hours as on the previous day and Wednesda
By 0700 approximately we had sent off these the forman aircraft had made the beach alne collapsible boats averaging parties of ten in each boat but in spite of all efforts in the vast
7. From 2330, when we landed, until dayly majority of cases all the soldiers left their boats evacuation was practically non-existent when they arrived at their ship, and left Cheir
Commodore Hallett's sections it is doubtful boats floating with no one to bring them back to the beach To make matters worse, these got off 80 men.
boats were dryting to the East and coming ashou
A few boats appeared but when the alreast the French who were using them to go reached their ship they all abandows off to British ships and left it drifting. as there were no boal
At this time there were no power boats at all and whaler trips were extremely infrequent The
30
At dawn we contacted headquarters rate of evacuation was appallingly slow.
one Captain RN and two Commanders RM
g informed to one of the La Commanders Panne RN
were no sarlors anywhere except for our the Captain RN had departed to and 9 did not party. No suggestions or orders were
See him again - that 9 proposed to act with from headquarters. The Commander my section as boatkeepers and to leave the informed us that they had come from beach a
which was now out of action with
By 0730 more ships had arrived. Evacuation was in ruins.
going quicker as we had formed boatherepers but was
Then still far from satisfactory The soldiers were in
The boat situation was now acute extremely dumay - getting into the boals the destroyer and one sloop opposite our area sold suy and we had to wade out shoulder dup dawn we must have had 15,000
to keep the boats stam on to the beach.
our section of the beach.
g decided that we should go anboard H.M.S.
Antony to get a change of clothing While boat anboard send
Shorlly after dawn some of the more
HMS Antony we managed to procure a motor officers started to arrive and we manage this large body of men which

427
399
30/5
from the Daisy Bell"? which was alongside
30/5
(1230)
one man in her with little idea of ach
At this time the general opinion of the more sevior
My 2.P.O's, signalmen and myself remained army officers that we met was that the infantry boat until she broke down twelve hours could not hold out for more than 24 hours.
After this appreciable interval with no ships present
13. The first object was to recover the majority a destroyer arrived and anchored slightly to which were how being used by the Frend the Eastward of Bray we towed as many bring them back to our area This use boats as we could to her.
done and we proceeded to start a few
It looked certain at this time that the Navy
30/5
had abandored the evacuation mentmant M.A
14.
At 0900 we made contact with Common
Hemans closed this destroyer in a boat.
who was then in a drifter g inform we found anboard two officers - mentinants
Stubbs and Fletcher from A and B sections -
what 9 was doing. He approved who had been told to leave by their Commodore me that he was very short of coal
Rear. Admiral Wake- Walker was anboard and he approximately, the Commodore steamed told mentmant Hemans and myself to carry on seaward 9 did not see the Commit with the boats.
we took them in again but still there was a long interval with no
15.
At 0930 - there was only one other slip to which to tow the hoats.
working writin five miles either side
It was a destroyers motor boat which
That was the last time that I saw Rear.
left behind, when the destroyer sailid,
Admiral Wake. Walker.
-aboutten being aground.
At about 1300 a considerable number, of slups
16.
During the forenoon, evacuation proceeded call started to arrive - Gawlers, drifters, sloops,
There were boats of all descriptions -
paddle minesweepers.
collapsible boats - available.
Evacuation then continued as fast as possible but the whole day we saw only two
IT.
By noon all ships that 9 could see half motor boats operating.
fully laden There was a full
We other asked each destroyer and slip for sailors more with no ship left to pick up to act as boackeepers but not one ship could let us have them.
evacuation boats.

