TNA ADM 199 795

form 8/4/0/1251 33
310
II.
MARGATE & MARGATE:DYNAMO
OPERATIONS.
To. 3286/212.
10:- Flag Officer Commanding Dover.
Forwarded in continuation of my
3172/212 of 11/6/40, Appendix 3.
Medelate Secretary to
Naval Officer in Charge,
22/6/40.
Ramsgate.
VICE
24 JUN ADMIRAL 1940
*
OVER

33
311
Small Vessels Pool,
Admiralty, S.W.1.
25th June 1940.
Dear Martineau,
I enclose a letter from Divine which gives you some information about him. You see he is not even getting T.124 pay now, and is more affaid of 8 hospital bill than any enemy action.
Milner Gibson is now at Hamble, you could get in touch with him, but I saw him last Friday and he agress that Divine is worth a R.N.V.R. commission which
I think should be given him at once, so as to clear his position in hospital.
I do hope you can do something to overcome red tape as he will be very useful when well, and even if not medically fit, can fulfil many R.N.V.R. jobs.
Yours sincerely,
Captain, R.N.
Commander Martineau,
Staff Officer, B.A. Dover,
Dover.

339
312
Royal Sunex Country Hospital
Brighton cool, Rura
Sanday.
last a
My Den
I have received the enclosed billet don from Wildfire as 9 would rather like to how where S stand could you put which in motion:
3 gather from this that 5 was dis charged in the with the returnes from the w Dunhis facty.
as this affects my present status,
I should like it clarified. the facts are on the institutions of Commandes Deffet at Ramagale
5 proceeded to Dones an wednesday Sune 5 - the
Male Seal Bay then (he Candit film) in By the +
subrequently in Haleyon, I look for in what been as oferetion h.A. On thenday la IS reported is you at the
Admualti and m The If in accordance will indination The proceeded to Machever Swar wounded as Wednesday 12
and smile June 13 have been the the above hospital as it affer top - care, was

- 340
313
discharged without my hnnowledge and consent prior to this & I was not covered at the time of my wounding and am not covered now hospitally therefore & am responsible for my Hospital Gills an Hell! as one transallantic crusses (sii) would say. of this is so g shall leas ofen my 27
stililes and expire in novible agong - -
altomatively elop with my prettient muse, and hnowing my wife S dont of you'll face the results of that
5 am progressing reasonably well
Mhen cut me of again A. bit this morning, here this long writing but that is only belit on their fart and I really am getting no my salaam to you and your confrace yr a D Divine a DD

31
of
Take C.)
X.
MO17606/40.
boacuation from Planders,
May June 1940.
Report by L: b.J. Garside, R.N.V.I.
in consection with
1940.

1940.
it
Noted. VA. Dover. Propers a copy of ther report be formal
H/ETE
313
the +is sto
5
Report of Operations with motor boals
8/7/40
in connedion with evacuation of hoted
B.E.F. from Hander
H.M.S.
27/8/10
from
100 (4)
C/o G.P.O., London 313/3
dfine.
The Secretary of yadite
The admiral bemmanding Paserre over
10/9/40
Greene
Sir Ibeg to submit report of
Crew
Noted.
operations with motor boats in Comn ection with to ay
2.
In no view of time elapsed and this mpany of the fact that eracuation of British &
soid timessary. operation report was small received considered merely craft the some
French forces from t lander x to during June 1940.
whink
Iremain Sir whick
Dr DIRECTOR OF SwRukui DUTIES
yours faithfully dune
E.y. Garside raft but
TRAININGION.STAFF
(Lient. RNVR)
sualties.
17/9.40. 9. 40.
He to engage very the enemy.
On arrival off the teach at Bray e, a instandions embaok were given to man the whater. and

a copy of ther report he forwarded
313/4
313
tago
9
Report of Operations with motor. boats
8/7/40
in connection with evacuation of
B.E.F. from Handero
"
On 27 in May 1940 Iwas appointed from
RIS
H.M.S. "Ting alfred to HMS willfire.
Sheeness for duty with motor yachts the 45' motor Cruser "Dizabeth Greene and on the following day took over and proceeded to Dover with I new of and lowing whater. In 29th May ti of proceeded to Braye dunes in company on ov with five other motor craft to assist destroyers & transports in Dunkisk in ferrying troops from teacher to
Roado. off the entrance to Dunkisk harbour the convay was madine gunned by a German aircraft but did not suffer damage or casualties.
Being unarmed we were unable to engage the enemy.
on arrival office teach at Boxye, instandions embask were given to man the whaler. and a

313/5
by Elizabech Greene" to destroyem up the to 20 troops each time for towing to tranders lying off the beach and on this occasion we returned with and other vessels lying in Dunkrik about 30 troops abound, arriving
Roads. These operations were rendered at Ramogate in the early houro of June difficult by the anshore brege which experienced in Dumkirk Roadsand
Bombing from high altitude was made the whaler differ ouet to handle when loaded with troops, but the near Sandetic Bank
Crew stuck to their task $ in a splend
Bythis time repairs to "dizabeth Green
In fashion, not a ungle man being loot had been completed but as maseimum spite of the almost Continuous bombing by hostile aircraft Devera
Considered monitable for further speed was only 6-7 knots she was hundred troops were ferried of but use until Fragune when with Crew eventually shortage of fuel and exclamo of Disc, we were towed by tug Racine'
Compelled a acturn to Ramogate cohicle to NOR Radide Dunkerque broy with refuelling and repairs were put in was reached at %r on 30 may, when instructions to proceed into Dunkisk
Harbour and embark troops at hand as repairs were not comple
Quai Felise Faure for ferrying to the by the morning of 31 may, I obtained transport Locust anchored of west permission assume from NOIC Ramogate mole of harbour in arrival at Quar
(30' command of R.N.A.S. anndon
Ichise faure, French troops were eluctant to fast launch) with 5 crew and procussed to embark in a small boat but at tactics La Panne, waing write "Y". the sam length took aboard about 30 officer / men.
were adopted in ferrying troof
Iwas unable to Contact the transport and

Referred.
N.7. Lumence
ADMIRAL COMMANDING RESERVES.
4th. September 1940.
4
ST
an attempt to go alongside a lane steamer for the purpose of transfering troops and returning for more was unsucceasful owing to failure of starboard motor, rendering the bout almost unmanceurable in the strong tideway in its heavily loaded condition The trouble was however eventually remedied, and Course was set for Ramsgate, which wasreached at 0730 on 4th June On the following day Stook lighted Greene back to
Sheemess in accordance with instructions and made my report.
E.y. Garside
Lieur. R.N.V.R.

34/-
Summary of Reports concerning the Evacuation of Troops
315
FROM the Dunkirk Area - May 27th - June 4th, 1940.
dray
9. BEACH PARTIES.
Captain Tennants report and 0.47
6.342 etsey.
R.A Dous. Reportal
Procedings
10.373 etosq.
Commodere S'Tepheuson's
Report
- 12.388.
hh Car McClelland's report p.390 lrog.
Repert by Capt. Howson p.394 -4"
Ships willing to ail
P-H12
P417
be Fellowd p.
hient varasom's report
10.434
hereit wells report
Repart of Cdr. Maund,
10. 437
[Arst S.N.O
6.448 b 445
Cdr Lewis report

Diynoms 85
342
316
7th June, 1940.
Sir,
I have the honour to forward herewith my Report of Proceedings in the Dunkirk area between the 27th May,
1940, and the End June, 1940.
The Report has been made up in the form of a
Daily Log with the more important signals included.
3
In addition I attach certain Appendices:-
(1) Activity of enemy sircraft.
(11) officers who performed valuable services.
the
(111) Ratings who performed valuable services.
I
(iv) Ratings in the original party.
By good fortune the mission entruated to no in the first place by the Admiralty and ultimately by
12 you was completed by 2300 on 2nd June, and I would like to record herewith that the chief factors responsible
VGA
for this successful conclusion were 1-
(a) The ready help we always received from Dover whenever asked for.
(b) The fearlessness and splendid seemanship and nearly of destroyers all the personnel ships coming to pier.
and mineaweepers the
The help of Rear-Admiral Vake-Walker the beaches. in distributing
(a) ships between the pier and
(d) The magnificent magod particularly work of of the the pier officers party and who sen, worked none and with th little rest for 7 days. than of these, at is more deserving of praise
Commander Clouston.
I have the honour to be, Sir,
VIDE ADMIRAL
Your obedient Servent,
B - JUN 1940
(Liqued) w Tenmant
DOVER
Captain, R.N.
Hear Admiral R.B. Hamany,
V.A. Dover.

317
EMBARKATION OF THE BRITISH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Sunday, 26th May, 1940
The
P.M. I was given details of arrangements being made for the provision of shipping for the evacuation of the
B.E.F. from Dunkirk and the beaches to the Eastward thereof, by Captain Jeffery, and at 6 p.m. I was ordered by V.C.N.S.
to proceed to Dunkirk to take control of the navel shore embarkation parties. The officers and sen of my party for the pier and beaches proceeded direct to Dover.
in
I left London 8.35 p.m. for the Nore, and explained the Admiralty plan for embarkation to the Commander-in-Chief.
I continued my journey to Dover early next norning where I 27/5
received my final instructions from V.A. Dover. After going through the plan for embarkation with him I left Dover in
H.M.S. WOLFHOUND at 1345 with 8 naval party consisting of
18 officers and 160 ratings, plus signal staff. The weather was fine and clear.
He proceeded North of the minefield - 8 voyage of some 90 miles - and about half way over the first dive bombing attack took place. These attacks continued at about halfhour or 40-minute intervals until NO reached Dunkirk at about1800. There were several very near misses but only minor damage was done to the ship. This was an unpleasent introduction to the war sone, and dive bombing was certainly more alarming afloat than ashore, as we were soon to discover.
On reaching Dunkirk we turned and proceeded alongaide in the middle of a very heavy bombing attack.
I disembarked my party, divided them up into sections and told the officers in charge of each section to scatter them round the port to make them less vulnerable to bombing attacks, while I proceeded to the Bastion Naval

344
318
TENNANT
- 2 -
for anmy
Headquarters to investigate the local situation.
heavely
The town was helf on fire, the streets being littered with wreckage of all kinds, and every window was smashed.
by
Great palls of smoke from the oil depots and refineries
80
enveloped the docks and town itself. On our way up to the Bestion we had to take shelter from two more raids by enemy bombers, the bombs from the last of which fell unpleasantly close. There were 8 number of British troops in the town and we passed a good few dend and wounded in the streets - svidently the victims of these air raids.
and
I held a meeting with Brigndier Parminter, Colonel
Whitfield, Area Commandant, and Commander Henderson, B.N.L.O.
After this meeting the pier and beach parties were at once organised, told off and dispersed.
At 1900 I took over as S.N.O. Dunkirk.
2005. The following signal made to V.A. Dover:- 26Mm,
"Port continuo sly bombed all day and on fire.
harbour. Send all ships there. Am ordering
Embarka tion possible only from beaches Rest of
WOLFHOUND to load there and seil."
V.A. Dover had intended to keep a destroyer in
Dunkirk as W/T link, bus I decided on arrival that this vas not possible NO ordered HOLPHOUND to sail.
Night of 27th Hay.
Signal 1958/27 to V.A. Dover:-
C beaches
"Please send every available craft, East tomorrow KIDS
Rvacuation Evacue
The havel party were spread out along the besch to act as police.
Troops in the district were directed to the beach and ordered to disperse along the sands so as to afford

345
319
smallest possible targets for enemy planes.
23/55
It was originally decided to embark # small proportion from the Rest Pier and the rest from the beaches by lighters or barges. The pier method, however, proved so effective as regards speed and order that it was used exclusively, parties of 50 men coming along the beaches to the pier and embarking.
Due to adequate air protection there was comparatively little enemy attack on the area.
During the night there were probably 6000 men embarked and cleared.
Day of Tuesday, 28th May.
Commenced embarkation of B.B.F. from end of Eastern
Mole. The Germans were contenting themselves with bombing the town and port.
Situation Report 0935/28
2000 men on Dunkirk beach and 7000
There are sand dunes for whom I have had no cannot ships.
men in now in need of water and Army back
They are Unlimited numbers are falling on supply. this area and situation will shortly be desperate."
The embarkation was continued throughout the day but few ships arrived except destroyers. The enemy air action was again slight due to adequate air protection and also due to the fact that a heavy pall of smoke from the burning town covered the operation most of the day - the only attacks that occurred were those when our aircraft some distance off at the further points of their patrol.
were the morning three shells fired from an enemy battery
Southwest During of Dunkirk landed near the embarkation point, but did no damage.

346
320
28/5
Signal 0840 to V.A. Dover:-
"Evacuation practicable. Vessels urgently required.
In the meantime some destroyers and small craft, including some Dutch Skoots, had arrived off Bray beaches, and I sent an M.T.B. down there to supervise the embarkation arrangements. I ordered the Dutch Skoots to anchor as close to the shore as possible and the destroyers to send all their boats to ferry the troops between the shore and the Skoots. As soon as the skoots were full they went alongside the destroyers to discharge their troops and then returned to their position near the beach. In this way we were able to get some 4000 men away during the afternoon and evening. This operation was continued through the night and it was estimated that a further 3000 men were embarked. On her return the N.T.B. was sent home as she was running short of fuel.
At 1420 heavy bombing on Bray took place and I ordered more troops to march to Dunkirk. During daylight hours probably 18000 troops were embarked from the Eastern Mole.
At 1725 the lowing signal was made to Admiralty:-
"Suggest used from Dunkirk 18 advisable and preferable at magnetic minesweeping of channel being night."
1835 signal made:-
signal sent #pressing "breed" be for all sent possible for troops shipping during whatever dark hours.* their
Night of 28th May.
Evaquation from the Eastern Arm proceeded steadily, embarkation being at average rate of 2000 an hour. Enemy

347
299
321
Colit
Tennant air action was slight due to our air protection but there was some shelling from the same point as during the day.
the
There were a good number of ships throughout the night and at times they exceeded the inflow of troops.
The port was now undergoing bombardment and situation report was sent at 2245/28 as follows
"French General appreciation is that situation in port tomorrow will continue as for today.
Provided aircraft fighters adequate embarkation can proceed full speed. French General assures me no German guns at Gravelines or Gravelines
Beacon and that area is clear of Germans.
Possibly you will consider further tests of the
West
Channel. French have taken over Belgian line in the vicinity of Nieuport. German guns to Southeast are now shelling Dunkirk but so far of little
Fighter matter. protection has been invaluable and
C. in C. B.R.F. total number of nen now evacuated.
bombing only sporadic. Please inform me for
Rear personnel, 3 corps, now reaching the beach.
Please pass to War Office."
Day of Wednesday, 29th May.
0630 Transport MONA QUEEN mined and sunk two miles East of Dunkirk pier. Very heavy explosion.
Situation Report 0709/29 from S.N.O. Dunkirk 1-
'No enemy interference at present. Embarkation up provided use of beach. All ships to Maximum going supply transport is maintained. Dunkirk. Swell at 2000 an hour. This can be kept prevents air attack would be disastrous.
Enemy protection essential. Passenger fighter transport mined and aunk about 2 miles East of
Dunkirk Pier Light."
At 1001 made Situation Report as follows:-
*Embarkation is going on well. Enemy obscure is leaving and us ominous. alone. I have sent Captain Bush by
The situation ashore is N.T.B.
with an appreciation.
18 little food or water in Dunkirk. These staid should for control of traffic. Armies are sending
There be sent as soon as possible, also a unable force or organise anything. Keep on A good
Medical any Officer with Staff should be despatched to help ship! Cannot West Channel be used?
Army unable to provide."