L29
c
30/5
400
23.
At 2000 it appeared again that the Name
3015
abandoned the evacuation All ships except
He replied that he had received orders to proceed anne and he could not get them back to me.
ROYAL/ the Golden? Eagle - had departed fully lader to
He weighed unmediately and departed; that was the more ships were arriving for more solding last time that 9 saw my own group of saulows
At this time an operations started J.
in
Royal more acute our section of the beach
For half an han a was stranded the golden?
which we were now operating [to the Westwand
Eagle with no means of getting off Before she stranded Crested? Eagle was bombed twice sailed a Commander RN in a flat bottom power driven boat arrived alongside 9 went about
24. Firing from the shore was also apprecially and returned to the shore with him The Golden and occasional busts of shells started G
Eagle souled almost immediately
Renal
30%/313r
25. The Golden? Eagle signalled me to come
Unfortunately at midnight we grounded on the ebb tide and filled our circulator with sand
Her Captain - a Commander RN- informed how water was not until 0100.
that his ship was almost full, that that the evacuation was over and that
31/5
The Commander remained with the boat for the add to tow some of the closest boats of tide to turn and 3 left to try and get another to his ship and then bring my saule boat. 9 found a pulling boat aground with for evacuation.
twenty soldiers setting in her trying to get her off by puching with three paddles I do not
26. g ordered my Petty officer to do this, think they realised that they were aground!
Captain of the Royal golden? Eagle continued While to me about the general situation
We got her off after about half an how by motor boat was away it broke down carrying the boat badily out to rea. we were pushed back continually 50 ground by out the started to drift to the Eastward surf as the soldiers were leathe to This wade dest chest deep before getting into her was
27.
About 2100 - just after dark many My one of many examples where naval boatkupers and sloops started to arrive.
were so urgently required.
by the motor boat were picked up that anchored close to us. 9 sign
&
After a very long interval and numense labour
Captain of this ship to ask him to send was we succeeded in reaching the Eastern most ship and now that more ships had arrived motor boat back as evacuation

___???___ 0
D
435
401
32). 31/5 of the line with our three paddles.
It approximately 0100
3 beg to assec submit the following suggestions
33). The ship that we boarded was a paddle
The rate of evacuation could have been carried out at a really great speed y there had
34). g was now stranded anboard without boat been sufficient sailors as boatleepers and sufficient or power boat. The shelling on the beach motor boats for tourng now more intense g decided that these nothing more that 9 could do at present
The paddle minesweeper sailed shortly after
I felt most limited in my activities by the and arrived 1215 at Harwich very definite orders that I had received that on no account was the naval party to be
35.) On arrwal at Hasurch, 9 reported by
1
left behind
No accurate information was available.
to Commander Goodenough in Vice. Admiral office.
Although it may have been unavoidable, a definite and fixed headquarters afloat would
36.) On arrival at HMS Excellent g found C
have helped immensely, where fatique from remainder of Commodore Halletts buitemants wading in the surf and rowing of boats back. They had been told to abanda could have been alleviated evacuation at midnight approximately by
The other hentenants of EFGH sections fully concer
S.N.O of the beach - a Commander.
about this, and in m all our cases, a change into dry clothing and an hours rest and we were fit again for duty.
g unable to obtain any information at all was any single one of the large number of ships to from which I towed boats during the day and might guVavasom.
ment.
the
H.M.S. Excellent
2/6/40.

Dynam- 300.
Alu/o/ 1446 of
4023
&
SUBJECT... REAR ADMIRAL, DOVER - RECOMMENDATIONS.
FROM
*** REAR ADMIRAL 7.3. WAKE-WALKER, C.B. O.B.E.
By
4
DATE
... 14th June, 1940. No. M.L. 364/6
TO
... VICE ADMIRAL COMMANDING, DOVER.
h.
In continuation of my report of proceedings dated the 8th June. I wish to bring to your notice the excellent work of the following two ratings under very trying and difficult conditions.
and
F. Laister C/J 69665 Chief Yeoman of Signals.
H.M.S. "KEITH".
S, Ro
3.7.
J. Collier C/J 69513 Yeoman of Signals -
0.
Taken from "LYNX".
escri
1
VIDE ADMIRAL
REAR ADMIRAL (M.I.)
JUN 1940
*
DOVER 0
yuma Came pack reformer)

101
CONFIDENTIAL Dynams 196 Buyo3 103,
Subject.
REPORT 0P EVACUATION OF B.B.F.
434
From
1111
The CAPTAIN, H.M.S. EXCELLENT. Portsmouth.
Date com
10TH JUNE 1940.
No. 0049.
To
****
THE VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER.
The attached report by Lieutenant J.G. Wells, Royal
Navy, of H.M.S. EXCELLENT, on the evacuation of the B.E.F. is forwarded in accordance with A.M.1652 of 6th June 1940.
2.
The enclosed seven photographs, which are described on the back, were taken by 8 Rice camera, which was damaged by sea water.
VICE ADMIRAL
CAPTAIN.

VI

Derelict lome