348
322
29/5
Embarkation proceeded at rate of 3 to 4,000 an hour.
Troops were now consisting mainly of the Fighting Corps, all the non-combatant troops in the area having been evacuated. The display of this Corps Troops was noticeably superior - previous detachments had reached the embarkation point in a straggling manner with scarcely any semblance of order. The Corps Troops marched in formation along the beaches, quickly scattering during an air raid, and reforming and continuing afterwards.
It was this order which enabled such 8 high rate of embarkation to be maintained.
At 1200 I proceeded with Brigadier Parminter by
Motor Boat to La Panne to G.H.Q. to report on the difficult situation vis-a-vis the French over the evacuation. when on board EXPRESS I made a signal to the Admiralty and to
V.A. Dover giving an appreciation of the situation as follows
:-
"Bombing of beaches and Dunkirk pier has now commenced without opposition from fighters, If they hit
Dunkirk pier embarkation will become very jammed.
Beach at La Panne covered with troops congregating in large numbers. Very slow embarkation taking place from Restern Beach.
The French Staff at Dunkirk feel strongly that they are defending Dunkirk for us to evacuate, which is largely true. To continue evacuation my appreciation is as follows -
The perimeter must be strongly hold, food and stores immediately provided, and bombing of Dunkirk pier must be prevented.
There is no other alternative evacuation to take off more than a tithe of men now on beach before they are bombed continuously."
1358/29
In Dunkirk itself we were left in comperative peace by enemy aircraft until the evening. V.A. Dover's 1906/29
received, reading:-
"Evacuation of British troops to continue at maximum speed during the night. If adequate supply of personnel vessels cannot be maintained

349
323
to Dunkirk East Pier destroyers will be sent there as well. All other craft except Hospital Carriers to embark from beach which is extended from one mile East of Dunkirk to one mile East of La Panne.
Part 2 follows,
Part 2 received as follows:-
"Whole length is divided into 3 equal ports referred to as La Panne, Bray, Malo, from
East to West with a mile gap between each port. La Panne and Bray have troop concentration points each end and in middle;
Malo at each end. These points should be tended by inshore craft.
Pass this message by V/S to ships not equipped
W/T, as opportunity offers. Destroyer at
Dunkirk pass to S.N.O. Dunkirk."
This was exactly what was required.
In the evening a series of fierce air attacks were made on the Eastern Arm. These resulted in H.M.S. GRENADE 7
being bombed while embarking troops. It looked for the moment as though she might sink and block the entrance to the harbour but 8 trawler and drifter were sent to assist her and managed to guide her into 8 pocket to the Westward of the main channel. She burned fiercely for some hours and eventually blew up with a loud explosion.
A trawler was also bombed and sank in the in channel about 50 yards from the East pier about two cables/from the
Eastern Lighthouse.
The transport FENELLA was sunk while loading at the outside extremity of the Eastern Arm. She was practically fully loaded but the troops were transferred to mother ship with very little loss
A troop transport CRESTED BAOLS was bombed and rendered unusable. She drifted down towards Bray where she ran aground. A "J" Class destroyer was bombed off the beaches but was taken in tow by another destroyer.

350
K May
324
Night of May 29th.
Enemy activity was reduced during the night, only two bombing attacks being made. It was intended to recommence embarkation from Eastern Arm under cover of darkness but apparently due to some misunderstanding the only ships that arrived were 4 trawlers and # yacht.
Consequently a great opportunity was missed. Probably
1500 troops could have been embarked had the ships been forthcoming. As 8 result or the bombing of the Hole referred to above, the pier itself was hit by 8 dive-bomber and severely damaged, but a brow was put in place which permitted the passage of troops.
In reply to V.A. Dover's 2057/29, asking whether the harbour was blocked, I replied at 8150 -
"No. Hope to get a good move on tonight but it is doubtful if much more can be done during daylight hours."
Apparently incorrect information as to the blooking of Dunkirk Harbour had been telephoned by Commander Dove from La Panne. This unfortunate incident reduced the shipping entering during the night to a minimum.

Thursday
30th May.
325
May
Passenger transport KING ORRY which had been damaged by a near miss p.m. 29th May, still alongaide the
Pier at midnight. I saw the Captain and told him he must go and gave him the alternative of beaching himself on the
Eastern beach if his ship was not searorthy, or of proceeding without troops to England = the escort of a trawler. At 0230 he was observed endeavouring to clear the harbour. It was subsequently found out that he sunk about 4 cables outside the entrance.
At 0039/30 made the following signal to Dover:-
"There is a shortage of ships and boats. I have no destroyers".
There were no air attacks in the early morning
Later when Ships seganta arrive and all was quiet., In view of the heavy target presented by a number of ships being alongaide the Hole at one time, destroyers were ordered alongside the Pier one at a time.
Arrival of the first destroyer was a signal for an attack by one bomber. Subsequently, however, the bright sunshine of yesterday gave way so nist and 10 was possible to speed up embarkation without undue risk.
0755 following signal was made:-
drifters arrived. No water 02 food yet provided on
"Great opportunity missed during night when only three
Dunkin's beach for large number of troops. Sporadie bombing".
Attbout 0800 store ship arrived with provisions but no water. This caused BO such congestion on the Pier that in view of the urgent about half need Thatoad to send had off beer every unloaded possible man, unloading was, after should Has, abandoned and the store ship filled with troops. A certain amount of water was obtained from destroyers.
One personnel ship arrived about 0920, the first one
Reyal since the previous day. Other ships (three drifters) filled shortly

352
Thursday 30ᵗʰ.Malpay
326
shortly after. Embarkation proceeded thereafter at a good steady rate.
TV.A.,Dover
Following signal WELD made at 0930:-
"Troops are concentrated tn unlimited musbers just
East of Dunkirk Beach, on Bray Beaches and at
La Panne. Please do your best to distribute. I
an getting along splendidly here. Send two hospital ships now. If mist persists I will bring than in on arrival."
AS 0943 the following Situation Report was made:-
are 1700 k/cs. I have no N.T.B. and can remain or when as at present & destroyer alongside continuously The only destroyers are in sight. If
Concur comminicate with U.K. by French vireless conditions station, moment bombing starts all mut above off".
for embarkation would be 8 magnificent help.
At 0950 I made following signal:-
"If this weather parsists I want a ship every half an hour".
The whole morning was visty and ideal for embarkation but few ships arrived and a great opportunity was again lost.
Hospital ships also did not arrive until afternoon and there were over one thousand wounded writing for transportation.
AS 1600 two destroyers arrived.
AS 1700 a car mas sens for 100 to go to G.H.O. and
I turned over the duties of S.N.O. to Communder Haund.
Friday at 1836 following signal was unde:-
"Am leaving job of N.B.O. to Commender everything for G.H.Q. for about two days and Memd I have who fully turned understanda over the the altuation and has well in hand."
At 1846 following signal was made:-
___???___ ___???___ REASON THE all
THE THE
appear be made to date both only with Dunkirk embarked
At 2025 a situation Report was made as follows:-
"Despite troops have been embarked during hour.
intense bombardment and air attack last four
Every thousand possible be affort untenable will by be Friday made. upon large
Dunkirk be will continued until last moment but depend ships will and destroyers at Pier tonight."
AB

353
30-31 may.
3327
dream
As ships had now arrived in good numbers it was
30
necessary that the rate of embarkation must in some way be speeded up. The troops coming down the Pier were, therefore, urged to quicken their pace and eventually the thousands of troops, tired and without food and water for days, broke into the double and kept it up the whole length of the
Eastern am for more than two hours. During that period it is estimated that more than 15,000 troops were embarked.
Night 30th - Blat May. Shelling was heavy during the afternoon and night and operations were greatly hampered.
However, ships arrived in some mmbers and with the cessation in the shelling between 3 and 4 a.m. about ten thousand troops were embarked. This relieved the congestion on the beaches which had been very great in the ovening. In the early morning the beaches were very nearly clear of troops.
I remined at G.H.C. for the night and telephoned the naval situation to the Admiralty. I was present with the G.in c. at several meetings, my main object being to explain to the Military that if the evacuation of the B.B.F.
was to be largely accomplished, it could only be done by means of Dünkirk. Even given good weather embaritation from the beaches must be very slow. A destroyer going full out with her boats to the beaches could only enbark 600 men in
12 hours, whereas this could be done in 20 minutes at the
Pier.
Some of the G.H.Q. staff expressed disappointment that more could not be done to push on with the embarkation off the beaches in a surf. I was antisfied that when the weather permitted everything possible was being done by the officers I had placed there, but I continually stressed that troops should be moved to Dunkirk and maximum numbers should also be available to embark there.
Political

354
328
329
Political My, The pressure was now being brought to bear on the C.in C. that the evacuation must be on a fifty-fifty
"Request load Ducidek, basis with the "Story French. My only stipulation was that at all costs we should be allowed free use of the Eastern arm while the French 0506, used the port, outer harbour and beaches.
I mde a signal provesting to Commander Maund at Dunkirk to for provide personnel ships for General constant Laurencie's troops
"An
(some 5,000 in number) at C.in c's. request. I also asked and
Admiral Wake-Walker to keep Dunkirk going at 100%
0940, you Inform
Little progress could be made off the beaches owing benefits.
to the surf.
C945, "Sun is now doming through
G.H.Q. informed no that a plan was being worked out for naval co-operation to bombard the advancing German tanks in protection
E
part
0957. "Lard Goart has agreed that 5,000 Project froms the later stages. This, however, was never necessary, as in British versels. Request meessanry shipe may far as /am aware at duck.
1044, *We have boon continually hearily Instituted and they are gradually finding the range of our loading barth. 1 reald rether only enter ships 8a necessary for the flaw of troops.
Continuous and heavy shelling all the serving) but the avocuntion proceeded fairly speedily. At last stdge vere arriving in Isrge numbers met strong # protection kept humbre oftsck any. The only thing necessary une tostep the shelling. At 1200 a signal DOB reserved Cris the Ate Maisen at Dover adding car position of essay bettery, This was not known with sugr certainly as En battery ass probably modile, but is NAB in the district M Laon Plage Becaus Kurk both. reply YOU rade se this The comminement, opvertheless, because wire Inserve MM a great deal while securite.
Texy heavy abroads uses Charking the resulty but vere educty upsa ships in the boods, Dive housing assistion various corried est - the Leading but without
I The seauthly.

355
329
Friday 31st May.
The following signals were made:-
0320, "Request more shipsto load Dunkirk."
0445. "Every available ship will be required at Dunkirk during the next two hours to evacuate rest of army.
0605. "Embarkation proceeding satisfactorily in spite of bombardment. I would again stress the need for more ships and constant fighter protection
0638. "Am now receiving a number of Frenchmen. I have raised no objection to their embarking in British ships and am allowing them to do so.
0940. "Request you will inform me whether troops are now being ordered to march to Dunkirk from the beaches.
0945.
"Sun is now coming through and I have a big target of ships in harbour. Request special air protection for next two hours.
0957. "Lord Gort has agreed that 5,000 Freich troops should be embarked here this evening after dark in British vessels. Request necessary ships may be sent to arrive at dusk.
1044. "We have been continually heavily bombarded and they are gradually finding the range of our as loading
I would rather only enter ships necessary berth. for the flow of troops.
Continuous and heavy shelling all the morning, but the evacuation proceeded fairly speedily. At last ships were arriving in large numbers and strong a 1. protection kept bomeing attack away. The only thing necessary was to tostop the shelling. At 1200 a signal was received from the Air Liaison
Officer at Dover asking for position of enemy battery. This was not known with any certainty as the battery was probably mobile, but it was in the district of Loon Plage Brouge Kerk
Soch. A reply was made to this effect. The bombardment, nevertheless, become more intense and a great deal more accurate.
Very heavy attacks were delivered during the evening but were Dive concentrated chiefly upon derelict ships in the roads.
bombing attacks were carried out on the ships loading but without success. The embarkation proceeded smoothly.

356
330
At 1800 approximately Lord Gort embarked at La Panne for the U.K.
At 1937 the following signal was made:-
"As it is vital to carry on the evacuation of troops throughout every available moment day and night it is intended to place two white lights at eastern and western pier head as a guide to ships in the hours of darkness. It is requested that all H.M.
ships and other vessels who are likely to enter port to-night be warned accordingly!
At 1945 a further signal was made:-
"Slow British progress in the port due to shelling, bombing, and wounded and French troops using quay.
Weather fine and clear, sea moderate, good prospects for night embarkation from beaches."
I returned Dunkirk with General Alexander and discovered that totally different instructions had been given to General
Alexander by Lord Gort and by Lord Gort in writing to Admiral
Abrial and General Fagalde.
Lord Gort had told the French authorities that General
Alexander would, assistine holdi-the the "PERIMETER" for the French to embark and that he was to place himself and his divisions under
General Fagalde's orders. General Alexander, however, was told by Lord Gort in my hearing that he was to do nothing to imperia his army and was ultimately responsible for their safety and evacuation.
I suggested to General Alexander that he should at once return to La Panne before the telephone was cut off to telephone to the Secretary of State for war, and to get the matter cleared up. This he did. The Secretary of State instructed General
Alexander to act on his own discretion and to proceed with the evacuation.
Admiral Abrial asked me to take charge of the British and
French embarkation, which I did. I also asked for French officers to assist, and they were provided.
The following signals were despatched:-
2028. "I have felt it necessary for the operation to

332
"maximum number or French and British may be evacuated.
Impossible from here to judge local situation. In close co-operation with Admiral Abrial you must act in this matter on your own judgment.
At 2315 I made the following signal:-
"Withdrawal now proceeding according to plan. Shall have certain reserves here to-morrow to assist French.
Intend to complete evacuation to-morrow by midnight."
A motor boat was sent to the mouth of the harbour at dusk and allocated berths to the ships as they entered, the requisite number or the personnel vessels being sent to the embarkation pier in the Western harbour to embark French troops.
A good number of ships entered harbour and embarked troops, and the seamanship displayed by destroyers, sloops and transports was most praiseworthy under exceedingly difficult conditions.
I gave orders to evacuate a large proportion of naval personnel during the night.
the final
All those that did remain until, withdrawal had performed their duties magnificently.
Sudday 2nd June.
0800/2 - from SIN.O.Dunkirk.
"Request again maximum number of transports for British and French. At 2130 June 2nd it is intended that all
British shall be evacuated by midnight. Request
M.A.S.B. at 2300.
At 0405 - from S.N.O.Dunkirk.
"Admiral, an Nord requess that block ships will arrive at
6300 to-morrow night. He will signal if their placing is to be postponed.
At 0730 - from S.N.O. Dunkirk:-
"Wounded situation acute. Hospital ships should enter during day. Geneva Convention will be honourably attack (This signal was made "en clear")
observed. It is felt that the enemy will refrain from
At 0830 - from S.N O. Dunkirk:-
"About 5000 British remain. Bofore ammunition short.
would assist. Early this morning the drifter Lord Cave of fast motor boats at 2130 at inner end of Long Pier
Sporting chance of embarking to-night. Maximum number our depot ship, was sunk by shell fire.

359
-6-
dr
333
2/6
As it had been decided to cease evacuating troops in daylight, there remained little to do except to prepare the maximum staff to-night.
The following signal was made at 1435:-
"Please direct proportion of shipping to the French.
Arrangements or embarkation in the Novul D'Avant Port."
1536/2. From S.N.O. Dunkirk.
"Situation of wounded desperate. Shortgge of medical stores and accomodation. Demand two hospital ships forthwith:
At 1538/2 the following situation report was made:-
"French still mintain front line except for area east of Bergues where the Germans have penetrated two miles on a two-mile front. Counter attack being made at 1500. In port no movement. Present situation hopefuls
At dark vessels of all kinds arrived and were berthed alongside the eastern armon the French jettys and further up the harbour. Berthing was carried out by an officer with a loud speaker at the pier head.
At 2230 the last of the B.E.F. started down the quay.
and were safely embarked by 2250 at which time I made a signal as follows:-
"Operation completed. Returning to Dover." I then 2/6
embarked in a N.T.B. and left for Dover.

360
335
334
After my return from G.H.Q. on the 31st May
I was closely associated with General Alexander who remained in command of British Troops. He was a tower of strength and delightful to work with at a very difficult time when it did not seem probable that we should succeed in getting away the last of the British Expeditionary Force. t1though my report does not make it clear, all signals from S.N.O. Dunkirk referring to military matters were made with his concurrence and approval.
He finally left Dunkirk with idmiral Wake-Walker in 8 M.T.B. at 2130 on 2nd June.
made
IS
and
5
that to to bestime in or -
= good INSURED of and Less and the depart

361
335
APPRODIX
ACTIVITY OF HIGH AIRCRAFT
As the energy aircraft second to work in distinct phones, I think 10 will be as votl to davote on Appendix to their operations.
on OUP arrival, they varo chiefly compied in weeking Denicipic and the part. It was guite out of the question to use the harbour at all, and my first renotion was that evacuation would have to be done from the beaches.
IS soon become obvious, however, that they were not including the plan in their attentions. AS times they vore hold off by 3 fine morning mist which sometimes permisted until afternoon. AS Sexe times, when the wind was Invourable, a houry pall of anote from burning oil tanks, morning they mdo attempts to mohine an the besches, but to the larguly obscured the pier. During the becomed but only for a brief pariod. Had they particated, were held off by andi-aireraft fire. the beaches vere also they would have inflicted terrific losses on us, for there they ware later attached the pier, with dive banbare, smk three ships goldom loss than 10,000 troops on the benches.
and damaged. the pier. Had they permisted in these successful attacks on the ydar and ships alongaide, the evacuation could nover have been achieved. They soon, the however, and on one day (31st), no loss than 100 the booking pier.
turned their attention to ships lying off beaches, made on ships within too miles of
Happily, base on other weeks. by this the make also, them more attacks was at Least 3b books vare dropped on one large work Bofore and may being collected and this comed to ships at guna ware attacking the piem. The havey attacks arrivals on during shy sea of compelled DD to stop all millings and daylight.
return Common to on the busbing of and its part and bastion.
the last dig, they speared once more to fighters vara occasionally in fighters evidence escorting their may missure basbors. of valief, AS but since the our oky om is a big place present give and us a great directors to if our adversis the French, ware and 1000
10 was often when our aircraft did arrive than,
02 frequently not. the British, opened fire on already fait disputed of special and No remaindez mathy sendialmed ht first particularly has thank

Penclose These remarks by Count Richards Appendint 366
who I Haw MA charge The BRAY Reaches 340
88X20706
J.STEWART
A.B.
88X23107
T.FOSTER
A.B.
B25147
H.FINDLEY
A.B.
JX139084
A.WARRINGTON
A.B.
J103642
G.HOLDAWAY
A.B.
N.K.
J.RAWE
Ord.
sax
William M.SMITH
0.81g.
John C.COPSON
0.Sig.
N.K.
T.COLTMAN
Sto.
KX88357
88314777
W.C.COX
L.S.
SSX29725
D.McCAHN
A.B.
N.K.
B.OWEE
A.B.
N.K.
J.SWANLEY
A.B.
William GERMANY
A.B.
N.K.
J97158
T.T.DEARING
A.B.
G.WINDER
A.B.
88X23772
L.MATHER
A.B.
D434
H.FLETCHER
A.B.
J99712
W.TERNSAR
Sto.
H.O.B.D.
A.B.
S8X29728
F.WSIR
JX149262
P.HAND
A.B.
SSX31323
B.J.TUCKER
0.81g.
88X30610
S.GIBBARD
0.81g.
G.AUSTIN
LA.
JX133281
SEX18097
D.O'PRAY
SSX29299
R.LOWTCAKR
A.B.
J11086
A.CANNON
P.O.
W.J.SKINNER
A.B.
S8X26514
A.B.
D208
B22367
G.V.BOWEN
A.B.
G.RICHMOND
A.B.
J113737
J.G.OWSET
A.B.
B20977
C.W.BOWRING
A.B.
JX129715
G.F.NIXON
A.B.
B25322
Sto.
W.MELROSS
KX86044
D.A.HEARS
Sig-
88X32365
A.B.
V.KNIGHT
SSX21778
J.L.TURNER
A.B.
SSX24057
A.B.
G.ROSE
JX151766
0.31g.
J.KIPLING
JX152103

Appendix 5
I enclose these remarks by Countr Richards
367
who I placed in change of the B.RAY Reaches 341
parties
SITUATION ON THE BEACHES.
in direction.
10.
At about 1930 on Monday 27th I met the Captain of the WOLPHOUND ashore and he told de that our instructions from the Senior Naval Officer were to proceed to the beaches.
the 2. of proceeded in close company with Lieutenant
Commander Dowling and his platoon. In route we met the head of the Army who were proceeding in the same direction.
3.
We arrived on the beaches after about 1/8 hour's march. During this march there was continuous bombing.
4. On arrival at the beaches It was apparent that agp the first flight of the Army were showing signs of lack of
13. discipline and for about 90 minutes 18 had a difficult time to restors order.
5.
I ordered the soldiers in my vicinity to sit down and at the same time placed by platoon across the road to prevent any more men coming on the beaches. I then called for
Army Officers to assist me and about 7 or 8 approached me.
18.6.
1 divided the soldiers up into parties of 30
and placed them under the care of an Army officer or an Able
It Seaman and dispersed them at intervals along the beaches in the direction of Dunkirk.
Àa each party arrived on the road leading on to the
16.7.
beach they were net by seamen who marshalled them into parties of 50/then and led them on to the beaches.
Quiet was then maintained and the embarking in boats commenced.
At about 2100 Commander Clouston sent A message to say that large parties could be taken off at Dunitiple and accordingly/

368
342
27/5
accordingly parties of approximately 500 at a time were sent off in that direction.
10. It was low water and embarkation in small boats was not an easy matter. Continuous air-bombing and machine-gunning from aircraft took place throughout the night but it seemed, by the Grace of God, that the smoke cloud over Dunkirk saved the beaches from being bombed, the main bombing being over the town and dockyard of Dunkirk and the town of St Malo.
23/5
11.
Embarkation continued throughout the night and in the early hours of the morning but during the forenoon the arrival of soldiers abated until there were only sailors left on the beach approximately 1 mile to the eastward of Dunkirk.
12.
I proceeded in close company with Commander Ken and
Lieutenant Commander Dowling with our platoons to Dunkirk. on arrival I reported to Captain Tennant who told me he wished 8
party to proceed to Bray de la Plage to embark 5,000 soldiers.
Volunteers were called for and Commander Ken and I
proceeded there by lorry (2 Commanders and 16 men).
13.
We arrived at approximately 1700 and found about 30,000
soldiers awaiting embarkation stretching from Bray to the eastward.
It was raining and conditions were most unpleasant for us but the other side was that we got no bombing during the night.
29/5
At about 0130 (Wednesday g9th) a high wind had got
14. up which made 11 obvious to no that embarkation from the beaches would be impossible or at any rate very inefficient. I therefore lined up the soldiers and sent them to Dunkirs in parties of 1,000
at varying intervals. 1 must have sent off 20,000 in the direction of
Dunkirk.
Later in the day the weather improved but there was a
15.
most lamentable lack of small boats.
16./

369
343
29/5
16.
At about 1200 Commander Ken and I motored into
Dunkirk to report progress as embarkation on our beach was then impossible. On our return our lorry was heavily machine gunned and hit. At this period a heavy bombing attack took place on the Fleet and beaches.
17.
On return to our headquarters (a lorry) we decided to make contact with General H.Q. but unfortunately our car broke down and we had to walk back 5 miles.
18.
During the night another naval embarkation party arrived on the beach to the eastward which reduced the limits of our beach.
30/5
19.
Early on Thursday morning 30th I proceeded to
Brigade H.Q. and offered the suggestion that piers be built by running Iorries out to sea. This was quickly done and was successful.
20.
I then drove Colonel Whitten and Colonel Mackenzie into Dunkirs to see Captain Tennant and then drove them back to Brigade H.Q.
During the afternoon and dogwatches the French poured 21. into our beaches but no boats arrived within 11 miles of our H.Q.
During the last dog the Germans directed me $
accurate 22. artillery fire on our beach. This fire continued throughout the night and our lorry was hit. The beach was completely evacuated by allied soldiers.
le had however taken up quarters in a water-boat
23. that was ashore at low water. NO boats had now been in for
16 hours on our beach.
During the night the weather became bad once more -
84.
and a heavy surf was running.
At/

370
344
Personal remarks by be Richal/s
31st may
At about 0300,it was impossible to carry out in embarkation on the beaches.
25.
Our men were showing signs of extreme exhaustion and as it was impossible to communicate with the Senior Naval Officer in we decided to take over a whaler that we had salved and to go to the nearest destroyer to report to the Senior Naval Officer.
26.
We waited for high water and at about 0730 put to ea.
There was a very heavy surf running and we had only an uneven set to land of oars, rope crutches and only an oar to steer by.
27.
Te approached two destroyers but they both got underway.
Two other destroyers passed us at about 7 cables but paid no attention to us.
28.
After about an hour as if from nowhere appeared the
Margate lifeboat. fe asked the Coxswain to take us to the nearest destroyer but all were underway at this time. Dg was returning to Margate and so se came back with him.
29.
The men in my party were completely exhausted and were asleep within five minutes of being onboard the lifeboat.
30. On arrival at Margate 1 phoned the Chief of Staff at Dover and reported our return.
31. I was ordered to return to Chatham with my party.
the you pan of the and commistems, the of
'' wasy cases
Although the reason for the st is the 11
Le

371
345
Personal remarks by be Richardson
Criticisms.
The points that I would like to bring home in the way of general criticism are:-
(1) When being bombed in daylight and at night it is apparently the Army training for the men to lie over on their faces in a huddled heap and to await the completion of the air raid.
I consider that if one lies over on one's face during an air raid, one gets the impression that the bombs when falling with very horrid shrieking noises are each and all coming to land right in the small of one's back. There is little doubt that the Army were considerably cowed by the bombing and I do feel that this form of inactivity during a raid is paychologically bad. I would have thought it better that the men be trained to stand up and take cover and loose off their rifles and anyhow look at the bomber, especially by day. It appeared to us obvious which aircraft was going to be anywhere near us and which vas going to be miles away, while to watch the Army lying down with their faces to the ground with the bombs shrieking, one could see that they were going through a tricky time by being in such a position. I saw no sign, except in one very isolated case, of any of the Naval ratings being at all genuinely upset by the bombing. Machine-gunning, though, was quite embarrassing.
I thought the pom poin fire of the Fleet and 4" barrage fire (2) to be most effective and consistent. The absence of fighters was a source of great discussion and in many cases bitter words. Although the reason for the absence of fighters is has been explained by the prime Minister, I do feel that it paychologically right to have a few bombers directly over taking part in such an operation. There is no but doubt that the men when fighters were present bombers did not come, soon/ as

372
346
soon as the fighters left, they seemed to know the exact moment in which to approach.
(3)
Lack of satisfactory communication arrangements was most noticeable. There were no portable wireless sets ashore with the beach parties nor were any field telephones supplied by the naval parties. The only method of communicating messages to ships embarking from the beaches was by a written message sent off in a boat.
Surnative
1 2000
30th
May
30th the
Dush are
&

373
Dynam III.
347
Admiralty, S.W.1.
8th June, 1940.
Rear Admiral, Dover - - Report of Proceedings, 29th May - 3rd June
Sir,
I have the honour to submit the following report on the operations off shore at Dunkirk between Wednesday, 29th May, and Tuesday, 4th June.
Much of this report has had to be completed from memory, and where
2. incident is so crowded it is difficult not to give & confused picture. The picture was, however, confused, and so far as operations off the beaches were concerned organisation was not possible. The most that could be done was to exercise some control and direction.
Narrative
29th May
I sailed at 2000 from Dover in ESK, who had on board 12 small beach
3. These were distributed at the beaches into any craft available and and
Commodore parties. Hallett was put into a drifter to take charge off shore at Bray
Commodore Stephenson off La Panne.
30th May
4.
At 0200, 30th May, I boarded HKBE off La Fame and heard the general situation from Captain Bush.
there were a few ships, drifters and other craft available. off the
5. beaches and At embarkation this time was proceeding slowly with the few boats showed the beaches black with troops, a number notor-boats of boats broached 6. Daylight to. A very few boats, principally whalers, and some were bringing off troops.
It was misty, clouds were low and the sea was calm, but even so
7. there was a slight surf inshore.
immediately obvious to no that any large The arews embarkation were the from
8. It became inshore boats and crews. and Amament and I
who 9. signalled essential the I beaches found During as to was depended H.M.Ships this away the effect. forenoon with on could more the I not C. went Finding in spare C. into at men that Dunkirk La from Panne, the A/A harbour in but HERE Guns none could to see the be the less used S.N.O. I I was able to get into the that picture. embarkation from Dunkirk was afforts the only were practical directed plan to if formed numbers the opinion were involved and all my subsequent signals.
large that end. I stressed this view in many the beaches had to be used to the fullest control capacity the of
10. At boats the same and time the problem I had to two deal requirements. with was to shipping the inshore available so as to balance these
11. half the Control length Ships of were was the not often beach, easy; tied the and it only to touch was their boata seldon with position Dunkirk available possible by involved at to their see that boats more a point. close being than approach In the inshore, early and v/s. days and off often the beaches these were an M.A/S.B. would have been invaluable.
To put the situation that developed into a mitshell, /at the plans made
12.

374
348
2.
at Dover envisaged far more men being embarked from the beaches than was in practice possible when the moment arrived, and I had therefore to modify them on the spot to make greater use of Dunkirk, and continually adjust the plan and the means to a changing situation.
13.
During the day of 30th May embarkation proceeded slowly - there were not enough ships off the beaches and at one moment HEEE was there alone. Men were coming off in pontoons but there was often no one to take these craft ashore again. During the day lorries were driven into the sea to form piers.
14.
There were many wounded on board HEBE, and at 4 Della I decided to send her home. Captain Bush went in her to strees the vital necessity for boats and crews if any numbers were to come off from the beaches.
15. landed at La Parme to visit the C.-in-C. It was necessary to vade the last few
Accordingly I transferred to WINDSOR off Bray at 1600, and at 1630
yards. Captain Tennant was with the C.-in-C. and the situation was discussed.
I stressed my views as to the difficulties of embarkation by boat and the necessity for moving towards Dunkirk, but I could not but be sware of a reluctance on the part of the Army to do so and & feeling that the Navy ought to be able to embark large mumbers by boat from the beaches. Arrangements to take off the
C.-in-C. at 1600 on Friday were made, and be informed no of the affort of which he had heard from the 1st Sea Lord by telephone, and which Yes to be made on
Friday night. The details of this I received next day at 1000. when Captain
Bush returned in HEBE.
16. soldiers the boat swanped in shallow water, but the second attempt with &
At my first attempt to return to WORCESTER in a pontoon paddled by smaller crew was successful and I got on board at 2200.
31st May
17. transferred At 0130 to EXPRESS on and in her proceeded to Dunkirk at daylight to direct ships
Friday, 31st May, as TORCESTER Yes full S with troops 1
to where they were most needed.
the breeze freshened and being onshore made boat work that very
18. On this day boats were breached to and stranded at high continued water so to movement was very doubtful of troops that it would be of any use except for a small period the embarkation from to Dunkirk and considered the value of beaching ships of difficult. Many the beaches came almost to a standatile. I but urge tide.
19. thereafter At 0645 so that I my movements should not be hangered by transferred to H.M.S. KEITH and kept her consideration free from troops of embarkation or wounded men.
arrived with the plana for the evacuation small for boats Priday and night.
20. At 1000 HERE the provision of larger numbers of to be
The crews essence to bring of off these the was rearguard at 0130 to minesweepers which were there about that time.
21. During the for day me to get Destroyers, Paddlera, and would other have been sent these the time of embarkation vas advanced to 2030 craft and off this made it necessary for this sany of these ships sent every into ship beaches at that time. But could have loaded quicker. As it was, I mmber of
Dunkirk itself where be they taken from the beaches more into Dunkirk than but I the liked. large which places could from which possibly boats were working looked up ahiya
22. About noon At 1430 I proceeded in KRITH to La balloon. Panne try KETTH was locate
HERE off La Panne came under fire from at ahore to battery to and moved the battery further but West. it was being directed by an observation fired on and I withdrew.
/23. A

375
349
3.
23.
A heavy gun was also shelling somewhat blindly off Bray, the shots falling outside the ships in fairly well defined areas which could be avoided.
An encounter between our own and enemy aircraft took place off
Bray 24. in which three of our own aircraft were shot down. Later air attack developed on ships and 10 raids took place but no ships were damaged.
In accordance with the plans tows of boats should have arrived off
Dunkirk 25. about 1800. Two tows of dinghies arrived at 1700 and were sent to La Panne where I also went in order to ensure the embarkation of the C.in C.
I left behind Lieutenant Commander Wynne-Biwards in an M.T.B. to direct the tows when they arrived and to order a large mmber of Hoppers and similar craft to beach themselves on the rising tide at the Western beaches. At La Panne
I found that HOLD had embarked Cy-in-C. according to plan, and I embarked the rest of the H.Q. from the beach 2 miles west in KEITH's boats. During this time KEITH and HERE were bombed and the boats were narrowly missed.
26. arrive till it was getting dark, making it very difficult to ensure their
I then returned to Dunicirk where the rest of the tows did not in M.A.S.B.6. to direct them and I took KEITH up to La Panne to shepherd finding the further beaches. Lt. Commander Tyme-Shrania was left behind
(e some of the tows in that direction. By this time the wind had drogged.
27.
About Midnight M.A/S.B.6 returned to KETTH, embarked the C.-in-C.
and took him to Dover.
28. KEITH of Parachute Mines off Bray, M.S.B's were heard to the The Eastward, town remained off La Panne during the night, during which there were reports and a few shells fell among ships off embarkation La Parme. moved probably our at cm, La Panne were heavily shelled and the embarkation
Westward in the consequence. dark as KETTH could not get close inshore, Panne but beding and beaches It was impossible to tell how the such reports vas as going came in in showed that it was slow and that beaches at La were heavily shelled.
lat June would be in occupation of La Pame in daylight the norming the
29. As the enemy to withdraw to the Westward at dam. were engity At and nen ships were ordered The beaches at La Pame noving were
Westward. moving along A all Minesweeper beaches to and a Paddler were ashore off Bray) a mmber situation was as follows. the Westward. Ships East of Bray were large of boats were floating empty and without crews.
the next few hours I sent all ships that collected vere not by full Motor or
30. During Dunkirk and tried to some of the Soats to induce a tug to boats assist and the towed Minesweeper West. ashore. I I kept BASTLISK with no and troops loading into also spent some time trying enpty of in case any covering fire was needed.
large numbers of enemy Airwaft Drive Bonbers. appeared and attacks were 31. made on About nearly 0730 all ships off the beaches by
During this period, one Destroyer of KETTH off Dunkirk and SECTRACE was hit were and eastlisk, sunk.
32. KEITH, appeared SKIPRACK, to and be dropped a tug with in threes survivors together; and fives, one of one my large staff states and the that others some
Bombs small, and three planes attacked of about 20 seconds. I have learnt this time. subsequently bombs that all had small a delay craft action and beaches were machine gunned at short of ammunition and I had intended to to transfer Dover. to
33. BASTLISK so KRITH that KRITH was could load at Dunkirk and then return
At 0745 a near miss jammed the stearing gear in KRITH and shortly
34.
/ after

376
350
4.
1/6
after she was hit in the after Bodler Room and started to settle down.
Captain Berthon then anchored her and M.T.B. 102, which had just arrived, came alongside. I embarked in her with my Staff, and after telling 2
tugs to stand by KEITH I went into Dunicirk to see General Alexander. Dive
Bombing and Maching Gun attacks were made on the N.T.B. on the way there.
35.
General Alexander was away from the H.Q., but I saw a Staff Officer and discussed the situation. At that time I gathered that the plan was to evacuate during the next night from the Western Beach only and Dunkirk.
The Rearguard were to withdraw at dawn and make their way to Dunkirk. As this meant continuing the embarkation for some hours of daylight I had grave fears of heavy losses after that morning's experience.
36.
As there was nothing more I could do at Dunicirk and all ships were returning I decided to return to Dover to make contact.
M.A/S.B. 37. 10. At Dover I was able to discuss the plans for the night
I reached Dover at 1130 in N.T.B. 102 and left again at 1730 in to operations which was invaluable, and thereafter I returned each day for this purpose.
0330 38. from the 18 miles of beach East of Dunicirit, for which large mmbers of
The plan for this night was, roughly, to embark between 2100 and small craft were to be towed out. In addition Personnel Ships were to embark from Dunkirk.
sailed early in M.A/S.B.10 and landed at Dusirink at 1900, visited
39. the S.N.O. and I the Ceneral, and gave them details of the plan. French I then learnt and to my great relief that the Rearguard were being relieved by the withdrawing during the night.
started to arrive and from then onwards I moved
40. between the At beaches 2100 ships and Dunkirk, continually senting ships which The were as loading slowly off the beaches into Dunicirk to fill - there. plan very originally made would not have made full use of Dunkink.
I went alongside the root of the East ydar in Donkirk there until to
41. off At 0200 of the Naval Ratings of the Shore Party, and There I lay was
0245 when I proceeded of the Harbour at this time and a Trawler was instead sunk. of As bring some round all ships barthed in harbour.
considerable shelling clear morning I decided to get ships away by 0300 some of the it was a very this put into effect I left for Dover: later hour.
0330, small craft and having however, seen continued their work off the beaches to &
42. Night - Sunday 2nd - Monday 3rd June.
it was understood that there was sere to 5000 embark British from still
Dunkirk ashore and over 30,000 some French local beach made any East-
At this stage French, and the plan arranged craft from the beach close ward. entirely Actually except a strong for wind and heavy shelling on the embarkation there impossible.
43. Minesweepers A very large and carrying Schoots capacity was outside. provided in Personnel in addition Ships, to Destroyers, Drifters and
Paddlers, Flotillas of boats working from Tugs time also the French had collected from a large quays up mmber the harbour. of fishing
44. vessels, Trawlers, By this and small steamers which worked bombing
I arrived at Dunkirk in M.A/S.B. 10. at 2030, after a
45.
/attack

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2/3/6
attack on the way. I then embarked General Alexander and transferred him shortly after to the first Destroyer to leave. Two motor boats with parties to assist on the pier and in the control and berthing of shipping had been sent over but these were attacked by aircraft on passage, and one with Commander Clouston was sunk. The other arrived, but had one engine cut of action and was too badly damaged to be of use. She was sent back to England.
46.
The evacuation was timed to start at 2100 and four Destroyers had got away by 2200. There was a fresh Northerly breeze and this, coupled with the flood tide, set ships off the pier and they had difficulty in berthing until the tide turned and the breeze dropped. Large mmbers of French fishing and other craft moving in and out of the harbours added to the difficulties.
2230 7. the B.E.F. were all away and at 2300 Captain Tennant and the rest of the
M.A/S.B. 10 assisted two destroyers to berth by pushing them.in. by
Naval party left in M.T.B. 102, The absence of the naval berthing parties, embarked with the last of the B.E.F., was much folt, and the French did nothing to replace them. There was then & very long pause before any French troops came down to the East pier. One ship was alongside 20 hours before she vas loaded.
TWO 8. Personnel Ships were sent in there. The second of these, the 300321, went
There were large mmbers of French troops at the Test Quar and ground when clearing and I was reluctant to risk any more. Also this ydar ras supposed to be used by French ships and some French Destroyers did & there.
OUEN refloated High tide next day and returned safely.
vailable 9. could not be filled in the time and I sent back three destroyers and
The flow of troops was so slow that it was obvious that the alige several Fleet Sweepers empty and also at least two Personnel Ships.
cme 0. down and did was not & appear in any mumbers until about half an hour before there were dam.
This disappointing night. For some reason the French did not he was that a counter-attack had to be made. At 0300 The hree reason Personnel given Ships alongside and I had to order then to leave at 0310.
lockships arrived at 0310 and I left for Dover shortly afterwants.
1ght 3/4 June.
educed by an hour, quays of the harbour. Teasels and lay two correttes
1. For this and night it was planned to use both East and West also piers off for addition loading the time available for embartation, 2230 to 0230, in YES
rom ere detailed. small boats. East For pier was to have 10 Transports, 6 Destroyers, Padilers.
0 small creft at the upper the West pier schoots, minesweepers, and s
HITSHED was to land berthing parties at 2200.
M.T.B. 102 and arrived at 2200 to find full the harbour of warming 2. with I went French over fishing in boats on their way in and the piers troops.
There was again a fresh Northerly wind WHITSHED and berthing and three conditions Personnel were Ships ary 3. difficult until the tide for turned over an at hour 2330. to get them. alongaide, No ship and succeeding finally I took in nd later SABRE were trying WHITSHED and landed available for abarkation. erthing at the It is remarkable pier that in spite of one of the berthing East party until off 2330 so that only this three only hours one was paddler was unable load from the East pier.
Owing to ships, the harbour entrance got in which the delay in berthing, the numbers of mall very craft congested and and the hat he there were handled no in these constricted waters. feared ontinual arrival of collisions fresh is usle solely to the magnificent Time and way again I
ship ships would were go ashore in some impossible position.
/55 I

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6.
55.
I had to send some ships out and delay others goding to the West pier until the entrance was cleared.
56.
The flow of troops down the East pier vas far better, but there were bad pauses. The West pier was always crowled, and as the ships detailed for this were insufficient I led in a Personnel Ship to the Test pier at 0145
and she was followed by ROYAL SOVEREIGN which did not leave till 0300.
berthing 57. party. When the latter left there were about 200 nen on the East
MALCOLM left at 0240 and EXPRESS at 0300 after embarking the pier and these were later embarked by SHIKART who was escorting the blockships.
58. had KELLET available and with her slow speed I did not feel justified in
At the West pier there were still & few hundred non, but I only taking the risk of the late departure that loading her would have involved.
59. transferred her troops, KELLET went aground and got off, and one paddler was
During the night KINGFISHER was holed by at French Trander and ce sent back unfilled.
French 60. Ships more than I have of British Ships. On all days, all however, they
In the foregoing narrative I have made no particular mention of
French any were using the West Quar and I think they did of French could and Destroyers played their part well. Latterly also, large numbers from fishing boats and small steamers took part and embarked nary nen
Dunkirk.
intermittent shall fire on Dunicink the whole East time, Pier but
61. There effectively was directed on the vital points such as the sunk in the it was never the embarkation, although one trueler was been and had no That effect so on little interference occurred must, 1 think, have due
Harbour. to the affective bombing of the batteries during the nights.
three nights at Dunkirk the handling of Transports, ships in
62. During the the most last difficult conditions vas magnificent. of small graft were the harbour under Paddlers, and all descriptions several wrecks
Destroyers, and Minesweepers, out in these confined waters, where and there that were so many non were moving in Little time was lost, the Caytains brought in inconvenient off is due places. to the coolness and supreme seamanship of of these ships.
During these operations the work of largest, all those and engaged what has has been been beyond 63. praise is from the the result smallest of the craft single-minied to the but that purpose did not and matter determination for cases, of all accomplished concerned. Few orders could be given ydok out special but everyone of those did who his came utmost. under I my had own few to bring to your notice the following Officers:-
Captain Berthon - H.M.S. KRITH
the time I was in H.H.S. sunk. NRITH Captain she VELIE Berthon subjected handled to shell and his his ship with fire great and bombing coolness During attack, and jurigment being finally and not all the calls I put upon him ship.
Ideutenant - H.H.S. KRITH.
which finally disabled KEITH this took officer drastic handled the During ship with the complete air attack coolness in a masterly my, /avoiding and ********

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7.
avoiding action at high speed in very confined waters full of shipping.
Finally when the helm jambed he continued to keep her under control.
Commodore G. 0.Stephenson
Did most valuable work off the beaches in a motor boat at
La Panne and Bray, organising and controlling small craft and the embarkation of Lord Gort. When La Fanne became untenable owing to shell fire he moved to Bray and only left the coast when driven off by the air attack of Ist June.
Lieutenant R.G.H.G.Eyre - M.A/S.B. 10
Handled his boat with the greatest coolness and skill inside
Dunkirk in crowded waters, darkness, and under shell fire. His good work greatly facilitated my task of control.
Lieutenant Commander C.J.Wynne-Sdwards
This officer assisted no throughout the operations and was invaluable. Unsparing of himself he net any call on him with the greatest efficiency. On two occasions he carried out difficult tasks with complete success, controlling small craft and directing Merchant ships to beach themselves so that they could be boarded at low tide.
Ideutenant Viscount Kelburn
Acted as my Signal Officer and carried out his duties with the greatest efficiency under most trying conditions.
I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient servent,
VICE AD MIRAL
*
DOVER
Rear Admiral.
The Vice Admiral Commanding,
Dover.

Blulo/ 388
380
354 62
H.M.S. "VERNON",
PORTSMOUTH.
11th June, 1940.
0: THE CAPTAIN,
H.M.S. "VERNON".
With reference to Confidential Portsnouth General rder 1700, I have the honour to submit the following:-
EVACUATION OF B.B.F.
During the period 0230/30 to 0115/1 Sig: 7. GILL
nd Able Seaman H. TAYLOR were outstanding amongst $ very ard-working party in embarking soldiers in boats at a Panne beach.
Throughout the period they continually went
.0 take nto the sea above their waists to get the boats through surf, the nd were ready day and night to get on with the work < Under ifter hell-fire and bombs they remained calm and cheerful, and rere ready for any job.
I have the honour to be, Sir, with
Your obedient servent, his
ADMIRAL
JUN 1940
*
OVER
V
R
is and
II.
3.
to
D: 211/24.
over.
IN VICE ADMIRAL, DOVER.
(Copy to:- The Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth).
Submitted with reference to Confidential Portmouth
4v red eneral Order 1700.
Marlon CAPITAIN.
from
ORTSMOUTH. M.S. "VERNON",
2th June, 1940.
A7,
About 280
ferried, and many more towed off in boats, all were being transferred to mineaweepers.
6. At about ke-Walker, airal C.B., OBB.E., R.N.,
DMTRALTY, S.W.1.

33% 38
H.M.S.Vernon.
355
Portsmouth.
saturday.June.1st.1940.
Sir,
I have the honour to report on the following ratings who served under my command on Thursday may. 30th on the beach at La Panne,
Belgium.
P.O.Taylor. Standard Chither
L.S. Carroll Alexanderg
Rechard A.B. Trevers. RERD. 514.
99907 Addent A.B. Forrester. 400 476
J. 102796
These men showed the greatest ability and resourcefulness under most arduous conditions. They continually up to their